In 2010, the state defense order was completed by 70%

In 2010, the state defense order was completed by 70%
In 2010, the state defense order was completed by 70%

Video: In 2010, the state defense order was completed by 70%

Video: In 2010, the state defense order was completed by 70%
Video: Soviet Young Pioneers (1922-91) 2024, December
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In 2010, the state defense order was completed by 70%
In 2010, the state defense order was completed by 70%

Despite the fact that the Russian defense industry received every penny under the state defense order, the army received only two-thirds of the ordered samples.

Former St. Petersburg businessman B. Nakonechny, who now holds the post of deputy head of the armaments department of the RF Ministry of Defense, said recently that due to "weak organization of the work of the chief executives, as well as the ineffective work of the institute of federal designers, the state defense order for 2010 has been disrupted." According to Nakonechny, as a result, the Russian Armed Forces did not receive two Project 955 submarines last year and one Project 885 submarine and a Project 20380 corvette. six.

It is clear that the words of Nakonechny are only a small part of the truth. Quite recently, just a few days ago, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov made a real scolding to the leadership of Roscosmos, precisely for the same thing. The results of the order fulfillment here turned out to be deplorable, out of 11 planned spacecraft by Roskosmos, only five were delivered.

The results, of course, are disappointing, but nevertheless, the words of Mr. Nakonechny concerning the nuclear submarines of Project 955 look, to put it mildly, rather strange. It is not clear how a specialist, who, by the nature of his job, is obliged to know the nomenclature of weapons thoroughly, could expect that the Ministry of Defense would be able to purchase two strategic nuclear submarine cruisers of Project 955 within one year. nuclear-powered ship "Yuri Dolgoruky". The ship is ready, it only remained to arm it. But the armament is not yet quite ready, and the finishing of the Bulava ballistic missile, as you know, has been somewhat delayed.

The second cruiser of Project 955 was launched on December 6, 2010, just three months ago, and certainly could not be included in the 2010 state defense order.

The same can be said about the Project 855 submarine. Most likely, we are talking about the multipurpose nuclear submarine cruiser Severodvinsk, which had not even been launched by the time the state defense order was approved.

Mr. Nakonechny has not yet very well entered the course of affairs in a new place for him, let's hope that with time he will sort it out, there would be a desire. The real state of affairs with the rearmament of the army and navy looks something like this. In 2010, Russia spent a gigantic amount on financing the state defense order - 1 trillion 174 billion rubles. What did you get? Full statistics are unknown. For example, it is completely unclear what and to what extent the strategic nuclear forces received. In terms of units of the general-purpose forces, it is known that in 2010 16 air defense radars, 8 spacecraft, 23 aircraft, 37 helicopters, 19 air defense systems, 6 launchers of the ground forces missile complex, 61 tanks, almost 400 armored combat vehicles and 6, 5 thousand cars. These figures were announced by the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Vladimir Popovkin.

One of the Russian publications, having made simple calculations, concluded that in general, the state defense order in 2010 was completed by no more than 70%. In any other developed country, such a figure would be considered a failure. In the context of the current Russian realities, this is almost a success. So, for example, in 2009, the state defense order, according to the calculations of the Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation, was fulfilled by 41.9% in terms of the volume of tasks, and by 64.9% in terms of the volume of work. At the same time, the Ministry of Defense financed the order in full.

This situation looks very strange and requires an explanation. Why, for example, quite recently India could buy 100 tanks from us for a certain amount, while the native Russian army received only 14 combat vehicles for the same money?

One of the reasons is known by the Chief Military Prosecutor of the Russian Federation, Colonel-General of Justice S. Fridinsky. According to him, the scale of corruption in the Russian state defense order system is simply amazing. “Sometimes it seems that people have simply lost their sense of proportion and conscience. The amount of embezzlement is often shocking,”admits the military prosecutor.

As an example, Fridinsky cited a recent criminal case against a group of officials from the Main Military Medical Directorate and the State Order Directorate of the Ministry of Defense (the same one where Mr. Nakonechny, who is so concerned about the failure of the 2010 state defense order), serves as the deputy director of the department. Some time ago, the defendants in the case entered into a state contract with a commercial firm for the supply of X-ray units in the amount of over 26 million rubles. As it turned out later, the cost of the purchased installations was overstated by more than three times, the damage caused to the state is estimated at more than 17 million rubles.

It turns out that at least two-thirds of the amount allocated from the defense budget was pushed into their pockets by military officials. If we assume that this is an approximate average "standard" of army corruption, it turns out that of the 19 trillion planned for the weapons program for 2011-2020, at least 11-12 trillion will go into the pockets.

The question arises: how to deal with this evil? Maybe, for example, the way they do it in America? According to the representative of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies Grigory Tishchenko at the Pentagon, the staff of the control and audit services consists of 1200 employees. The performance of each military auditor is $ 2.3 million per year. In the Russian Ministry, only 70 officials perform the same tasks. Another question hangs in the air. Why does the chief manager of state trillions, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, who so loves to refer to the experience of the United States, does not want to learn from their experience in this matter?

As sad as it is to admit it, the obvious answer to this question lies on the surface …

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