The withdrawal of our troops in 1944 to the Baltic Sea and the withdrawal of Finland from the war radically improved the position of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF). He left the Gulf of Finland into the Baltic Sea. The German command tried with all its might to secure its maritime transport, the volume of which increased sharply, since the combat capability of the Courland grouping, which was pressed to the sea, directly depended on them. In addition, it demanded from the ships all possible assistance to the ground forces, therefore, it strengthened the composition of the fleet in the Baltic Sea with the help of ships transferred from the North and Norwegian Seas.
By the beginning of 1945, on the Baltic Sea, the Germans had 2 battleships, 4 heavy and 4 light cruisers, more than two hundred submarines, over 30 destroyers and destroyers, about seven dozen torpedo boats, 64 minesweepers, almost two hundred landing craft and a significant number of patrol boats. ships and boats.
Based on the current situation and the general plan of the Red Army offensive in the Eastern regions of Prussia and Pomerania, the Supreme Command Headquarters set the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the 1945 campaign the main task of disrupting enemy sea communications. By 1945, of the 20 submarines (UBL) of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, six were deployed on enemy lines of communication in the Baltic Sea.
The submarines were stationed in Kronstadt, Hanko, Helsinki and Turku. Their combat control was carried out from the Irtysh floating base located in Helsinki. To ensure the interaction of the submarine forces with aviation, a remote control post was created in Palanga, which contributed to the improvement of the exchange of information on the location of enemy convoys and control of forces.
On January 13, 1945, the troops of the 3rd Belorussian Front went on the offensive, giving rise to the East Prussian operation, and a day later the troops of the 2nd Belorussian Front joined it. In early February, the forces of these fronts reached the coast of the Baltic Sea, as a result of which the East Prussian grouping was dismembered into 3 parts: Heilsberg, Konigsberg and Zemland. All branches of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet took part in the liquidation of the Konigsberg and Zemland groupings together with ground troops.
Based on the situation on the Baltic coast and in connection with the actions of the Soviet ground forces, Admiral V. F. Tributs set tasks for the submarine brigade: to disrupt enemy communications in the southern and southwestern regions of the Baltic Sea, right up to the Pomeranian Bay, to interrupt the communications of the Courland grouping and, together with the air forces, to block the port of Libau. 6-8 submarines were supposed to be in the sea at the same time. Those of them that operated in the area of the coastal flanks of our ground forces were to fight against enemy warships in order to prevent them from shelling Soviet troops. They also had to carry out operational reconnaissance of approaches to the German bases of the Nazis in the southern part of the Baltic Sea, to lay mines on the routes of movement of enemy convoys.
To accomplish these tasks, the brigade commander, Rear Admiral S. B. Verkhovsky decided to deploy boats in areas that were located on the approaches to Windau and Libau, west of Danzig Bay and from the meridian of the Brewsterort lighthouse to conduct active hostilities on enemy communications.
Provided for the interaction of submarines with aviation, which was to be expressed in continuous mutual information of the headquarters of the UAV and the Air Force about the data of aviation reconnaissance and changes in the areas of operations of submarines, their entry into positions and return to bases.
The transfer of the submarine to positions from the bases was carried out along skerry fairways under pilotage, accompanied by a escort ship, and with the appearance of ice - and an icebreaker. The submarine, as a rule, went to the dive point after sunset, followed in a submerged position for at least 25 miles, after which the commander, assessing the situation, himself chose the method of transition to the position. The main method of operation of submarines was cruising in designated limited areas.
Timely air reconnaissance data on the movement of convoys made it possible for submarine commanders to correctly assess the situation in their area, make the necessary calculations, go on the course of movement of enemy ships and carry out attacks. So, using data from aerial reconnaissance, they went to the courses of enemy convoys and attacked the transports "Shch-303", "Shch-309", "Shch-310" and others.
The combat score in 1945 was opened by the submarine "Shch-310" Captain 3rd Rank S. N. Bogorad. On the night of January 7, 1945, while on the surface, the submarine found a caravan of 3 transports guarded by ships and boats. The boat moved into positional position. (The positional position of the stock boat is the surface position of a trimmed boat, capable of diving at any time. In this position, the main ballast tanks are filled, and the middle tank and the rapid dive tank are purged. In the positional position, the submarine has the least seaworthiness, can go extremely low speed be on the surface of the sea with waves of no more than three points.)
Reducing the distance to 3.5 cables, "Shch-310" fired a volley at the head transport with three fan torpedoes. Two torpedoes hit the transport, which sank. Shch-310 operated for 62 days in difficult winter conditions. During this period, she covered 1210 miles underwater and 3072 miles on the surface and in position. The submarine did a good job of reconnaissance, revealed the anti-submarine defense system and the methods of action of the enemy patrol ships, which was valuable information for our boats, which were to go on military campaigns.
Our other submarines also operated successfully in January. The first to go to sea in the new 1945 was "Shch-307" Captain 3rd Rank MS. Kalinin. On January 4, she left the base and at midnight on January 7 took up the position assigned to her on the approach to Libau. In the evening of January 9, "Shch-307" was lying on the ground, when the acoustician reported the appearance of the noises of the propellers of the ships of the convoy. Having surfaced to the positional position, the commander found the lights of a large transport and escort ships. Having deployed the boat to attack with stern torpedo tubes, Kalinin fired a two-torpedo salvo from a distance of 6 cables. Both torpedoes hit the transport, which quickly sank. For more than two hours the patrol ships persistently pursued the Shch-307, dropping 226 depth charges on it; 70 of them exploded at close range.
Having corrected the damage, the boat continued to look for the enemy. At night, she carried out a search while on the surface, during the day - under a periscope. On the evening of January 11, the boat was in cruising position. The cruising position of a submarine is the surface position of a trimmed boat, with a filled rapid dive tank and an unfilled main ballast tank and a medium tank. In cruising position, the submarine is capable of rapid diving.
Soon the navigation lights of two transports and two patrol ships were seen from the submarine. Shch-307 began maneuvering to launch a torpedo attack. At that moment, the escort ships noticed the boat, lit it with rockets and began to bypass it from both sides. She had to turn around to a countercourse and dive. After making sure that the enemy had stopped pursuing, the commander decided to surface and continue the attack. "Shch-307" approached the enemy and from a distance of 5 cables fired a three-torpedo salvo at the transport, which caught fire and sank.
Other crews were also successful. For example, the submarine "K-51" Captain 3rd Rank V. A. Drozdova, on January 28, attacked a transport ship standing in the roadstead of Rügenwaldemünde and sank it. On February 4, in the Libava area, the submarine Shch-318 of Captain 3rd Rank L. A. Loshkarev, despite severe hydrometeorological conditions and strong opposition from anti-submarine defense ships, sank one enemy transport and damaged the other.
On February 10, ground forces with the forces of two Belorussian fronts began to carry out the East Pomeranian operation. Our armies cut the enemy grouping and at the beginning of March reached the Baltic Sea. In February and March, the German command was engaged in an intensive transfer of troops from Courland to Danzig Bay and East Prussia. The movement of transports between Libava and Danzig Bay has increased significantly, in connection with which our submarine forces have intensified their combat activities in this area.
So, on February 18, the guards submarine "Shch-309" of captain 3rd rank P. P. Vetchinkin. On the morning of February 23, when the boat was maneuvering at a position near Libava, the signal officer, foreman of the 1st article KT Alshanikov and sailor F. I. A box in moonlight (visibility was up to 15 cables) found a transport ship, guarded by a pair of patrol ships. Having reduced the distance to 9 cables, "Shch-309" sank the transport with a three-torpedo salvo. One of the escort ships opened artillery fire on the boat, and the other began pursuit. It lasted 5 hours. Bombs exploded very close. As a result of the explosions of 28 bombs, the commander's periscope and some other devices were damaged. Despite this, the boat made several more attacks, after which it returned to base. On February 24, in the Danzig Bay, she launched a transport ship to the bottom and damaged the K-52 submarine patrol ship, Captain 3rd Rank I. V. Travkina.
To combat Soviet submarines and ensure the safety of their sea communications, the Germans deployed a reinforced patrol service with surface ships and submarines, created special search and strike groups from ships equipped with hydroacoustic equipment. The main task of these groups was to destroy our boats or drive them out of the convoy's area of movement. To do this, ahead of the course of the convoys, the enemy carried out preventive bombing. Having found the submarine, the escort ships chased it for some time in order to drive it to the depth and give the transports the opportunity to pass. At the same time, they summoned search groups to the detection area for a long pursuit of the boat. It could last up to two days, while about 200 depth charges were dropped.
In the southwestern part of the Baltic Sea, to search for our submarines, the Germans used planes during the day and on bright moonlit nights, which, having found a boat, by missiles or other means, notified surface ships about its location. For PLO purposes, the enemy widely used submarines, camouflage, using acoustic ratchets, which did not make it possible to listen to the noise of the ships' propellers. To avoid encounters with our boats, the Nazis made transitions at night or in poor visibility. And to hinder the actions of our boats, the enemy carried out transportation in high-speed vehicles. The convoy included 2-3 transports, which were guarded by destroyers, patrol boats and boats.
However, the Soviet submariners continued to build up the power of their attacks. As a result of the withdrawal of Soviet troops to the southern shores of the Baltic Sea and the encirclement of the Konigsberg and Danzig groupings in March, the enemy embarked on an intensive evacuation of troops, equipment and valuable property removed from the occupied territories to western German ports. This caused an intensification of the movement of transports from the ports of the Danzig Bay to the ports of Pomerania. Therefore, the bulk of our boats were deployed in this direction. Submariners' activities have become even more effective.
So, on March 1, in the afternoon, while searching underwater, the K-52 boat found the noise of a transport ship's propellers, but a large wave did not allow attacking it at periscope depth. Then I. V. Travkin plunged the boat to a depth of about 20 m and decided to conduct an attack using data from hydroacoustic devices. Thanks to the high skill of the commander and the excellent training of the acoustics, the first periscope-free attack in the Baltic was carried out successfully. Having launched two more ships to the bottom and having used up all the torpedoes, "K-52" returned to base on March 11.
The submarine "K-52" launched its next combat campaign on April 17, and it lasted until April 30. During this time, "K-52" sank 3 enemy transport, despite the powerful opposition of the enemy. So, during the pursuit on April 21, patrol ships dropped 48 depth charges on it in 45 minutes. All day on April 24, the area where the boat was located was bombed by planes, dropping about 170 bombs. During the entire cruise, aircraft and ships dropped 452 bombs on the K-52, of which 54 exploded at a distance of fifty to 400 meters. However, the commander by skillful maneuvering broke away from the enemy. The crew skillfully fought for the survivability of their ship. The submarine returned safely to base.
Boldly, calmly, decisively acted, actively looking for enemy ships in the Danzig Bay, the commander of the L-2 submarine mine layer, Captain 2nd Rank SS Mogilevsky. Using sonar equipment, he detected fascist convoys 6 times, and took the boat to attack five times. On the morning of March 25, when the boat was sailing at a depth of about 25 meters, the acoustician recorded the noise of the ships' propellers and the operation of sonars. The boat surfaced to periscope depth, and the commander saw a convoy of 6 transports, destroyers and patrol ships. Reducing the distance to 6.5 cables, "L-21" fired a three-torpedo salvo at the transport ship and sank it. This was the third victory of the minelayer in this campaign.
By the end of March, Soviet troops had completely cleared East Pomerania of the Nazis. Our connections occupied the ports of Gdynia and Danzig. In April, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was tasked with assisting the Red Army in eliminating the German groups that were surrounded in the areas of Konigsberg, Pillau (Baltiysk), Swinemunde and Hela. The positions of our submarines were moved to these areas, which destroyed enemy ships and ships making transitions by sea. Having received a combat order, on March 23, the guards submarine "L-3" of Captain 3rd Rant V. K. Konovalov. She achieved great success on April 17. At 00 o'clock. 42 minutes the acoustician made out the noises of the propellers of transport ships and patrol ships. The boat began to maneuver for a torpedo attack. To catch up with the convoy, the submarine had to go on the surface on diesel engines. At 23 hours 48 minutes from a distance of 8 cables with a three-torpedo salvo "L-3" sank the motor ship "Goya", which was carrying about 7000 people, including more than a thousand German submariners, and most of them were Wehrmacht soldiers. Recently, it has become fashionable to present the death of "Goya" as a crime of Soviet submariners, since there were a certain number of refugees on the ship among the military. At the same time, the authors of these statements completely ignore the fact that the sunken ship could in no way be considered hospital or civilian. The transport went as part of a military convoy and had Wehrmacht and Kriegsmarine servicemen on board. The vessel was wearing a military camouflage color, and also had anti-aircraft weapons on board. At the same time, there was no sign of the Red Cross, which clearly excludes ships from targets for attack. Consequently, the "Goya" was a legitimate target for submariners of any country of the anti-Hitler coalition.
The March and April cruises of the boats testified that the German command significantly strengthened the ASW forces. In some cases, the enemy's opposition was so great that the Soviet submarines had to stop the attack and leave the area of movement of the enemy convoy.
In addition to torpedo weapons, the boats also used mine weapons. Thus, the L-3, L-21, and Lembit submarine mine blocks placed 72 mines on the routes of movement of German convoys and on the approaches to German bases. Approximate areas for laying mines were assigned by the brigade commander. The submarine commanders laid mines after additional reconnaissance and identification of the enemy's fairways. So, the underwater minefield "Lembit" Captain 2nd Rank A. M. Matiyasevich on March 30 put 5 cans, 4 mines in each, on the way of enemy ships. In April, a transport, two patrol ships and an enemy PLO ship were killed on these mines.
In addition to disrupting sea communications, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet submarines counteracted enemy ships' shelling of our military formations in the coastal area, conducted reconnaissance of enemy bases, places suitable for landing. For example, the submarine "Shch-407" reconnoitered the landing site on the island. Bornholm. Guards submarine "L-3", having carried out mine laying and a number of torpedo attacks on the approaches to Vindava at the end of January, on February 2, by order of the submarine commander, moved to the Brewsterort-Zarkau area to attack ships that fired at our units on the Zemland Peninsula. On February 4, the submarine fired three torpedoes in a salvo at the destroyer. After the L-3 attack, the enemy stopped shelling the Soviet troops. Also at this time, "L-3" put mines on the path of the movement of fascist ships. On March 10, by order of the fleet commander, in order to prevent shelling of the coastal flanks of the Soviet troops located on the Pomeranian coast, the L-21 submarine and the Shch-303 guards submarine were deployed in the Danzig Bay.
The success of submarine combat operations depended on the combat training of personnel. The submariners were required to have excellent knowledge of the material part, the tactical and technical data of the ship, so the commanders paid great attention to combat training. The training of officers mainly consisted of an analysis of military campaigns with a detailed analysis of the actions of submariners. So, at the gathering of commanders of mine and torpedo warheads of submarines, which took place from March 1 to March 3, the successful torpedo attacks of the submarines "Shch-307", "S-13", "K-52" and others were analyzed. group foremen, squad commanders, staff torpedo operators and mine workers, which contributed to their skill improvement, skillful actions during torpedo attacks and mine laying. Only from January to March 1945, in order to transfer combat experience, 14 classes were held with officers and foremen of electromechanical units. The commanders of the combat units of the submarines "S-13", "D-2", "Shch-310", "Shch-303" and others made reports at them.
In 1945, the intensity of the work of mechanisms compared with 1944 increased significantly. For example, the submarine "L-3" covered 3756.8 miles in three months of 1945, and only 1738 miles in the entire previous year; Submarine "S-13" in 1944 covered 6013.6 miles, and in one cruise in 1945 - 5229.5 miles. In addition, the load on diesel engines increased mainly in night attacks and searches for the enemy on the surface.
Despite the increased stress in the operation of the mechanisms, there were no failures due to the fault of the personnel, and when damage appeared, the submariners quickly eliminated them on their own. So, on "Shch-307" the clutch-bamag failed. Petty officers N. I. Tanin, A. P. Druzhinin and V. N. Sukharev put it into operation in 12 hours. A similar malfunction in 16 hours was eliminated by foremen A. I. Dubkov and P. P. Shur on "Shch-310". In the factory, according to technical standards, 40 hours were allocated for this work.
For four months in 1945, the Red Banner Baltic Fleet submarine forces sank 26 transports. The mines exposed under the boats blew up 6 German ships and 3 transports. The Nazis lost 16 submarines that were involved in the PLO. Our losses in 1945 amounted to one submarine - "S-4", which was lost in the area of the Danzig Bay. The actions of the submarine forces of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet contributed to the success of the ground forces in the Baltic States, East Prussia and East Pomerania.
