By the beginning of June 1904, all the battleships of Port Arthur had acquired technical readiness to go to sea. On May 15, "Sevastopol" was repaired, on May 23 - "Retvizan", two days later - "Tsarevich", and, finally, on May 27, "Pobeda" returned to service. There are no more reasons to continue to defend Arthur's inner roadstead, and on May 21, Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft sends a telegram to the governor:
“The battleships, except for the“Victory,”the cruiser are ready to leave. The enemy is 15 versts from Arthur. Whether to go to sea, whether to engage in battle, or to stay (telegram No. 28 dated May 21, 1904, received by the governor on June 1, 1904).
And then … The conventional wisdom:
1. Alekseev demanded that VK Vitgeft go to Vladivostok, and he refused in every possible way and did not want to do this.
2. Temporarily, etc. the squadron commander preferred to use the fleet to defend Port Arthur on the model and likeness of the defense of Sevastopol in 1854-55. during the Crimean War.
3. The flagships of the squadron supported Rear Admiral VK Vitgeft.
Now often there are reproaches of insufficient determination (or even cowardice) of the squadron commanders: they say, they did not want to go into battle, they hoped to sit outside the fortress walls … But, reading the documents of that era, you come to the conclusion that the matter is much more complicated: the governor Alekseev, Rear Admiral V. K. Vitgeft and the flagships and commanders of the 1st rank ships had completely different ideas about the tasks of the Port Arthur squadron.
Governor Alekseev believed that the Japanese fleet was significantly weakened. Even before V. K. Vitgeft first brought the squadron to sea (June 10, 1904) Alekseev temporarily reported to ID. The commander of the Pacific squadron, that the Japanese have only 2 battleships and 5 armored cruisers at Port Arthur. Alekseev showed even greater optimism in his telegram No. 5 of June 11 (received in Port Arthur only on June 21):
“I am reporting the state of the Japanese fleet: the Hatsuse, Shikishima, Ioshino, Miyako sank; at the docks - "Fuji", "Asama", "Iwate", "Yakumo", "Azuma", "Kassuga"; only "Asahi", "Mikasa", "Tokiwa", "Izumi" (), "Nissin" are operational.
Here Evgeny Ivanovich (Alekseev) reduced the Japanese fleet to 2 battleships and 3 armored cruisers. Interestingly, with what feeling did Wilhelm Karlovich read this telegram, who the day before this telegram was sent, met 4 battleships (not counting the Chin Yen) and 4 armored cruisers of the Japanese at sea?
So, the governor believed that the force opposing the Arthurians at sea had significantly weakened. At the same time, he feared a Japanese land attack on Port Arthur and quite rightly believed that the preservation of the squadron was more important than the preservation of the fortress. In accordance with these considerations and despite the general unpreparedness of the squadron, he gave the order to withdraw the ships to Vladivostok:
“… I am taking all measures to unblock Arthur as soon as possible. But in view of any accident, the fleet must, defending the fortress, prepare for the last extreme, go to sea for a decisive battle with the enemy, smash it, and pave its way to Vladivostok … (telegram No. 1813 dated May 19, 1904, received at the squadron on June 3, 1904).
However, five days later, the governor clarified his position:
"If the squadron succeeds in defeating the enemy fleet upon leaving, and Arthur still holds out, then the squadron's duty, instead of leaving for Vladivostok, is to help lift the siege of the fortress and support the actions of our troops sent to Arthur's rescue …" (telegram No. 1861 dated May 23, 1904, received on squadron on May 31, 1904).
Thus, the position of the governor was reduced to the fact that it was necessary to leave the fortress and go to Vladivostok, taking advantage of the relative weakness of the enemy. If you suddenly manage to break it on the road, then there is no point in going to Vladivostok and you can stay in Port Arthur, helping the fortress.
Initially V. K. Vitgeft seemed to share the opinion of his boss. In response to the governor's telegram received on June 6:
"… as soon as all the ships are ready and the first favorable moment for the exit of the squadron against the now weakened enemy at sea, take this important and serious step without hesitation."
The Rear Admiral replied:
“… The enemy is not terrible. Delayed the exit without extreme, doubting the safety of mines; in the area of 10 miles mines explode in all directions … I go out in high water, about ten. In case of death, I ask you to petition my wife for a pension, I have no money."
It is extremely strange to read this. "The enemy is not terrible"? Since March, the squadron did not go to the exercises from the internal raid, the newest "Retvizan" and "Tsarevich" did not have any training at all since the fall of 1903 - only twelve days in January, in the period from the moment of the termination of the armed reserve and until the explosion at the very beginning of the war …
V. K. After leaving the sea on June 10, Wigeft wrote in a report to the governor:
“… the squadron in the combat sense was no longer there, but there was only a collection of ships that did not practice in squadron navigation, and the late Admiral Makarov, who died so unexpectedly, feverishly working on its organization at an even more favorable time, left, only in this sense, raw material …"
And yet “the enemy is not terrible”, but right there: “In case of death, I ask you to petition my wife for a pension” …
Is it possible that V. K. Did Vitgeft believe in the governor's information about the extreme weakening of the Japanese fleet? It is doubtful: the rear admiral himself assumed that he would encounter more powerful forces, informing Alekseev:
“… Since the importance and necessity of the squadron's departure is recognized, albeit with a risk, I will leave when ready, trusting in God. I personally did not prepare for such a responsible duty. Meeting according to my information: 3 battleships, 6 armored cruisers, 5 cruisers of II rank, 32 destroyers … (telegram No. 39 of June 2, received by the governor the next day).
What did V. K. Vitgeft? He himself informs the governor about this in report No. 66 of June 17, 1904 (report on the squadron's exit on June 10):
“My plan of proposed actions after the exit was to have time to leave for the night at sea, away from destroyers, expecting that the enemy's fleet is much weaker than ours, according to the information of the Headquarters, and is located in different parts of the Yellow Sea and Pechila. In the afternoon it was supposed to go to Elliot and, having found the enemy, attack him in whole or in parts."
VC. Vitgeft went to sea in the hope that the governor's data was correct, and then he was going to give battle. However, Wilhelm Karlovich had a presentiment that he himself estimated the number of the opposing enemy much more accurately than Alekseev, and the battle could turn out badly both for the squadron and for himself. Perhaps V. K. Vitgeft had a presentiment of his own death, it happens. But, be that as it may, the rear admiral withdrew the squadron and met the Joint Fleet not far from Port Arthur, and in forces exceeding Alekseev's expectations, and his own. Only 4 armored cruisers Kamimura were missing, busy capturing Vladivostok cruisers - they could not be returned to Arthur promptly, but the entire 1st combat detachment consisting of 4 battleships, Nissin and Kasuga, supported by two more armored cruisers of the 2nd detachment was in front of V. K. Witgeft. For the general battle, Togo gathered all the forces available to him into a single fist: the ships of the 1st and 2nd combat detachments accompanied the "rarities" - "Matsushima" and "Chin-Yen" of the third squadron of Vice Admiral S. Kataoka. It is not surprising that V. K. Vitgeft retreated - he did not consider himself able to fight such an enemy. In the evening the battleship "Sevastopol" ran into a mine, which required a rather lengthy repair, so that the rear admiral took the squadron to an internal roadstead.
And he was probably a lot surprised that such his actions did not satisfy the governor at all. Despite the fact that in his first message, sent even before the submission of the report to V. K. Vitgeft pointed out:
“I met the enemy - 5 battleships, including Chin-Yen, 5 or 6 armored cruisers (in fact, there were only 4. - Author's note), including“Nissin”and“Kasuga”, 8 class II cruisers, 20 destroyers, why he returned to Arthur."
Alekseev, without hesitation, answered V. K. Vitgeft:
“I received Your Excellency's report No. 66 on the 17th.
Upon careful examination, I do not find sufficient grounds on which, instead of following my instructions - to go to sea and, attacking the enemy, inflict a defeat on him, you decided to return to the raid …”Telegram No. 7 dated 1904-18-06, received on 1904-20-06.
Answering the letter temporarily Id. the head of the Pacific Ocean squadron, sent by him to Alekseev along with a report, the governor wrote:
“Remember the battle of the Varyag, and if you entered the battle with greater faith in your squadron, you won, perhaps, a brilliant victory. I expected this, and all my instructions were reduced to a single goal, so that the squadron of the Pacific Ocean, having endured a series of trials, could valiantly serve the Tsar and the Motherland."
It is likely that these answers of Alekseev completely shocked V. K. Vitgeft. After all, he was not a stupid person, and he perfectly understood his inadequacy for his position, and agreed to it because there was an order and because he was assigned only to temporarily perform duties during a period of general weakness of the fleet and the absence of major active operations. But then he was entrusted with going to sea and fighting, even against the weakened forces of the enemy, and now it was assigned to him, no less than to become a real commander, lead the fleet into battle and defeat the vastly superior forces of the enemy!
Alekseev perfectly understood the weakness of his chief of staff and at first had no intention of throwing him into a decisive battle. But for some time now he simply had no other choice: to replace the deceased S. O. Makarov, Vice Admirals N. I. Skrydlov and P. A. Bezobrazov, and the latter was to accept the post of chief of the Port Arthur squadron. However, on the proposals of the governor, somehow transfer P. A. Bezobrazova in Port Arthur N. I. Skrydlov replied with a categorical refusal due to the too high risk of such a "crossing". And to prevent the siege of Port Arthur by the forces of the ground army, it also did not work out. And besides, Alekseev has already informed the sovereign about the need to break through the squadron to Vladivostok. Accordingly, on June 18, Nicholas II sent a telegram to his governor, in which he wondered why the squadron, having not received any damage, nevertheless returned to Port Arthur and ends the telegram with the words:
"Therefore, I consider it necessary for our squadron to leave Port Arthur."
And so it happened that the “convenient” governor V. K. No one will replace Vitgeft, but he cannot be allowed to defend himself in Arthur either. And instead of waiting for the newly arrived admiral and surrendering command, Wilhelm Karlovich now had to independently give a general battle to the Japanese fleet!
Gently, but very persistently, the governor made it clear to V. K. Vitgeft, that the situation has completely changed, and now the rear admiral is charged with the duty to defeat the Japanese fleet or otherwise lead the Port Arthur squadron to Vladivostok. And so, obviously, he drove the latter into the blackest melancholy. That is why Wilhelm Karlovich gives an extremely pessimistic answer to the above letters from the governor:
“Not considering myself a capable naval commander, I command only by chance and necessity, as far as reason and conscience, until the arrival of the fleet commander. Combat troops with experienced generals retreat without inflicting defeat, why is it that from me, completely unprepared, with a weakened squadron, thirteen-node course, without destroyers, is expected to destroy the strongest, well-trained, seventeen-node combat fleet of the enemy … I did not deserve reproaches: I acted, reported honestly, truthfully about the state of affairs. I will try honestly and die, the conscience of the death of the squadron will be clear. God will forgive, then it will be found out”(telegram No. 52 of June 22, 1904, received by the governor on June 26, 1904).
In the same letter to V. K. Vitgeft outlines the opportunities that he sees for the forces entrusted to his command:
“I report to the goodwill that according to the present state of affairs in Arthur, the state of the squadron, there are only two decisions - either the squadron, together with the troops, to defend Arthur to the rescue, or die, since the moment of entering Vladivostok can come only when death is in front and behind.
Thus, Wilhelm Karlovich outlined his position, which he adhered to, judging by his other letters to the governor, until the very exit to the sea and the battle on July 28, 1904 V. K. Vitgeft did not consider it possible either to successfully fight the Japanese in view of Port Arthur, or to break through to Vladivostok: had he been left to himself, he probably would have written off the crews and guns to the shore to defend the fortress in the image and likeness of the defense of Sevastopol. And this, of course, does not suit the governor at all. Therefore, in a reply telegram, he writes V. K. Vitgeft:
“I received telegram on June 22, No. 52. Your opinion expressed in it about the existence of only two solutions for the squadron - to defend Arthur, or to perish with the fortress - is so inconsistent with the HIGHEST instructions and the assignment of the forces entrusted to you that I am obliged to propose a discussion of the council of flagships and captains to the question of leaving and breaking through the squadron to Vladivostok, with the participation of the port commander (telegram No. 11 of June 26, 1904, received at the squadron on July 2, 1904).
The meeting of commanders and flagships took place a day after receiving the governor's telegram, on July 4, 1904, according to its results, a protocol was sent to the governor, according to which:
“There is no favorable and safe moment for the fleet to leave the sea … … The squadron cannot enter Vladivostok without a fight … contribute to the early fall of the fortress."
When reading this report, one involuntarily gets the impression that neither the flagships nor the commanders of the ships wanted to go to sea and preferred to disarm the ships for the defense of Arthur, but in reality this is not the case. The fact is that the signed "Opinions" of the flagships and captains of the 1st rank who participated in the meeting were attached to the "Protocol" itself, and there their opinions were specified quite unambiguously:
Opinion of the head of the battleship detachment (signed by Rear Admiral, Prince Ukhtomsky):
“I believe that our squadron should not leave Port Arthur for Vladivostok, unless, in the general course of military events, it has not been decided to surrender Port Arthur to the enemy, without defending it to the last opportunity. All the main naval forces of the Japanese are gathered near Port Arthur, their army and their military transports, and therefore the place for our fleet is here, and not in the waters of the Sea of Japan."
Opinion of the Chief of Coastal Defense (signed by Rear Admiral Loshchinsky):
“The fleet, remaining in Port Arthur, significantly strengthens the passive and active defense of the fortress; it is likely that in the future it will also render an immense service to the passage of our main ground forces through Kin-Chjou and past Mr. Distant, where our squadron can approach, gradually catching mines in front of itself and, perhaps, in this place will give a general battle to the enemy."
Opinion of the chief of the cruiser squadron (signed by Rear Admiral Reitenstein):
“For the good of the cause, for the victory, the fleet should not leave Arthur. The real task of the fleet is to clear its way to the Far, which is being done. Move along the coastal strip to the Far, take possession of it and stay there. Then not only Arthur was saved, but the Japanese were expelled from Kwantung, and there is no way for the Japanese to reach Arthur either by dry or by sea, and our northern army can easily unite with Arthur. The fleet will leave, and the northern army will not come to Arthur, as there will be a screen of the enemy fleet in Talienvan."
Opinion of the commander of the battleship "Tsesarevich" (signed by Captain 1st Rank Ivanov):
“If Port Arthur is not a foregone conclusion to surrender, then with the fleet in it, he can successfully withstand the siege for another month, or another; the issue is in the amount of reserves and combat supplies, and the fleet, acting as actively as possible, can even significantly weaken the enemy squadron."
Opinion of the commander of the battleship Retvizan (signed by Captain 1st Rank Schensnovich):
“I foresee another case of the squadron leaving in the event of our second squadron entering the waters of the Pacific Ocean. In this case, the squadron that left Arthur will fight, and when the enemy squadron will hide in their ports for the inevitable repairs necessary after the battle at sea, the second squadron of the Pacific Ocean will remain and will dominate the sea."
Opinion of the commander of the battleship "Sevastopol" (signed by Captain 1st Rank von Essen):
“There is reason to think, however, that after the energetic actions of our cruising detachment in the Sea of Japan, part of the enemy's naval forces was withdrawn to the shores of Japan; there is a need to be convinced of this by making a reconnaissance of the exit of our squadron to the sea in full force, for a time from one to another full water. If at the same time it turns out that the enemy has significantly reduced ships operating against Arthur, then our fleet can take some active steps, keeping the Japanese in a constant tense state, and then leaving for Vladivostok is not necessary."
Opinion of the commander of the cruiser I rank "Pallada" (signed by the captain of the 1st rank Sarnavsky):
“My opinion is that the fleet will remain in Port Arthur until the last moment, and if the Lord God wills that Port Arthur was taken by the enemy, then our fleet will have to go out and break through, and no matter how many ships of our fleet come to Vladivostok, this will be our plus and our pride. Now, if the fleet leaves the besieged city, I’m even scared to think what a depressing impression this will make on the whole of Russia and on our ground forces.
Our fleet must now move on to more active operations against enemy coastal positions, their shops, and so on."
Opinion of the temporary head of the 1st destroyer squadron (signed by Lieutenant Maksimov):
“I consider the departure of the squadron from Arthur to go to Vladivostok wrong and unreasonable. I consider the exit of the squadron to fight the enemy beyond doubt.
Opinion of the temporary head of the II destroyer detachment (signed by Lieutenant Kuzmin-Karavaev):
"The squadron should try to defeat the Japanese fleet located off the Kwantung Peninsula, but in my opinion, it should not go to Vladivostok."
Thus, slightly exaggerating, we see three points of view on the further actions of the squadron:
1) The governor believed that with or without a battle, the fleet needed to break through to Vladivostok.
2) V. K. Witgeft believed that it would be best for the fleet to abandon active operations and focus on protecting Port Arthur.
3) The flagships and squadron commanders assumed that it would be best to stay in Port Arthur to the last extreme, and in this their point of view coincided with the position of V. K. Vitgeft. But, unlike the latter, many of them saw the task of the fleet not in bringing the guns ashore and helping the garrison to repulse the attacks of the Japanese army, but in interfering with the squadron's actions, weakening the Japanese fleet, or even giving him a decisive battle.
In the opinion of the author of this article, the opinion of the flagships and squadron commanders was the only correct one.
Unfortunately, the breakthrough to Vladivostok was completely impossible for the Russian squadron. And the point here is not at all that the Combined Fleet of Heihachiro Togo was superior to the Russian forces in Port Arthur in all respects. On the way to Vladivostok, the battleships of V. K. An absolutely unforgiving enemy awaited Vitgeft, his name was coal.
Lieutenant Cherkasov wrote in his Notes:
“… If Sevastopol and Poltava have enough coal in peacetime just to get the shortest economic route from Arthur to Vladivostok, then the available reserves in a combat situation will not be enough for them even halfway. "Novik" and the destroyers will have to load coal into the sea from the ships of the squadron …"
But who could give them this coal? According to the results of the battle on July 28, we see a completely bleak result: the "Tsarevich" was not too damaged in the battle, its guns and vehicles were in good order, the hull had no critical damage and flooding. From this point of view, nothing prevented the battleship from breaking through to Vladivostok. But in the battle, the chimneys of the ship suffered: and if in its normal state, following the twelve-node course, the battleship spent 76 tons of coal per day, then as a result of the battle this figure increased to 600 (six hundred) tons.
According to the project, the "Tsarevich" had a normal supply of coal - 800 tons, a full one - 1350 tons; on July 28, she went to sea with 1100 tons, since no one wanted to overload the ship before the battle. And after the battle on July 28, the battleship had only 500 tons: this would not have been enough before Vladivostok, before entering the Korean Strait.
Approximately the same situation developed with the battleship "Peresvet": it went into battle with 1200-1500 tons of coal (the exact amount, unfortunately, is unknown), and this should have been enough for 3000-3700 miles - the actual consumption of coal on ships this type reached 114 tons per day at a speed of 12 knots. The distance from Port Arthur to Vladivostok through the Korea Strait was less than 1,100 miles, so it would seem that such a supply is quite enough for the battleship. But in the battle two of his three chimneys were badly damaged. And although the exact consumption of the battleship's coal in the battle on July 28 is unknown, there is evidence that Peresvet returned to Port Arthur with almost empty coal pits. And this means that one could not even dream of any breakthrough to Vladivostok after the battle - the maximum that could be done was to bring the battleship to the same Qingdao and intern there.
As V. K. Vitgeft and flagships, it was almost impossible to go to sea secretly from the observers of Heihachiro Togo - it took too much time for the squadron to enter the outer roadstead and into the sea. And then the faster Japanese fleet, in any case, managed to intercept the ships of the Port Arthur squadron. Accordingly, the Russian battleships could not evade the battle, but in battle it is impossible to avoid damage. At the same time, the two oldest battleships obviously could not get to Vladivostok. Even without receiving combat damage (which is obviously fantastic), they would still have to intensively maneuver and move at higher than economic speeds - accordingly, they would quickly waste coal. In fact, the only possible option for their use was that "Sevastopol" and "Poltava", leaving with the fleet, helped him in the battle with the Japanese, and then returned to Port Arthur or interned in the same Qingdao. So it was possible to try to ensure the breakthrough of four battleships out of six, but if at least one of these four gets damaged pipes, then, like the Sevastopol and Poltava, it will not be able to follow to Vladivostok. And in the end, only half the squadron will break through, or even less.
And will it break through? Assessing the consequences of the battle on July 28, 1904, many authors point out that the Russians had almost broken through, that they had to hold out quite a bit, until darkness fell, and then - look for the wind in the field! But this is not at all the case. Having withstood the battle with the Russian squadron, the Japanese could easily set a course for the Korea Strait, at least even with part of their squadron - if the Russians managed to knock out some of the Japanese battleships and armored cruisers. And already there, joining up with the four armored cruisers of Kamimura, Heihachiro Togo could give a second battle to the remnants of the Russian squadron. The chances of slipping unnoticed by the Strait of Korea, past all observation posts and numerous auxiliary ships at V. K. There was practically no Vitgeft. And even if such a miracle happened, nothing prevented the Japanese from advancing to Vladivostok and intercepting the Russian squadron already on the outskirts of the city.
The problem of the Port Arthur squadron was that after the battle with the Japanese fleet and regardless of its result, some of the ships had to either return to Arthur or be interned, and only a part of the ships that entered the breakthrough could get to Vladivostok, and most likely - part is insignificant. But the Japanese ships damaged by Russian fire during the breakthrough will be repaired and put back into service. But the Russians do not: those who return to Arthur will perish, those who are interned will be saved, but will not be able to continue the war. Accordingly, it made sense to break through only if the question arose about the life and death of the Arthurian squadron, but the situation in June and early July 1904 did not look like that at all.
But to act actively from Port Arthur … it was a very tempting option, because in this case, a lot began to play against the Japanese. The Heihachiro Togo squadron was tied to the landing sites and covered the transports that supplied the army. But there were no Japanese bases there, all that the Japanese had were floating workshops, and in case of any serious damage they had to go to Japan for repairs. At the same time, although Port Arthur as a naval base was not able to compete with Japanese naval bases, it could repair moderate damage from artillery fire very quickly. The problem was the lack of a dock for battleships, but underwater damage in an artillery battle is not so frequent, and much less destructive than the same explosion on a mine.
And therefore the squadron did not need to leave Port Arthur, but should have been actively fighting, in the hope of imposing a battle on a part of the Japanese fleet. But even if this did not succeed, it was quite possible to risk and give a general battle to Heihachiro Togo near Port Arthur, when there was an opportunity for the wounded ships to retreat under the protection of the fortress. The badly beaten "Japanese" was supposed to go to Japan, and even accompanied by other warships, to be repaired there and spend time returning back - a similarly damaged Russian battleship had a good chance to return to service faster.
And besides, the squadron, not knowing what state the preparation of the 2nd Pacific squadron was in, seriously admitted that it could come up within a few months, and then another reason appeared to go to sea - to fight the Japanese, to tie their fleet in battle, even if the losses of the Port Arthur squadron are higher, they will not be meaningless, but will pave the way for the ships coming from the Baltic.
The mood of the flagships and caperangs of the Arthurian squadron was fully explained by the above reasons: they were in the fortress of Port Arthur for a long time, they understood that when trying to break through, the squadron, with a high degree of probability, would cease to exist as an organized combat force without causing significant damage to the Japanese combat fleet, and her departure will bring the fall of Port Arthur closer. So why leave? What could the squadron from Vladivostok do that it was not able to do, based in Port Arthur? Rear Admiral Ukhtomsky did not prove himself to be a great naval commander, but the words he said at the Meeting of flagships sounded as if Fyodor Fedorovich Ushakov or Horatio Nelson had suddenly spoken through his lips:
"Near Port Arthur, all the main naval forces of the Japanese are gathered, their army and their military transports, and therefore the place for our fleet is here."
In Russian historiography, the opinion somehow gradually developed that the constant demands of the governor Alekseev to break through the squadron to Vladivostok were essentially the only true ones, and that only indecision (if not cowardice) was temporary and so on. Commander of the Pacific Ocean squadron V. K. Vitgeft's speedy implementation was prevented. But if we put ourselves in the shoes of the flagships and unbiasedly consider the capabilities of the 1st Pacific Squadron: without an afterthought, but as the Arthurian sailors could see in June and early July 1904, we will understand that the desire of the governor to quickly take her ships to Vladivostok is premature and was dictated by the eternal "to take care and not to risk", as well as the fact that the governor, despite his admiral's rank, had a very poor idea of the consequences of such a breakthrough.
Unfortunately, one should not see a strategic genius in the attempts of V. K. Vitgefta to detain the squadron in Port Arthur. This delay made sense only under the condition of active hostilities against the enemy at sea, and this V. K. Vitgeft did not want to at all, preferring to anchor and only sending detachments of ships to support the land flanks. The matter is important and very useful, but not enough for the squadron.
The opinions of a number of flagships and ship commanders, alas, remained unheard: the squadron again froze in the inner basin of Port Arthur until the battleship Sevastopol was repaired. And there everything turned out to be the same: on July 25, the battleship entered service and on the same day the ships in the inner roadstead were under fire from siege 120-mm howitzers. The next day, Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft received a telegram from the governor:
“To the submitted minutes of the meeting of flagships and captains of the fourth of July, HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY deigned the following answer“I fully share your opinion about the importance of the soonest exit of the squadron from Arthur and the breakthrough to Vladivostok”.
On this basis, I confirm to you the exact execution of the orders set forth in my dispatch number seven. Report your receipt”(telegram No. 25 of June 21, 1904, received at the squadron on July 26, 1904). …
Two days later, on July 28, 1904, the squadron, led by the battleship Tsesarevich, on which V. K. Vitgeft, reached a breakthrough in Vladivostok.
