Long 13 articles of this cycle, we understood the descriptions of the battle of July 28 and the events preceding it, which constitute the historical part of this work. We studied the facts and looked for explanations for them, identified cause-and-effect relationships in an attempt to understand - why did it happen that way, and not otherwise? And now the thirteenth, final article of the cycle offered to your attention is devoted not to facts, but to unrealized opportunities, which can be characterized by the question: "What would happen if …?"
Of course, this is already an alternative history and everyone who is jarred by this phrase, I ask you to refrain from further reading. Because below we will try to find answers to questions about what might happen if:
1) V. K. Vitgeft accepted Matusevich's offer and sent the low-speed "Poltava" and "Sevastopol" to Bitszyvo after the squadron went to sea, and he himself would have gone to the breakthrough with only four of the fastest battleships.
2) After the 1st phase, when V. K. Vitgeft separated the "Poltava" and "Sevastopol" from the squadron and sent them to Port Arthur or neutral ports, while he himself developed a full speed and would go to the breakthrough with the rest of the squadron.
3) V. K. In the second phase of the battle, Vitgeft, with an energetic maneuver, approached the Japanese catching up with a pistol shot, and perhaps arrange a dump with their 1st combat detachment.
In addition, in this article we will try to determine the best way to use the 1st Pacific Squadron in the state it was in on July 28, 1904.
It is well known that the speed of the Russian battleships was inferior to that of the Japanese. The main reason for this was two "slug" - "Sevastopol" and "Poltava", which were hardly capable of giving 12-13 knots constantly, while the other four battleships of V. K. Vitgefta in this parameter approximately corresponded to the Japanese ships of the 1st combat detachment. And therefore it is not surprising that a number of officers of the 1st Pacific Squadron and many analysts of later times considered it necessary to split the squadron into "high-speed" and "low-speed" detachments, which should have increased the chances of a breakthrough of the "high-speed" wing to Vladivostok. But is it really so?
Let's consider the first option. The Russian squadron in full force goes to sea, but then splits up. Only high-speed ships are going to break through, while the Sevastopol and Poltava, together with the gunboats and that part of the destroyers of the 2nd detachment, which was capable of going into battle, are sent to “assault” the Japanese landing site in Biziwo. The defense of Biziwo is a priority for the Japanese, but if the main forces of Heihachiro Togo first attack the "slow-moving" Russian detachment and defeat it, then they will not have time to catch up with the main forces of the Russians.
This option is certainly interesting, but, alas, it hardly had any hopes of success. The Russians completely missed the domination of the sea and did not even control the outer raid, so the Japanese learned about the squadron's withdrawal before the battleships of Port Arthur began to move - through the thick smoke from the pipes that arose at the time of the preparation of the boilers "for the march and battle", which was done even when the ship was at anchor. In addition, Heihachiro Togo had many cruisers, destroyers and other ships capable of providing reconnaissance and there is no doubt that by the time the Russian squadron entered the outer roadstead it was being watched from many ships and from all sides. This is exactly what happened during the Russian breakthrough on July 28, 1904. Given the fact that the ships of the United Fleet had very reliable radio stations, Heihachiro knew about any actions of the Russians almost at the very moment when these actions were taken.
It is interesting that when sending a "slow-moving" detachment to Bitszywo V. K. Witgeft should not have obstructed Japanese intelligence in any way - on the contrary! H. Togo must have received information that the Russian squadron had split up, otherwise the whole idea would have lost its meaning - in order for the Japanese to "bite" the bait, they had to know about it. If H. Togo, for some reason, instead of “catching” “Sevastopol” with “Poltava”, would have gone to intercept the high-speed wing, then he had excellent chances to defeat “Tsesarevich”, “Retvizan”, “Victory "and" Peresvet ". In this case, no breakthrough into Vladivostok would have taken place, and the Biziwo attack (even if it was successful) became an extremely weak consolation for the Russians.
Thus, it was impossible and unnecessary to hinder Japanese intelligence, but … let's put ourselves in H. Togo's place. Here in front of him on the table is a radiogram stating that the Russians have divided their squadron into 2 detachments, indicating the composition of these detachments and their courses. What prevented the Japanese commander from now dividing his own forces in such a way as to leave a detachment of sufficient strength to defend Biziwo, and with the rest of the ships rush in pursuit of the "high-speed wing" of the Russian squadron?
On the way of "Sevastopol" and "Poltava" to Bitszyvo in the morning of July 28, there were ships of the 5th combat detachment, but not only them - not far from Arthur there were "Matsushima" and "Hasidate", a little further (near Dalniy) "Chiyoda" and " Chin-Yen ", and the direct cover of Biziwo was carried out by" Asama "," Itsukushima "and" Izumi ". This, of course, would not have been enough to stop two old, but strong Russian battleships, but who would prevent Heihachiro Togo from reinforcing these ships with one of his battleships - the same "Fuji"? In this case, to counter the Russian detachment, the Japanese would have 1 relatively modern and one old battleship (Fuji and Chin-Yen), a modern armored cruiser (Asama) and 5 old armored cruisers (although, strictly speaking, Chiyoda "Could formally be considered an armored one, since it had an armored belt), not counting other ships. In addition, Heihachiro Togo could also send Yakumo to Biziwo - although he was at Port Arthur, he could well catch up with Sevastopol and Poltava and join the battle when the latter start a battle with Fuji. These forces would have been quite enough to prevent the Russian detachment from reaching Biziwo.
At the same time, in order to catch up with the main Russian forces, the Japanese commander still had three battleships and two armored cruisers (Kasuga and Nissin). Taking into account the actual results of the battle on July 28, 1904, these ships on the "Tsesarevich", "Retvizan", "Victory" and "Peresvet" would have been more than enough.
In no case should we forget that with the departure of Sevastopol and Poltava, the Russian squadron significantly lost in its combat power, since it was on these ships that the best artillerymen of the squadron served. It was these ships that showed the best results in the firing of 1903, and in terms of the total points they scored, they surpassed the next Retvizan by 1, 65-1, 85 times, while the Peresvet and Pobeda turned out to be even worse than the Retvizan … As for the "Tsarevich", this battleship arrived in Port Arthur at the very last moment before the war, when the other ships of the squadron stood in reserve, so that before the outbreak of the war it could not have had any serious training. And even after it began, a torpedo hit and lengthy repairs did not allow full-fledged training of gunners, which is why many in the squadron considered its crew to be the worst in training in comparison with other battleships.
It may not be entirely correct to assert that without Sevastopol and Poltava, the armored detachment of the 1st Pacific Squadron lost half of its combat power, but this assessment is very close to the truth. At the same time, the 1st combat detachment of the Japanese without "Fuji" and on condition of non-alignment of "Yakumo" in the second phase was losing a quarter of the artillery that took part in the battle, which H. Togo actually had in the battle on July 28, 1904. Thus, the consequences the division of the 1st Pacific squadron into 2 detachments, one of which would go to attack Biziwo, could lead to heavier losses than the 1st Pacific squadron suffered when an attempt was actually made to break through with all its forces.
According to the second option, the Russian ships go for a breakthrough together, as happened in the battle on July 28, but at the moment when, as a result of X's maneuvers, the Japanese 1st combat detachment is behind the 1st Pacific squadron and the distance between the opponents reached 10 miles, V. K. Vitgeft gives the order to "Sevastopol" and "Poltava" to return to Port Arthur, and he, with the rest of the ships, increases the speed to 15 knots and goes to the breakthrough.
This would be a completely realistic option, but it promised success only if the battleships of V. K. Vitgefta were able to maintain no less than fifteen-knot speed for a long time (days), and the Japanese could not go faster. Usually, the squadron speed of the 1st combat detachment of H. Togo did not exceed 14-15 knots, and although there are references to 16 knots, they are quite controversial (it is difficult to estimate the speed from Russian ships with an accuracy of a knot), moreover, it can be assumed that if such a speed developed, it was only for a short time. Accordingly, even if the Japanese, having waved their hand at "Sevastopol" and "Poltava", rushed after the main forces of V. K. Vitgeft, then they could only catch up with them on the very late evening, and H. Togo simply would not have had time to inflict decisive damage on the Russian ships. After that, the 1st Japanese combat detachment could only go to the Korea Strait, but if the Russians really demonstrated the ability to maintain 15 knots around the clock, then it is not a fact that the Japanese would have time to intercept them even there.
But could the four most modern Russian battleships maintain 15 knots for a long time? The answer to this question is very difficult. According to passport data, there was certainly such an opportunity. In addition, it is known that in 1903 Peresvet, without too much trouble with machine commands and without forcing machines, kept the speed of 15.7 knots for 36 hours (battleships race along the Nagasaki-Port-Arthur route). Coal to Vladivostok could have been enough for the battleships: in the first phase of the battle, the pipes of the battleships did not have too serious damage, which could cause excessive consumption of coal. It is also not known what happened to the Retvizan, which received an underwater hole shortly before the breakthrough was made - it was impossible to patch up such a hole, and the ship went into battle with water inside the hull - it was held only by reinforced bulkheads, but with an increase in speed, reinforcements could well have surrendered. causing extensive sinking of the ship. On the other hand, after the battle on July 28, 1904, nothing of the kind happened, but the Retvizan did not develop 15 knots during the breakthrough either. Nevertheless, knowing the entire history of the battle, retrospectively it can be assumed that the bulkheads of the battleship would still withstand such a speed.
With a certain degree of probability, this option could really lead to a breakthrough of a part of the squadron to Vladivostok. But neither V. K. Vitgeft and no one else at that particular moment of the battle on July 28 could have known about this.
From the very exit of the squadron, when trying to develop more than 13 knots on the battleships, something broke, which made it necessary to reduce the speed and wait for the Pobeda (once) and the Tsarevich (twice) to fix the breakdowns and go into operation. In order to maintain constantly such a high speed, well-trained stokers are required, and they were once such, but long "holidays", when the squadron practically did not go to sea since November 1903 (with the exception of the period of command of S. O. Makarov) did not contribute in any way to maintaining the appropriate qualifications of machine instructions. It should also be borne in mind that the coal in Port Arthur was not good and clearly worse than what the Japanese could (and actually did) have. Nobody knew what would happen to the Retvizan if it went for a long time at 15 knots. But most importantly, none of the Russian officers had any idea what the maximum squadron speed the Japanese fleet could develop.
Knowing the history of the Russo-Japanese war at sea, we can assume (although we do not know for sure) that the Japanese were unlikely to go faster than 15 knots. But the sailors of the 1st Pacific Squadron understood only that their coal was of inferior quality, the stokers were less trained, and the Japanese ships, apparently, were in better technical condition. From this it followed irrefutably that the Japanese, in any case, would be able to go faster than the Russians, and throwing two battleships (especially the best riflemen of the squadron) almost to certain death in order to delay the renewal of the battle could not be considered good. idea. Thus, it can be argued that this option, even if it was realistic, could in no way be recognized as such on the basis of the data that Russian officers had during the battle.
In discussions devoted to the battle on July 28, the following plan sometimes surfaced - in the interval between the 1st and 2nd phases, to send "Poltava" and "Sevastopol" not to Port Arthur, but to the attack on Biziwo, and here- then the Japanese would have to lag behind the Russian squadron and rush to defend the landing site! Alas, as we saw earlier, no one prevented the Japanese from allocating a detachment sufficient to fend off this threat - and continue to pursue the Russian squadron with superior forces. Moreover, it was enough for the Japanese 1st combat detachment, continuing to pursue the main forces of the Russian squadron, to disperse with two old Russian battleships at a short distance on counter courses, and the latter would receive very severe damage, after which the Biziwo attack would become extremely doubtful. And that is to say - such an attack had some chance if it was supported by light ships, such as gunboats and destroyers, but what two damaged Russian battleships would do at night (before they could not reach Biziwo) in the waters where there were many mines enemy fields and destroyers?
And finally, the third option. When the Japanese overtook the Russian squadron (approximately at 16.30) and the battle resumed, the 1st combat detachment of Heihachiro Togo found itself in a very disadvantageous tactical position - it was forced to catch up with the Russian ships, passing along the column of V. K. Vitgeft and gradually closing the distance, thereby allowing the Russians to concentrate fire on their warheads. What would happen if at this moment the Russian admiral turned "all of a sudden" or made a different maneuver and rushed at the Japanese at full speed?
In order to try to imagine what an attempt to get closer to the Japanese at pistol-shot distance would lead to, one should try to understand the effectiveness of Russian and Japanese fire at different stages of the battle. In total, in the battle on July 28, 2 phases are distinguished, approximately equal in time (generally speaking, the 1st phase lasted longer, but there was a break in it when the sides did not conduct an artillery battle - taking into account this break, the time of fire impact in the 1st and 2nd phase is comparable). But the battle in the second phase proceeded at a much shorter distance, because H. Togo "went into a clinch" to defeat the Russians before dark. Therefore, all other things being equal, it was to be expected that during the second phase, both the Japanese and Russian battleships would receive a much larger number of hits than in the first.
We have already written about the effectiveness of the fire of the sides in the first part of the battle: for example, the Japanese achieved 19 hits with large-caliber shells, including 18 caliber 305-mm and one 254-mm. In addition, the Russian ships received about 16 shells of other, smaller calibers. In the second phase, the number of hits on Russian battleships was expected to increase - they received 46 large-caliber hits (10-12 dm) and 68 hits with other calibers. Thus, as a result of the reduction in the fighting distance from 50-70 kbt in the first phase to 20-40 kbt in the second phase, the firing efficiency of the Japanese gunners of large-caliber guns increased almost two and a half times, and more than fourfold for other calibers!
Alas, Russian battleships are not showing the same efficiency gains. If in the 1st phase 8 heavy (6 - 305-mm and 2 - 254-mm) and 2 shells of a smaller caliber hit the Japanese ships, then in the second phase the Japanese ships hit another 7 heavy and 15-16 shells of a smaller caliber (not counting 2 hits from the cruiser "Askold", made by him during the breakthrough, ie at the end of the battle of armored detachments).
It is interesting that the loss of the formation shortly after the death of V. K. Vitgefta had practically no effect on the accuracy of Russian fire - out of 7 heavy shells that hit Japanese ships in the 2nd phase of the battle, three found their target after these unfortunate events.
And yet, if during the first phase of the battle for 1 hit of a Russian heavy projectile (254-305 mm) there were 2, 37 Japanese, then in the second phase for 1 the same hit the Japanese responded with 6, 57 shells! Two, in general, random hits of Russian six-inch shells in the 1st phase are insufficient for statistics, but in the 2nd phase the Japanese gunmen of medium and small-caliber artillery provided 4, 25-4, 5 times more hits than theirs Russian colleagues.
Despite numerous testimonies from Russian officers that when the distance was reduced, the Japanese began to get nervous and shoot worse, the analysis of hits from the sides does not confirm anything of the kind. With a decrease in the distance, the quality of Japanese shooting increased significantly, but the heavy guns of the Russian battleships could not boast of such and even reduced their effectiveness (7 hits against 8 in the 1st phase). In any case, at relatively short distances of the 2nd phase of the battle, the Japanese achieved 4.5-5 times superiority over the Russian ships. And this - taking into account the tactically losing position in which the Japanese were for a long time! In addition, one should never forget that the most severe damage to battleships could only have been caused by shells of 254-305 mm caliber, and here the Japanese achieved absolute superiority in the 2nd phase - 46 hits against 7.
Thus, it can be stated that the close proximity could hardly bring luck to the Russians - with the reduction of the distance, the superiority of the Japanese in firepower only grew. And this meant that an attempt to get closer to the Japanese could in no way contribute to the breakthrough of the squadron to Vladivostok - much more damage was to be expected than those that V. K. We received Vitgeft in reality.
And yet … The Russian squadron had one advantage in the second phase of the battle. It could not help break through to Vladivostok or win the battle, but at least it gave some chances to inflict sensitive losses on the Japanese.
The fact is that Heihachiro Togo preferred to "surround" the Russian squadron with his cruisers and destroyers - the detachments of these ships really sought to settle in the distance around the ships of V. K. Vitgefta and this had its own reason - no sharpest and unexpected maneuver of the Russians would have allowed them to go beyond the sight of Japanese high-speed reconnaissance officers. But this tactic also had its drawbacks, which consisted in the fact that the main forces of the Japanese did not accompany either the cruiser or the destroyers. But the Russian commander, leading the ships to the breakthrough, had both cruisers and destroyers available, and in close proximity.
An attempt to bring the battleships of the 1st Pacific Squadron closer to the main forces of H. torpedoes - this was perhaps the only chance. And besides …
Partly such a low accuracy of fire of Russian ships in the 2nd phase of the battle can be explained by the indication of V. K. Vitgefta to shoot at "Mikasa", which made the latter hide among the water columns from falling shells, and it was extremely difficult to adjust fire on him. Therefore, it can be assumed that if the Russian battleships rushed in front of the Japanese and each in this case chose the best target for himself, then our artillerymen would be able to achieve a slightly larger number of hits than happened in reality. It also cannot be ruled out that for some time it would have been difficult for the Japanese to direct their guns at the Russian ships moving in countercourses, as happened with the Retvizan, when it rushed to attack the Japanese formation. The Japanese really fired worse on counter-courses, and this gave additional chances to both battleships (not getting excessive damage when approaching), and cruisers and destroyers going into a torpedo attack …
Just go to such actions V. K. Vitgeft could not in any way - he was given the task of breaking through with the squadron to Vladivostok, and he was obliged to carry it out, and an attempt to arrange a dump with a dashing mine attack did not contribute to the completion of the task in any way - it was clear that when approaching the Japanese, the squadron would most likely receive very severe and breakthrough damage.
All of the above allows you to determine the optimal strategy of the 1st Pacific Squadron. She was inferior to the enemy in literally everything, and even the advantage in heavy guns was leveled by the poor training of the gunners. But still it had one and only advantage - the ship-repairing capacity of Port Arthur significantly exceeded what the Japanese had at their flying base near the Eliot Islands, and it was this advantage that the Russians could well try to "play" with.
Suppose that the order to break through to Vladivostok, which was received by V. K. Vitgeft, would be composed something like this:
1) The 1st Pacific Squadron should go to sea, and the purpose of its exit will be determined by the actions of the enemy.
2) If for some reason the squadron is not intercepted by the main forces of the Japanese fleet, it must proceed to Vladivostok.
3) If the main forces of the Japanese nevertheless impose a battle, the squadron must, without regret, refuse to break through to Vladivostok and engage in a decisive battle with the Japanese fleet. In battle, the task of the battleships is to, after waiting for a convenient moment, get close to the enemy, or even completely mix the formation, trying to use not only artillery, but also torpedoes and ramming. The task of cruisers and destroyers, hiding behind the battleships before the deadline, at the right time, decisively attack enemy armored ships with torpedoes.
4) After the battle, the squadron should retreat to Port Arthur and quickly correct the damage that prevents the breakthrough to Vladivostok, after which, without delaying a single day, make a second breakthrough attempt. If a ship receives such damage to the underwater part that cannot be repaired without lengthy repairs, then it should be left in Port Arthur.
5) In an open battle against the entire force of the Japanese fleet, the 1st Pacific Squadron is unlikely to find enough strength to drive the enemy back and pave the way to Vladivostok. But if it is possible to destroy or at least damage several enemy ships with torpedoes, then they will no longer be able to participate in the battle when they leave again.
6) If, even after the second exit, the enemy is able to block the squadron's path with equal or superior forces, then again, without seeking to go to Vladivostok, give him a decisive battle, after which retreat to Port Arthur, and, having repaired, make a new attempt to break through.
7) In such battles, we will have an advantage due to the ship repair capabilities of Port Arthur, which are far superior to those of the Japanese at their flying base. And even if our damage is stronger, we will be able to return ships to service faster than it is available to the Japanese, so if not from the first, then from the second time, the advantage in large ships may be ours. Even if this does not happen, then, desperately fighting, we may, perhaps, sink several enemy battleships or cruisers, and so, even at the cost of our own death, we will facilitate the case of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, which is going to our rescue.
8) When leaving, take with you all destroyers capable of going to sea, even those that cannot go to Vladivostok. Such destroyers must fight, supporting the squadron, attack Japanese ships at night, and then return to Port Arthur (V. K. Vitgeft took with him only those destroyers that could pass to Vladivostok).
The above plan shows a huge number of "bottlenecks" and it is far from the fact that all of the above would lead the 1st Pacific Squadron to any kind of success. But if Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft had received such an order, he simply would have had no choice. In the battle on July 28, 1904, he found himself in a very difficult situation precisely because he was charged with an unconditional duty to break through to Vladivostok, and by no means enter into a desperate battle (in which he himself did not want to enter in any case). And therefore it is quite understandable why, before the start of the second phase, he rejected the proposals of his headquarters to enter a decisive battle: the chances of success in such a battle were scanty, but there was no hope for a subsequent breakthrough at all. And from the point of view of accomplishing the task (breakthrough), the tactics of V. K. Vitgefta looked optimal: using her tactical advantage, try to knock out the head "Mikas" and hold out until dark.
But if the Russian Rear Admiral had an order: if it was impossible to evade a battle with the main forces of the enemy, to abandon the breakthrough and give a decisive battle with a subsequent withdrawal to Arthur, then he could hardly reject the proposals of his headquarters. And what could have happened then?
Most likely, the first phase of the battle would have proceeded unchanged - while the Japanese were "frolicking" at 50-70 kbt, it was not possible to get close to them, so V. K. All Witgeft had to do was go forward with the expectation of some Japanese mistake. But then, if after the resumption of the battle
Vitgeft would have given full speed and, having slightly dispersed, commanded "all of a sudden", attacking the enemy with the formation of the front,
then H. Togo would have had very little time to make a decision, and it is far from the fact that he would have chosen the only right thing - a turn "all of a sudden" from the Russian squadron. Moreover, it is not a fact that even if Heihachiro Togo made such a decision, the 1st Combat Detachment would have time to implement it.
It is very difficult to calculate the consequences of this maneuver, and we will not describe it in detail, but will simply make a number of assumptions. Suppose that the Russians acted as described above, and the destroyer cruisers, seizing the moment, were able to attack the Japanese with torpedoes. Let's say the Russians were lucky, and the oldest Japanese battleship of the 1st Detachment Fuji received one or two torpedo hits, but did not die and was able to drag it to the parking lot at Elliot Island. Let us also assume that due to the fire effect of the Japanese (and the number of hits on Russian battleships would obviously increase), the Russians lost the Peresvet (the battleship that suffered the most in that battle), the Askold cruiser and some of the destroyers sunk. What's next?
The Russian squadron is returning to Port Arthur, but now all the ships are going there - the order “STATE EMPEROR ordered to follow to Vladivostok” no longer dominates the commanders, which means that “Tsesarevich”, and “Diana”, and “Novik”, and other ships return with the squadron. As you know, on August 20, the Russian ships were repaired and technically ready for a new breakthrough attempt. Of course, it must be assumed that the 1st Pacific, as a result of converging with the Japanese fleet at close distances, will undergo more damage, but if the squadron intended to urgently go to sea again, then there would not have been many sailors sent to land and they could have done a lot with their work. speed up repairs. The Japanese artillery could not prevent the Russians from being repaired - the problems with the Russian ships began only in November, when the Japanese were able to use 280-mm siege artillery, but this was still a long way off. Thus, approximately on August 20, the Russian squadron could take a risk and go for a second breakthrough.
In this case, "Fuji" could no longer block her path - it would either be in Elliot's caissons, or it would be somewhere in the Kure shipyards, but clearly not in the ranks. And on the other 3 Japanese battleships, during the battle on July 28, out of the standard 12 305-mm guns, five failed (most likely from the explosions of their own shells inside the barrel). So they would have to stop 5 Russian battleships (minus "Peresvet"), having only 7 guns of this caliber. With all due respect to the skill of the Japanese artillerymen, it is extremely doubtful that such forces could inflict decisive damage on the Russian ships and stop their breakthrough into Vladivostok.
In addition to all of the above, something else suggests itself, namely, realizing that some of the Russian ships (such as the Sevastopol and Poltava), most likely, will not be able to reach Vladivostok due to the lack of coal, one could try in advance bring several coal miners under neutral flags to a neutral port (yes, the same Qingdao) in order to be able to replenish coal reserves after the battle.
Of course, all of the above does not at all look like a panacea for all troubles - the same Japanese destroyers and numerous minefields on Arthur's outer roadstead could at any moment "correct" the composition of the Russian squadron. And yet … perhaps only a decisive battle with the Japanese fleet, a quick repair of ships in Arthur and a second breakthrough gave the 1st Pacific Squadron the greatest chances to break through at least part of its forces to Vladivostok, causing maximum trouble for the United Fleet.
Thank you for the attention!
THE END
List of used literature:
1. A. A. Belov. "Battleships of Japan".
2. A. S. Alexandrov, S. A. Balakin. "Asama" and others. Japanese armored cruisers of the 1895-1896 program
3. Artillery and armor in the Russian-Japanese war. Nauticus, 1906.
4. A. Yu. Emelin "Cruiser of the II rank" Novik ""
5. V. Polomoshnov "Battle of July 28, 1904 (battle in the Yellow Sea (battle at Cape Shantung))"
6. V. B. Hubby "Kaiser-class battleships"
7. V. Maltsev "On the issue of shooting accuracy in the Russian-Japanese war" Part I-IV
8. V. N. Cherkasov "Notes of an artillery officer of the battleship" Peresvet"
9. V. Krestyaninov, S. Molodtsov "Battleships of the" Peresvet "type. "Heroic Tragedy"
10. V. Yu. Gribovsky "Tsarevich in battle on July 28, 1904"
11 V. Yu. Gribovsky. Russian Pacific Fleet. 1898-1905. History of creation and death.
12. V. Ya. Krestyaninov, S. V. Molodtsov "Cruiser" Askold"
13. V. Ya. Peasants "Sea Mine War at Port Arthur"
14. V. Maltsev "On the question of the accuracy of shooting in the Russian-Japanese" Part III-IV.
15. R. M. Melnikov "Squadron battleships of the" Peresvet "class"
16. R. M. Melnikov "Tsarevich" Part 1. Squadron battleship 1899-1906
17. P. M. Melnikov "Armored cruiser" Bayan "(1897-1904)"
18. Analysis of the battle on July 28, 1904 and the study of the reasons for the failure of the actions of the 1st Pacific squadron / Marine collection, 1917, No. 3, neof. dep., p. 1 - 44.
19. Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905. Fleet actions. The documents. Division III 1st Pacific Squadron. Book one. Actions in the southern naval theater of war. Issue 6th. Fight July 28, 1904
20. S. A. Balakin. Battleship "Retvizan".
21. S. V. Suliga "Squadron battleships of the" Poltava "class
22. S. A. Balakin. Mikasa and others. Japanese battleships 1897-1905 // Marine collection. 2004. No. 8.
23. Top secret history of the Russo-Japanese war at sea in 37-38. Meiji / MGSh Japan.
24. Description of military operations at sea in 37-38 years. Meiji / Naval General Headquarters in Tokyo.
25. Surgical and medical description of the naval war between Japan and Russia. - Medical Bureau of the Maritime Department in Tokyo.
And also a lot of documents published on the site https://tsushima.su in the following sections:
- The actions of the fleet. Vice Admiral Stark's period of command
- The actions of the fleet. The period of command of Vice Admiral Makarov
- The actions of the fleet. The period of direct command of the Governor E. I. V. 2-22 April 1904
- The actions of the fleet. Period of command of Rear Admiral Vitgeft (June 11 - July 28, 1904)
- The actions of the fleet. Battle in the Yellow Sea 1904-28-07. Damage to Russian ships
