The flagship's signal, made at 09.00: "The fleet is informed that the Emperor ordered to go to Vladivostok" caused undisguised relief in the squadron. Now the crews gained confidence that V. K. Vitgeft will not turn back to Port Arthur due to the main forces of the enemy, as happened when leaving on June 10. Vl. Semyonov, a senior officer of the armored cruiser Diana, later wrote:
“This signal was met with undisguised approval.
- How long ago! - Well done Vitgeft! - No retreat!.."
But the fleet needed another hour in order to overcome its own minefields and go to clean water, and all this happened in view of the enemy. Old armored "Matsushima", "Nissin" and "Kasuga" were visible, and the destroyers even tried to attack (or simulate an attack) on the trawl caravan. But "Novik" without the admiral's order left the formation, covering the caravan from the sea, on which the Japanese attack ended. The armored cruisers of the Japanese moved away, and at 09.35 the Tsarevich, still in the minefield, raised a signal: "Do not interfere with the Japanese fleet to telegraph."
What was the reason for this? Probably V. K. Vitgeft believed that with so many observers, the squadron's radio operators simply would not be able to suppress the Japanese negotiations. And even if it did, all the same, the main forces of H. Togo are somewhere nearby and will soon be notified of his exit, albeit with flag signals from high-speed destroyers. At the same time, the radio stations of those times were very unreliable, and the benefits of them were undoubted, and therefore it made no sense to overload them with work more than necessary.
At about 10.00, the squadron entered clean water, at 10.15 V. K. Vitgeft released the trawling caravan, which, under the cover of gunboats and destroyers from the 2nd detachment (not going to breakthrough), returned to Port Arthur. The squadron lined up in marching order - the first was the 2nd rank cruiser "Novik", behind it, in five cables - the wake column of the battleships of the squadron: "Tsesarevich" in the lead, behind him - "Retvizan", "Victory", "Peresvet", " Sevastopol "and" Poltava ". On the right traverse of the "Tsarevich" was the 1st squad of the 1st destroyer detachment, on the left - the 2nd squad. Following the battleships in the same wake column were the cruisers: the lead "Askold", "Pallada" and "Diana".
In such a formation, the squadron moved to a breakthrough - having set a course for Cape Shantung, the ships first moved in an eight-knot course, increasing it first to 10, and then to 13 knots. Such a gradual increase in speed was explained by concern about the condition of the battleship Retvizan, which was knocked out the day before - it was reinforced by bulkheads, but, of course, they could not seal the hole itself. As a result, the battleship went for a breakthrough, having a hole of 2.1 m2 in the underwater part, 250 tons of water in the bow end and the danger of additional flooding if the reinforcements holding the water in the flooded compartments could not withstand. Therefore, the speed of the squadron was increased slowly, and the Retvizan was asked several times from the Tsarevich about the condition of the bulkheads.
However, the surprise was presented not by Retvizan, but by Tsarevich: about 5 minutes after the squadron reached 13 knots, at 10.35 am the flagship battleship raised the signal "I can not control" and the speed had to be reduced. The "Tsarevich" walked in jerks, then slowing down, then accelerating, causing the column of battleships to stretch out, and the intervals between them were violated. By 11.00, the situation on the flagship seemed to have been taken under control, he gave the signal "Observe the distances" (and also - "Whistle for wine and for lunch", which was probably not at all superfluous in view of the impending battle) and the squadron began to gain 10, then 12 knots. And half an hour later, Japanese troops appeared from all directions.
Ahead and to the left of the course of the Russian squadron, about 20 miles from it, could be seen the 1st combat detachment, the main forces of H. Togo. By this time, "Nissin" and "Kasuga" had already joined the battleships, so that 6 armored ships were going to cross the course of the Russian squadron. The 3rd detachment appeared from the rear-right, the "dogs" from the "Yakumo", but the distance to them from the Russian ships was not made out - the Japanese cruisers were poorly visible. The 6th detachment, 3 armored cruisers marched on the left in 100 kbt, and on the left and behind in some 80-85 kbt - Matsushima, Hasidate and the Chin-Yen that joined them … In the intervals between the detachments, numerous destroyers.
For the armored fleets of that era, it was extremely important not only to detect the enemy, but to engage with him in the most advantageous position for himself, which could be achieved by maneuvering in view of the enemy. Usually, the time of the battle is determined from the moment of the first shot until the moment of the ceasefire, but this is not entirely true. The battle begins when the admirals of the opposing fleets, seeing each other, begin to change the courses and speeds of their squadrons in order to achieve a positional advantage for their ships. Therefore, here we will consider the maneuvering of the Russian and Japanese squadrons from the moment they discovered each other until the first shot.
From the point of view of the naval tactics of those years, the position of the Russian squadron was obviously losing - weighed down by the slow-moving battleships Poltava and Sevastopol, and now also by the Retvizan, whose bulkheads could pass at any moment, it was losing speed to the main forces of the Japanese. In theory, of course, it was possible to single out a "high-speed wing" in the squadron battleships "Tsesarevich", "Pobeda" and "Peresvet", which, perhaps, could move even a little faster than the Japanese line (its speed was limited by the rather slow-moving "Fuji "). But the listed ships were the weakest battleships of the Russian squadron and therefore did not have a chance to defeat the 1st combat detachment of H. Togo. "Battleship-cruisers" Peresvet and "Pobeda" in their technical characteristics occupied an intermediate position between battleships and armored cruisers, and besides, they fired poorly: on maneuvers in July 1903, only "Petropavlovsk" fired worse than these battleships-cruisers. As for the "Tsarevich" … Of course, according to its passport data, it was a powerful ship, capable of fighting one-on-one with any Japanese battleship. However, as the senior officer of "Poltava" S. I. Lutonin:
“To admit, we didn’t count on 'Tsarevich'. This battleship, the strongest in our squadron in terms of armament, movement and armor, was the weaker of all in terms of personnel. He made the transition from Toulon to Arthur, never fired, was not in battle on January 27, went to sea for the second time, and what his team was - I could be convinced, looking closely at the seven people transferred to Poltava."
Strictly speaking, S. I. Lutonin is not entirely right. The squadron battleship "Tsesarevich" left for the Far East directly from the French shipyard, and arrived in Port Arthur on November 19, 1903, when the other ships of the squadron were already in the armed reserve: nevertheless, the battleship managed to shoot a little on the way. The organization of these firing was interesting - going in tandem with the armored cruiser Bayan, the ships alternately towed the shield, while the "fellow traveler" fired at it with small-caliber shells or cartridges. However, these were only barrel, and not caliber firing, the benefits of them were undoubted, but this was not enough for the training of gunners. After the arrival of the "Tsesarevich", they did not enter the reserve, but the ship did not receive any special training either - in November-December it stood in the inner roadstead, conducting only those exercises that could be conducted while at anchor. Only on December 29, the ship went out for firing for the only time. According to R. M. Melnikov:
“Practical and combat charges and cartridges were fired from 305-mm guns 4 and 4, 152-mm 7 and 10, 75-mm 13 and 46, 47-mm 19 and 30. As you can see, not all of the guns had to make even one shot."
And then, from January 2, the ship got up for repairs, because a new supply of 305-mm shells was finally delivered from France, which they did not manage to deliver before the ship left for Arthur. The "Tsesarevich" returned to service only on January 20, made one and only exit as part of the squadron, and then … the war began, on the very first night of which the battleship received a torpedo and again stood up for a long repair.
Thus, one should not expect much from the "Peresvet", "Pobeda" and "Tsarevich" troika.
And the other ships of the squadron, alas, could not boast of high combat readiness: as already described in previous articles, the Russian battleships lost a significant number of old servicemen demobilized before the war, and had almost no practice since November 1, 1903, when they stood in reserve. After that, the ships went to sea only for a few days before the war, and even during the period of command of S. O. Makarov, and "Tsesarevich" and "Retvizan" did not even have this, because were under repair. The rest of the time, the battleships defended in the inner roadstead of Port Arthur. As a result of this standing, even performing ordinary maneuvers was difficult for them (remember the case of the Sevastopol battering ram!), And even more difficult and (even more so!) Separate maneuvering in battle by two detachments was out of the question.
In one line, the Port Arthur squadron was capable of fighting, but at the same time its squadron speed was 1.5-2 knots inferior to the Japanese fleet, and this was a great danger for the Russians. Earlier, in one of the articles devoted to the Battle of Tsushima, we examined in detail the British maneuvers of 1901-1903, but now we recall that in the 1903 exercises, the "fast wing" of Vice Admiral Domville, having 2 knots of speed advantage, put a "stick over T "at a distance of 19 kbt to two most experienced British admirals, one of whom (Wilson) in the two previous years himself won in this way his opponent (Noel). We also said that H. Togo studied in England for a long time, and his combat and life experience was far superior to that of V. K. Vitgeft. It would seem that nothing prevented Heihachiro Togo from repeating the recipes of the British commanders and, in their usual aggressive manner, trying to expose the Russians "a stick over the T" at a relatively short distance - this would be the best way to deliver a crushing blow to the Russian squadron, since it went to sea.
So what happened on July 28, 1904 from the moment the main forces discovered each other (11.30) and until the opening of fire (approximately 12.22)?
Period 11.30-11.50
Rear Admiral V. K. Vitgeft acted reasonably and simply, but this is the case when simplicity does not equal primitiveness. Wilhelm Karlovich saw the enemy to the left and in front of his course, at a great distance from his ships, and he quickly, at a speed of no less than 15-16 knots, was crossing the line, while the sun was at that time to the right and in front of the Tsarevich. In such conditions, it was not even worth dreaming to take an advantageous position between the Japanese fleet and the sun, so that its rays would blind the gunners of H. Togo. All that did Wilhelm Karlovich - keeping the same course and speed, raised the signal "Rebuild in battle formation" and ordered to prepare for battle on the left side. One can, of course, say that one should have prepared for battle not with the left side, but with the right side, because the movement of the Japanese clearly betrayed a desire, cutting the course of the Russian squadron, to stand under the sun and attack from this quite advantageous position. But the fact is that in battle you cannot know anything for sure: the enemy was on the left and V. K. Vitgeft ordered to prepare with him for battle, and if the Japanese go under the sun and are on the right - well, there is more than enough time to rebuild, since the distance between the units is still great. But there was no need to delay the rebuilding of the battle formation: the lack of fusion of the squadron did not dispose to rebuilding at the last moment. It was not necessary to increase the speed until the rebuilding was completed for the same reasons - V. K. Vitgeft did not do this.
In accordance with the order of the commander, "Novik", sailing forseil (a term that is used many times in many sources and denotes the lead ship of the squadron), took its place in the ranks of cruisers between "Askold" and "Pallada", and the destroyers moved to the starboard side. And it was here that "accidents inevitable at sea" made themselves felt: at 11.50, the "Tsarevich" again raised "K" ("I can not control") and rolled out of order, and the rest of the ships of the squadron were forced to stall.
We now turn to the actions of the Japanese. The commander of the United Fleet saw the Russian squadron, and saw that she did not start any difficult maneuvers in view of the enemy. The simplest solution for the Japanese would be to approach the Russian squadron in such a way as to stay to the left of it, and then put the "stick over the T". At the same time, the ships of H. Togo, having performed the "stick" maneuver, would go out under the sun, which would blind the Russian gunners, making it difficult for them to fire.
Instead, in the first phase of the battle, Heihachiro Togo undertook a series of strange and incomprehensible maneuvers. Seeing the Russian squadron, H. Togo for some time led his ships on the same course, but somewhere around 11.40 he turned to the left, i.e. in the direction opposite to the one where the Russian ships were.
He was still going across the course of the Port Arthur squadron, but now he had to cross it later than he could. Why did he do it?
The main task of the Japanese fleet was to protect sea communications between Japan, Korea and Manchuria, and for this it was necessary to neutralize the Russian squadron. Heihachiro Togo probably knew that the Japanese siege artillery was firing at the water area of Port Arthur, respectively, the exit of Russian ships to a breakthrough into Vladivostok or "the last and decisive" must have taken place in the very near future. And here is the Russian squadron in front of him. In order to solve his strategic task, the Japanese commander had two options - either to drive the Russians back to Port Arthur, where siege artillery would overwhelm them, or to crush and destroy them in a naval battle. And if V. K. Vitgeft did not want to return, as soon as he saw the Japanese fleet, then obviously it was necessary to impose a sea battle on the Russians as early as possible in order to inflict maximum damage before dusk, in which at least some of the Russian ships had a chance to slip past the Japanese.
Japanese sources claim that H. Togo was trying to "lure" V. K. Witgeft farther out to sea - but what sense could that be for the Japanese commander? On the contrary, if V. K. Witgeft, seeing the Japanese fleet, again turned to Port Arthur, at the muzzle of siege artillery, H. Togo should have welcomed this.
Whatever the true motives of the Japanese commander, his battleships, having deviated to the left, nevertheless crossed the course of the Russian squadron at 11.50 - just when the "Tsarevich" fell out of order.
Period 11.50-12.15
The Russian squadron was in a fever. The flagship battleship, having gone out of action, forced the rest of the ships of the squadron to abruptly slow down, however, after a few minutes "Tsarevich" was able to take its place. At 12.00 V. K. Wigeft increased speed and raised the signal "Have 13 knots", but just 5 minutes later, raising the same flag "K" and stopping the course, the battleship "Pobeda" rolled towards the side. The formation was broken, and the squadron again reduced the speed to the smallest."Pobeda" took its place at 12.10 (some sources indicate that "Pobeda" went out of order at 12.20) Vl. Semenov wrote about this episode as follows:
“Combat squadron! The color of the Russian fleet!.. - clenching his fists, panting with rage, did not speak, but growled my neighbor on the bridge of "Diana" …
And did I dare to stop him? Tell him: “Be quiet! Your business is to do your duty!.. "And if he answered me:" Those who created this squadron, did their duty?.."
No!.. What to say!.. - I had no thoughts of stopping him … Tears of impotent rage came to my throat myself …"
So, at least 10 minutes, from 11.50 to 12.00, when the Tsarevich again led the squadron, or for 20 minutes from 11.50 to 12.10 (if it is true that Pobeda returned to service at 12.10), the Russian squadron was virtually uncontrollable and incapable to a quick maneuver. The direct fault of V. K. There is no Vitgeft in this - unless, of course, his refusal to actively train crews is taken into account. However, these 10-20 minutes could decide the fate of the Russian fleet: if, instead of making an incomprehensible turn away from the Russian squadron, which we wrote about above, H. Togo would have turned towards the ships of V. K. Vitgeft (as shown in diagram # 1), or even just kept the original course, he would have put his "stick over the T" to the Russians exactly at the moment when the Port Arthur squadron lost control!
It can be stated that in the outset of the battle, Heihachiro Togo missed the brilliant opportunity to finish the battle with lightning speed with a convincing victory for the United Fleet.
However, this was the beginning of H. Togo's strange maneuvers. After the Mikasa crossed the course of the Russian squadron at 11.50, the 1st combat detachment for some time followed the same course, and then suddenly turned away "all of a sudden" from the Russian squadron and began to move away from it. At the same time, the speed of the Japanese squadron was about 15-16 knots, and the Russians could not even gain 13 knots, which made the distance between the ships increase.
But back to the actions of V. K. Vitgeft. After 12.15 pm, the "Tsarevich" began to gradually turn to the left, and did this until the very opening of fire and even later. What for? Let's see the diagram:
We cannot know what was guided by V. K. Vitgeft, deviating to the left, but not because this maneuver is illogical, but because he had many reasons for such an act. Let's try to put ourselves in the place of the Russian admiral. Now the main forces of the enemy have appeared, they are clearly ahead of the Russians in speed, and their position is quite advantageous and has advantages over that occupied by the ships of V. K. Vigefta. It's time for the Japanese to join the battle, but instead H. Togo begins some kind of incomprehensible "dance with a tambourine", undertaking a series of maneuvers of an unclear purpose. He seems to be luring the Russians, urging them to follow the same course, but in battle it is completely undesirable to do what the enemy expects of you! By 12.15, thanks to H. Togo's maneuvering, the courses of the Russian and Japanese squadrons diverge, so why not "help" him by turning a little more to the left? After all, the 1st combat detachment still has a certain advantage, it can still, sharply rushing to the left, throw the Russians "a stick over T". But if the Russians take it to the left, the speed of the squadrons' divergence will increase even more and the further, the more difficult it will be for H. To put his "stick". Moreover, if he succeeds in this maneuver, the sun, although it will blind the Russian artillerymen, but not so much, because the Japanese ships will be not against the background of the solar disk, but to the left. For the Japanese to engage in such a position means giving up a number of advantages, and one could hope that H. Togo would not do this. No one could prevent the Japanese commander from moving further away from the Russian squadron, taking a more advantageous position and trying his luck again, but such games were completely satisfied with V. K. Vitgeft. The more Heihachiro Togo "pranks" around the Russian squadron slowly going to break through, without getting involved in a decisive battle, the more chances the Russian admiral has to hold out until darkness. But this was his goal - some chances for a breakthrough into Vladivostok (at least part of the squadron) from Wilhelm Karlovich appeared only if in the daytime battle on July 28 the ships led by him did not receive heavy damage.
The turn to the left for the Russian fleet was quite logical, but why V. K. Was Vitgeft doing it so slowly, gradually leaning towards a new course? We cannot know what the Rear Admiral was guided by, but regardless of the reasons for his decision, it was absolutely correct. The fact is that such a change in course, due to its smoothness, the Japanese commander might not have noticed, or, more precisely, noticed, but not immediately, and the later H. Togo understands that the Russians are changing course, the more difficult it will be for the commander of the United Fleet put "stick over T".
But apart from the above, V. K. Vitgeft was one more reason to turn left …
Period 12.15-12.22
The exact time when the Japanese commander undertook his next maneuver is unknown, but it can be assumed that the Japanese began to execute it at 12.15, possibly a few minutes later. H. Togo again orders "all of a sudden," and his squadron again goes across the Russian fleet. "The stick over the T" is as if set, and at 12.20-12.22 the fight begins.
It is still unclear whose shot was the first, some sources say that the Nissin opened fire, others that the Tsarevich opened the fire, and still others that it was Peresvet, but this, by and large, does not matter. Much more important is that Heihachiro Togo, possessing all positional advantages, managed to bring his squad into battle in almost the worst configuration. After all, what actually happened? First, at 11.50 the Japanese crossed the course of the Russian squadron, and the flagship of H. Togo "Mikasa" was leading. Then - an inexplicable turn "all of a sudden", and the Japanese detachment in front formation begins to move away from the Russians. And suddenly - again the U-turn "all of a sudden", now the lead is not "Mikasa", but the end of the Japanese column - the armored cruiser "Nissin" …
And what did all this lead to? Instead of setting up a "crossing T" for the Russians half an hour earlier, crossing the course of the Russian squadron so as to go out into the sun, and thus make it as difficult as possible for the gunners V. K. Vitgefta, the 1st combat detachment puts a "shelf over T", moving in the opposite direction. Instead of leading the main forces to carry out such an important maneuver himself, H. Togo transfers command to the junior flagship, Vice Admiral S. Kataoka, since it is the Nissin who now leads the column! What could have happened that made H. Togo at first ignore the excellent opportunity to put the Russians "a stick over T", and then, having squandered the advantages of the position, suddenly rushed to put it from almost the worst position? What happened around 12.15 that hadn't happened before?
Only one. Evasion of V. K Vitgeft to the left. But what could be so dangerous for himself X. To in this turn?
Of course, after so many years, it is impossible to assert anything for sure, but we will still risk putting forward a version explaining all the above inconsistencies in the actions of H. Togo. Let's run a little ahead: some (but not all) sources note that at 12.30 "Tsarevich" made another, not smooth, but a sharp turn to the left. On the one hand, this turn can be easily justified by at least a desire to get out of the "stick over T", but some sources claim that the flagship of V. K. Vitgefta bypassed the Japanese mine bank. So, Vl. Semenov writes:
“At 12 hours 30 minutes. The "Tsarevich", which has been leaning more and more to the east lately, suddenly turned to the right abruptly, at 4 ° R. It turns out that the enemy destroyers, scurrying to and fro far ahead, on the course of the squadron, aroused his suspicion, and, as it turned out, not in vain. Not disdaining any, even the smallest, chance, they threw floating barrage mines (without anchors) along the road to us.
The turn of the "Tsarevich" saved the squadron from the danger of passing directly through this floating mine bank, but we nevertheless passed quite close from it, almost very close. From the "Novik" (obviously, on the orders of the admiral), holding in place and letting the entire column pass by, they continuously semaphore: "Beware of floating mines!" - Two of these have passed on our port side not far away. (Or rather, we passed them.)"
So what do we see? From the very beginning of Kh. Togo's maneuvering, one gets the impression that he is luring the Russian squadron somewhere. Official Japanese historiography indicates that he wanted to captivate V. K. Vitgeft farther from Port Arthur, but, according to the author, this version does not stand up to criticism at all:
At first, the commander of the United Fleet did not have the slightest reason to lure V. K. Vitgeft at sea - on the contrary, the turn of the Russians back to Arthur, under the barrels of siege artillery, was quite beneficial to the Japanese.
Secondly, all subsequent actions of H. Togo in this battle do not at all testify to his desire to absolutely destroy the Russians in a naval battle - rather the opposite.
And finally third … If Kh. Togo really wanted to lure the Russians further into the sea, he could easily initially take such a course that it would appear to the ships of V. K. Vitgefta not at 11.30, but later, and as much later as you like. The Russian squadron was under close surveillance, surrounded by numerous Japanese destroyers and cruisers. Accordingly, the commander of the United Fleet perfectly knew all her movements and had the superiority in speed, so that he could appear on the horizon at any moment when he saw fit. Kh. Togo did not suffer from sclerosis at all and remembered perfectly well that on June 10 V. K. Vitgeft led his ships forward only until he saw the main forces of the United Fleet, but after that he turned back almost immediately. And if the Japanese commander decided to carry the Arthur squadron into the sea, why was it necessary to show V. K. Witgeftu his battleships ahead of time?
But if Heihachiro Togo did not lure the Russian ships into the sea, then … where did he lure them? And here is the author's version: seeing that the Russians were walking without changing course, the Japanese destroyers threw mines along the course of the Russian squadron. And then H. Togo simply waited in the hope that V. K. Witgefta will be blown up on them! This hypothesis is supported by the fact that while the Port Arthur squadron followed the same course, the Japanese commander did absolutely nothing, writing bizarre zigzags far from the Russian ships. But when they began to turn to the left, thereby leaving the minefield intended for them, he rushed into battle.
In other words, H. Togo had the advantages of a position, and the squadron speed of his detachment was superior to that of the Russians. Taking advantage of all this, the commander of the United Fleet could try to defeat V. K. Witgeftu, putting the "stick over the T" in the most comfortable position for himself, and the Japanese commander's chances of success were very high. Considering that, as we now know, in the period 11.50-12.20 the Russian squadron lost control of two battleships, including the flagship, these chances were not just great, but huge. But Heihachiro Togo gave up all this for the sake of a ghostly chance of a successful sabotage, a chance to weaken the Russian squadron even before the start of the battle.
Of course, the author of this article does not at all claim to be the ultimate truth. Perhaps his hypothesis is incorrect, but in fact H. Togo, in full accordance with the official historiography, really tried to take V. K. Vitgefta further from Port Arthur. But then it should be admitted that Kh. Togo refused a brilliant chance to defeat the Russians in order to … V. K. Vitgeft took his ships further out to sea for a dozen miles!
It is impossible to even say which of these options characterizes Heihachiro Togo from the worst side.
No, formally, as a result of his maneuvers, the Japanese commander nevertheless put a "stick over the T" to the Russians. But what was the point in this, if at the beginning of the battle the head "Tsarevich" and the Japanese line were divided (according to various sources) from 70-75 to 90 kbt? "Stick over T" has deadly efficiency when it is "placed" at effective fire range, when the concentrated fire of the squadron that has made the "crossing" gives enough hits to quickly destroy the lead ships of the enemy one after another. It was not for nothing that British Admiral Domville put his "stick" at a distance of only 19 kb during the 1903 maneuvers! But the Japanese gunners, no matter how good they were, could not provide enough hits from either 90 or 75 kbt.
At 12.22 p.m. Heihachiro Togo put in the "crossing T" by V. K. Witgeftu … With about the same success H. Togo could "cross the course of the Russian squadron", being somewhere near the Elliot Islands, when V. K. Vitgeft has not yet brought his ships out of Port Arthur.
So, having analyzed the actions of the parties in the outset of the battle, we can state that the maneuvering initiated by the commander of the United Fleet, regardless of the reasons that caused it, was completely erroneous. At the same time, the actions of the Russian squadron should be recognized as almost flawless - surprisingly enough, but V. K. Vitgeft did exactly what and when it was necessary. On the one hand, one can even say that he did nothing at all (except for a rearrangement and a gradual turn to the left). But the fact is that a military leader must not only be able to act when it is necessary, but also be inactive when no action is needed (of course, he must also be able to distinguish the first case from the second). VC. Vitgeft carefully watched his enemy, and did not prevent the Japanese from making mistakes, and his only turn had the consequence that Heihachiro Togo, having many advantages at the time of the meeting of the squadrons, was forced to rush into battle without taking advantage of any of them.
P. S. So that none of the respected readers get the impression that the author is "cheating" with the maneuvering schemes, I present a Japanese map of the battle, guided by which, everyone can make their own opinion about the maneuvering of the squadrons.
