The battle of October 4, 1917 is interesting in that absolutely everything was mixed in it: selfless courage and loyalty to duty, cowardice and alarmism, professionalism and slovenliness, and besides, a fair amount of black humor.
In order not to force readers to look for the previous article, we present the map of the Moonsund Archipelago once again, highlighting the battle site on it on October 4
Further. Let's just say that almost all descriptions of the battle on October 4 are either extremely compressed and do not allow us to understand how the Russian and German ships maneuvered and at whom they fired, or they are replete with terrain bindings (“when I reached Paternoster's parallel, I went to the Ost”), which without a map and the reference book cannot be understood, which the reader usually does not do. Therefore, the author took the liberty of depicting the movement of ships, superimposing them on the diagram from Kosinsky's book. Of course, these schemes are arbitrary and do not correspond to the exact maneuvering of ships, but they still give a rough idea of what is happening.
Let's take a closer look at the place where the battle took place. As we have already said, during the battle on October 4, Russian ships maneuvered in the Bolshoi Sound Strait, separating Moon Island from Werder Island and the mainland. This strait was defended by two minefields: one, placed in 1916 directly at the entrance to the Bolshoi Sound from the Gulf of Riga, and the second, installed in 1917 slightly south of the first.
But there was also a third. The fact is that the Germans, wanting to block the exit to the Gulf of Riga, placed several mine cans from an underwater minelayer (on the diagram, their approximate location is highlighted in blue; unfortunately, the author does not have an accurate map of the obstacle). In essence, they only harmed themselves by this: the Russians cleaned the fairway in this obstacle and calmly used it, while the Germans, in fact, only strengthened the Russian mine position at the Bolshoi Sound. But the Germans had a rough idea of the location of the Russian minefields.
The German commander (Vice Admiral Behnke) led his ships from the south (blue solid arrow) and did not feel the slightest desire to storm the 1917 obstacle head-on. He intended to bypass it from the west or east (blue dotted line) and withdraw his battleships to the southern edge of the minefield in 1916. From there, "König" and "Kronprinz" could fire on Russian ships up to Schildau Island (trajectory - red dotted line). By the way, the battleships "Slava" and "Citizen" (red circle) were stationed just near this island for the night.
The choice between the western and eastern passages proved to be very difficult. In the west, as mentioned above, there was a German minefield, which should now be crossed. In the east, there was less mine risk, but the movement of ships was greatly hampered by shallow areas - the banks of Afanasyev and Larin. As a result, the German vice-admiral did not choose, but decided to trawl both passes, and then how it goes.
It is interesting that the Russian patrol destroyers Deyatenyy and Delyny discovered the enemy even before dawn. Benke's ships weighed anchor at dawn and at 08.10 began moving towards the Russian minefields, but even before 08.00, that is, before the Germans went ahead, the commander of the Naval Forces of the Gulf of Riga (MSRZ) M. K. Bakhirev received a message from Deyatelny: "I see 28 smoke on SW" and shortly after that: "Hostile forces are marching to Kuivast."
In response, M. K. Bakhirev ordered the "Active" to continue monitoring and find out which ships are part of the German squadron, and immediately ordered "Citizen" and "Slava" to go to the Kuivast raid. At about 0900 hours the battleships arrived, and on the Slava they were in such a hurry to carry out the vice-admiral's order that they did not choose the anchors, but riveted the anchor chains. At the same time M. K. Bakhirev gave the command to the rest of the ships (minelayers, destroyers, transports), standing in the roadstead of Kuivast, to go north. This was absolutely the right decision, because there was no point in exposing them to the attack of the German dreadnoughts.
The question arises: why M. K. Bakhirev did not try to use the armored cruiser "Admiral Makarov", the armored cruiser "Diana" and the newest destroyers - "Noviks" in the battle against the squadron breaking through from the south? The answer lies in the fact that on the day of October 4, the sea forces of the Gulf of Riga were, in fact, two separate battles: from the very morning the enemy became more active on the Kassarsky reach. "Diana" was sent to the Moonsund Strait, "Admiral Makarov", taking water into its compartments and, following the model and likeness of "Glory" in 1915, creating a roll of 5 degrees, had to support the destroyers with fire. In no case could the enemy forces on the Kassar Reach be ignored: this not only put the land defenders of Moon Island in a dangerous position, but also gave the Germans a theoretical opportunity to cut off the way for the Russian ships to retreat, at least by throwing mines at the same Moonsund Strait.
Almost simultaneously with the approach of the Russian battleships to Kuivast, the German squadron of Vice Admiral Benke "buried" in the southwestern edge of the Russian minefield in 1917.
In other words, by 09.00 everything was ready for battle: both the Germans and the Russians concentrated their forces. The Germans began trawling the obstacle in 1917, the Russians concentrated a detachment of ships, which they gathered to confront the Germans as part of the "Slava", "Citizen", the armored cruiser "Bayan" under the flag of the ISRZ commander and the destroyers covering them.
The visibility was excellent, in general the day of October 4, 1917 was characterized as "beautiful, clear".
Period 09.00-10.05
Coming to the minefield, the Germans immediately began to sweep, their other ships stopped. In the interval 09.15-09.23 "Koenig" fired at the patrol destroyers "Deyatenyy" and "Delyny" (the direction of their movement is the red dotted arrow), having spent 14 shells for this from a distance of 86-97 cables, but did not achieve hits. For almost an hour, Behnke's minesweepers worked unsecured, and then, at 09.55, the German squadron split into two parts. Six minesweepers and nine boats-minesweepers under cover of the light cruisers Kolberg and Strasbourg (on the diagram - the western group) went through the Russian and German minefields to the Small Sound to support the breakthrough of ground forces on Moon. At the same time, the main force (the eastern group), including both German dreadnoughts, went east along the minefield in order to try to pave a road bypassing the obstacle from the east.
For the Russians, everything was much more "fun". Approximately at 09.12 the enemy was noticed and identified (most likely from Deyateny and Deleny, since at that moment only they could see the enemy well). In his "Report" M. K. Bakhirev indicated the following composition of forces:
"At sea … two battleships of the Koenig class were visible, several cruisers, among them one of the Roon class, destroyers and two large transports, probably seaplane mothers … Further more smoke was visible."
As we know, the German forces consisted of only two dreadnoughts and two light cruisers, but when identifying a group of ships from a long distance, such errors are more than forgivable, especially since the main enemy (dreadnoughts) was identified correctly.
On the "Citizen", "Slava" and "Bayan" they announced a military alert and raised their top flags. But at that moment the Germans launched a bombardment of the Moona artillery batteries. This is how M. K. Bakhirev:
“At 0930 hours there was a raid on the Kuivast raid of four large enemy seaplanes, which dropped bombs mainly on the pier and the Moonskie batteries. The explosions of the bombs were very large, gave a lot of black smoke and apparently had great destructive power."
Here you should pay attention to the time difference between German and domestic sources. In continuation of the quoted passage by M. K. Bakhirev writes:
"At the same time, the enemy, marching into the W-th passage, opened fire on our patrol destroyers."
It turns out that the Germans opened fire after 09.30. While, according to German data, the shelling was carried out at 09.12-09.23. In general, we can only say for sure that first our ships detected the enemy and prepared for battle, and then German seaplanes appeared. Despite the presence of anti-aircraft guns on our ships, the seaplanes did not fire at them, because these guns did not have their own crews, they were equipped with other naval guns and it was decided not to distract them for "trifles".
Then M. K. Bakhirev gave the order to advance to a combat position. And what happened next evokes admiration, shame and laughter at the same time. S. N. Timirev, the commander of the cruiser "Bayan", describes what happened:
“Simultaneously with the signal“Bayan”weighed the anchor and raised the balls to“stop”. According to the plan drawn up in advance, it was assumed that at the signal "beeches", "Glory" and "Citizen" were going at full speed to the position; "Bayan", following them, had to fit a little behind, at a distance of 1.5 kb from the position. It should be noted that the role of "Bayan" was purely moral, because the range of its guns was 10-12 kb less than on battleships. Several agonizing minutes passed after the signal went off: "Slava" and "Citizen" raised anchors, lowered the balls to the "middle speed", but … did not move: not the slightest breaker was noticeable under their noses. Is it a "moral element" again? Awful moment! And the enemy kept approaching, and from minute to minute one could expect that he would open fire from his 12-inch towers; it was clear to us that then no forces would be able to pull the ships into position. Bakhirev came up to me and muttered through clenched teeth: “They don't want to go! What should we do?". It occurred to me that if we go ahead, the ships will follow us: partly because of the habit of "following the admiral's movement", and partly out of a sense of shame that they are "led" by the weakest ship. And so they did. We lowered the balls and went full speed, turning to position. The trick succeeded: the big ships also lowered the balloons and seethed under their noses. Bakhirev and I felt relieved from the heart …"
What is a Koenig-class dreadnought?
It is a naval fortress, armed with ten magnificent 305mm Krupp cannons that only our newest 305mm Tserel battery cannons could compete with. Developed in the 19th century, the 305-mm cannons of the "Citizen" and "Glory" were much weaker. At the same time, "Koenig" is excellently protected: it is capable of destroying any battleships in the world, while remaining invulnerable to their shells. Perhaps four battleships in their combat power could be equal to one dreadnought of this type. Perhaps the four Bayan-class cruisers had some chance of success, fighting one battleship. But what should the officers of the Bayan feel when they went towards the two dreadnoughts of the Koenig type? Recall that the British Admiral Trubridge, having four armored cruisers, each of which was larger and stronger than the Bayan, did not dare to block the path of the only battle cruiser Goeben, and Goeben was weaker than the Koenig.
And all right, the risk was only in the danger of being substituted under the 305-mm cannon of the Germans. But neither S. N. Timirev, nor M. K. Bakhirev could not be sure of the crew of their cruiser: what could the "activists" of the ship committee have incited when the risk of the planned enterprise became clear to them? Nevertheless, the officers remained in their places and performed their duty.
The movement of "Bayan", obviously, shamed the teams of "Glory" and "Citizen" and they seemed to go to the position. Why "like"? Let's remember what S. N. Timirev:
“At the signal from the buki,“Slava”and“Citizen”are in full swing to the position; "Bayan", following them, had to fit a little behind, at a distance of 1.5 kb from the position."
That is, after taking up the position, the battleships had to be between the "Bayan" and the German ships. What actually happened?
"Bayan" went to the position that should have been at the booms (highlighted in bold on the diagram), but before reaching it, turned left (green arrow) and let the battleships go ahead. It was assumed that "Glory" and "Citizen" will take the battle, turning stern to the enemy. The fact is that it was practically impossible to maneuver in the “open spaces” of the Bolshoi Sound, and if the ship, being under enemy fire or receiving damage, would begin to turn, it risked ending up on the shallows. Therefore, it was better to immediately turn around so that, if necessary, there was a possibility of retreat. In this case, the "Slava" should have been located further, and the "Citizen", due to the fact that its guns were less long-range - closer to the enemy.
The battleships and turned around. But so that after their turn (red arrow), instead of standing in front of the "Bayan" at the booms, they turned out to be much to the north, which is why the flagship M. K. Bakhireva turned out to be the closest ship to the Germans!
It is interesting that this moment is not advertised anywhere at all. M. K. Bakhirev noted only:
"Since the ships were stretched along the S – N line (that is, from south to north. - Author's note), at 10 o'clock I ordered them to stay closer to the admiral."
Mikhail Koronatovich did not dramatize the actions of his ships. Suffice it to say that he did not mention at all about the delay of "Citizen" and "Slava" and their unwillingness to go to the position.
At 09.50 a.m. battery opened fire, firing at minesweepers that bypassed the 1917 minefield from the west, but quickly fell silent, most likely due to undershoots, because the distance to the enemy was still too far. By about 10.00, the ships took up positions, and the battleships began to turn, bringing the enemy to a course angle of 135 degrees on the left side. At 10.05 a.m. "Citizen" opened fire, but its shells fell in large undershoots, and the fire was stopped. Half a minute later, Slava entered the battle, firing at the minesweepers of the western group (red dotted arrows on the diagram).
Period 10.05-11.10
So, the Russian battleships struck at the minesweepers that were breaking through in the direction of the Small Sound, but only "Slava" "reached" them. The distance was 112, 5 cables. It is interesting that the "Slava" was armed with the very "9-foot" rangefinders, the low quality of which, according to some researchers, sharply reduced the accuracy of the British battlecruisers in the Battle of Jutland. But on the "Slava" they proved to be very successful: the first salvo of the battleship gave a flight, the second - undershot, and the third - covering, after which the German minesweepers set up a smoke screen.
The light cruisers of the group breaking through from the west, of course, could not compete with the guns of the Russian battleship, so Benke's dreadnoughts tried to support their own with fire. At 10.15 "Koenig" fired at the cruiser "Bayan", and the "Kronprinz" fired five five-gun salvoes at the "Citizen". But the distance to the "Citizen" was too great, and the "Kronprinz" stopped firing, and the "Bayan", apparently within range of the "Koenig" (the first salvo landed very close to the stern of the cruiser), withdrew to the east and also ended up outside the range of the German heavy guns.
Up to this point, the descriptions of the battle do not contain anything contradictory, but then certain difficulties begin. It is very likely that this was the case.
The minesweepers of the detachment that had come under fire were in two groups. The 8th semi-flotilla is ahead, the 3rd division is behind. Most likely, "Slava" fired at the 8th semi-flotilla at the head and forced it to hide behind a smokescreen, during which time the 3rd division came closer, and "Citizen" opened fire on it, as a result of which these minesweepers were also forced to retreat … Both Kosinsky and Vinogradov claim that at the same time the "Citizen" tried to fire at the eastern group of minesweepers with 152-mm guns, but it should be noted that these minesweepers were too far away to be fired at with such cannons. Perhaps they just fired a couple of volleys to excuse them? Unfortunately, the author is not aware of this.
The Russian battleships fought, remaining motionless, although they did not anchor: they held in one place, earning money with machines. At 10.30 M. K. Bakhirev ordered to fire "at the nearest enemy."
At about 10.50, the smoke screen set by the western group finally cleared away. It turned out that the previously retreated minesweepers regrouped and began trawling again, and now they were much closer than before. "Slava" opened fire on them from 98, 25 kbt. She was immediately supported by "Citizen" and "Bayan", as well as the battery of Moona. It was at this moment, according to Russian observers, that one enemy minesweeper was sunk and the second damaged, but German reports do not confirm this. Nevertheless, the minesweepers for the second time were forced to hide behind a smoke screen and retreat. Judging by the fact that the minimum distance between the "Slava" and the minesweepers was 96 cables, it can be assumed that the German "trawl caravan" failed to pass half a mile under concentrated Russian fire. Then the Russian ships transferred fire to the cruisers and destroyers following the minesweepers, and also forced them to retreat.
The breakthrough of the Kohlberg and Strasbourg in the direction of the Small Sound was thwarted. Official German history says the following about this:
"Thus, the attempt to break through the obstacles … and the mines delivered by German submarines failed, it had to be completely abandoned."
But the further description baffles the author. The fact is that after the appearance of the minesweepers of the western group at 10.50, the Slava distributed fire. The bow turret fired at the minesweepers, while the stern turret began to fire at the König and Kronprinz. Moreover, according to German official history:
“The Russian battleships transferred their fire to the 3rd squadron (on the dreadnoughts. - Author's note) and very quickly took aim at it. They kept very skillfully on the border of the range of fire of our heavy ship artillery (20.4 km 115 kbt). The position of the squadron was extremely unfortunate: it could neither approach the enemy, nor, while standing still, evade his fire."
How could this be?
Kosinsky and Vinogradov write that during this period of the battle the German battleships could not "reach" the Russian ships: their volleys, although they landed next to the "Bayan" and "Citizen", but still with shortages. The result is a physically impossible construction:
1. The firing range of "Slava" was 115 kbt.
2. The firing range of "Koenig" and "Kronprinz" was the same 115 kbt.
3. "Citizen" was between the "Slava" and the German battleships.
4. "König" and "Kronprinz" could not send their shells to the "Citizen".
5. But "Slava", it turns out, easily covered the German dreadnoughts ?!
And then one of two things. Or, nevertheless, the real firing range of the German dreadnoughts was somewhat less than 115 cables, which would be extremely strange. Or else we will have to admit that the two German dreadnoughts fled as soon as they opened fire, despite the fact that the volleys fell down pretty short!
Although we cannot reliably determine the reasons for the retreat, there are two absolutely reliable facts. "To prevent the Russians from gaining easy success":
1. Vice Admiral Behnke ordered his dreadnoughts to retreat.
2. They were forced to do this by the shooting of only one, aft, tower of the battleship "Slava".
At 11.10 the battle ended, the Germans retreated to regroup, and the battle was over. Their attempt to pass to the west of the 1917 barrier turned out to be a complete failure.
At 11.20 on the halyards of "Bayan" the signal went up: "The admiral expresses his pleasure for excellent shooting." In the opinion of the author of this article, it is absolutely deserved.
German minesweepers twice, and cruisers and destroyers once came under fire from Russian ships, and in all cases were forced to immediately set up smoke screens or retreat, and in fact the shooting was carried out at the maximum distances for Russian guns of 96-112 cable. At the same time, one should not at all think that the Slava's artillerymen bombarded the enemy with shells. We reliably know the consumption of shells, the bow tower of "Glory" before its failure (which happened at the very end of the first phase of the battle): the right gun managed to use up four shells, the left - seven. Thus, it can be assumed that the aft turret fired hardly more than 8-9 rounds per gun, and in total in the first phase of the battle, the battleship consumed about 29 rounds. And these shells were fired at at least four different targets (two groups of minesweepers, destroyers, battleships). This indicates that the German ships were forced to either set up smoke screens, or flee literally after the first or second salvo of "Glory"! And this is at a distance of 96-115 cables! And this is when firing long-range projectiles with increased dispersion!
In the first phase of the battle, the Russians achieved success, but the Germans, having retreated by 160 cables, were preparing for a second attempt.
