During the Great Patriotic War, one of the tasks of the fleet was to support the coastal flanks of ground forces with naval and coastal artillery. Huge destructive power, long firing range, the ability of naval artillery to move long distances in a short time and to influence the enemy for a long time - these positive qualities of naval artillery were taken into account when planning its fire assistance to the coastal flanks of ground forces.
The naval artillery was attracted for artillery preparation, as well as to support and escort army units in coastal areas during combined arms offensive operations, during the landing of assault forces and in the defense of coastal sectors (areas).
The main principle of the use of naval artillery for fire support of the army in the offensive was the principle of massing it in the direction of the main strike of the troops, as well as in the course of strikes against the most important enemy targets located in the depth of the defense.
The development of questions of artillery assistance and the drawing up of a plan for the use of the forces of the fleet and coastal defense, in accordance with the general plan of interaction, was carried out by the headquarters of the front (army) together with the headquarters of the fleet. In terms of the use of naval artillery, the following were envisaged: forces and assets of the navy, attracted for assistance; areas of fire assistance; formations of ground forces with which the fleet interacts; artillery tasks; combat control schemes.
This article will be limited exclusively to the actions of naval artillery during the offensive operation near Leningrad in January 1944. The Soviet troops had to crack the powerful, deeply echeloned German defense, which had been improved by the German 18th Army for 2, 5 years. The artillery group of the fascists consisted of more than 160 batteries here, including batteries of siege weapons with caliber 150 and 240 mm. The tactical zone consisted of a developed system of powerful nodes of resistance and strong points. Particularly strong was the defense south of the Pulkovo Heights, where there were not only artillery and rifle bunkers, but also strong reinforced concrete bunkers, as well as rows of anti-tank ditches, bunkers and escarpments. For the shelling of Leningrad, the German command created two special artillery groups. They included 140 batteries.
The command of the Leningrad Front decided to deliver the main blow with the troops of two armies: the 2nd shock was to launch an offensive against Ropsha from the seaside bridgehead and the 42nd from the southern part of Leningrad to Krasnoe Selo, Ropsha. The Red Banner Baltic Fleet (KBF) was to assist the coastal flank of the land armies in this offensive. In this regard, the artillery of the fleet was tasked with covering the transfer of troops to the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland during the deployment of army units and conducting a powerful artillery preparation before the start of the offensive of the ground armies. In addition, it had to continuously support the offensive of ground units in the Krasnoselsko-Ropsha direction and provide their flank from the Gulf of Finland to the border of the Narva River, destroy defensive facilities, suppress batteries, "neutralize" observation posts, headquarters, communication centers, disrupt land communications,to inflict massive artillery strikes on places of accumulation of reserves and enemy rear lines. The use of naval artillery in the operation was essential. Long-range artillery of the Navy could destroy the enemy in the second defensive zone, which compares favorably with most of the field artillery.
The naval artillery involved was divided into five artillery groups. The head of the coastal defense of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, in his order, assigned fire missions to each artillery group and distributed general fleet reconnaissance and fire adjustment means. The planning of the naval artillery fire at the coastal defense headquarters was carried out on the basis of the tasks assigned by the front artillery commander. During the operation, they were clarified by the army headquarters through the liaison officers of the coastal defense headquarters.
In the first group there were 95 guns with a caliber from 76, 2 to 305 mm. It included the artillery of Kronstadt and its forts, the artillery of the Izhora sector, armored trains "Baltiets" and "For the Motherland", a group of warships of the Kronstadt Naval Defense Region (KMOR) - the battleship "Petropavlovsk" (nine 305-mm guns), destroyers "Terrible "(Four 130-mm guns). "Strong" (four 130-mm) and gunboat "Volga" (two 130-mm), as well as operatively attached to the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, three 152-mm and two 120-mm batteries. Since the task of the group was to assist the 2nd Shock Army, it was transferred to the operational subordination of the army artillery commander.
The artillery of the other four groups was used mostly in the Krasnoselsky direction. The second group included the battleship October Revolution, the cruisers Tallinn, Maxim Gorky, Kirov, and destroyers. The third group's artillery consisted of a battalion of destroyers and gunboats. The fourth group was represented by artillery range guns: one 406-mm, one 356-mm and five 180-mm. These three groups were under the operational subordination of the chief of the coastal defense of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. They had to destroy centers of resistance, command and observation posts, headquarters, rear services, communication centers, roads in the depths of the fascist defense, and prohibit the approach of his reserves.
The fifth group consisted of the 101st Naval Railway Artillery Brigade. She allocated 51 guns for the operation (three 356-mm, eight 180-mm, eight 152-mm and 32-130-mm). This group had the task of suppressing the long-range artillery of the Nazis in the Bezbotny and Nastolovo regions, paralyzing enemy traffic on the roads, disrupting the work of its command and observation posts and communication centers, and countering the shelling of Leningrad.
In total, 205 guns of only large and medium calibers were used to support the actions of the front forces, which significantly increased and improved the composition of the artillery of the Leningrad Front. The control of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet's artillery, allocated for fire support of the front forces, was strictly centralized.
Planned tables of fire groups were drawn up only for the first two days of the operation. With its development, naval artillery fire was planned on the eve of the next day of the offensive, or was opened at the request of the front (army) artillery commanders with the approval of the head of the coastal defense of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, or by their direct order. This system basically ensured precise control of the naval artillery fire and the timely execution of fire missions in the interests of ground forces. To ensure timely fire on targets detected by reconnaissance means of battalions and ships, the latter were given the right to independently open fire in their sectors.
Indicative in the operation under consideration is the fact that each group was assigned one or two platoons of artillery reconnaissance, and a network of observation posts was deployed, of which there were 158 at the beginning of the operation. Interaction between observation posts and command posts of combined-arms commanders was well developed. The significant density of artillery reconnaissance made it possible to conduct it along the entire front, to fully meet the need for artillery to adjust fire. Intelligence data was carefully analyzed and communicated to all parts of the naval artillery. Thus, they had accurate information about the enemy military and artillery groupings and the nature of the bridgehead's engineering structures.
Since a large number of naval and field artillery took part in the artillery offensive, and it was territorially dissociated, special attention was paid to the organization of command and control during the offensive operation. Two exercises were held, where the main focus was on providing communications and adjusting fire. At the same time, liaison officers were assigned to the headquarters of the supported units. They were appointed from among the most trained artillery officers.
The preparation of the artillery of the fleet for the performance of the tasks ended with the sighting of benchmarks located at a distance of 500 meters to 2 kilometers from the targets. It made it possible to mislead enemy intelligence about the tasks of using our artillery, to make calculations to suppress all planned targets.
The offensive of the troops of the Leningrad Front began on January 14, 1944 from the Oranienbaum bridgehead. The artillery of the first group, together with the artillery of the 2nd Shock Army, fired at the batteries, headquarters and rear facilities of the Nazis. In 65 minutes, two fire raids were made on all targets, alternating with methodical fire, more than 100,000 shells and mines were fired. The defense was broken by powerful artillery and air strikes. The 2nd Shock Army went on the offensive and on the third day broke through the German main line of defense, wedging in to a depth of 10 km and expanding the breakthrough zone to 23 km. On January 15, a powerful artillery preparation began for the 42nd Army's offensive in the Krasnoselsky direction. The naval artillery fired simultaneously on 30 targets. For 2.5 hours, she fired 8500 shells with a caliber of 100-406 mm. Going on the offensive, the 42nd Army met fierce opposition from the enemy and in 3 days advanced only 10 km. From the fourth day, the resistance of the fascists began to weaken. The artillery of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet transferred fire to the main strongholds in the areas of Krasnoe Selo and Ropsha, and the German troops retreating to Krasnogvardeysk. The artillery sailors of the battleship October Revolution, the cruisers Kirov, Maxim Gorky, the leader of Leningrad and the 101st Naval Brigade of Railway Artillery distinguished themselves here. The counter-battery fight was also very effective. As a rule, enemy batteries were covered with naval artillery fire and fell silent, firing no more than two or three volleys. On January 19, the 2nd Shock Army occupied Ropsha, and the 42nd - Krasnoe Selo. At the end of the day, their mobile units met in the area of the village of Russko-Vysotskoye. The Peterhof-Strelna German group ceased to exist. Its defeat was of great importance. German troops were driven back 25 km from Leningrad.
During the fighting, two German divisions were completely defeated and five suffered serious losses. Soviet troops captured 265 guns of various calibers, including 85 heavy ones from the artillery group that fired at Leningrad, 159 mortars, 30 tanks, 18 depots, as well as a huge amount of small arms and other military equipment.
The railway artillery of the fleet was of great importance in the artillery support of the infantry offensive. She changed firing positions and followed the troops of the Leningrad Front. The railway batteries with their fire suppressed enemy artillery and its nodes of resistance, clearing the way for the offensive of the Soviet infantry and tanks.
Field artillery, having a relatively limited range of fire, did not have time to accompany the rapidly advancing infantry. These tasks were assigned to the naval artillery, which successfully completed them. The naval artillery, carrying out a maneuver with fire, crushed the defensive structures, assisted in the offensive of the troops. The combined-arms commanders gave a positive assessment of her combat activities. In total, during the operation, the naval artillery fired 1,005 shots, using up 23,624 shells with a caliber of 76-406 mm.
In breaking through the main line of the enemy defense, the massing of artillery played an exceptional role. The main features of the use of naval and coastal artillery were: the echeloning of its battle formations, which made it possible to consistently transfer fire into the depths of the enemy defense and concentrate it on important directions; widespread use of large-caliber artillery in operations with the task of destroying enemy defense targets.
The artillery of the fleet was also of great importance in the Vyborg offensive operation (June 1944). The enemy created a powerful echeloned defense with a depth of 90 km on the Karelian Isthmus. In the zone of operations of the 21st Army, reconnaissance established 348 targets, which could be destroyed by artillery with a caliber of at least 122 mm.
The tasks of the fleet artillery were: on the eve of the offensive, together with the army artillery, destroy enemy centers of resistance and fortifications in the Beloostrovsk direction; to participate in artillery preparation for the offensive when breaking through the first line of defense, to support the troops in breaking through the second and third lines, to accompany the advancing troops with fire; neutralize and suppress enemy batteries and artillery groups; to disorganize the enemy's command and control by strikes at headquarters, command posts and communication centers; by strikes on railways and highways and junctions in the rear of the front - Terijoki, Raivola and Tyuresevya - to prevent the maneuver of forces and the supply of reserves.
For these tasks, four groups were organized: the first - 1st Guards. naval brigade of railway artillery (42 guns from 130 to 180 mm); the second - the coastal artillery of the KMOR, which included the Kronstadt sector with the battleship "Petropavlovsk", 4 destroyers and 5 gunboats from the brigade of skerry ships, the artillery of Ust-Izhora with a railway artillery division (NO guns with a caliber of 100-356 mm); the third - one 356-mm and one 406-mm guns of the naval artillery range; the fourth - the ships of the squadron: the battleship "October Revolution", the cruisers "Kirov" and "Maxim Gorky" (21 guns with a caliber of 180-305 mm).
According to the decision taken, the ships and the railway batteries of the fleet allocated for the operation were regrouped. Part of the brigade of railway artillery was relocated to the Karelian Isthmus, where railroad tracks and shelters were equipped. A number of railway batteries from the Pulkovo area were relocated to the Bolshaya Izhora area. The ships of the squadron were pulled closer to the front line: the battleship and cruisers were transferred to the Leningrad commercial port; destroyers "Glorious" and "Vice-Admiral Drozd" in Kronstadt. For gunboats, maneuvering positions were equipped north of Kotlin, in the area of the Tolbukhin lighthouse and on the Eastern Kronstadt roadstead. Artillery reconnaissance has been strengthened. All this ensured the possibility of the influence of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet artillery on the entire enemy tactical depth of defense.
To support the constraining actions of the 23rd Army, the Ladoga military flotilla formed a fire assistance squad of 3 gunboats and 4 patrol boats. The commanders of the artillery groups were subordinate to the commander of the artillery of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Planned fire was opened only by order of the fleet artillery commander. At the same time, the group commanders were given the right to independently open fire when conducting counter-battery warfare, destroying the enemy force observed in the zone of responsibility, as well as at the request of the advancing troops.
Adjustment of artillery fire was of great importance. For this, 118 observation and correction posts, 12 spotter aircraft and one aerial observation balloon were allocated.
The Vyborg operation took place from 10 to 20 June 1944. On the morning of June 9, on the Karelian Isthmus, naval and field artillery with front aviation inflicted a powerful preliminary strike against enemy engineering and defensive structures throughout the entire tactical depth of the first line of defense. The Nazis responded by shelling observation posts, batteries and ships. Therefore, our artillery had to not only destroy defensive structures, but also engage in counter-battery warfare. Poor visibility and strong enemy resistance did not interfere with the solution of the task, which was due to good organization, as well as high-quality adjustment of fire from aircraft. 176 targets out of 189 planned were completely destroyed.
Operating with all four groups, the naval artillery opened fire 156 times. Of the planned 24 targets, 17 were completely destroyed and 7 partially. In addition, the sailors suppressed 25 active batteries. During the day of the battle, they used up 4,671 shells. It is important to emphasize that the artillery of the fleet destroyed the long-term fortifications of the enemy, located in the depths of its defenses, and often inaccessible to field artillery. At the same time, she suppressed a large number of heavy batteries that interfered with the actions of our land artillery. On the night of June 10, the fleet's artillery periodically fired, preventing the enemy from rebuilding their defenses. A number of large centers of resistance were suppressed, many enemy command and observation posts were destroyed, and the work of rear communications was paralyzed. As a result of the artillery strike, a significant part of the enemy's fortifications of the first line of defense was destroyed, the enemy suffered significant damage.
On June 10, anticipating the offensive, an air and artillery preparation was carried out, which lasted more than three hours. It was attended by aviation and artillery of the army and navy. Massive artillery fire from the front, powerful coastal batteries and ships largely determined the success of the offensive of the 21st Army, whose troops, by the end of June 10, broke through the fascist defenses and advanced up to 14 km. Overcoming fierce enemy resistance, the 21st Army and the 23rd Army, which had launched an offensive on 11 June, continued to move forward. On June 13, they entered the second line of defense.
The offensive of the 21st Army along the Gulf of Finland was accompanied by artillery support from the Red Banner Baltic Fleet and coastal defense ships. The ships of the Ladoga military flotilla reliably covered the flanks of the 23rd Army, provided artillery support to its right-flank units.
On June 14, after conducting artillery and aviation training, the armies of the Leningrad Front broke into the second line of the enemy defense, and on the 17th they reached the third line. On June 20, as a result of the assault, the city of Vyborg was occupied.
During the operation, the enemy offered fierce resistance. To strengthen our strike, the firing positions of the naval artillery were widely maneuvered, which made it possible to extend its operations to the entire zone of offensive operations of the main grouping of the front. Since June 16, the ground forces of the 21st Army have been supported by gunboats and armored boats. On June 19, one of the railway batteries of the fleet, advancing along with the combat formations of ground forces, fired on Vyborg.
During the Vyborg operation, the naval artillery fired 916 rounds, using up 18443 shells of caliber from 100 to 406 mm. She destroyed 87 nodes of resistance, fortifications, headquarters, warehouses, destroyed 58 enemy tanks and a large number of other equipment.
The specific features of the use of naval artillery in an army offensive operation were: fire assistance to the coastal flank of the front for the entire depth of the offensive; assistance to the army in breaking through powerful defensive zones in the main direction; widespread use of railway batteries and naval artillery; high efficiency of shooting, as a result of good training of forces, organization of artillery reconnaissance and adjustments: the use of naval artillery for counter-battery warfare.
So, during the offensive of the troops of the Leningrad Front, the artillery of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet was widely used to provide fire assistance to the coastal flanks of land armies. Possessing great power and firing range, it was used as a long-range artillery. The great mobility of naval and naval railway artillery made it possible to concentrate it in the necessary directions, to support the troops leading the offensive with fire.
