As you know, excessive tolerance towards those who calmly interact with our direct enemy behind our back can lead to a "stab in the back" at the most unexpected moment and in the most "weakened" zone. This is exactly what happened with the Su-24M front-line tactical bomber of the Russian Aerospace Forces on the morning of November 24. Our Su-24M was intercepted by multipurpose F-16 fighters of the Turkish Air Force over the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic (1-2 km from the Turkish border). The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation said that a short-range air-to-air missile with IKGSN (AIM-9 "Sidewinder") was used. As a result of hitting the missile defense system, presumably in the aircraft's ZPS, the power plant ignited and the tail surfaces of the bomber were damaged, which led to the crash of the car. Two pilots were able to quickly eject, but already when approaching the surface, small arms fire was opened at the defenseless commander of the vehicle, Oleg Peshkov, and Syrian jihadist Turkomans, holding the northern regions of the province of Latakia (near the Turkish border), were brutalized on the ground above him. pilot-navigator Konstantin Murakhtin was able to escape from the militants and was later rescued by the Syrian army together with Russian special forces; and in an organized search and rescue operation, we also lost a young marine soldier, Alexander Pozynich. This tragic incident forced a complete revision of the tactics and security measures of the Russian Aerospace Forces in the Middle East.
The criminal violation of all international standards for the protection of air borders is evidenced by all factors confirmed by ground-based radar means of objective control of the Syrian air defense, electronic equipment of the downed Su-24, as well as evidence provided by the rescued pilot-navigator of the Russian Aerospace Forces Konstantin Murakhtin. First, the Turkish air defense and air force operators did not issue any warnings over any of the radio communication channels; secondly, the Turkish F-16C did not even align with our Su-24M and did not make any warning maneuvers, but immediately entered the rear hemisphere (tail) of our car; thirdly, they used a short-range air-to-air missile with IKGSN, which did not allow the aircraft's radar warning system to detect the fact of a missile attack and make an anti-missile maneuver. If the AIM-120C AMRAAM missile were used during the attack, the Beryoza SPO would immediately detect the radiation of its active radar seeker and the pilots got at least a fraction of time for an anti-missile maneuver, but the Turks used the classics of the genre of real insidious cowards
Since the receipt of information on the interception of the Su-24M, many versions have been worked out, including interception by ground-based air defense systems of Turkey, but this version was discarded, since the aircraft did not perform anti-aircraft maneuvers and flew at an altitude of 6 km. What does this indicate? Almost all modern MANPADS with passive IKGSN, including Igloo-S, RBS-90 or Stinger, which have a maximum interception altitude of 4,000 m, even theoretically could not intercept the Su-24M returning to the Khmeimim airbase at an altitude of 6,000 meters. It was not used on the Sushka and the Hawk or Patriot air defense missile systems, the missiles of which have a PARGSN, and hence the illumination of the radar complexes, which would force the pilots to maneuver, since the Beryoza SPO would certainly have responded to the irradiation with AN ground-based radar equipment / MPQ-50 and AN / MPQ-46 (RLO and RPN SAM "Hawk") or AN / MPQ-53 ("Patriot"). For this reason, there remains the only version confirmed by the Turks: the interception was carried out by the F-16. Moreover, this was done really suddenly and by the most insidious method of "stabbing in the back." After the rescue of Konstantin Murakhtin, and his interview for the media, all of the above version was fully confirmed, and finally all myths were dispelled on November 27, after the press conference of the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Aerospace Forces V. Bondarev.
The Turks, long before the Su-24M combat operation, were planning their aggressive action, and at the time of the flight of our aircraft to the combat zone, they had already begun escorting it with the help of ground-based AWACS radar from deep within Turkish territory, and the coordinates were reported to the F-16S pilots, who by this time had already were in the air. And already upon the return of the bombed vehicle (with empty pendants), the Falcon, with the AN / APG-68 radar off, at the target designation of the same ground-based radar, imperceptibly entered the rear hemisphere of the Su-24M, which was on its way to the base. Moreover, the F-16C link had to approach in the mode of following the terrain (at ultra-low altitudes), in order to avoid being detected by ground-based air defense systems of Syria, as well as by the Russian Aerospace Forces radar on duty at the airbase in Latakia, but they still made flaws: the flight took place at 2- 3 km, and the Syrian surveillance radars were bearing Turkish fighters for a long time, loitering not far from the incident zone. The Turks knew very well that the Russian Air Force did not ferry A-50 AWACS aircraft to Syria, and there was no escort by Su-30SM fighters at that moment, i.e. the fate of the Russian crew and aircraft depended solely on the prudence of the pilots and the Turkish leadership, but “evil” prevailed, the Turks committed an aggressive act, the consequences of which would not be long in coming, and the reasons are probably already clear to almost any non-bombed schoolchild.
We were not the only ones who felt all the "friendliness" and adequacy of the Turkish leadership. Since 1996, Turkey has been using its F-16Cs to demonstrate ambition in the 4-mile airspace of most of the Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. Over the 20 years over the sea, there have been many air battles with the Greek Mirage-2000, in which both sides suffered losses. Almost every season is not complete without the violation of the Greek space by Turkish fighters, and sometimes the violation of territorial waters by the warships of the Turkish Navy, to which Greece has to respond every time. At the same time, one can notice a disappointing fact: each penetration into the airspace of Greece occurs suddenly and from different air directions, which indicates that the Turks have developed certain tactics to gain superiority over the Greek Air Force over the Aegean Sea, which can be used both in the near future and in the future, when NATO "disintegrates", and possibly outlives itself, the tendencies of which are already visible today. Probably, the imperial habits of Turkey will continue to spread to the continental shelf belonging to Greece. And here Turkey is trying to position itself as a regional dwarf superpower with a tough and aggressive foreign policy.
The Turkish side took such actions not at all because of some invented encroachment on the country's sovereignty, which was not even close (after all, the plane already without equipment passed 3-5 km from the air border zone of Turkey and did not perform dangerous maneuvers), but solely for the purpose of demonstrating dissatisfaction with the destruction of their most profitable oil business, perfectly organized in recent years with ISIS. Another of the main factors of such a criminal action is the mutually beneficial ties between Bilal Erdogan (the son of the Turkish president) and IS, where the former provides a good cover for the illegal distillation of cheap oil from the western part of Syria at the political level, which even European and American analysts emphasize.
The fact that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg recognized the Turkish version as the most truthful is a logical fact, but the facial expressions of his face and the general confusion in answering questions from the media described the true picture, in which not everything is as smooth as NATO is used to, and in the bloc itself there are completely ambiguous opinions, since one of the most important members of the alliance in the Southeastern ON, namely Turkey, “brought the whole bloc under a monastery”, which will cause an irreversible military-technical “boom” of our aerospace forces in the Middle East, significantly weakening the position of NATO. In fact, Turkey "scored a juicy goal" against NATO for decades to come, and all thanks to its own economic benefits.
Despite the fact that this "toad" alliance will have to swallow, they will be able to turn this incident in their favor. It is likely that such a "action" may be repeated, and its purpose will be to call a commensurate response from the Russian Aerospace Forces, which will subsequently lead to the blocking of the Bosphorus and an attempt to significantly complicate the logistics through the 720th PMTO in Tartus for a general weakening of the Aerospace Forces RF in the Mediterranean. How to be here? And here, in any case, you will have to "show your teeth", and on both sides of Turkey, it is not excluded that the development of events by force. At the same time, an escalation can occur even in the region of the Black Sea basin, where activists from the Crimean Mejlis sponsored by the same Turks helped the Ukrainian pravosek to plunge the entire peninsula into darkness, and Ukrainian artillery is concentrated in the Kherson region. Russia is now being pushed into direct confrontation, which will become increasingly difficult to avoid. Well, we have to fight back!
Working through all the subtleties of the possible escalation of the confrontation with Turkey, it is necessary, first of all, to take into account the strongest sides of the Turkish Armed Forces. Despite the low level of development of the radar and optoelectronic industries, as well as the low level of development of the production of jet aircraft engines, the Turkish company TÜBITAK was able to develop its own model of high-precision weapons, which poses a threat to both neighboring states and the Russian Aerospace Forces. The SOM tactical cruise missile (pictured) has a range of 200-300 km, with the possibility of increasing it to 2000 km, is capable of performing anti-aircraft maneuvers at low altitudes, has a low CEP and a low radar signature, is equipped with an ARGSN and a satellite guidance channel. These characteristics allow the missile to hit command posts, radar stations, the most important elements of anti-aircraft missile systems, airfields. These tactical cruise missiles are the most dangerous when they are massively used on difficult terrain, where to intercept such a strike it is necessary to pair several types of air defense missile systems in the amount of several batteries for each type, here you will not get off with one "Fort". The possible aggravation of the Turkish threat could serve as an impetus for further building up the air defense potential of the Russian flight contingent at the Syrian airbase Khmeimim, as well as air defense in the Caucasus and Crimea.
And the first significant steps have been taken by our leadership today. Their economic part consists in the complete cancellation of the project of the strategically important Turkish Stream gas pipeline for Turkey, the freezing of the Akkuyu NPP construction project, the complete cessation of cooperation in the tourism sector, as well as the light industry; Thus, Russian textile manufacturers have already proposed to the government to formulate a proposal to abandon Turkish clothing at the all-Russian level. In addition, a huge number of joint business plans will be stopped. All this will lead to billions of losses on the Turkish side. But these are not yet the most significant measures that the Black Sea "neighbor" will fully experience. Turkey will lose its previously existing leverage on the Crimean peninsula, where it has always had significant interests, since the ferry service between the shores will be completely interrupted, Sergei Aksyonov said at the beginning of the week. There will be huge difficulties in financing and other types of support for the Crimean Tatar Mejlis, whose representatives, together with Kiev henchmen, bring great discomfort to Crimea. Restricting the influence of the Turkish factor on the development of the Mejlis in Crimea can be considered a huge plus for the security of the region, since it has long been known about Dzhemilev's punitive battalion "Crimea", acting against civilians and the army of Novorossia in Donbas, as well as the participation of many of its members in ISIS. which, in turn, managed to declare Ukraine one of its enemies last week. This is where the entire extremist-terrorist circle "Turkey-ISIL-Mejlis-Ukraine" closes, in which Ukraine will once again be assigned the role of a "rabid punching bag" supporting Turkey and IS in absentia. It is from these "Trojans" that the Russian Federation will get rid of it now.
The second, tougher countermeasures will, of course, be expressed in the termination of military cooperation at absolutely all levels of interaction between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staffs, a significant increase in the strike potential of the Russian Aerospace Forces near the Turkish borders, as well as in the quite adequate so-called expansion of the "scope of what is permitted" in cases of defense when the lives of our compatriots or allies in the anti-ISIS coalition are at stake.
Literally in the very first hours after the tragic incident with the Su-24M, the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces decided to send to the coast of Latakia the RKR pr. 1164.5 "Moskva", as well as in the vicinity of the Khmeimim VKS airbase the newest air defense missile defense system S-400, which from now on allowed to shoot down all air objects that are classified by means of air attack that threaten our Aerospace Forces.
The S-300F "Fort" air defense system on board the "Moscow", as well as the S-400 will be able to close almost all airspace not only over the northwestern part of the SAR, but also over the southern part of Turkey (Hatay, Adana, Mersin, Gazi provinces, etc. etc.), which will no longer allow the Turkish Air Force to operate even at medium altitudes near the border with Syrian Latakia. All our strike units will now be escorted by Su-30SM and Su-27SM multipurpose fighters, and the Su-34 will be given preference in performing strike operations near the Turkish border, which will be able to stand up for itself in an air battle. But there are also some details of a tactical nature that show the inadequacy of the measures taken.
Today, most of the central and eastern parts of Syria continue to be controlled by IS detachments, in particular Raqqa, Homs and Deir ez-Zor. The range of the S-400 and S-300F located in the western part of the SAR does not allow "finishing off" these lines, there is no possibility of placing ground-based air defense systems near the front line near Aleppo and other central cities, since there is a danger of losing a promising air defense system in the course of artillery and rifle battles with IS, as well as the subsequent transfer of its element base to the West directly or through the Turkish side.
There is also a geographic factor. All shipborne radars and air defense systems, as well as ground-based air defense systems deployed in the coastal littoral zone of Latakia, do not have the ability to view the lower echelon of the Syrian airspace already 30-35 km from the coast, since it is impeded by the Jabel-Ansaria mountain range with average heights of more than 1100 m. And no pseudo-coalition can guarantee that the Turkish Air Force, independently or with the help of our Western "friends", will not develop another plan of action against our aviation at low-altitude echelons, where ground attack and army aviation often operate. And for this it is necessary to deploy a strategic reconnaissance aviation link, which will operate accompanied by the Su-35S at a considerable distance from the most missile-hazardous areas of the theater of operations. We are talking about the A-50U long-range radar detection and control aircraft and the ORTR Tu-214R aircraft, the use of which over the Syrian theater of operations was out of the question. And these are the only machines capable of presenting the most realistic picture of the theater of military operations, with all its changes that are threatening.
The presence of A-50U aircraft, equipped with the improved "Shmel-2" radar system, will allow tracking any means of air attack (from fighters to stealthy tactical missiles at ranges from 150 to 450 km) flying at ultra-low altitudes and over the most difficult mountainous terrain. That is, any dangerous approach of the enemy to any of the elements of the Aerospace Forces will be immediately detected, and fighter aircraft will be used against the intruder. Neither the S-400 nor the "Fort-M" have the surveillance capabilities of the airborne AWACS complex, since for them there is a concept of a radio horizon, which depends on the terrain and the height of the location of divisional radar systems. For information, it is likely that the A-50U is capable of providing target designation for 9M96E2 missiles outside the radio horizon of the complex, i.e. over 40 km, which will allow the S-400 to attack targets in any part of Western Syria, and even beyond the Ansaria mountains.
As for the Tu-214R, capable of conducting long-range optical and electronic reconnaissance of ground and underground targets, these aircraft can also play an important role in the information field of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria. The "core" of the Tu-214R is the MRK-411 multi-frequency radar complex, the two-way AFAR of which can not only detect and classify ground and sea objects with the highest accuracy, but also operate in the subsurface radar mode, detecting the enemy's underground infrastructure. For visual and infrared observation, the OESVR (optoelectronic aerial reconnaissance station) "Fraction" is used. This aircraft would now be very relevant over the Syrian theater of operations, because immediately after the transfer of the S-400 battery to Khmeimim, the Turks immediately moved armored units of the Army and infantry to the border areas of the Hatay province; I don't think they would dare to move towards Latakia, but no one could even think of a possible attack by Turkish F-16s on our Su-24M! Tu-214R can track any "gestures" of the Turkish army in the border areas, this will allow the Aerospace Forces and ground forces in the SAR to act, if necessary, to proactively. The actions of any promising aviation group related to the network-centric component of the Air Force today must be supported by this kind of aviation.
For new food for thought for the sake of, I will give some facts that few people managed to pay attention to. Their first side was announced on November 26 by Vladimir Putin at a joint press approach with François Hollande, immediately after talks with the French president. V. Putin admitted that tactical data on the actions of the Russian Aerospace Forces, which the Russian Federation transmits to the US Air Force in the region as part of the exchange of data to prevent air incidents, can be distributed "right and left", including the main regional sponsor of terrorism, Turkey. This data could have helped the Turkish Air Force plan a cunning plan of attack on our front-line bomber. But that is not all.
The second side "surfaced" on the Western Internet a few days before the tragedy. On November 19, the Internet resource flightglobal.com published the news about the beginning of duty in the Middle East region of an improved version of the American AWACS aircraft E-3G Block 40/45 of the “AWACS” system. The site reports that the plane is directed to Southwest Asia (Western Asia); those. will operate from one of the air bases in Saudi Arabia. This aircraft, even when on the ground, has a flight time to the southern borders of Syria of no more than one hour, and therefore can quickly move forward and conduct long-range observation of Russian fighters and bombers from a distance of 500 - 600 km. The most powerful radar with AFAR AN / APY-2 is capable of simultaneously tracking 600 or more air targets, among which may be the entire operating group of the Russian Aerospace Forces. This aircraft can safely provide information to the Turkish Air Force via the Link-16 channel, which is used by the Turkish army as a structural unit of the NATO bloc. This E-3G was sent to the Arabian Peninsula precisely for the purpose of monitoring the aircraft of our Aerospace Forces, why don't we send such machines to the region?
The transfer of the S-400 battalion and the "Moscow" rocket launcher to Syria has already forced Ankara to stop flying over the SAR, cools down all radical sentiments in the Turkish leadership and hatred on the part of our navigator Konstantin Murakhtin, who, like the entire flight crew of the Air Force, will still remember everything, what we had to go through on November 24. And the words of the US State Department about the "possible self-defense" of inhuman Turkomans who fired at pilot Oleg Peshkov in an ejection seat, once again confirm the previous line of Washington, regardless of any human principles.
On November 25, the Russian Aerospace Forces of the Russian Federation struck a blow at the Turkish "humkonvoy", carrying new "trunks" and building materials for IS and the so-called "moderate opposition" to the transshipment base in Azaz, this event marked the beginning of the end of the endless flow of cheap oil for Erdogan, and therefore, new incidents may already be well thought out in the "flat" minds of the Turkish elite. What they can come to will be very instructive for the "world community", probably in the near future.
