As we said earlier, when the Retvizan and Peresvet turned in the direction of Port Arthur, the commanders and junior flagships of the 1st Pacific Squadron found themselves in a very ambiguous position. According to the letter of the charter, they had to do what the commander of the squadron, the admiral, ordered, but he went to Arthur, while the Sovereign Emperor ordered to break through to Vladivostok. If we were guided not by the letter, but by the spirit of the law, then even then it was not clear what to do: go to the breakthrough on our own, and thus weaken the squadron if it subsequently makes a second attempt to go to Vladivostok, or stay with the squadron … but who knows if it will take the risk does she re-go to sea?
The squadron turned to Arthur at about 18.20. For some time all her ships went together, but after 40 minutes, i.e. at about 19.00, the commander of the cruiser detachment, Rear Admiral N. K. Reitenstein, made the final decision to go to Vladivostok. To this end, "Askold" increased its speed and raised the signal "Be in the wake line" - it should have been read as an instruction to "Pallada" and "Diana" not to follow "Askold", but to take a place in the ranks of battleships, which they did: N. K. himself Reitenstein overtook the battleships and, passing in front of the Retvizan's nose, raised the signal "Follow me." In other words, there was already a third officer (in addition to P. P. Ukhtomsky and Shchensnovich), striving to take over the command of the squadron.
And here again confusion arises - of course, the admiral did not know who was in command of the squadron and whether P. P. Ukhtomsky. But what prevented him from coming closer to the "Peresvet" and finding out the state of the junior flagship? N. K. Reitenstein could easily have done this, and then there would have been no reservations left: nevertheless, the commander of the cruiser detachment did not do that. Why?
It can be assumed that N. K. Reitenstein decided to go for a breakthrough at all costs. If P. P. Ukhtomsky is killed or wounded and does not command the squadron, then there is no point in requesting "Peresvet", and N. K. Reitenstein, being a rear admiral, has the right to do what he sees fit. If the prince remained on duty, then he obviously does not mind returning to Arthur - otherwise "Peresvet" would not have gone to the wake of the "Retvizanu". Accordingly, the chances that P. P. Ukhtomsky will allow N. K. Reitenstein to break through on his own, are minimal, most likely, he will order the cruisers to return with the squadron. But N. K. Reitenstein did not want to receive such an order at all - and if so, then why should he inquire about the state of P. P. Ukhtomsky? Now N. K. Reitenstein had every right to act independently: "Peresvet" was badly damaged and did not seem to raise any signal (at least they did not see anything on "Askold"). But having received an order from the junior flagship, N. K. Reitenstein, of course, will no longer be able to break it …
Why didn't Retvizan follow Askold? The answer is very simple - when the swell arose and the nose of the Retvizan began to "sink", filling with water through the damaged 51 mm plate of the bow armor belt, E. N. Shchensnovich decided that his ship was not capable of breaking through to Vladivostok. Then, not wanting to just leave the battle, he attempted to ram, but did not succeed, because he received a concussion at the most crucial moment. The ram did not succeed, and E. N. Schensnovich turned to Port Arthur. He had the right to do so - in accordance with V. K. Vitgeft, "Retvizan" was the only ship that was allowed to return to Port Arthur, as it received an underwater hole before the breakthrough began.
It is very difficult to say how legitimate such a decision was made by the "Retvizan" commander. It can be assumed (without having any evidence) that the battleship could still go to the breakthrough or to a neutral port. We know for sure that the ship did not have problems with the flooding of the bow, following to Arthur, but it must be borne in mind that at this time it was moving, substituting the left side of the swell, so that part of the water that entered the hull through the damaged armor plate on the starboard even flowed out back. Also, "Retvizan" did not need any urgent measures to ensure survivability in Arthur's harbor. However, all of the above does not mean at all that the Retvizan was able to go to Vladivostok, exposing the damaged starboard side to the waves. E. N. himself Schensnovich could hardly witness the damage to the bow of his battleship. His injury was not penetrating, and on this basis, some Internet analysts believe it to be quite insignificant and did not interfere with E. N. Shchensnovich to fulfill his duties. But what is a splinter contusion? Imagine that a person was hit in the stomach from full swing with the end of a thick metal rod, reinforcement, if you like. This will be the concussion.
Thus, "Retvizan" did not turn after "Askold", because its commander considered the battleship incapable of breaking through, and "Peresvet" - because P. P. Ukhtomsky decided to return to Arthur. "Diana" and "Pallada" took their place behind the battleships, as they were ordered by N. K. Reitenstein. As a result, of all the ships of the squadron, only Novik and the 2nd destroyer squadron under the command of S. A. Maksimova, and a little later - "Diana".
In literature, the "Askold" breakthrough is usually described in the most enthusiastic tones: probably anyone who was even a little interested in battles at sea in the Russo-Japanese War read a description of how "Askold" fought first with a detachment of Japanese ships led by the armored cruiser "Asama ", And he could not detain the Russian cruiser, caught fire and retreated, and" Chin Yen "received two hits. Then the path of the Russian cruiser was intercepted by Yakumo and the 3rd combat detachment, but Askold damaged one of the Takasago-class cruisers and set the Yakumo on fire, so the Japanese were forced to withdraw from the battle.
The spectacle, albeit a large, but just an armored cruiser, forcing two much larger and better armed armored ships to retreat, certainly strikes the imagination, but, alas, it does not quite correspond to reality.
What actually happened? By 19.00 the position of the opposing squadrons was approximately as follows:
"Asama" and the 5th combat detachment of the Japanese approached the Russian squadron from the northeast, which, generally speaking, was a fair amount of arrogance on their part - one single armored cruiser and antiques of the 5th detachment went out to the firing range of Russian battleships, in while H. Togo with his battleships was too far away and could not support them with fire. On the other hand, the Japanese commander separated the Nissin and Kasuga from the 1st combat detachment, which followed the Russians from the southeast, and the Yakumo and the 3rd combat squadron were located to the southwest of the Russians.
"Askold" went along the line of the Russian squadron and cut its course - at that time he really had a firefight with "Asama" and ships of the 5th detachment. It is likely that the Japanese ships at that time were firing at Askold, but you need to understand that the Japanese could not go to intercept or pursue him - behind the back of the flagship cruiser N. K. Reitenstein, the battleships of the 1st Pacific Squadron marched, which, of course, were too tough for Asama and the 5th detachment. Therefore, "Askold" did not break past the "Asama" and did not force him to retreat - the Japanese ship was forced to retreat in order not to be exposed to the attack of the Russian battleships. In addition, in this shootout "Asama" did not receive a single hit, he did not receive any damage in the battle at all, therefore, there could be no fire on it. But in the "Chin-Yen" really hit two Russian shells, but it is impossible to say for sure whether this was the result of the fire of "Askold" or whether the gunners of another Russian ship achieved success.
After N. K. Reitenstein passed under the nose of the Retvizan, it turned southwest and the exchange of fire died down. For "Askold" rushed "Novik", which went to the left of the Russian battleships, and destroyers of the 2nd squad: "Silent", "Fearless", "Merciless" and "Stormy". 1st squad under the command of captain 2nd rank E. P. Eliseev did not follow "Askold" - they preferred to carry out the instructions of the late V. K. Vitgeft, who ordered to stay near the battleships at nightfall. Somewhat later, E. P. Eliseev distributed his torpedo boats among the battleships and tried to approach the lead Retvizan in his Endurance, but the latter, mistaking the Endurance for a Japanese destroyer, opened fire on it, so that E. P. Eliseev was forced to go to Arthur on his own. As for the "Diana", the cruiser at about 19.15-19.20 tried to follow the "Askold", but quickly found that he could not catch up with him, which is why he turned back and stood in the wake of the next one to Arthur "Pallas".
Thus, from the entire Russian squadron, only two armored cruisers and four destroyers went to break through, while the destroyers immediately fell behind - they could not go against the wave (swell in the right cheekbone) at the speed of an armored cruiser. "Askold" and "Novik" were in for a hot affair: in front of them was the armored "Yakumo" and the 3rd combat detachment, consisting of the three best armored cruisers of the Japanese - "Chitose", "Kasagi" and "Takasago". In addition, the 6th combat detachment was located in the immediate vicinity - three more small armored cruisers. All this was more than enough to stop and destroy the Russian ships. Nevertheless, the Japanese failed to do this, and the reasons for how this could happen are completely unclear.
Heihachiro Togo had every reason to let the Russian squadron return to Arthur, because he was becoming a trap for the 1st Pacific squadron. In addition, in the coming night, the Japanese destroyers could well have succeeded by sinking one or even several Russian battleships. H. Togo probably already knew that his ships had not suffered too much and were ready to resume the battle at any moment, but the Russian squadron could suffer losses from mines, torpedoes, ground artillery until the next exit … and all this played into the hands of the commander of the United Fleet.
But the breakthrough of two high-speed cruisers into Vladivostok did not fit into the Japanese plans at all - they were already forced to hold large forces against the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. Therefore, "Askold" and "Novik" had to be stopped, and the Japanese seemed to have everything they needed.
It can be assumed that the following happened. It is known that the Yakumo had big problems with speed, and according to some testimonies in the battle on July 28, it barely kept 16 knots. He, of course, tried to intercept the Askold, but could not block his path, and the fire of the Yakumo gunners was not accurate enough to inflict heavy damage on the Russian cruiser. Thus, "Yakumo" did everything he could, but he could neither catch up nor damage the "Askold". At the same time, Vice Admiral S. Deva showed extreme discretion, if not cowardice, and did not dare to fight with his three fast cruisers against Askold and Novik. And this is incomprehensible. Yes, "Askold" was one-on-one superior to "Kasagi" or "Takasago", but the latter were individually clearly stronger than "Novik", so the superiority in forces remained with the Japanese, who, moreover, could count on the support of the cruisers of the 6th squadron, and if you manage to bring down the speed of "Askold" - then "Yakumo". And even if things suddenly turned out very badly for some Japanese cruiser, it was easy for him to get out of the battle - the Russians went for a breakthrough and did not have time to finish off the enemy.
It is also surprising that the Japanese do not record hits on their ships in this episode of the battle. It is reliably known about only one hit on the Yakumo - when the Poltava, in the interval between the 1st and 2nd phases, stuck a twelve-inch projectile into this cruiser. As a result, the behavior of the Japanese during the breakthrough of "Askold" and "Novik" is somewhat shocking: not a single Japanese ship was damaged, the gunners of the Russian cruisers did not achieve a single hit, but S. Deva, having superior forces, does not risk pursuing N. K. Reitenstein! How to explain this - S. Virgo's indecision or the concealment of combat injuries, the author of this article does not know, although he tends to the former.
In any case, only the following is reliable - at about 7.40 pm "Askold" and "Novik" entered the battle with the 3rd combat detachment and "Yakumo". Having passed them, the Russian cruisers fired at the Suma, which had lagged behind the 6th detachment and quickly got out of the way of the Russian cruisers. It got dark at 20.00 and at 20.20 "Askold" ceased fire, since he no longer saw the enemy. In the future, the honor to pursue the Askold and Novik fell to the Akashi, Izumi and Akitsushima - a persistent feeling that the Japanese sent in pursuit exactly those ships that were obviously not able to catch up with the Russians.
The result of the fire of the Russian cruisers for the entire time of the breakthrough was one likely hit on the Izumi (which Pekinham had mentioned about the damage on the night of July 29), following along with the 6th detachment, although this cannot be reliably asserted.
However, regardless of the number of hits achieved, the courage of Rear Admiral K. N. Reitenstein is beyond doubt. He could not have known about the problems with the boilers and (or) Yakumo vehicles and had to consider that he was going into battle against a high-speed armored cruiser, significantly superior in firepower and protection to the Askold and Novik combined. But, apart from the Yakumo, the Japanese had a great advantage over N. K. Reitenstein, so that the battle promised to be very difficult, and the Russian ships were almost doomed to defeat. The Rear Admiral, of course, could not have imagined that the enemy would turn out to be so timid and unobtrusive - and still went for a breakthrough. And therefore, despite the fact that "Askold" did not inflict the damage to the Japanese ships, which is attributed to him, but its valiant (albeit not too skillful) crew and the admiral himself fully earned the respect and admiration of contemporaries and descendants. Of course, the decision of N. K. Reitenstein to leave the squadron, rushing to break through on his own, at that moment was controversial, but further events confirmed his innocence. For a second breakthrough, the 1st Pacific Squadron did not come out and was buried alive in the harbors of Port Arthur, while the actions of the rear admiral saved Askold for Russia.
But even before "Askold" ceased fire, two large ships separated from the squadron and went to Vladivostok - at 20.00-20.05 "Tsesarevich" and "Diana" decided not to return to Arthur, and "Diana" was followed by the destroyer "Grozovoy" …
In total, 6 battleships, 4 armored cruisers and 8 destroyers left Arthur for a breakthrough, of which 1 battleship, 3 cruisers and 5 destroyers did not return. For various reasons, none of these ships reached Vladivostok, the Novik and Burny were killed, and the rest of the ships were interned in various neutral ports. All this happened after the battle on July 28, 1904, and thus goes beyond the scope of this study. But nevertheless, one should warn those who are ready to indiscriminately blame the commanders of the ships that did not return to Arthur only because the latter refused to break through to Vladivostok and went to neutral ports. The "Tsarevich" did not have coal to go to Vladivostok. "Askold" on the morning of July 29 could not give more than 15 knots of travel - this is how the damage received by the cruiser during the breakthrough affected it. "Diana" was a sad sight at all - the hit of a Japanese 10-inch projectile into the underwater part led to the fact that three aft six-inch guns could no longer fire, so that the cruiser was left with only three active 6-inch guns (he went to a breakthrough with only 6 such guns, since the other two remained on the batteries of Port Arthur). At the same time, the maximum speed of the "Diana" before the enemy hit was 17 knots - it was with this speed that the cruiser tried to follow N. K. Reitenstein, and it is obvious that, having received a heavy shell from the Kasuga under the waterline, the cruiser still lost speed. In fact, the Novik remained the only large ship capable of breaking through without eliminating at least some of the damage - but it was he who made just such an attempt.
The remaining 5 battleships, the Pallada armored cruiser and 3 destroyers went to Port Arthur. On the night of July 28-29, the commander of the United Fleet threw 18 fighters and 31 destroyers against the scattered ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron. Attacking the Russian ships, the latter fired 74 torpedoes, having achieved one hit in the stern of the battleship Poltava, but, fortunately, the torpedo, hitting at an acute angle to the hull, did not explode. The only damage was the incapacitation of the 254-mm Pobeda gun by a direct hit from a 57-mm projectile.
Let's sum up the lengthy 12 articles of this cycle. The battle on July 28, 1904 is usually considered a draw, since it did not lead to a decisive result and not a single ship of the opposing sides was killed in it. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the Russians were defeated in it, since their task - to pave their way to Vladivostok - was not fulfilled. The combined fleet was supposed to prevent the breakthrough of the Russians into Vladivostok, and this is how it actually happened: despite the fact that part of the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron escaped the Japanese, almost all of them were forced to intern in neutral ports, and did not participate in further battles …
However, the fact that the Japanese fleet achieved its goal does not mean that it acted in an exemplary manner. The commander of the United Fleet made many mistakes in managing the forces entrusted to him, and it can be said that the victory was achieved not thanks to, but rather, contrary to the naval skill of Heihachiro Togo. In fact, the only reason for the Japanese victory was the overwhelming superiority of the training of the Japanese squadron gunners over the Russian. The battle on July 28, 1904, also called the Battle of the Yellow Sea or the Battle of Shantung, was won by a Japanese artilleryman.
Usually, the pre-war system of training naval gunners is blamed for the low level of training of Russian gunners, but this is not true. Of course, there were many complaints about the training of gunners - the number of trainings was insufficient, as was the consumption of shells per gun, they usually fired at fixed or towed shields at low speed, and the firing distances were extremely small and did not correspond to the increased distances of naval combat. But with all this, and provided that the artillery training programs were not violated, the training of the Russian and Japanese gunners should be considered comparable.
As we wrote earlier, in the battle on January 27, 1904, the ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron achieved a comparable number of hits with the Japanese. The percentage of hits of large-caliber shells from Russian ships was 1, 1 times lower than that of Japanese ships, the Japanese were 1.5 times more accurate in average caliber. And this is despite the fact that:
1) Before the battle, Russian ships stood in the armed reserve for 2, 5 months and, unlike the Japanese, did not have any training at that time.
2) Shortly before entering the reserve, many senior gunners left the squadron (demobilization in 1903), their place was taken by "young soldiers", who had practically no time left for training.
3) The Japanese gunners possessed significantly better technical means - there were more rangefinders, and in addition, the Japanese guns were equipped with optical sights, while the Russians did not.
4) The Japanese had a well-manned staff of officers, while on Russian ships this was not, as a result of which, in a number of cases, conductors commanded the fire of the plutongs and towers.
We also cited as an example the situation in which already in the post-war period the ships of the Black Sea Fleet, including the armored cruiser Memory of Mercury, found themselves in the post-war period. he is alone, but a sharp drop in accuracy "almost twofold" was characteristic of all "reserved" ships. So it was only 3 weeks, not 2, 5 months, and there was no demobilization between the shooting. The above allows us to conclude about the need for regular training and a rapid decrease in the quality of shooting in the absence of such.
In other words, if, for some reason, the war would have begun not on the night of January 27, 1904, but in the late summer of 1903, even before demobilization, then it can be assumed that the Russians could have demonstrated even more accurate shooting than the Japanese.
Thus, the superiority of the Japanese in firing accuracy in combat on July 28, 1904 was not at all due to gaps in the pre-war training of artillerymen, but to neglect of combat training during the war itself. Almost 9 months passed since entering the armed reserve on November 1, 1903 and until the battle on July 28, 1904, of which the squadron conducted full-fledged training for only 40 days, during the command of S. O. Makarov. This attitude towards the exercises, of course, had an extremely negative impact on the gunners' ability to hit the target. After such a break, one should be surprised not that the battleships of the 1st Pacific Squadron fired four times worse than the Japanese, but that the Russian gunmen generally hit at least someone.
Gaps in combat training were the result of the general passivity of the squadron (again, excluding the short period of command of S. O. Makarov). One can understand V. K. Vitgeft, who feared to lead the squadron to the outer roadstead - everything there was littered with mines so that any exit to the sea was fraught with mortal risk. Suffice it to recall that on June 10, the battleships, having entered the outer roadstead, despite the preliminary trawling, stood exactly on the mine bank (10-11 minutes were caught between the ships) and only by a miracle not a single ship was blown up. But the limit of miracles for that day had obviously been exhausted, so that upon its return the Sevastopol was blown up by a mine.
Indeed, it was fraught with the withdrawal of the squadron in such conditions, but who is to blame for the fact that the Japanese were completely at ease with Arthur's outer roadstead? The Russian squadron possessed a position inaccessible to the Japanese (internal raid) with sufficiently powerful coastal batteries, and any damaged ship could easily be delivered for repair. In contrast, the Japanese had only a flying base and a landing site in Biziwo, which were supposed to be guarded. They had more ships, but the possibilities for repair and coastal defense were much less, and therefore, with proper preparation, OUR destroyers had to throw mines at night and threaten Japanese ships with torpedo attacks, retreating and remaining inaccessible during the day under the cover of high-speed cruisers. Alas, with the exception of Stepan Osipovich Makarov, who was the only one who remembered that the best defense was an attack, our admirals did not think about an attack. They did not think of imposing their will on the enemy and forcing him to defend by their active actions. On the contrary, the absolutely unthinkable and unjustified in the war credo "Take care and not risk" was proclaimed, and it is to him that we owe the fact that the 1st Pacific Squadron could not control not only the Yellow Sea, but at least the outer raid of its own harbor.
The real reason for the defeat of the Russian squadron lies not at all in the fact that in the battle on July 28, she did something wrong. On the contrary, Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft commanded surprisingly sensibly, he took full advantage of the endless mistakes of Heihachiro Togo, repeatedly putting the latter in a very unenviable tactical position. But all this could not compensate for the gaping and almost nine-month failure in combat training, and therefore it can only be sadly stated that the battle in the Yellow Sea was lost by the Russians even before it began.
This concludes the description of the battle on July 28, 1904, or the battle in the Yellow Sea (at Shantung), and the last thing left is to analyze the opportunities that V. K. Vitgeft just before and during the battle. This is what the last article of this cycle will be devoted to.
