Having studied the battles of the battleship "Slava" in Moonsund, we can draw some conclusions about the battle at the mine-artillery position as a way of conducting combat operations of the weakest fleet against the strongest.
Undoubtedly, undefended minefields seriously impede the enemy's actions, but they cannot stop them on their own. Even very dense minefields, such as those exhibited in the Irbensky Strait as of 1917, were nevertheless passed by German minesweepers, although this took several days.
In no case have light forces, such as gunboats, destroyers and submarines, been able to play any significant role in the defense of mine and artillery positions. Their role was limited to patrols and reconnaissance, but in no case could they prevent the trawling on their own.
Here, however, a significant reservation should be made. Mikhail Koronatovich Bakhirev believed that the mine position in the Irbensky Strait was set very badly:
In the Irbensky Strait itself, a minefield had long been established and maintained, which by no means could be considered a mine position:
1) the southern coast of the strait belonged to the enemy and was heavily fortified;
2) the large area of the field made it possible for the enemy to carry out sweeping work all the time, and we could not catch the moment when he really intended to force the passage; besides, thanks to this field, we were deprived of the possibility of constant observation of enemy minesweepers;
3) the enemy could carry out these sweeping works completely without the support of his fleet;
4) during a breakthrough, thanks to the arrangement of our position, the enemy was always guaranteed against our attacks by destroyers and submarines, since it was protected by our barriers, placed parallel to the coast (this was, in my opinion, a huge mistake);
5) the enemy had the opportunity to make a swept fairway along its very coast and monitor its good condition;
6) we did not have the opportunity to send our destroyers and submarines to W, into the sea, unexpectedly for the enemy, from the Gulf of Riga and, therefore, 7) this field deprived us of the opportunity to conduct exploration in the Baltic Sea from the Gulf of Riga.
It is possible that if the mine position corresponded to the wishes of M. K. Bakhirev, light forces could be used with greater efficiency. However, there are certain doubts about this.
Of course, if the minefields were placed perpendicular to the coast (across the strait), then there would be mine-free spaces between them, which the defenders would know about, but the attackers would not. In this case, it would be possible to conduct a group of destroyers under the coast, and then launch an attack, moving outside the minefields. But the German minesweepers operated under the protection of larger ships, such as light cruisers, battleships and dreadnoughts, which, with intense fire, were quite capable of making such an attack impossible. "Slava" twice (August 3, 1915 and October 4, 1917) drove away enemy destroyers from the maximum firing range. There is no doubt that two battleships or dreadnoughts, supported by two light cruisers (namely, such a detachment was usually assigned to direct cover for a trawling caravan) would have coped with such a task much faster and more efficiently.
As for submarines, it would seem that for them the crossing of minefields by the enemy is almost ideal conditions for an attack. The main problem of the submarine is that it is not able to approach an enemy warship on the surface (drown), and under water the submarine has too low a speed for this. Therefore, by and large, a submarine can attack a warship if, by chance, it passes within the reach of its torpedo weapon. But breaking through minefields presents the boat with additional opportunities.
Firstly, a significant part of the enemy detachment is usually in front of minefields, waiting for the moment when the fairway will be swept. Accordingly, the submarine has enough time to get close to the enemy and attack him. If the submarine is behind the minefields, then it has the opportunity to choose a suitable position, because the enemy does not know where the minefield ends and whether a new one will begin, which is why it is forced to be careful and move at low speed behind the sweeping caravan even where the mines are already no.
Nevertheless, the only successful case of using submarines was the attack on the German base of the Indianola minesweepers, as a result of which the latter was damaged and was forced to refuse to participate in the battle on October 4, 1917. And this despite the fact that they took part in the defense of Moonsund very experienced British crews using boats that were very perfect for that time. To a certain extent, such a disappointing result was a consequence of the fact that the Germans attracted a sufficient number of destroyers to guard their larger ships. But on other occasions, the submarines failed. So, in 1915 the command of the fleet sent E-1, E-9, "Bars" and "Gepard" to the Irbensky Strait. On the morning of August 10, two armored cruisers (Roon and Prince Henry), accompanied by two light cruisers, approached the Irbene Strait. In a short battle, they drove off the Russian destroyers, and began shelling Cape Tserel. In total, the German cruisers fired for 40 minutes, during which time the E-1 and Gepard tried three times to attack the German cruisers. Alas, to no avail.
It can be assumed that light forces are able to play a certain role in the defense of mine and artillery positions, but they cannot defend them on their own.
As for the coastal artillery, it hardly showed itself in the battles of Moonsund: on October 4, the batteries of Moona and Werder were very quickly suppressed by the Germans. There is a reasonable assumption that the most powerful battery of 254-mm guns was forced to cease fire for technical reasons.
The only more or less "bright spot" was the short duel of the battleships "Friedrich der Grosse" and "König Albert" with the "Tserel battery", which consisted of four modern 305-mm guns. Despite the fact that one gun (and one more episodically) fought against two German dreadnoughts, the Germans could not suppress it and were forced to retreat without causing any damage to the Russians.
As the experience of numerous battles "sea against the shore" teaches, coastal artillery is quite capable of resisting shipborne artillery. A good example of this is the defense of the Dardanelles by the Turks against attacks from the allied Anglo-French fleet. Despite the fact that the Turkish coastal defense artillery was inferior to the allies both quantitatively and qualitatively, the mine and artillery positions of the Turks lived up to their expectations.
The fact that Russian batteries played almost no role in the defense of Moonsund in 1917 speaks not of the weakness of the coastal artillery, but only of the propaganda of the troops, who have completely lost their fortitude and any desire to fight. On the whole, it should be considered that mine and artillery positions protected by modern coastal artillery are capable of stopping the enemy's many times superior naval forces. But coastal artillery has two major drawbacks that must be taken into account.
The first of them is a very high cost with any lack of mobility, as a result of which coastal artillery could only be used to cover the most important, point targets. At the same time, if the enemy storms one of them, at all other points this artillery will be useless and will be idle.
The second is vulnerability from the shore. So, for example, the "Tserel battery" in the presence of decisive commanders and calculations was almost invulnerable from the sea. But no one could prevent the Germans from landing in another place on the island of Ezel (which, in fact, they did in 1917) and seize the indicated battery from land. But in order to reliably cover all landing areas, there were no longer enough heavy guns. If we return to the operation in the Dardanelles, we will see that despite the very numerous artillery (both stationary coastal defense and field), the Turks were still unable to prevent the landing of the landing forces. True, their very selfless defense did not allow the landing forces to fulfill their assigned tasks, and as a result, the latter were evacuated.
Of course, you can build a whole system of coastal batteries and cover them with bastions from land, creating a first-class fortress capable of defending against sea and land opponents with equal efficiency. But the cost of such structures is extremely high. For example, the cost of the Revel-Porkalaud position, covering the entrance to the Gulf of Finland and being part of the fortress of Peter the Great, was estimated at 55 million rubles. Almost the full price of two Sevastopol-class battleships! It should be borne in mind that:
1) the above 55 million included only coastal structures, without creating defensive positions against the land enemy;
2) the Revel-Porkalaud position itself did not guarantee the protection of the Gulf of Finland from invasion and could only protect it in cooperation with a strong Baltic fleet.
In general, mine and artillery barriers protected by coastal artillery can be considered a very effective form of defense against a superior fleet, but such a defense is not self-sufficient and cannot guarantee the protection of the coast as a whole. Coastal artillery can cover only some of its most important points and needs other, complementary means of naval warfare.
Consider now the heavy artillery ships. As the experience of Moonsund has shown, a mine and artillery position gives significant advantages to the ships defending it and allows them to resist a much stronger enemy. Of course, it can be argued that in both cases, carrying out operations in 1915 and in 1917, the Germans achieved their goals, and the naval defense forces of the Gulf of Riga were unable to prevent a rush into the Gulf of Riga, and in 1917 they lost the battle at the Great Sound.
But … If "Slava" alone on the high seas would have fought with the 4th squadron of the Hochseeflotte, which included seven battleships of the "Alsace" and "Braunschweig" class, then the Russian battleship could hardly hold out for at least an hour. But defending the mine and artillery position, "Slava" not only did not die, but also forced the Germans to interrupt the operation and retreat. The gunners of the Nassau and Posen at sea would have shot Slava in half an hour, but at the mine-artillery position, Slava held them back for 24 hours, and only on the second day of the operation did the German dreadnoughts manage to break into the Gulf of Riga. Even "Koenig" and "Kaiser" failed to destroy the ships of M. K. Bakhirev on the first try, although, if the "Glory" and "Citizen" happened to fight the battleships of Benke on the high seas …
The battle of heavy artillery ships in a mine-artillery position was characterized by the following features:
No matter how superior forces the enemy had, he used only a small part of them to cover the mine caravan. So, in no case did the Germans attract more than two heavy ships: on July 26, 1915, they were Alsace and Braunschweig, on August 3-4 of the same year, Nassau and Posen, and in October 1917, - "König" and "Kronprinz". Usually, in addition to battleships, the enemy included two light cruisers in the covering detachment of the trawling caravan.
In the opinion of the author of this article, "Slava" was a more perfect ship than the battleship of the "Braunschweig" type. It is likely that the Germans thought differently, believing that the ships of these types are equal in their combat qualities. But on July 26, they put two ships against one "Slava" and did not succeed. It would seem that it would be easier to add one or two more battleships, providing an advantage of one to four, but this was not done. Instead, the Nassau and Posen were sent into battle.
But the German plan of operation was built in the hope of luring four battleships of the "Sevastopol" class from the Gulf of Finland to help their own in order to destroy them in a general battle. Of course, the Russian dreadnoughts sat too deep to pass the Moonsund Strait into the Gulf of Riga. In order to throw the Sevastopoli into battle, they had to be taken out through the throat of the Gulf of Finland into the open sea. And the 4th squadron of the hochseeflotte looked like an ideal bait for this: albeit numerous, but old ships gave a strong temptation to the Russian command to crush the forces storming the Irbensky Strait with one blow. Another question is that on the road to Irbens, eight dreadnoughts and three hochseeflotte battle cruisers were waiting for the four Russian battleships, but it was assumed that the Russians did not know about this.
The Russians, having received the codes of the German fleet from the wrecked cruiser Magdeburg, knew about this intention of the Germans, but the German commander, of course, could not have imagined this. Accordingly, he should have hidden the presence of his dreadnoughts in the Baltic, presenting the matter as if the Germans had nothing more serious at Moonsund than the old battleships. And yet, to continue the operation, he sends Irben "Nassau" and "Posen" to break through. Why?
We can assume the following.
First, it is likely that the trawling caravan had a limitation on the width of the trawling lane. This, in general, is understandable: the narrower the fairway, the easier it is to sweep, the less chance for a minesweeper to be blown up by a mine, and if there are an abundance of minesweepers, then it is probably better to play it safe by sending them to several echelons in order to maximally exclude missed mines. Despite the involvement of significant minesweeping forces (39 minesweepers on July 26, 1915), only two battleships were assigned to cover the trawling caravan. In the second phase of the battle on October 4, the German dreadnoughts followed 19 minesweepers, but the Kronprinz nevertheless followed the Koenig, albeit slightly to the left of its course, that is, the width of their formation was probably less than if they were walked in parallel wake columns.
Secondly, the speed of the trawl caravan is very limited. Of course, in the descriptions of the performance characteristics of the German minesweepers of that period, we can see the speed of movement with a trawl even 15 knots, but it is obvious that in practice nothing like this happened. In order to pass the Irbensky Strait, it was necessary to trawl no more than 45 miles, however, on July 26, the German minesweepers, having started their work, at 03.50, even at 13.00, were extremely far from its completion.
Obviously, heavy ships breaking through a mine and artillery position are severely limited in maneuver and speed. Unlike the attackers, the defenders do not have such restrictions, which was demonstrated by "Slava" in the battles of 1915. The ship moved along the edge of the minefield, first from north to south, and then in the opposite direction, and when it came under fire from enemy battleships, it always had the ability to retreat to the east, go beyond the range of German heavy artillery and then start over.
At the same time, the main target for the artillery of the defenders is not the escort warships, but the minesweepers, the disruption of which prevents a breakthrough. And the covering forces follow the trawl caravan and at some distance from the latter - at least in order to have time to stop if the trawler in front is blown up by a mine. It obviously follows from this that the distance between the defending battleship and the minesweepers will always be less than the distance separating the defending battleship from the heavy covering ships.
Nothing prevents the defenders from firing at minesweepers from a distance close to the maximum firing range. In this case, with a sufficient density of fire and a high-quality fire control system, it is quite possible to provide cover for minesweepers. At Moonsund Slava succeeded, although the battleship could not provide the first and did not have the second. As the practice of battles has shown, regular coverings of a trawl caravan are quite enough to force it to stop working and retreat, even in the absence of direct hits on minesweepers.
It is extremely difficult for the covering forces of the trawling caravan to counter such tactics. With an equal firing range of guns, ships following the minesweepers may not be able to fire at the enemy at all, or there is much less time left, because the defenders will only occasionally enter the range of the attacking artillery. But even in the latter case, the battleships defending the mine-artillery position will be located at the sharp bow corners of those breaking through, which will not allow the attackers to use all the heavy artillery in battle. At the same time, the defenders are able to fight with their entire side. In addition, the slowly "creeping" forward minesweepers are a much easier target for sighting than a battleship maneuvering at 14 knots or more.
If all of the above is true, then it turns out that neither three, nor even four battleships of the Wittelsbach and Braunschweig class were not enough to ensure unconditional superiority over a single "Slava" while she was defending a mine and artillery position. This is what forced the German commander of the operation to unmask the presence of the dreadnoughts and send Nassau and Posen into battle. And they eventually fulfilled their task, but the Germans succeeded in breaking through only after they introduced two dreadnoughts into battle against one battleship of the squadron! In fact, we are talking about the confrontation between ships that differ by two generations: between the "dotsushima" battleships and dreadnoughts were the so-called "pre-dreadnoughts", significantly superior in firepower to the battleships of the previous types.
In the Russian imperial fleet, such ships were "Andrew the First-Called" and "Emperor Paul I", and I must say that if on August 3 and 4, 1915 the Irbensky Strait were defended not by "Slava", but by one of these ships, then it is not known how the matter would have turned out. The main problem of "Glory" in the battle on August 3 was the short range of the main battery, which the commander and crew had to replenish with artificial bank and tactical maneuvering, but which, of course, could not be fully compensated by either one or the other. But "Andrew the First-Called", having 305-mm turret mounts with an elevation angle of 35 degrees, could fire 12-inch shells at 110 kbt, and 203-mm - at 95 kbt. That is, being at the limit of the range of the German 280-mm guns, which from such a distance could hardly inflict fatal damage to our battleship, he could simultaneously fire one of the dreadnoughts from 305-mm guns, and a trawl caravan with 203-mm guns, and completely it is not known how the Germans would have liked it. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the "Andrew the First-Called" and "Emperor Paul I" were equipped with a fire control system developed by Geisler, arr 1910, and they, perhaps, had a better fire control system than was on the "Slava".
Also, the author would venture to assert that if the Irbensky Strait in 1915 had been defended not by the Slava, but by one of the battleships of the Sevastopol project, the Germans would have had to retire without salt. Because the Russian dreadnought, with its almost twenty-foot rangefinders (and not "9-foot", as on "Slava"), a dozen rapid-fire main battery guns, a firing range of heavy 470, 9-kg shells in 132 cables, which was two miles higher than the capabilities of the Nassau-class battleships' cannons, as well as the armor that was almost invulnerable at such distances, would have presented a completely insoluble problem for the Germans.
Unfortunately, the Russian command did not take the risk of losing at least one dreadnought and did not send a Sevastopol-class ship to Moonsund. The reason is clear: in 1915, no battleship at all could pass the Moonsund Canal directly from the Gulf of Riga to the Gulf of Finland, so a ship of this class that left for Moonsund had to win or die. So they sent the least valuable combat unit (they chose between "Glory" and "Tsarevich"). As for 1917, despite the bottom-dredging works in the Moonsund Strait, neither the First-Called, nor the Sevastopoli could pass through it. So, only the Tsarevich with the Slava had the opportunity to retreat in the event of a failure in the defense of Moonsund, and, again, the most experienced and "sniffed of gunpowder" crew was on the Slava.
In this regard, one can only regret that when choosing the main base of the imperial Baltic fleet, they stopped at Reval (present-day Tallinn). As an alternative, it was proposed to equip such a base in Moonsund, and for this to deepen the Moonsund Canal so that ships of all classes of the domestic fleet could pass through it. If the option with the fleet base in Moonsund had been adopted, then there is no doubt that in 1915 an attempt to break into the Gulf of Riga would have run into trouble with the twelve-inch guns of the newest Russian dreadnoughts - with a very sad result for the Kaiserlichmarin.
The main reason why the Germans succeeded in breaking through to the Gulf of Riga in 1915 and the success in Operation Albion in 1917 was not at all in the viciousness of the idea of an artillery mine position as such, but in the overwhelming quantitative and qualitative superiority of the German materiel. The Germans were superior to "Slava" in absolutely everything: the number of artillery barrels of the main caliber, firing range, rangefinders, control systems, etc. and this superiority ultimately nullified the advantages of the Russian position. In 1917, the problems of hydrography were added to this superiority. The battleships M. K. Bakhireva were extremely constrained by the fairway of the Bolshoi Sound and practically could not maneuver, turning into floating batteries.
From all of the above, the following conclusion can be drawn: the mine and artillery position as a form of coastal defense in the First World War fully confirmed its viability as a means of allowing the weakest fleet to defend against the attacks of the strongest. But only taking into account one, its most important feature: the mine-artillery position compensated only for the quantitative, but not the qualitative, weakness of the defending forces.
In other words, in order to successfully defend a mine-artillery position from attacks by squadron battleships, equivalent squadron battleships were required, albeit in smaller numbers. In order to withstand the attack of the dreadnoughts, dreadnoughts were needed. It was impossible to defend the mine-artillery position with weaker types (and even more so - classes) of ships.
Based on the results of the battles in Moonsund, it is quite possible to assume that the four Russian "Sevastopol", relying on the coastal artillery of the Revel-Porkalaud position, was really capable of repelling the attack of at least a dozen Hochseeflotte dreadnoughts (at least until the appearance of the Kaiserlichmarin superdreadnoughts and "Bayerlichmarine" Baden "with their 380-mm main caliber) and do not miss the German ships deep into the Gulf of Finland. But neither four, nor eight, nor twelve battleships of the Slava class, no number of monitors, coastal defense battleships, and so on could have done this.
It is known that the tsarist program for the construction of dreadnoughts in the Baltic is now periodically criticized. At the same time, its main theses are that, since we still could not achieve equality with the German High Seas Fleet, there was no point in starting that our dreadnoughts were still doomed to defend their bases with the beginning of the war, which means there was no need spend large amounts of money on their creation.
But in fact, only the presence of dreadnoughts as part of the imperial Baltic fleet guaranteed the inviolability of the Gulf of Finland, and if the command dared to send a ship of this class to Moonsund, then perhaps the Riga one.
Concluding the series of articles about the battles of "Glory" and the defense of the Moonsund archipelago, I would like to note the following. In the eyes of modern researchers, the reputation of Admiral M. K. Bakhirev found himself heavily tarnished by the results of his unsuccessful battle at Gotland, in which, despite the general superiority in forces, the Russian fleet achieved more than modest successes. As a result, the characteristic of an indecisive and dependent naval commander stuck to the admiral.
But in the conditions of 1917, after the February revolution and the March massacre of naval officers that followed, which began with the fact that the sailors raised the lieutenant of watch V. G. Bubnov, who refused to change the Andreevsky flag to the revolutionary red one (the battleship "Andrew the First-Called"), Mikhail Koronatovich showed himself to be a desperately brave and skillful commander.
The very fact that he remained at his post, when confusion, vacillation and unwillingness to fight spread in the army and navy, when disobedience to officers became the norm, and not an exception to the rule, when the activities of commanders were placed under the control of ship committees, when officers were already could not know what to fear more: the superior forces of the German fleet or a traitorous bullet in the back from the “comrades” unwilling to carry out the combat order, says a lot.
Dry lines of the report of M. K. Bakhireva on the defense of Moonsund on September 29 - October 7, 1917 cannot convey the entire tragedy of the situation in which the Russian naval officers found themselves, who risked staying on duty and fulfilling their duty:
“The command, under the influence of agitation, did not trust the officers; with constant proximity to the enemy, the result was excessive nervousness, turning into confusion in dangerous moments, and even turning into panic in difficult moments."
"Discipline, one might say, was absent, and in the teams there was a consciousness of complete irresponsibility and confidence that they could do everything with their bosses."
"The orders of the chiefs were discussed by committees, or even general meetings of the team, and were often not executed."
“The commander of Glory, Captain 1st Rank Antonov, shortly before the battle reported to me that he was not at all confident in his team and that during any operation there could be a case that the team would decide not to go to the designated place and in case of failure to fulfill its desire will bandage him and the officers."
In light of the above, it is not so easy to accuse Rear Admirals Sveshnikov and Vladislavlev (commandant of the Moonsund fortified area and the chief of staff of a submarine division) of cowardice when, on the eve of battles, they voluntarily abandoned their posts. But Mikhail Koronatovich tried to find some bright sides in the current situation:
“Despite all this, I was sure and now it seems to me that I was right then that good half the ship crews, who had been in the Gulf of Riga since early spring, sincerely wished to repulse the enemy and defend the gulf from the capture of the enemy."
FULL half!
M. K. Bakhirev correctly saw the danger of the landing on Dago and Ezel and demanded the deployment of additional artillery to protect them. But the headquarters of the fleet did not believe in such a possibility and did not find weapons for the admiral.
The Germans launched an invasion and the admiral's suspicions were "brilliantly" confirmed. The forces entrusted to his command are under strong pressure: the enemy attacked the islands, the Irbensky Strait, and Soelozund. Everything around is crumbling like a house of cards: the garrisons are running without fighting, the minelayer cannot be persuaded to throw mines, the basis of the Irben's defense, the Tserel battery treacherously surrenders … And in such a situation M. K. Bakhirev manages to bring the ships entrusted to him into battle with the enemy many times superior to him. The admiral fought the battle at the Great Sound, counting on a scanty chance to hold the position and save the defense of the Moonsund archipelago. In battle, he acted flawlessly, not allowing any tactical error, but the obviously superior forces of the Germans, taking into account the fact that they had maps of Russian minefields, did not leave Mikhail Koronatovich a single chance.
M. K.'s actions Bakhirev in Moonsund should be recognized as skillful and heroic, and taking into account the crews on his ships - doubly heroic. Of course, the "grateful" country "in full" rewarded him for his valor on the battlefield.
Already on January 2, 1918, the admiral was dismissed without the right to receive a pension, and in August of the same year he was arrested and released only in March 1919. But he did not flee the country, but became an employee of the operational department of the Marine Historical Commission (Moriscom). In November 1919, Mikhail Koronatovich was arrested again, on charges of aiding Yudenich's rebellion. On January 16, 1920, the admiral, who had fought so bravely against the superior forces of the German fleet, was shot.
