So, the 1st Pacific squadron was retreating. The Retvizan, whose commander believed that the responsibility of the commander rests on his shoulders, tried to lead the squadron to Port Arthur. The current commander, Rear Admiral Prince P. P. Ukhtomsky, sought to collect the battleships into a single whole, for this purpose he lay down in the wake of the "Retvizanu" in order to form at least some semblance of a formation. He was followed by Pobeda and Poltava, but Sevastopol, despite the small move of Peresvet (8-9 knots), lagged behind. "Tsarevich" with a jammed steering wheel tried to get in behind the "Sevastopol", but it turned out badly - the battleship could not get up in line and simply moved "somewhere in that direction."
The choice facing the new Russian commander, alas, was not striking in the abundance of options. It was possible to try to turn and go to a breakthrough in Vladivostok, but the Russians' road was again blocked by the 1st Japanese combat detachment of H. Togo in the amount of 4 battleships and 2 armored cruisers, and if Yakumo had separated from them by this time, then all stayed nearby. An attempt to march on them would obviously lead to a renewed battle. It was possible, taking advantage of the fact that the Japanese, having taken up a position between the Russian squadron and Vladivostok, were not looking for a battle now, drag the time until darkness, and only then turn and try to slip past H. Togo. And, of course, you could give up everything and return to Port Arthur.
As you know, Prince P. P. Ukhtomsky chose a rather strange solution. He was going to stay overnight at the battle site in order to assess his capabilities in the morning and then only determine whether the squadron should continue to break through, and subsequently simply led the squadron to Port Arthur. Usually this decision is recognized as erroneous, cowardly, alarmist, and even treacherous. But is it?
Before answering the question posed, it is necessary to assess the consequences of the battle for the Russian and Japanese battleships, as well as their ability to continue the battle on the evening of July 28, 1904. Of no less interest is the ability of the ships of Rear Admiral P. P. Ukhtomsky to go on a breakthrough to Vladivostok, and for Kh. Togo's squadrons - to pursue the Russians.
First, about the Japanese. In total, 35-36 shells hit their armored ships, while the most injured was the flagship of H. Togo "Mikasa" - he received 24 hits. The battleship received quite unpleasant blows, but nothing that threatened the buoyancy or combat effectiveness of the ship. The most serious damage was damage to the 178 mm armor plate in the area of the bow barbette, due to which the battleship, following the damaged side to the swell, could get flooding in the bow, as well as disable the aft barbette 305-mm installation.
The pipes received some damage, but visually they are insignificant and it is highly doubtful that they would lead to a drop in traction and increased coal consumption. In general, despite a fair number of hits and the failure of part of the artillery, "Mikasa" remained fully combat-ready and could continue the battle.
The rest of the Japanese ships collectively received fewer shells than the single Mikasa. In fact, they were only slightly scratched by Russian fire.
The only significant loss of the Japanese squadron was the massive failure of 305-mm guns - having 16 such guns on 4 battleships at the beginning of the battle, by the end of the battle the 1st combat detachment had lost 5 of them: as we said above, in all cases the Japanese indicate reasons not related to combat damage - explosions of shells in the barrel bore or other troubles. It can be assumed that one or two Japanese twelve-inch guns were nevertheless incapacitated by the Russians: a direct hit into the barrel and the rupture of a projectile in it gives very similar damage, but this hypothesis has no confirmation. Be that as it may, apart from a slight weakening of firepower, the Japanese 1st combat detachment did not suffer any other significant damage, all ships were able to withstand squadron speed, had no stability problems, and retained a sufficient amount of ammunition to continue the battle. As for coal reserves, the author does not have reliable data on its consumption, but it can be assumed that all 4 Japanese battleships had sufficient reserves to chase Russian ships, if they tried to break through to Vladivostok. Some doubts exist only about Nissin and Kasuga - there is some, very small probability that if they had to move fifteen knots on the night of July 28-29, then on the afternoon of July 29 they would need refueling with coal. Accordingly, if the movement of the Russians to Vladivostok became noticeable, then nothing would prevent the commander of the United Fleet from withdrawing his squadron to the Korean Strait and meeting there with the armored cruisers of Kh. Kamimura. The latter had already received an order to go to Ross Island … The Russians, in general, did not have a chance to go unnoticed by the Strait of Korea - too many warships and auxiliary vessels of the Japanese fleet were concentrated there. Accordingly, H. Togo had the opportunity to resume the battle against the Russian squadron, having 4 battleships and 6-8 armored cruisers.
But even after making completely unthinkable assumptions in favor of the Russian squadron:
- that the "Nissin" and "Kasuga", due to the lack of coal, could not seek the Russian forces on July 29, if they had gone for a breakthrough;
- that on Mikas, due to pipe damage, the consumption of coal increased so much that it would also not be able to chase the Russian squadron;
- That "Yakumo" and "Asama" would get lost somewhere along the way and could not go to their main forces on the morning of July 29;
even in this case, the Japanese had the opportunity to give a second battle with the forces of 3 squadron battleships ("Asahi", "Fuji", "Shikishima") and 4 armored cruisers of Vice Admiral H. Kamimura.
And what about the Russians? Unfortunately, her injuries were much more serious than that of the Japanese. In total, at least 149 shells fell into the Russian ships before the end of the battle of the squadron battleships - these are only those for which there are descriptions of the damage caused by the hit, the total number can reach 154. Sadly, on the whole, the Japanese surpassed the Russian gunmen in accuracy. more than four times, and only one "Peresvet" was hit by about the same, or even more shells than the entire Japanese fleet on July 28, 1904.
At first glance, according to the results of the Japanese fire effect, the squadron did not suffer so much: not a single Russian ship was killed and did not have any damage that threatened it with death. The artillery of the Russian battleships, although it suffered some damage, nevertheless, for the most part, remained combat-ready. But…
"Tsarevich" - received 25 rounds of all calibers. Despite hits (including heavy shells) in the turrets of the main and medium caliber, the artillery was preserved in perfect order, the ship's armor belt was also not pierced. Nevertheless, the "extra" water hit the hull: a 305-mm projectile in the 1st phase of the battle hit the bow on the right, slid along the armor belt and exploded already below it, opposite the side unprotected by armor. An elliptical dent formed in the skin, the tightness was broken, and 153 tons of water were taken - the ship received a list, which had to be straightened by counter-flooding. In addition, the bow fire tank was damaged by shrapnel, from which water flowed directly into the bow of the ship. This inflow of water, of course, could not drown the battleship, but led to the formation of a trim on the bow and to a deterioration in the ship's controllability. As long as the steering was normal, it was completely uncritical, but when a successful hit by the Japanese made it necessary to steer the machines, the ship lost track, as evidenced by two uncontrolled circulations in an attempt to follow the Sevastopol. In addition, a heavy Japanese projectile hitting the foremast led to the fact that it could collapse at any moment, burying the nasal bridge under it or falling on the pipes, which were barely breathing in incense.
In general, there was a paradoxical situation - the "Tsarevich", keeping the guns and armor intact, nevertheless could no longer fight in the same formation with the other ships of the squadron - even at a speed of hardly more than 8 knots, it could not go to the wake of the "Sevastopol" … In addition, the most severe damage to the pipes led to a strong drop in thrust and, accordingly, a large overconsumption of coal. With the available reserves, the battleship could no longer reach Vladivostok. More precisely, theoretically, such a possibility remained - if you drown out the fodder stokers and go along the economic course along the shortest path, then coal, albeit just barely enough, could be enough. But in practice, taking into account the inevitable resumption of the battle, an increase in speed and maneuvering, the ship would have remained with empty coal pits somewhere in the middle of the Tsushima Strait. Conclusion: the battleship did not have the opportunity to fully participate in the battle if P. P. Ukhtomsky wanted to resume it, and could not go to a breakthrough in Vladivostok.
Retvizan - 23 hits. Even before the battle, the battleship had about 500 tons of water in the bow rooms, and a large-caliber Japanese shell that damaged the 51 mm armor plate covering the waterline in the bow led to additional flooding. It is difficult to say how much all this prevented the breakthrough to Vladivostok - on the one hand, after the battle, the ship proceeded to Arthur at a sufficiently high speed (probably at least 13 knots). But on the other hand, on the evening of July 28, the excitement increased from the southeast, i.e. if the battleship continued on its way, the waves would hit the bow of the starboard side, where the damaged armor plate was located. When the ship, towards the end of the battle, was sailing this course, the increase in the trim on the bow was so strong that it caused anxiety of the senior officer, who went to see what happened. At the same time, the turn to Arthur led to the fact that the waves "attacked" the other side of the battleship, so that, according to the testimony of its commander, water that had previously entered it began to flow out of the bow hole. Of the other damage, only one was serious - a large-caliber projectile jammed the bow turret of 305-mm guns. The nasal tube received damage similar to that of the "Tsarevich", but the rest did not suffer significant damage, so the battleship had enough coal to break through to Vladivostok. Conclusion: very ambiguous. Despite the partial loss of combat capability and the failure of part of the artillery, the battleship could continue the battle and, probably, could still go to Vladivostok, despite the damage and flooding of the bow.
"Victory" - 11 hits. The least damaged Russian battleship had no serious damage. One 305-mm projectile knocked out a plug in the 229-mm armor belt of the ship, due to which a coal pit and 2 corridors were flooded, another shell of the same caliber hitting the unarmored side formed a hole that was overwhelmed by water, but in general these floods were insignificant. Conclusion: the ship could continue the battle and go to the breakthrough to Vladivostok.
"Peresvet" - up to 40 hits (35 of them are described). Heavy damage to the masts and torn halyards, due to which the ship was not able to raise signal flags anywhere, except for the bridge handrails (from where almost no one saw them). Two hits of 305-mm shells on the starboard side - unarmored bow, led to very extensive flooding and a trim on the bow. When the rudder was shifted, the water in the forward compartments of the living deck spilled over from one side to the other, which is why the roll reached 7-8 degrees and held for a long time, often until the next shift. The ship did not obey the helm well. At the same time, the booking did not seriously suffer - the 229 mm armor plate was displaced, causing minor flooding (160 tons of water entered) and the 102 mm upper belt plate split from the 305 mm shell hit, however, the shell did not pass inside. The bow tower turned with difficulty, the pipes were badly damaged. As a result, according to the report of the flagship ship engineer N. N. Kuteinikov, upon returning to Port Arthur, there was almost no coal left on the ship. Conclusion: despite serious damage, "Peresvet" could continue the battle on July 28, but because of the increased consumption of coal, it could not follow to Vladivostok.
Sevastopol - 21 hits. Nevertheless, the ship did not receive serious damage, with the exception of a large-caliber projectile that exploded in the area of the aft pipe and damaged the pipelines of the aft stoker compartment, which caused the speed to drop sharply - the ship could not produce more than 8 knots, moreover, there is reason to assume that it and I couldn't give 8 knots. "Sevastopol" remained combat-ready, its artillery was in order, there were no serious floods: from the blows of enemy shells the hull flowed in the place damaged by the collision with the battleship "Peresvet", and behind the armor plates of the main belt, which were hit by heavy shells, the bolts of the mountings "flowed" but that was all. Thus, "Sevastopol" could stand in line only if P. P. Ukhtomsky reduced his squadron speed below 8 knots, but this was hardly possible. Despite the fact that the chimneys of the battleship almost did not suffer, according to N. N. Kuteinikov, when returning to Arthur, there was almost no coal on the "Sevastopol". Conclusion: the battleship could fight on its own, but due to the loss of speed, it was not able to either follow along with the squadron or go to Vladivostok alone. The latter was all the more impossible due to the lack of coal.
Poltava - 28 hits. The battleship had no critical damage to armor or artillery, but a shrapnel damaged the bearing of the left side vehicle, which reduced the ship's speed, and the hull was seriously damaged. Particularly unpleasant was the hole in the stern, formed by the hits of two Japanese shells and having 6, 3 m in length and 2 m in height. Despite the fact that the hole was located at a known height from the waterline, the ship began to take water in waves. Through the efforts of the crew, it was possible to somehow patch the hole, but the continuation of the battle or the increase in excitement were very dangerous for the battleship. The ship received a certain amount of water and, following the last in the ranks, already in the 1st phase began to lag behind the squadron. The chimneys of the ship received some damage, senior officer of the "Poltava" S. I. Lutonin writes:
"The top of the rear pipe is cut off by ¼ of its length, and the middle is ripped open, there is a huge hole in the front."
Unfortunately, there is no information on coal reserves at Poltava after its return to Port Arthur. But we have already quoted the words of the senior artilleryman of "Peresvet" V. N. Cherkasova:
"There is enough coal on" Sevastopol "and" Poltava "in peacetime only to reach by the shortest economic route from Arthur to Vladivostok, then the available stock in a combat situation will not be enough for them even halfway."
An interesting testimony was also left by the flagship ship engineer N. N. Kuteinikov. Describing the damage to the ships of the squadron, he reported:
“The draft in the boilers dropped significantly from damage to the chimneys and casings, so the coal consumption was probably excessive. I saw almost empty coal pits on Peresvet and Sevastopol."
In other words, N. N. Kuteinikov says that excessive consumption of coal was characteristic of all ships that received the corresponding damage, and the fact that he pointed out the absence of coal only for Peresvet and Pobeda does not at all indicate thatthat on the other battleships everything was in order. In view of the above, it is very difficult to assume that the "Poltava", and so not shining in range, and even damaged pipes, was able to reach Vladivostok. Conclusion: "Poltava" could, albeit with a certain risk, continue the battle, but was unlikely to have the opportunity to go to Vladivostok due to a lack of coal reserves.
Theoretically, on the evening of July 28, 4 battleships could continue the battle as part of the squadron: "Retvizan", "Peresvet", "Pobeda" and "Poltava". "Sevastopol" lagged behind and could keep the formation at a speed of less than 8 knots, and "Tsesarevich" could not go in the ranks at all. In practice, due to the self-will of E. N. Shchensnovich, who tried to lead the squadron to Arthur, P. P. Ukhtomsky had only three battle-worthy battleships under his command, and with these forces he could not resume the battle with the Japanese fleet, even if he had such a desire. As for trying to wait until dark and only then go for a breakthrough without engaging in battle with the battleships of H. Togo, only Retvizan and Pobeda were capable of this - these two battleships could go to Vladivostok at night, developing 13-14 and maybe even 15 knots. If it suddenly turned out that there was enough coal on the Poltava to break through, then it was possible to try to bring this battleship to Vladivostok, but in this case it was necessary to go no more than 8-10 knots at an economic speed.
Thus, it can be stated that in the second phase of the battle, Heihachiro Togo, albeit with a huge risk to his ships, still achieved the task. Having approached the Russian battleships, he inflicted such serious damage on them that a breakthrough of the 1st Pacific Squadron in full strength was no longer possible. In the best case, 2 or 3 battleships could go to Vladivostok, and both the Retvizan and Poltava suffered very seriously in the battle. And even with the most fantastic assumptions in favor of the Russians, these 2-3 ships on the morning of July 29 would have been opposed by 3 practically intact battleships and 4 Japanese armored cruisers who did not participate in the battle at all. True, three 305-mm guns were disabled on Japanese ships, but the "Retvizan" also had a jammed bow turret of the main caliber: besides, in fact, to resume the battle, H. Togo would have had a much larger number of ships.
But these considerations were not dictated by P. P. Ukhtomsky return to Port Arthur: the main problem of the rear admiral was the lack of information - this is well stated by V. N. Cherkasova:
“The admiral actually could not take command, no one answered his signal, and it was not possible to call anyone to him. The darkness that came very quickly prevented all attempts."
What did V. K. Vitgeft immediately after the end of the 1st phase of the battle on July 28? Inquired ships for damage. Having learned that such could not prevent the further continuation of the battle with the full strength of the squadron, the admiral made further decisions. In contrast, whatever signals P. P. Ukhtomsky, almost no one reacted to them. To understand the state of the forces entrusted to him, P. P. Ukhtomsky could not. The battleship, on which he himself was, was badly damaged and could not go to Vladivostok due to a lack of coal. Accordingly, to determine which ships are suitable for a breakthrough, and which ones are not, to allocate suitable ones to a separate detachment and send them to Vladivostok - the rear admiral could not do any of this.
Another question - what if P. P. Ukhtomsky had such an opportunity - would he? There are great doubts about this, but history does not know the subjunctive mood: one can only hypothesize how P. P. Ukhtomsky, if his battleship had not been so damaged, and he was able to establish communication with other ships. Well, in fact of what happened, "Peresvet" was unfit for a breakthrough, followed by "Pobeda" and "Poltava", the other ships ("Sevastopol" and "Tsesarevich") nights and became easy prey for the Japanese in the morning, turn P. P. Ukhtomsky to Vladivostok. In addition, the rear admiral could not have been aware of the gluttony of the Pobeda boilers and the problems with the Poltava chassis: these battleships could not be taken to Vladivostok without first finding out their condition, because this could doom the latter to senseless death.
In these conditions, the return to Port Arthur, even if in violation of the order of the Sovereign Emperor, should be considered fully justified. As for the idea of staying overnight at sea at the site of the battle, it was most likely dictated by the desire not to lose the ships in the approaching twilight. But this did not happen - the squadron was still able to pack up and went to Arthur.
Thus, the decision of P. P. Ukhtomsky about returning to Port Arthur was, in fact, the only possible one. What's interesting is that, in retrospect, we can argue that it was also completely correct.
After all, how did the Russian sailors see the battle? In their opinion, the Japanese ships received very serious damage (it always seems so in battle). Undoubtedly, in the bases of the Japanese metropolis, this damage could be repaired very quickly - but in order to be repaired there, it would be necessary to lift the blockade from Port Arthur, and the commander of the United Fleet, obviously, could not go to this. So all that remained for him was to repair himself according to his ability at his flying base, near the Elliot Islands. But the temporary base cannot be well equipped for repairs: the crew forces, and the floating workshops - that's all the Japanese could count on. At the same time, although Port Arthur's ship-repairing capacities were inferior to those of the Japanese in the metropolis, they obviously surpassed the capabilities of H. Togo near the Elliot Islands.
And this, in turn, meant the following. In the opinion of the Russian sailors, both squadrons suffered decently in the battle, which means that both of them needed repairs. But due to the fact that the battleships of the 1st Pacific Squadron have the opportunity to be repaired in Port Arthur, and the Japanese will have to be repaired with improvised means, the Russians will have time faster. This means that if the Russian squadron re-emerges for a breakthrough, the Japanese will be able to resist it with only part of their forces, or they will be forced to send damaged and unrepaired ships into battle. It was possible to go for broke - to spend a few days on additional loading of coal and the most important repairs, and in 5-7 days again go for a breakthrough.
In fact, the Japanese did not suffer so much that they needed to be repaired for a long time, but, on the other hand, they lost 5 305-mm guns out of 16, which greatly reduced the combat power of the squadron, while replacing these guns with new ones it was very difficult. Thus, if the Russian battleships, having solved the problem with coal and slightly repaired, re-entered the sea, they would indeed have encountered a fairly weakened enemy.
Consequently, the return of the 1st Pacific Squadron to Port Arthur was not a mistake. A mistake was the refusal to re-enter the breakthrough, or to a decisive battle with the Japanese after the Russian battleships were returned to service.
The actions of P. P. Ukhtomsky should be considered correct: but it should also be recognized that the turn of the Retvizan and Peresvet to Port Arthur caused a certain confusion among the ship commanders and flagships of the squadron. They found themselves in an extremely difficult position. On the one hand, the Sovereign Emperor ordered to go to Vladivostok, but orders must be followed. On the other hand, it was clear that the squadron could not continue the battle now, which means that it should return to Arthur. But will she come out of Arthur again? Will there be another breakout attempt? The commanders faced an extremely unpleasant choice. To carry out the order of the Tsar and go to Vladivostok? And thus weaken the squadron, when, having gathered strength and repaired, will again go for a breakthrough? Doesn't such an act smell like a shameful flight? Or return with everyone to Arthur? And perish there, if the "All-Blessed" do not sanction another attempt at a breakthrough? But right now there is an opportunity to lead your ship to a breakthrough, avoid senseless death and fulfill the will of the Emperor?
