It is known that there are two polar points of view on the actions of the battleship (squadron battleship) "Slava" during the battles in Moonsund during the First World War. Many sources call the battle path of this battleship heroic. However, there is another opinion “on the Internet” - that the battleship was used ineffectively, moreover, during the entire period of the battles it did not hit anyone, and therefore did nothing heroic.
In addition, the actions of the battleship "Slava" periodically fall into the focus of discussions of a different kind. For a long time, supporters and opponents of the "big fleet" have been breaking their spears on the topic of what would be more effective for the Russian Empire - the creation of line squadrons capable of crushing the enemy in a general battle, or the construction of relatively small battleships or monitors intended for defense on mine and artillery positions.
In the cycle of articles offered to your attention, we will try to figure out how the battleship "Slava" showed itself in battles with the Kaiser's fleet and how justified such a form of naval combat as the defense of a mine-artillery position is.
The Russian battleship met four times the superior forces of the Germans at mine and artillery positions: three times in 1915 and once in 1917, and the last meeting was fatal for "Slava". Let's consider these "meetings" in more detail.
In 1915, the Admiral Staff concentrated huge forces in the Baltic Sea: 8 dreadnoughts and 7 old battleships, 3 battle cruisers and 2 armored cruisers, 7 light cruisers, 54 destroyers and destroyers, 3 submarines, 34 minesweepers, a minelayer and auxiliary ships. With these forces, the Germans were going to carry out a large-scale operation in the area of the Moonsund archipelago, defended by the Russians.
The operation had three goals:
1) Support for German troops advancing in the direction of Riga. To this end, the fleet had to cross the Irbensky Strait and invade the Gulf of Riga, from where German ships could support the coastal flank of the advancing army.
2) Prevent the Russian fleet from supporting its army. To do this, it was supposed to destroy the Russian naval forces in the Moonsund archipelago and set up a minefield in the strait connecting the Gulf of Finland and Riga. This strait was too shallow for dreadnoughts, but enough for the passage of gunboats, destroyers and cruisers. Having blocked it, the Germans could not be afraid of the impact of Russian naval artillery on their ground forces in the battles for Riga and the mouth of the Dvina.
3) Destruction of the main forces of the Baltic Fleet. It was assumed that the most modern and powerful German ships (dreadnoughts and battle cruisers) would not take part in the storming of the Irbene Strait - they planned to send the old battleships of the 4th squadron there. They would act as bait, because they gave the Russians a great temptation to bring their only brigade of dreadnoughts out to sea (four battleships of the Sevastopol type), which could easily crush the old German ships. But in this case, 11 battleships and battlecruisers of the High Seas Fleet would have been waiting for them, which had no great difficulty in cutting off the Russian route of retreat to the Gulf of Finland and then destroying them. This, in the opinion of the admiral staff, would put an end to any active actions of the Russian fleet in the Baltic - not that they were so effective in 1914 - early 1915, but still pretty much annoying the Germans.
In accordance with the above, only the 4th squadron was sent to break through the Irbensky Strait, which included, in addition to minesweepers and a minelayer, 7 old pre-dreadnought battleships, accompanied by light cruisers and destroyers.
For the Russian command, this plan did not come as a surprise, they knew about it and prepared to counter. But only light forces were in Moonsund, and it was clear that they would not repel such a large-scale invasion. Therefore, it was decided to send a heavy ship to help them, which should have become the "core" of the defense of Moonsund. There was not much to choose from: there was no point in risking the dreadnoughts by driving them into the mousetrap of the Gulf of Riga. As for the battleships, the benefits of the ships of the "Andrew the First-Called" class were not much superior to those of the "Slava" or "Tsarevich", while the latter, having a smaller draft, would feel much more confident among the shallow waters of the Moonsund archipelago.
As a result, the choice fell on the "Glory" and the battleship, under the cover of the ships of the fleet, made the transition to Moonsund. Since the ship did not allow the draft to go to the Gulf of Riga directly from the Finnish ship, it was necessary to go around the Irbensky Strait (the fairway along which the battleship passed was immediately mined). Now the naval forces of the Gulf of Riga included one battleship, four gunboats, a division of old destroyers, four submarines and a minelayer. Together with the crew of the Slava, the flagship artilleryman of the 2nd battleship brigade, Lev Mikhailovich Haller, left for Moonsund.
First battle (July 26, 1915).
At dawn (03.50), the Germans began trawling the Irbensky Strait in its middle part - the pre-dreadnoughts Alsace and Braunschweig, as well as the cruisers Bremen and Tethys, provided direct cover for the trawling caravan. The other five battleships of the 4th squadron held on to the sea.
The first to open fire on the enemy were the gunboats "Threatening" and "Brave", but were immediately driven off by the main caliber of the German battleships. However, the good news for the Germans ended there - they got stuck in minefields and had three ships blown up, of which the T-52 minesweeper immediately sank, and the cruiser "Tethys" and the destroyer S-144 were forced to stop fighting - their Germans had to to be towed "to winter apartments". At about 10.30, "Slava" arrived.
It would seem that a lot of blood should be shed now. Many of those who have studied the history of the Russian Imperial Navy remember the battle of the Black Sea battleships with the German battle cruiser "Goeben", when our gunners achieved hits from a distance of 90 and even 100 cables, so why should it have happened differently in the Baltic?
But alas - if for the Black Sea battleships, which were to shell the Turkish fortresses in the Bosphorus, the elevation angle of 305-mm guns was increased to 35 degrees, at which their 331.7 kg shells flew at 110 kbt, then for the Baltic battleships, only 15 degrees of vertical guidance, which, with the same guns and shells, limited their firing range to 80 kbt. The "Slava", whose guns were heavily shot, had a maximum firing range even lower - only 78 kbt. And the German battleships, whose main caliber was formally even somewhat inferior to the "Slava" (280-mm versus 305-mm), had an elevation angle of 30 degrees, which made it possible to shoot 240-kg shells at a distance of over 100 kbt.
The advantage in range was not slow to show itself - "Slava" was fired at from a distance of 87, 5 kbt. It is psychologically difficult to be under fire and not shoot back, but the Russian battleship did not open fire - there was no point in showing the enemy the true range of its guns. However, it was undesirable to expose itself to the blows, even if they were clothed, but falling at a significant angle, shells, and therefore, after the German battleships fired six volleys at the "Slava", the battleship retreated beyond the range of their fire.
In this battle, "Slava" was not damaged. According to the testimony of the midshipman K. I. Mazurenko:
“During the shelling, small fragments of 11-inch German shells fell on its decks during the shelling, as they exploded into the water, without causing any harm to either the ship or its personnel. the decks were empty in battle"
On this, in essence, the participation of "Glory" in the battle on July 26 ended. The Germans continued to sweep the barriers of the Irbenskiy Gulf unrestricted, they managed to pass through two lanes of mines, but after that by 13.00 they flew into the third obstacle. This density of minefields to a certain extent shocked the German command, they are simply not ready for such a turn of events. There were practically no chances to wipe the passage to the Gulf of Riga in one day, and the coal reserves (most likely on the minesweepers) were coming to an end. Therefore, the commander of the German forces, Erhard Schmidt, gave the order to curtail the operation and retreat - it became clear to him that much more serious preparation would be needed to cross the Irbene Strait.
Soon after 13.00, the ships crossing the Irbensky Strait received an order to retreat, but this did not save them from losses - at 14.05 a minesweeper T-58 was blown up and sank on mines. And then the Germans left.
What conclusions can be drawn from the results of the battle on July 26, 1915? For the first time in its history, the Kaiserlichmarine faced strong minefields, which he tried to force - but it turned out that the minesweepers involved were not enough. This in no way indicated the inability of the German fleet to carry out such operations - the banal lack of experience let down, and the Germans quickly learned from their mistakes.
As for the "Glory", its appearance had only a psychological effect - the Germans saw that they were opposed by a single Russian battleship, and speculated about why the ship did not open fire and did not enter the battle. Perhaps the presence of "Slava" became an additional argument in favor of ending the operation, but one thing is certain - this time the German squadron was stopped by dense minefields that blocked the Irbensky Strait, but not by the defense of these obstacles by the forces of the fleet.
Nevertheless, the psychological effect of the presence of a heavy Russian ship, ready to enter the battle under the cover of mines, was very great. The commander of the German naval forces in the Baltic (E. Schmidt commanded ships at sea), Grand Admiral Prince Heinrich, attributed great moral importance to the destruction of Slava, and even the Kaiser himself demanded that the Russian battleship be sunk by "submarines".
Second battle (3 August 1915)
The Germans made the next breakthrough attempt only a week later. At the same time, the composition of the breakthrough group, which was to pave the road to the Gulf of Riga, underwent qualitative changes - instead of the old battleships of the 4th squadron, the dreadnoughts "Nassau" and "Posen" were supposed to enter into action. The rhombic arrangement of the 280-mm artillery of the main caliber on these battleships is difficult to recognize as optimal, but the ability to fire in any direction (including straight ahead) from at least six barrels (at sharp heading angles - out of eight) gave two such ships an overwhelming advantage over "Glory" in an artillery battle, even if the distance between the opponents would allow the Russians to fire.
The main caliber of the battleships "Alsace" and "Braunschweig", which came under fire from "Slava" on July 26, were 280-mm cannon SK L / 40, which fired 240-kg shells with an initial speed of 820 m / s, while on " Nassau "and" Posen "were installed more modern 280-mm guns SK L / 45, throwing 302-kg shells at a speed of 855 m / s. Four 305-mm cannons of "Slava" fired 331.7 kg shells with an initial speed of 792 m / s. Thus, the guns of the dreadnoughts in their combat capabilities came close to the main caliber of the "Glory", but if the Russian battleship could fight from two or four 305-mm guns, then the "Nassau" and "Posen" could fire together from 12-16 280 -mm guns, exceeding the Russian battleship in the number of barrels by 3-4 times. As for the firing range of German dreadnoughts, the information about it in various sources differs, but in any case it exceeded 100 kbt.
The Russians also tried to prepare for future battles. The biggest problem of the Russian ship was the insufficient range of its guns, and something had to be done about it. Of course, there was no way to upgrade the gun turrets by increasing the elevation angle directly in Moonsund, but L. M. Haller proposed another option - to take water into the body of the battleship and thereby create an artificial roll of 3 degrees. This was to increase the range of Russian guns by 8 kbt. Why did you stop at exactly three degrees?
Firstly, with a roll of more than 3 degrees, the rate of fire of the main caliber guns fell sharply, due to the arising difficulties with loading the guns. Secondly, the battleship had to move along the obstacles, changing the direction of movement from north to south, and with a roll of more than 3 degrees, the roll over took a lot of time. At the same time, in order to give the ship a roll of 3 degrees, it was enough to take 300 tons of water (100 tons in three compartments), which took no more than 10-15 minutes. And, finally, thirdly - with a roll of 5 degrees, the armor belt was completely out of the water and did not protect the newly formed "waterline". That was fraught, for example, with a direct hit of enemy shells in the boiler rooms or engine rooms of the ship. The "technology" of the battleship heeling had time to be tested and worked out before the second attack of the Kaiser's fleet, but you need to understand - even in this state, the battleship could not shoot beyond 85 cables and thus lost much to Nassau and Posen.
This time the Germans did not seek to start early in the morning - the order to advance to the Irbenskaya position on the "Slava" was received at 12.19 and at 13.45 the battleship was at the Tserel lighthouse. In the west appeared numerous smokes of the German squadron - the signalmen of "Slava" counted 45-50 smokes. The battleship went south, and its speed was reduced first to 12, and then to 6 knots. As soon as the distance between the "Slava" and the German dreadnoughts was reduced to 120 kbt, the Germans opened fire, giving 6 volleys to no avail - all of them fell short of 1.5 to 15 kbt from the Russian battleship.
In response to this, "Slava" retreated slightly to the east, in the opposite direction from the Germans (they were moving from west to east). Here the battleship turned north, received the required amount of water and, having received a roll of 3'30 degrees, fired two volleys "to check the rangefinders and warm up the guns." But both of them lay down with great undershoot, so that the fire was "crushed". At 15 o'clock, they turned south again and turned the ship over. In fact, at this time "Slava" went back and forth across the course of the German ships breaking through the Irbensky Strait.
By 16 o'clock the distance to the German battleships was reduced to 105-110 cables, but the Russian guns still could not send their shells to any enemy ships and therefore were silent. The Nassau opened fire and fired nine volleys that landed very close to the Slava. The battleship, unable to respond, retreated to the east again. But suddenly on the "Slava" they noticed a suitable target for their guns - it turns out that two German destroyers tried to pass into Riga, nestling on the southern bank of the Irbenk Strait. At 16.50 "Slava" immediately turned west to meet the breaking through German squadron and (as far as the distances allowed) opened fire on the destroyers from their six-inch towers. The German destroyers immediately retreated, and both German dreadnoughts struck at the approaching Slava. The Russian ship did not need such close "attention" to the 280-mm cannons, especially since it could not respond with fire. "Slava" retreated, having been under fire from "Nassau" and "Posen" for about 5 minutes or a little more. During this time, the enemy battleships managed to make at least 10 volleys.
But at 17.30 Slava again turned to the west and began to approach - at 17.45 its guns opened fire at the minesweeper, and then at the light cruiser Bremen (Slava mistakenly assumed that they were shooting at the armored cruiser Prince Adalbert). "Nassau" and "Posen" immediately responded, and their volleys fell either in flights or shortages, that is, the Glory was within the effective range of their guns. For another 7 minutes the German dreadnoughts chased after her, and this time, in order to be able to fire at the German cruiser that had come forward for five minutes, the Slava had to expose herself to enemy fire for 10-12 minutes.
But as soon as the "Slava" went beyond the fire of the "Nassau" and "Posen" (approximately at 18.00), she immediately turned around and again went to meet the enemy. Some confusion arises here, because after this turn, no one fired at the Slava, and the Russian battleship was able to open fire only half an hour later, at 18.30 at “some vessel”, most likely a minesweeper.
Perhaps the whole point is that at about this very time the Germans stopped trying to break through, turned around and went west. If we assume that the "Slava" pursued them, trying not to enter the zone of fire of the dreadnoughts, and fired at the lagging enemy ship, as soon as the opportunity presented itself, then everything falls into place. But it should be borne in mind that this is only a guess of the author, the exact time of the turn of the Germans to the west is unknown to him. By 19.00, only a few smokes remained on the horizon from the Germans, and Slava was ordered to return to Ahrensburg, where she arrived at 23.00.
The battle on August 3 ended, and this time "Glory" played a much more significant role than in the previous contact with the enemy on July 26. It is difficult to say how right Vinogradov is, stating:
"The stumbling block was definitely in the" Slava "- during the day on August 3, she repeatedly forced the minesweepers to withdraw."
After all, before the German retreat, Slava managed to fire at the minesweeper once (at 17.45). But there is no doubt that the presence of the Russian battleship, constantly "looming" in front of the German detachment, forced the trawl caravan to behave extremely carefully, not "protruding" beyond the protection of the "Nassau" and "Posen". The Germans could not know the real range of Russian guns in any way. It can be reasonably assumed that the actions of the Slava significantly reduced the speed of trawling the Irben position and thus did not allow the Germans to pass it during August 3.
The battleship was exposed to the fire of the dreadnoughts "Nassau" and "Posen" four times. In each of the four cases - briefly, from 5 to 12, maybe 15 minutes. Someone will remember that in the Russo-Japanese War, battleships fought for hours, but it should be understood that the fire of German artillery from a distance of 90-110 cables was much more dangerous than the 12-inch shells of Heihachiro Togo in the same Tsushima. At great distances, heavy shells fall at a significant angle to the horizon, and can easily pierce the decks of old battleships, which are by no means intended to withstand blows of such force.
At the same time, the dreadnoughts of the First World War were equipped with rangefinders and fire control systems, an order of magnitude superior to what the gunners of the Russian-Japanese war had. And therefore it is not surprising that the commander of the Slava did not want to expose his ship to the risk of receiving decisive damage for nothing, without having the slightest chance of inflicting damage on the enemy.
But in those cases when there was a chance to cause damage to the ships of the Kaiserlichmarine, the Russian battleship did not hesitate for a second. Barely noticing the opportunity to attack the German destroyers (at 16.50) or fire on the minesweeper and cruiser (17.45), "Slava" immediately went to rapprochement with the enemy - under dreadnought fire.
There is no doubt that if the turret mounts of the 305-mm guns of "Slava" had, after the model and likeness of the Black Sea battleships, the maximum elevation angle of 35 degrees, which allowed shooting at 110 cab., Then the battles of "Glory" with the German fleet on July 26 and August 3 would have been much fiercer. But the Russian sailors (for the umpteenth time!) Were sent into battle with criminally unusable weapons. It is difficult to find an excuse for this - a separate practical detachment of the Black Sea (led by the battleship "Rostislav") under the flag of Rear Admiral G. F. Tsyvinsky demonstrated effective shooting at distances up to 100 cables inclusive back in 1907. In the next year, 1908, G. F. Tsyvinsky were warmly approved not only by the naval minister, but also by the Emperor-Emperor. And, nevertheless, in 1915, "Slava" was forced to fight, having a maximum firing range below 80 cables!
In essence, "Slava" was forced to withstand significantly (at times) superior enemy forces, and even with useless materiel. Nevertheless, even in such unfavorable (if not to say - hopeless) conditions for themselves, the Russian sailors were not at a loss, but tried to do everything that was possible, without being afraid to improvise.
Of course, it is difficult to expect high performance from shooting at extreme distances, and even with an artificially induced roll of the ship.
In total, in the battle on August 3, Slava used 35 305-mm and 20 152-mm shells. It should be borne in mind that 4 or even 8 305-mm shells were fired towards the enemy "to check the rangefinders and warm up the barrels," and in fact - rather to raise the morale of the team. We are talking about the first two salvoes of "Glory", which fell with a great undershoot - unfortunately, the sources do not indicate whether these were full volleys (i.e. from all four 305-mm barrels at once) or half (i.e. from two barrels), as usual, the battleships were targeted. Accordingly, there is no way to establish the number of shells in these volleys. You can, of course, talk about "wasted shells," but let me remind you - at the first fire contact, although the "Slava" was out of reach of German guns, the Germans fired not two, but as many as six volleys at the Russian battleship.
Thus, we can say that Slava fired 27 or 31 305-mm shells effectively, that is, with a chance to hit the enemy. Let us take as a standard of accuracy the effectiveness of German heavy artillery in the Battle of Jutland: having spent 3,497 280-305-mm rounds, the Germans achieved 121 hits, which left 3.4% of the total number of shells fired.
Focusing on this percentage of hits, we come to the conclusion that the maximum that can be expected from "Slava" with the available consumption of 305-mm shells is one single hit to the enemy. But given that:
1) The range finders and fire control devices of the German battleships were more perfect than what they had on the Slava.
2) The indicated 27-31 shells "Slava" used up, firing at three different ships (minesweeper, cruiser Bremen, and then minesweeper again), that is, the Russian battleship spent on average no more than 10 shells per target. Is it a lot or a little? Suffice it to recall that the newest battle cruiser Derflinger, which had much better materiel than the Slava, and had the Kaiser's prize for excellent shooting before the war, in the outset of the Battle of Jutland was able to shoot at the Princess Royal only on the 6th volley, having spent 24 rounds. This, incidentally, happened when no one fired at the Derflinger at all.
3) In any particular case, the combat situation has its own individual characteristics: visibility, etc. It is of interest that in the battle on August 3, two German dreadnoughts, possessing the best material and using up a significantly larger number of shells on the Slava than the Russian battleship fired, could not achieve a single hit
In accordance with the above, it can be stated that the absence of hits by "Glory" in the battle on August 3 cannot serve as proof of the poor training of the Russian artillerymen.
