At the very end of last year, news appeared in the Russian media regarding a return to an old and almost forgotten idea. According to RIA Novosti, work is already underway to create a new combat railway missile system (BZHRK) and the first missile train of the new project can be assembled by 2020. Our army already had similar systems, but the only ones in the history of the BZHRK 15P961 "Molodets" were taken off duty back in 2005 and soon most of the equipment from their composition was disposed of. Trains with rocket weapons were rightfully the pride of Soviet designers, and of the entire country as a whole. Due to their capabilities, these complexes posed a serious threat to a potential enemy. However, the history of this type of technology cannot be called simple. At first, a series of not at all pleasant events at first severely limited the potential of domestic BZHRKs, and then led to their complete disappearance.
The creation of a railway missile system was very difficult. Despite the fact that the corresponding order of the country's leadership and the Ministry of Defense appeared back in 1969, the first full-fledged launch of the new RT-23UTTKh missile took place only in 1985. The development of the BZHRK was carried out in the Dnepropetrovsk design bureau "Yuzhnoye" them. M. K. Yangel under the leadership of V. F. Utkin. The specific operating conditions of the new system forced the development of a lot of new solutions, from a redesigned launcher car, disguised as a refrigerator, to a collapsible fairing of the rocket head. Nevertheless, more than fifteen years of work have been crowned with success. In 1987, the first regiment "Molodtsov" took over the duty. In the next four years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, three divisions were formed, armed with a total of twelve new BZHRKs.
Unfortunately, shortly after the formation of the last third division, several unpleasant things happened, which had a very bad effect on the further service of the BZHRK. In 1991, during international negotiations on the future START I treaty, the Soviet leadership agreed to several disadvantageous proposals from the American side. Among them was a restriction on the routes of patrolling "rocket trains". With the light hand of the President of the USSR M. Gorbachev and some of his associates, the BZHRKs could now move only within a radius of several tens of kilometers from the bases. In addition to the obvious military and political disadvantages, such a limitation also had economic consequences. Simultaneously with the commissioning of the Molodets complexes, the Ministry of Railways was working to strengthen the tracks within a radius of several hundred kilometers from the BZHRK bases. Thus, the Soviet Union lost both the main advantage of the BZHRK, and a lot of money spent on the reconstruction of tracks and preparation of launch positions.
The next international treaty - START II - meant the removal from duty and disposal of all RT-23UTTKh missiles. The date for the completion of these works was 2003. A cutting processing line was assembled with the participation of the United States especially for dismantling and disposal at the Bryansk missile repair plant. Fortunately for the BZHRK, shortly before the deadline for the disposal of missiles and trains, Russia withdrew from the START II treaty. However, over the next few years, scrapping continued, albeit at a much slower pace. Until now, only a few cars of the former BZHRK have survived, which are used as museum exhibits.
As you can see, the short history of the Molodets missile systems was difficult and unsuccessful. Almost immediately after entering service, the trains with missiles lost their main advantage and after that did not pose the same threat to the enemy as before. Nevertheless, the complexes continued to remain in service for a decade and a half. Now there is every reason to believe that the dismantling of the Molodtsev took place only when they had exhausted their resource and the available stock of missiles had come to an end. One of the most serious attacks on Russian missile trains was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Because of him, the Yuzhmash plant, which assembled the complexes and missiles for them, remained on the territory of sovereign Ukraine. This country had its own views on the future work of rocket production and therefore the trains were left without new weapons.
In discussions of news about the beginning of the development of a new BZHRK, the advantages and disadvantages of this type of technology are often considered. The former, of course, include the possibility of being on duty at a great distance from the base. Once a train with missiles has entered public railways, its detection becomes very, very difficult. Of course, three diesel locomotives, nine refrigerated cars (three rocket modules) and a tank car to some extent gave out old BZHRKs, but colossal efforts were required to ensure that their movements were tracked. In fact, it was necessary to "cover" with intelligence means all or almost all of the territory of the Soviet Union. Also, the advantage of the complex can be considered a successful liquid-propellant rocket RT-23UTTH. A ballistic missile with a launch weight of 104 tons could deliver ten warheads with a capacity of 430 kilotons each at a range of up to 10100 kilometers. In the light of the mobility of the missile complex, such characteristics of the missile gave it simply unique capabilities.
However, it was not without its drawbacks. The main disadvantage of BZHRK 15P961 is its weight. Due to the non-standard "load", several original technical solutions had to be applied, but even with their use, the launch module of three cars exerted too much pressure on the rails, almost at the limit of the latter's capabilities. Because of this, at the end of the eighties, railway workers had to change and strengthen a huge number of tracks. Since then, the country's railways have again undergone wear and tear, and before putting into service a new missile system, it is likely that the next update of the tracks will be needed.
Also, BZHRK are regularly accused of insufficient strength and survivability, especially in comparison with silo launchers. To test the survivability, the corresponding tests began in the eighties. In 1988, the works on the themes "Shining" and "Thunderstorm" were successfully completed, the purpose of which was to test the operability of trains with missiles in conditions of strong electromagnetic radiation and thunderstorms, respectively. In 1991, one of the combat trains took part in the Shift tests. At the 53rd research site (now the Plesetsk cosmodrome), several tens of thousands of anti-tank mines were laid with a total explosion power of about 1000 tons of TNT. At a distance of 450 meters from the ammunition, with the end facing them, a rocket module of the train was placed. A little further - 850 meters away - another launcher and the command post of the complex were placed. The launchers were equipped with rocket electric mockups. During the detonation of mines, all BZHRK modules suffered slightly - glass flew out and the operation of some minor equipment modules was disrupted. A training launch with the use of an electric rocket model was successful. Thus, a kiloton explosion less than a kilometer from the train is not able to completely disable the BZHRK. To this should be added the more than low probability of hitting the enemy missile warhead on the train while moving or near it.
In general, even the short-term operation of the Molodets BZHRK with serious restrictions on the routes clearly showed both the advantages and the difficulties associated with this class of military equipment. Probably, precisely because of the ambiguity of the very concept of the railway complex, which at the same time promises greater mobility of missiles, but at the same time requires strengthening the tracks, not to mention the complexity of creating a train and missiles for it, design work on the creation of new "rocket trains" has not yet been resumed … According to the latest data, at present, employees of design organizations and the Ministry of Defense are analyzing the prospects for the BZHRK and determining the necessary features of its appearance. Therefore, now we cannot talk about any nuances of the new project. Moreover, due to the presence of the Topol, Topol-M and Yars mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK), which do not need a strong railroad track, the creation of a new BZHRK may be canceled altogether.
Now a variety of opinions are being expressed about the possible appearance of a promising BZHRK. For example, it is proposed to equip it with missiles of existing projects, such as the RS-24 Yars. With a launch weight of about 50 tons, such a rocket, which, moreover, is already used at the PGRK, can be a good replacement for the old RT23UTTKh. With similar dimensions and half the mass, the new rocket, with certain modifications, can become the armament of new BZHRK. At the same time, the combat characteristics of the complex will remain approximately the same. So, the gain in range (up to 11,000 km) will be compensated by a smaller number of warheads, because in the head of the RS-24 there are only 3-4 (according to other sources, six) charges. However, the Yars missile will have been in operation for about ten years by the time it is expected to be put into service with the new BZHRK. Thus, new missile trains will need a new ballistic missile. It is quite possible that its appearance will be formed along with the requirements for the entire complex.
At the same time, rocket designers can use the experience gained in the creation of relatively small missiles like the Topol or Yars. In this case, it will be possible to create a new rocket with extensive use of mastered solutions and technologies, but at the same time suitable for use in railway complexes. As the basis for a new missile for the BZHRK, the existing Topoli-M or Yarsy are also suitable due to the fact that they are adapted for operation on mobile complexes. However, the final decision on the "origin" of the missile and the requirements for it, it seems, has not yet been made. Given the duration of the development and testing of new missiles, in order to be in time by 2020, rocket designers should receive requirements within the next years or even months.
Finally, the need to build infrastructure needs to be considered. Judging by the available information about the state of the old BZHRK bases, everything will have to be rebuilt. In a matter of years, old depots, control rooms, etc. turned out to be decommissioned, deprived of a large number of special equipment, rendered unusable and sometimes even partially looted. It is quite understandable that for effective combat work, the new railway missile systems will need appropriate structures and equipment. But restoring existing buildings or building new ones will significantly increase the cost of the entire project.
Thus, if we compare railway and ground missile systems, the comparison may not be in favor of the former. A hypothetical mobile ground launcher, with the same rocket as a railway, is less demanding on the condition of the road, is much easier to manufacture, and also does not need to coordinate routes of movement with third-party organizations, for example, with the leadership of the railway. An important advantage of ground-based missile systems is also the fact that all the infrastructure necessary for them is simpler and, as a result, cheaper than for railway ones. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the middle of the 2000s, the command of the strategic missile forces officially announced the abandonment of the BZHRK in favor of the PGRK. In light of this decision, the resumption of work on the railway complexes looks solely as an attempt to expand the capabilities of the nuclear forces and, if certain prospects exist, equip them with another type of equipment.
In the current situation, it is not yet worth waiting for news regarding the start of construction of the first rocket train of the new project, because it has not even been decided yet what it will be and whether it will be at all. Therefore, it remains to be hoped that the analysis of capabilities and prospects, including a comparative one (BZHRK or PGRK), will be carried out with full responsibility and its results will only benefit our missile forces.
