Ensuring the survivability of troops during the Second World War had a significant impact on the success of the ongoing hostilities. This is one of the most important and rather complex problems of the art of war; its role has grown even more with the advent of nuclear and high-precision weapons.
In a broad sense, survivability is the ability of military formations to maintain and maintain their combat capability and continue to perform combat missions with active opposition from the enemy. In World War II, the main ways to achieve high survivability of troops were: improving the technical equipment of troops, increasing the combat qualities of equipment, weapons (structural strength, durability, invulnerability from fire, adaptation to the terrain, etc.) and their effective combat use; improving the organizational and staff structure of military formations; development of the art of organizing and conducting combat actions and operations; improving the types of combat support; timely replenishment of losses; education of personnel; training of commanders, staffs and troops.
Technical equipment is a set of measures aimed at creating and providing troops with new military equipment and weapons that have the best fire capabilities, maneuverability, increased resistance to the effects of various weapons and reliable protection of personnel. During the war years, our Armed Forces possessed weapons, for the most part, at the level of the best world models. A significant role in achieving high survivability of equipment and weapons was played by the skillful implementation of measures to protect their personnel. This was achieved, for example, by improving the armor protection of tanks from being hit by shells, reducing the proportion of light tanks, as well as equipping troops with various self-propelled artillery installations. It is known that equipment and weapons only create material opportunities for achieving a high level of survivability of troops. To turn them into reality requires great efforts and skill of soldiers who directly use weapons and equipment in battle. The Patriotic War gave many examples of how the skillful possession of warriors of technology allowed our tank or anti-tank gun to destroy 3-4 tanks, and an aircraft to hit 2-3 enemy vehicles. This is exactly how the 4th Tank Brigade of Colonel M. E. Katukova defeated the enemy, who had multiple superiority in forces, in October 1941 near Mtsensk. With 56 tanks and skillful use of ambushes, they destroyed 133 tanks and 49 guns of the enemy and for several days stopped the advance of two German tank divisions to Moscow. In modern conditions, the deep mastering of new military equipment and the effective use of its combat capabilities are even more important for increasing the survivability of troops. That, unfortunately, now, with the transition to 12 months of service for conscripts, can not always be achieved.
Survivability presupposes the existence of a rational organizational-staff structure (OSHS) of military units and formations. Military experience has shown that the main directions for improving the OShS were: increasing the fire and strike power and maneuverability of military formations; increasing the ability to continue hostilities in the presence of significant losses, the creation of stable command and control bodies. It is important to note the appropriate ratio of personnel in combat, service and rear units.
The unification and qualitative improvement of the OShS of military formations of various types of troops became the basis for the development and use of new, improved methods of conducting an offensive battle (operation), which helped to reduce the losses of our troops and increase their survivability in battle.
We will trace the development of the organizational structure using the examples of rifle, armored and mechanized troops and artillery. In the rifle troops, it followed the path of increasing their firepower, striking power and maneuverability. In terms of personnel, for example, the rifle division was reduced by almost half, but the number of fire weapons increased significantly: mortars by July 1942, in comparison with the same month of 1941 - more than twice - from 76 to 188, artillery guns, respectively - from 54 up to 74, machine guns - from 171 to 711 and machine guns - from 270 to 449. The division received 228 anti-tank rifles. As a result, its firepower has increased significantly. If in July 1941 the division fired 40 450 rounds per minute from its standard small arms L, then in July 1942 - 198470. The weight of an artillery salvo during the same period increased from 348 kg to 460, and that of a mortar - more than threefold - from 200 kg to 626.
All this already at that time allowed the rifle division to successfully fight against enemy fire weapons and manpower, reducing its firepower and preserving its survivability for a longer time. In December 1942, a single staff for rifle divisions was introduced in the Red Army. In the third period of the war, on the basis of increased economic opportunities and acquired experience, he again underwent changes. As a result, the weight of the division's artillery and mortar salvo increased by the end of 1944 in comparison with July 1942 from 1086 to 1589 kg, and at the end of the war it reached 2040 kg. At the same time, the division's mobility and maneuverability increased.
In the interests of better leadership of the troops, by the end of 1943, the process of restoring the corps organization of the rifle troops was generally completed. At the same time, the structure of the combined-arms armies has improved. All this allowed them to maintain vitality and conduct an offensive for a long time.
Great changes took place during the war years in the organization of military formations of armored and mechanized troops. The experience of the first Soviet offensive operations of 1941-1942 strongly confirmed the need for large tank formations that are capable of rapidly operating in the enemy's operational depth and are hardly vulnerable to enemy artillery and aviation fire, i.e. maintain combat effectiveness for a long time.
In the spring of 1942, the formation of tank corps began in the Red Army, and in the fall - mechanized ones. By the fall, 4 tank (1st, 3rd, 4th and 5th) armies of mixed composition were created. However, due to the fact that rifle divisions, which had less mobility than tank formations, lagged behind them in the course of hostilities, the combat capabilities of Soviet tank armies were reduced. In addition, command and control of the troops became more difficult.
An important role in increasing the maneuverability, striking force and on this basis increasing the survivability of tank armies was played by the unification of their organizational and staff structure, which assumed the creation of homogeneous tank armies by including, as a rule, 2 tank and 1 mechanized corps in their composition, and also self-propelled artillery, anti-tank destroyer, anti-aircraft, mortar, engineering and rear units. With the means of fire support and air cover for the main forces, the tank armies of this organization acquired greater independence and combat effectiveness. By the summer campaign of 1943, the formation of five tank armies, having a uniform composition, was completed, and in January 1944, the sixth.
The development and improvement of the organizational structure of artillery also influenced the increase in the survivability of troops. A decrease in the degree of his resistance to our advancing troops and a decrease in their losses largely depended on the reliability of suppressing and destroying the enemy by fire. During the war, starting from the end of 1941, there was a continuous process of increasing the number and improving the quality of guns and mortars, and the organizational structure of military artillery was also improved. By December 1944, the total number of barrels of guns and mortars in the division, in comparison with July 1941, had increased from 142 to 252. The presence of a significant number of standard artillery in the divisions provided reliable support for the combat operations of rifle regiments. An artillery regiment (brigade), a rocket artillery regiment (M-13) and an anti-aircraft battalion were introduced into the states of the rifle corps.
By April 1943, army artillery was organized, which included cannon, anti-tank, mortar and anti-aircraft artillery regiments, and in 1944 - army cannon artillery and anti-tank brigades, anti-aircraft artillery divisions. Thus, the saturation of rifle divisions, corps and combined arms armies with artillery increased their firepower and increased survivability in battles and operations.
Even greater changes took place in the artillery of the RVGK. At the beginning of the war, it consisted of divisions and regiments and accounted for up to 8% of the total number of artillery assets. In the fall of 1942, the process of consolidating the artillery formations of the RVGK began by creating artillery divisions, howitzer, artillery-anti-tank brigades and heavy guards mortar regiments, and from April 1943 and artillery corps. As a result, by 1944, our army had 6 artillery corps, 26 artillery divisions and 20 separate artillery brigades, 7 guards mortar divisions, 13 guards mortar brigades and 125 guards mortar regiments. If before the winter of 1941, 49 anti-tank fighter regiments were formed, then by the beginning of 1944 - 140. At the same time, 40 new anti-tank artillery brigades were deployed. By the end of 1943, their total number reached 508. By 1945, the artillery of the RVGK made up almost half of the artillery of the Ground Forces.
The concentration of a significant number of artillery barrels in the main directions increased the reliability of suppressing and destroying enemy groupings, especially their fire weapons. As a result, our advancing troops suffered less losses, which significantly increased their survivability, made it possible to shorten the time for breaking through the enemy defense and conduct a swift offensive.
The development of the organizational structure and combat capabilities of aviation also contributed to the increase in the survivability of the troops. If earlier it was distributed among the fronts and combined-arms armies, then from 1942 it began to unite into air armies subordinate to the commanders of the front forces. At the same time, the formation of the RVGK aviation corps began. A transition was made from mixed formations to homogeneous ones: fighter, assault and bomber. As a result, their combat and maneuverability capabilities have increased, and the organization of interaction with ground formations has become easier. The massive use of aviation in the desired area led to an increase in the defeat of enemy groupings, a decrease in his resistance to the advancing formations and large formations, and as a result, to a decrease in losses and an increase in the survivability of our troops.
Also during the war years, the organizational structure of air defense units and formations was improved. They received new anti-aircraft artillery guns, anti-aircraft machine guns and radar equipment for service in increasing numbers, which ultimately improved the coverage of ground forces from enemy airstrikes, reduced losses among soldiers, equipment and contributed to an increase in the combat effectiveness of combined-arms formations.
The art of organizing and conducting combat and operations had a great influence on increasing the survivability of military formations. In the preparatory period, an important role was played by the skillful placement of elements of the battle order (operational formation) of troops, command posts, rear services and material and technical means. The course of the war confirmed the fact that the formation of troops in battles and operations should in every possible way contribute to the implementation of the most important principle of military art - concentration of efforts in a decisive place at the required moment, and be carried out in accordance with the conditions of the current situation, especially taking into account the nature of the likely impact of the enemy, the capacity of the operational the direction and content of the tasks performed by the troops.
One of the main measures to increase survivability is the fortification equipment of the areas where troops are located, command posts and rear services. During the war years, engineering equipment and camouflage of the starting areas for the planned offensive were greatly developed. An extensive network of trenches and communication trenches was created, which ensured the preservation of troops before the start of the offensive.
An important role for the survivability of the troops was played by increasing the stability of command and communications posts, protecting them from reconnaissance and defeat by the enemy. This was achieved with the help of a whole range of measures: the creation of efficient headquarters and other bodies of field control and reserve means of communication; sheltered placement, reliable protection and defense of command posts; careful camouflage and strict adherence to the established operating mode of radio equipment.
To mislead the enemy about the location of the true command posts, false posts were deployed. Operational camouflage, as is known, is designed by deceiving the enemy to make it difficult for him to detect and deliver strikes by air and artillery forces against the most important targets. One of its effective methods, as the experience of the war has shown, was the creation and maintenance of a network of false positions, first of all, artillery and anti-aircraft weapons, false areas of the location (concentration) of troops with the widespread use of imitation sets of military equipment in them, demonstration of the operation of false radio stations and actions troops. Disinformation of the enemy, false regroupings, demonstration actions and other operational and tactical measures were widely used. In the Siauliai operation (October 1944), for example, the command of the 1st Baltic Front carried out in a short time a covert regrouping of four combined arms, two tank armies, two tank and one mechanized corps to the Siauliai region. In order to create a plausible picture, the concentration of large groupings of troops in the direction of the false strike, units of the 3rd shock and 22nd armies were regrouped in the Jelgava region. As a result, the main forces of Army Group North, including three tank corps of the German forces, concentrated on the direction of the false strike, which ensured the successful conduct of the operation. There are many similar examples during the war years.
Of particular interest is the question of the influence of the art of conducting operations on the survivability of troops. The essence of this relationship is that a more perfect art leads to the preservation of the forces and capabilities of the troops and is an essential condition for the implementation of the outlined plans and the fulfillment of operational tasks. This is especially clearly demonstrated in operations to break through enemy defenses, build up forces and maneuver with available forces and assets during offensive operations. When breaking through the continuous positional defense of the enemy, the troops suffered the greatest losses, which sharply reduced their combat effectiveness, and, consequently, survivability. Therefore, the search for the most effective methods of breaking through enemy defenses and forms of operational maneuver, mainly through artillery, air and tank strikes, as well as the speed of the infantry advance, acquired great importance.
The difficult conditions of the beginning of the war, the losses of the Red Army in military equipment reduced the striking power and mobility of our formations and formations. Attempts to launch an offensive against an enemy superior in strength on the move and on a wide front, undertaken in 1941, were unsuccessful. This required a new approach to the conduct of the offensive. The experience of the war has shown that for its organization it is necessary to create at least a triple superiority over the enemy, to plan in detail the fire defeat of the enemy, to accompany the advancing formations with fire to the entire depth of the breakthrough.
During the counter-offensives near Moscow, the idea of delivering the main attack of the front by two or three armies became more clearly visible, but a high massing of forces and equipment in the area of the breakthrough sector had not yet been achieved. This was due to the limited time frame for preparing a counteroffensive in difficult winter conditions, which made it difficult to carry out front-line regroupings and the withdrawal of troops to favorable directions. The idea of concentrating efforts in one direction began to find practical embodiment in army operations. So, the commander of the 31st Army, General V. A. Yushkevich struck in a narrow sector (6 km) with the forces of three of the five divisions. Lieutenant-General V. I. Kuznetsov and K. K. Rokossovsky.
To develop tactical success in the operational period of the operation, army mobile groups began to be created (according to PU-43, they were called success development echelons). And although the mobile groups were few in number and consisted of troops with different speeds of movement, their penetration into the depths increased the pace of the offensive, reduced losses, and increased the survivability of the troops.
The art of organizing and carrying out a breakthrough influenced the increase in the survivability of troops in the counteroffensive near Stalingrad, where the principle of massing forces and equipment manifested itself in the form of concentrating the efforts of two or three armies and available front-line assets on the directions chosen for the breakthrough. Thanks to the massing of forces and weapons against the weak sectors of the enemy defense, it was possible to create a sufficiently high density of troops and an advantageous ratio: for infantry 2-3: 1, for artillery 3-4: 1, for tanks 3: 1 or more. The groupings created in the main directions had a strong initial strike and could develop an offensive. This operation is described quite fully in articles and books, so we only note that by the end of the first day (November 19), rifle divisions were able to advance 10-19 km, and tank corps 26-30 km, and on the fifth day (November 23) went to the Kalach, Sovetsky area, closing the "cauldron" for 22 German divisions and 160 separate enemy units.
Beginning in the summer of 1943, the conditions for breaking through the enemy's defense became more complicated due to the increase in its depth, the increase in the density of troops and engineering obstacles. The enemy moved from a focal to a continuous, deeply echeloned defense. To successfully conduct the offensive and preserve the survivability of the troops, it was necessary to find more perfect methods of carrying out a breakthrough. The solution to this problem went in several directions. The battle formations of formations and units were echeloned, higher artillery densities were created, the duration of artillery preparation and the force of air strikes against targets in tactical depth increased. The transition to more powerful support for the attack by the method of a single barrage of fire played a special role in increasing the survivability of the troops breaking through the defenses. An important measure helping to reduce losses and increase the pace of troop advance was the widespread use of escort guns, especially self-propelled guns, to destroy surviving anti-tank guns and enemy firing points during a breakthrough. This made it possible not to distract tanks to fight enemy anti-tank weapons, and provided an opportunity to smash more successfully pockets of resistance that interfered with the advance of the infantry.
In the second period of the war, the increase in the depth and strength of the tactical zone of the enemy defense very sharply indicated the problem of completing the breakthrough of the defense and the further development of offensive actions into the operational depth. In the course of solving it, they tried to find new ways. If at Stalingrad, the development of tactical success into operational success was carried out by the introduction of mobile army groups into battle, then at Kursk - mobile front groups, which included one or two tank armies.
One of the conditions that contributed to the successful breakthrough of the enemy's defenses and to increase the survivability of troops in the third period of the war was the further improvement of preparation for the offensive by aviation and artillery. The time of artillery preparation was reduced to 30-90 minutes, and the effectiveness increased due to the number of fire raids and the density of fire. The depth of its implementation has increased. For example, in the 27th, 37th, 52nd armies, during the Iassy-Kishinev operation, it reached eight kilometers. In the Vistula-Oder operation, most armies suppressed the enemy within the entire first line of defense, and the most important objects in the second. The attack was supported by single and double barrels.
In the Berlin operation, artillery preparation was carried out to a depth of 12-19 km, and the artillery support with a barrage increased to 4 km, i.e. captured the first two positions. An important new event that contributed to the preservation of their forces and a successful breakthrough was the artillery offensive at night.
In the third period of the war, it became necessary to ensure the survivability of troops in the absence of operational pauses between operations, when a significant part of manpower and resources was spent on solving tasks in the first of them, and there was very little time for their restoration. All this required better planning of combat operations. The first and subsequent offensive operations became more closely linked with each other. The increase in the survivability of the ground forces was facilitated by the conquest of air supremacy by our aviation. Up to 40% of all sorties were spent on this. The density of bombing strikes also sharply increased during air preparation of the attack. If in the operations of 1943, it did not exceed 5-10 tons per 1 sq. km, then in 1944-1945 it already reached 50-60 tons per 1 sq. km, and sometimes more; in the Berlin operation - 72, and in the Lvov-Sandomierz operation - 102 tons per 1 sq. km.
During the offensive, our troops successfully repelled enemy counterstrikes. This was facilitated by the deep formation of armies, the creation of powerful mobile barrage detachments and artillery-anti-tank reserves, which, in addition to anti-tank artillery, included self-propelled guns and tanks. The art of repelling counterattacks also consisted in organizing more precise interaction between army troops in maneuvering forces and means from non-attacked sectors, and in involving aviation in strikes against the main forces of the counterblow group. This was the case, for example, in the course of repelling German counterattacks by the 65th and 28th armies, during the second stage of the Byelorussian operation and by the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts - in the Budapest operation. Of particular importance was the rapid buildup of the advancing forces' efforts and the exit to the rear and flanks of the counterattacking groupings. Thus, skillful repulsion of enemy counterattacks led to the preservation of combat effectiveness and an increase in the survivability of troops to pursue and destroy the retreating enemy.
The skillful use of tank armies in the role of mobile front groups played a great influence on increasing the survivability of combined-arms formations in 1944-1945. They delivered deep massive strikes, skillfully carried out maneuvers to bypass large groupings and heavily fortified areas, overcame intermediate lines and water barriers on the move, etc. Their successful operations in the operational depth helped the combined-arms armies achieve their goals without great costs.
An example is the actions of the 2nd Guards. tank army in the East Pomeranian operation. While leading the offensive, the army faced stubborn Nazi resistance in the Fryenwalde area, Marienfless. Then, covering this front with part of the forces, the main forces - the 9th and 12th Guards. tank corps, using the success of the 3rd shock and 1st guards. tank armies, it carried out a roundabout maneuver on March 2 and 3. As a result, the army, without losing a single tank, captured the city of Naugard on March 5, went into the rear of a large fascist group that resisted the 61st Army, and contributed to its defeat. The successful maneuver of the 3rd Guards is also well known. a tank army in the rear of the Silesian enemy grouping in January 1945.
As you can see, during the war years, the problem of maintaining the survivability of troops was solved by a whole complex of interrelated factors. This ensured the combat effectiveness of formations and large formations and gave them the opportunity to conduct continuous battles and operations for a long time.
