Currently, when there is an active revision of history, publications and statements have appeared that distort the nature of Soviet-Japanese relations during World War II, in which there is a noticeable desire to present Japan's foreign policy as peaceful, and aggressive plans for preparing for a war against the Soviet Union as "defensive" … Such statements are not new; at the end of the twentieth century, a number of Japanese and American historians, considering the events of 1941, especially emphasized the "defensive" nature of the neutrality pact concluded between Japan and the USSR on April 13, 1941. For example, former Japanese Foreign Minister M. Shigemitsu, in his published memoirs, argued that Japan "had absolutely no intention of violating the treaty of neutrality." And the American historian K. Basho stated that Japan had signed a pact of neutrality, wishing to protect itself from the threat of a Soviet attack from the north. It is precisely such statements that have now been adopted by Russian "historians".
At the same time, many documents have survived, indicating that the Japanese leadership, concluding this pact, planned to use it not for peaceful purposes. Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka, even before the signing of the pact of neutrality, on March 26, 1941, during a conversation with the head of the German Foreign Ministry Ribbentrop and Count Schulenburg, the ambassador of Nazi Germany to the USSR, said about the forthcoming conclusion of the pact that no Japanese prime minister could force Japan to remain neutral if a conflict arises between Germany and the USSR. In such a case, Japan will undoubtedly begin military action against the USSR. And the existing pact will not interfere with this.
Literally a few days after this statement, Matsuoka, on behalf of the Japanese government, put his ministerial signature under the text of the neutrality pact between Japan and the USSR, the second article of which said that if one of the parties to the pact becomes involved in hostilities, the other side undertakes maintain neutrality throughout the conflict.
After the pact was signed, the intentions of the Japanese government regarding its use to cover up preparations for aggression did not change, as evidenced by Matsuoka's statement to the German ambassador to Tokyo, General Ott. In a telegram sent on May 20, 1941, addressed to Matsuoka, the Japanese ambassador to Berlin, General Oshima, informed his boss that, according to Weizsacker, the German government attached great importance to the statement made by the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka to General Ott that in the event the beginning of the Soviet-German war, Japan will also attack the USSR.
The German attack on our country prompted the Japanese leadership to intensify preparations for a war against the USSR. In an effort to disguise the preparation of its troops for the attack, the Japanese government deliberately misled the Soviet embassy about their plans. Here it is appropriate to cite information from the diary of the USSR Ambassador to Tokyo K. A. Smetanin, accepted by the tribunal as an official document. On June 25, 1941, the USSR ambassador, who had a meeting with Matsuoka the day before, wrote the following in his diary: “I asked Matsuoka about Japan's position in terms of the outbreak of the war and whether Japan would maintain neutrality in accordance with the pact. Matsuoka preferred to evade a direct answer, stating that his position on this issue was stated at the time (April 22) in a statement upon his return from Europe. Matsuoka was referring to the statement of April 22, 1941, where he assured that the Japanese government would faithfully observe the neutrality pact with our country (this statement was published in the Asahi newspaper on April 23, 1941). However, as the documents show, all this was intended to deliberately deceive the Soviet government.
The German ambassador in Tokyo, in a telegram to Ribbentrop on July 3, 1941, informed that Matsuoka explained that the Japanese statement was made to the Russian ambassador in such a form in order to deceive the Russians or keep them in the dark, since the empire had not finished preparing for war. Matsuoka also noted that Smetanin did not suspect that the military preparations, according to the government's decision of July 2, 1941, "on preparations for the invasion of the territory of the USSR", are being conducted with increasing activity. Soon the Japanese cabinet clarified its attitude to the neutrality pact with our country to the allies. On August 15, during confidential conversations with the ambassadors of Italy and Germany, the head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, speaking about the pact, emphasized that in the current conditions, this agreement with the USSR is the best way to take the first steps to implement existing plans regarding the USSR, and that it is nothing more than temporary an agreement that exists until Japan finishes preparing for war.
Thus, with the idea of concluding a neutrality pact with our country, the Japanese pursued the treacherous goal of using it as a screen for disguise and preparation for an attack. It is worth noting that the conclusion of this neutrality pact was a success of Soviet diplomacy and a far-sighted step of the Soviet government, since it had a certain restraining influence on the Japanese ruling circles, which were forced to reckon with the public opinion of their country and other states. It is known, for example, that the Japanese leadership in the days of the most intensive preparation for military aggression in 1941 discussed the resignation of Foreign Minister Matsuoka to justify their actions, which fundamentally contradicted the neutrality pact. This, for example, is evidenced by the statement made on July 1 by the Japanese ambassador in Rome that, in the opinion of his government, the implementation of Japanese military plans against the USSR “requires the resignation of Mr. Matsuoka due to the fact that he recently signed a non-aggression pact with Russia ", and" it should disappear from the political arena for a while."
After Matsuoka's resignation from the post of Foreign Minister in July 1941, Japan's foreign policy, which provided for the solution of the "northern problem" by armed force, did not change. On July 20, the new Japanese foreign minister, Admiral Toyoda, unequivocally assured the German ambassador that the change in cabinet would not affect government policy.
Under the guise of a neutrality pact, the Japanese were preparing for a military attack on our country, taking special measures to preserve secrecy. The chief of staff of the Kwantung Army during a meeting of commanders of formations held on April 26, 1941 (after the ratification of the neutrality pact), stressed that the strengthening and expansion of preparations for war with the USSR should be carried out "top secret", taking "special precautions." He pointed out that it was required, on the one hand, to continue strengthening and expanding preparatory actions for war, and on the other, to maintain friendly relations with our country in every possible way; trying to maintain an armed peace and at the same time prepare for military operations against the USSR, which will ultimately bring the Japanese a sure victory.
Before the Nazi attack on the USSR, the preparation of the Japanese for the invasion of our Far East was carried out in accordance with the plan developed in 1940 by the Japanese General Staff of the Army. This plan, according to the testimony of the commander of the Kwantung Army Yamada and his chief of staff Khata, provided for the main attack on the Soviet Primorsky Territory and its occupation.
Immediately after the start of World War II, the General Staff of the Japanese Army began to develop a new plan for the war against the USSR, called "Kan-Toku-En" ("Special maneuvers of the Kwantung Army"). The idea and the main content of the plan speaks of their aggressive nature. The former commander of the 4th Army of the Kwantung Army, Kusaba Tatsumi, stated that according to the new plan, at the beginning of the war against our country, the main blow was delivered to Primorye by the forces of the 1st front. At this time, the 2nd front covered the flank of the 1st front and conducted preparations for operations in the direction of Zavitaya-Kuibyshevka. At the outbreak of the war, the N army was to be transferred to the 2nd front in this direction (soon the N army received the name of the 8th army) and aviation, which was striking the territory of Soviet Primorye.
According to the operational plan of the command, the 2nd front with the forces of the 4th army from the Shengvutun-Aigun area and the 8th army from the Chihe area forcing the Amur River and leading an offensive in the direction of Zavitaya-Kuibyshevka, cutting the Amur railway, destroying parts of the Red Army, occupies Blagoveshchensk, Kuibyshevka, Curled and Shimanovskaya. After that, an offensive is carried out on Khabarovsk and Rukhlovo.
Acting in accordance with the Kan-Toku-En plan, the Japanese command took emergency measures to increase the number of its formations in Manchuria. The German military attaché in Tokyo Kretschmer, in a telegram sent to Berlin on July 25, reported that the call of reservists, which had begun in Japan and Manchukuo and slowly proceeding, suddenly accepted on July 10 and in the following days (especially on 1, 4, 7, 12 and 16 th divisions) is a large scale that does not lend itself to further camouflage. And from July 10, the dispatch of military units began, namely: transport, technical and artillery units of the 16th and 1st divisions and the dispatch of reservists from Japan with the Seishin and Racine destinations for troops and reservists, and Tien Jin and Shanghai - only for reservists.
The Kwantung Army increased by 300 thousand people. In order to hide as much as possible the sharp increase in the Kwantung Army, the Japanese command did not begin to form new formations, but went along the path of increasing the number of soldiers in the already existing formations and units. The subdivisions of the Kwantung Army on the lands of Manchuria were staffed with personnel reinforced infantry divisions of the A-1 and A types, which, by the end of the autumn of 1941, were brought up to a full-time 24-29 thousand personnel each. In terms of personnel and armament, the reinforced division of the Kwantung Army was almost twice as large as the usual Japanese infantry division.
In total, the Japanese army had 5 reinforced A-1 type infantry divisions and 19 reinforced A-type infantry divisions. Of these, the Kwantung Army had: all reinforced A-1 type infantry divisions and 12 reinforced A-2 type divisions. By 1942, the number of soldiers of the Kwantung Army was brought to one million people. The number of tanks has doubled in comparison with 1937, and the number of combat aircraft has tripled. In 1942, the Japanese in Manchuria concentrated 17 reinforced Japanese infantry divisions, equal in size and firepower to 30 conventional divisions, a significant number of separate units, and the number of soldiers in fortified areas increased sharply.
Undoubtedly, the Kan-Toku-En plan was drawn up not to defend against the “Soviet threat” from the north, and large forces of Japanese troops were hastily concentrated near the Soviet state border after the start of the Great Patriotic War. In 1941, the leading Japanese military and state bodies and leaders were convinced that the USSR did not threaten Japan. For example, the Japanese fleet commander, Admiral Yamamoto, in a secret combat order on November 1, 1941, stated that if the empire did not attack the USSR, then, in the opinion of the Japanese naval headquarters, the Soviet Union itself would not start military operations against the Land of the Rising Sun. A similar point of view was expressed by the Japanese Prime Minister, General Tojo, during a meeting of the Privy Council committee in December 1941. He announced that Soviet Russia was busy with the war with Germany, so he would not try to take advantage of the imperial advance to the south.
A number of Japanese statesmen in the Tokyo process and in post-war memoir literature tried to assert that Japan in 1941 was not ready for war with the USSR because the German leadership allegedly did not inform the Japanese government about the impending attack on the Soviet Union. It allegedly found out about the fascist attack on the USSR only on June 22, 1941 at 16 o'clock Tokyo time. However, the Japanese government was in fact aware of the impending attack on the USSR in advance. On May 3, 1941, Matsuoka, at a meeting of the Headquarters Communication Committee with the government, announced that, according to Berlin, Germany would be able to strike at Russia in two months. Also in May, Ribbentrop, when asked by the Japanese government regarding the possibility of a German-Soviet war, replied that at the moment a war between Germany and the USSR is inevitable. If the war starts, it can be over in 2-3 months. The troop concentration for the war is complete. A few days later, on June 3 and 4, the Japanese ambassador, General Oshima, during conversations with Hitler and Ribbentrop, received their confirmation of preparations for war with the USSR, which he informed his government about. The latter, however, recognized the need to develop a new policy in this situation.
At the end of the second week of June, the Japanese government received a notification from Ambassador Oshima that the war against the Soviet Union would be launched "next week." Consequently, the Japanese government already knew in advance the timing of the German attack on the USSR. This is confirmed by the entry in the diary of the adviser to Emperor Hirohito, the Marquis of Kido, made by him almost a few hours before the start of the war. “On June 21, 1941,” wrote the Marquis of Kido, “Prince Canoe said that the modern war between Germany and Russia is not unexpected for Japanese diplomacy, since Ambassador Oshima was notified of this, and the government had enough time to take measures and prepare to the current situation”.
The awareness of the Japanese government and command of the impending German attack on the USSR allowed the Japanese leadership to discuss in advance the most important issues of preparing Japan for war, to determine their positions and take important measures in order to be fully prepared for an attack on the Soviet Union. In the spring and summer of 1941, in an atmosphere of increased secrecy, extensive preparations for the war were going on: airfields, access roads to the borders, warehouses for ammunition and fuel and lubricants, barracks for personnel were hastily built on the territory of Manchuria and Korea, modernization of artillery systems and small arms of the Kwantung Army was carried out, Japanese military intelligence stepped up its activities in the regions of Siberia and our Far East.
After June 22, 1941, Japanese military preparations took on an even greater scope. By the fall, Japanese troops stationed in Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, Hokkaido, Korea, the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin, as well as significant naval forces, were prepared for a surprise invasion of our Far Eastern borders and Siberia and were only waiting for a signal. But there was no signal.
On June 22, when Japan received news of Germany's invasion of the USSR, the army and navy general staffs at a joint conference came to a consensus on the two main directions of the forthcoming aggression - "northern" and "southern". This opinion of the military circles, which had matured long before the start of the war, became the basis of the fundamental decision adopted on July 2 at the imperial conference on the imminent entry of Japan into World War II and the preparation of military operations against the USSR ("northern direction") and against the United States and England ("southern direction ").
One of the points of the resolution adopted at the conference with the emperor, said that, although the Japanese attitude to the outbreak of the war is clearly determined by the allied spirit of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis, the Japanese should not interfere in it for a certain period, but they should secretly continue their armed preparations against the USSR. in doing so, we will proceed from our own interests. Negotiations with the USSR should also be continued with even greater precautions. And as soon as the course of the German-Soviet war becomes favorable for Japan, all the power of Japanese weapons should be resolutely used to solve its northern problems.
In the first weeks of the German-Soviet war, while the offensive of the German troops was developing successfully, the Japanese top leadership, believing in a quick victory for Germany, tended to deliver the first blow against our country. Representatives of the Japanese monopolies, the most adventurous elements in the ruling circles, insisted on immediate entry into the war. Matsuoka, a protege of the powerful Manchu concern "Mange", already on June 22, at an audience with the emperor, insistently advised him to agree to the immediate entry of the empire into the war with the USSR.
However, the most influential figures in Japan, although they advocated aggression against the USSR, recommended starting it a little later, when the Soviet Union would be significantly weakened. Minister of War General Tojo, for example, said at a cabinet meeting in the presence of the emperor that Japan could gain great prestige if it attacked the USSR when it was about to fall, "like a ripe plum." The Japanese generals believed that this moment would come in about a month and a half. The Chief of the Army General Staff, General Sugiyama, at a meeting of the Headquarters and Government Communications Committee on June 27, said that it would take 40-50 days to prepare the Kwantung Army for the invasion of Soviet territory. On July 1 in Rome, the Japanese ambassador announced that Japan wants to actively oppose Russia, but needs several more weeks. On July 4, the German ambassador Ott reported to Berlin: The Japanese army is preparing diligently … for an unexpected, but not reckless opening of hostilities against Russia, the first goal of which is to seize areas on the coast. Therefore, General Yamashita also remained in the Kwantung Army."
But by August 1941, the confidence of the Japanese command in a quick victory for Germany was shaken. The persistent resistance of the Soviet troops disrupted the schedule of the offensive of the Nazi Wehrmacht. In early August, the intelligence department of the General Staff of the Army reported to the imperial headquarters about the failure of the German command's plan to crush Russia in 2-3 months. The Japanese noted that the Smolensk defense was delaying the German army for more than a month, the war was becoming protracted. On the basis of this conclusion, on August 9, the Japanese headquarters and the government made a preliminary decision to prepare for a first-priority strike against the United States.
However, even during the period when Japan was conducting intensive preparations for a war against the United States, the work on the invasion of our territory was not stopped. The Japanese command followed with the utmost attention the course of the war on the Soviet-German front and the state of the grouping of our troops in the Far East and Siberia, trying to choose the most favorable moment for an attack. The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, during a meeting of commanders of formations in December 1941, gave orders for each army and formations of the first line to monitor the current changes in the martial situation of the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic to ensure the possibility at any time to have information about the true situation in order to timely "establish signs of a tipping point in the setting."
And the turning point has come. However, not in favor of the German troops. On December 5, 1941, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Moscow. The defeat of the elite armies of the Wehrmacht at the walls of our capital meant a complete failure of the German blitzkrieg plan against our country. This is the only reason why the Japanese ruling circles decided to refrain from the planned attack on the USSR in 1941. The Japanese leadership considered it possible to start a war with us only in the presence of one of two factors: the defeat of the Soviet Union or a sharp weakening of the forces of the Soviet Far Eastern Army. By the end of 1941, both of these factors were absent.
We must pay tribute to the foresight of the Soviet Supreme Command, which during the period of heavy fighting near Moscow kept military forces in the Far East, which did not allow the Japanese military leadership to hope for a victorious outcome of the prepared attack. General Kasahara Yukio, who at that time was chief of staff of the Kwantung Army, admitted at the Tokyo trial that although by December 1941 part of the Soviet troops had been sent to the West and the forces of the Far Eastern Army had decreased, the balance of forces did not allow the Japanese generals to hope for success. aggression.
It is also worth remembering that the Japanese leadership was not limited only to preparing its troops for a war against the USSR. In 1941, the General Staff of the Japanese Army conducted active reconnaissance and sabotage work on the territory of the Soviet Union in close contact with the Nazi Abwehr. This indicates a gross violation by Japan of the existing neutrality pact. As soon as Germany attacked the USSR, the General Staff of the Japanese Army took the initiative to establish contacts with the high command of the Wehrmacht to coordinate anti-Soviet subversive activities. In the memorandum of the High Command of the German Armed Forces, it was reported that on 1941-04-06, the assistant to the Japanese military attaché in Berlin, Colonel Yamamoto, informed the head of the II counterintelligence department of the Wehrmacht, Colonel von Lagousen, that the General Staff of Japan was ready to conduct anti-Soviet subversive activities in the territory of our Far East, especially from Mongolia and Manchukuo, and, first of all, in the area of Lake Baikal. According to the agreement between the command of the Japanese army and the Wehrmacht, the Japanese General Staff systematically presented the fascist command of Germany with valuable intelligence information about the USSR. Major General Matsumura, who held the post of head of the Russian department of the General Staff of the Japanese Army from the fall of 1941 to August 1943, testified that, by order of the Chief of the General Staff, he transmitted information about Soviet troops in the Far East, the military potential of the Soviet Union to the 16th department of the German General Staff. the transfer of our troops to the west.
In 1941, a large number of Japanese spies, saboteurs and counter-revolutionary literature were transported across the Soviet border. The border troops alone detained 302 Japanese spies while crossing the border. Japanese intelligence deployed two armed bands across the border of the Soviet Union to carry out sabotage and terrorist activities in our Far East. Soviet authorities have established 150 cases of the transfer of counter-revolutionary literature across the border of the USSR. In 1941, Japanese troops violated the Soviet state border 136 times by subunits and single-handedly and 24 times fired at Soviet territory, border guards and ships. In addition, Japanese aviation violated our border 61 times, and the Japanese fleet entered Soviet territorial waters 19 times.
Brazenly violating the articles of the neutrality pact, the Japanese fleet illegally blocked the coast of our Far East, fired at, sunk and detained Soviet ships. The International Military Tribunal, on the basis of irrefutable data, stated that Soviet ships with clearly readable identification marks and flags, anchored in Hong Kong at the end of 1941, were subjected to shelling, and one of them was sunk; a few days later, Soviet transport ships were sunk by aerial bombs dropped from Japanese aircraft; many of our ships were illegally detained by Japanese warships and forced to go to Japanese ports, where they were often under arrest for a long time.
Thus, in 1941, the Japanese leadership was actively preparing for the invasion of our territories, simultaneously committing acts of aggression against the USSR, and grossly violated the pact of neutrality. Having decided on the primary aggression against the United States, the Japanese did not stop preparing for war against us, waiting for a favorable moment to start it. Japan kept a million-strong army at the ready on the Soviet borders, diverting a significant part of the USSR Armed Forces to this and thereby providing significant assistance to Germany in its military operations on the Eastern Front. The Japanese plans were thwarted by our victories near Moscow. It was they, and by no means the peacefulness of the Japanese upper circles, who forced the Land of the Rising Sun to refrain from military action against the USSR in 1941. But the Japanese government did not stop nurturing its aggressive plans, and only the crushing blows of the Red Army on the Hitlerite Wehrmacht in 1943-1944. forced Japan to finally abandon the attack on the USSR.
