In the two years that have passed since the end of the operation to "force Georgia to peace", the Saakashvili regime with the help from abroad managed not only to restore the military potential of the country, but also significantly exceed it as of the moment of the beginning of the aggression against South Ossetia.
This is largely due to the fact that the world community did not accept Russia's proposal to introduce an international embargo on the supply of arms and military equipment to Georgia. Due to the constant build-up of Georgia's military potential in the post-conflict period, Russia has long sought to impose an embargo, but Russia's arguments were never accepted.
Moreover, in these two years, weapons were actively supplied to Georgia from abroad.
The restoration of military potential was carried out in three main areas. These are infrastructure (bases and other military facilities), the purchase of military equipment to compensate for losses and the improvement of training for the Georgian army.
PURCHASE OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR RECOVERY OF LOSSES
At the time of the end of the conflict in the course of hostilities, losses in the equipment of the Georgian Armed Forces amounted to 6-8 aircraft, 16-20 tanks, 14-18 infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, 2-3 launchers of MLRS and radar.
According to Russian media reports, 65 Georgian tanks were captured on the territory of South Ossetia. Of these, 44 MBTs were exported to Russia. The rest of the tanks were destroyed on the spot due to malfunction or complete inoperability.
Russian troops also captured 5 OSA anti-aircraft missile systems, 15 BMP-2, several 122-mm D-30 towed howitzers, and 15 Hummer armored vehicles.
A significant amount of equipment was captured at Georgian military bases. In particular, in Gori, during the retreat, Georgian troops left 15 T-72 tanks, several dozen armored vehicles and artillery systems along with ammunition. Part of the ammunition was destroyed or evacuated to Russia. A large number of small arms were removed as trophies from the Senaki base.
During the hostilities, 15 units were destroyed or damaged. surface ships, including several patrol boats.
These losses in military equipment are not so significant compared to what was in service with the Georgian army.
As of January 1, 2008, the Georgian Armed Forces had the following types of weapons.
Armored vehicles: 196 MBT T-72, 62 MBT T-55 / AM2, 60 BMP-1, 85 BMP-2, 2 BTR-60PB, 17 BTR-70, 27 BTR-80, 11 BRM-1K, 51 armored vehicles MT- LB.
Artillery systems: 100-mm T-12 guns - 40 units, 122-mm D-30 guns - 83 units, 152-mm 2A36 guns - 3 units, 152-mm 2A65 guns - 11 units, 152-mm SAO 2S19 - 1 unit, 152-mm SAO 2S3 "Akatsia" - 13 units, 152-mm SAO "Dana" - 24 units, 203-mm SAO 2S7 "Pion" - 6 units.
Mortars: 60 mm S6-210 - 30 units, 82 mm M-69 - 25 units, 100 mm M-57 - 50 units, 120 mm M-43 - 31 units, 120 mm UBM -52 - 25 units
ATGM: “Fagot” - 56 units, “Competition” - 758 units, “Kombat” - 400 units.
MLRS: 122 mm RM-70 - 6 units, 122 mm BM-21 - 16 units, 160 mm LAR - 4 units, 262 mm M-87 Orcan - 4 units.
UBS: L-39 Albatross - 8 units, Su-25UB - 1 unit, L-29 Dolphin - 9 units.
Attack aircraft: Su-25 - 5 units, Su-25K - 17 units.
Helicopters: UN-1N Iroquois - 7 units, Mi-2 - 2 units, Mi-8T - 4 units, Mi-24 - 9 units.
UAV: "Hermes-450" - from 8 to 16 units.
ZSU and ZU: 23-mm ZSU-23-4 "Shilka" - 4 units, ZU 23-mm ZU-23-2M - 12 units.
VMT: landing boats - 4 units, artillery boats - 2 units, patrol boats - 34 units, missile boats - 1 unit, mine-sweeping ship - 1 unit.
MANPADS: “Thunder” - 30 units, “Strela-2M” - more than 200 units.
Air defense systems: Buk-M1 missile launcher - 6 units, Circle - 40 units, Osa-AKM - 4 units, S-75/125 - 35 units.
The above data is from early 2008. By the time of the aggression against South Ossetia, that is, in 7 months of 2008, very significant deliveries were made for a number of types of military equipment.
It should be noted that both before and after the aggression against South Ossetia, along with the declared export of arms to Georgia, many countries practiced with the Saakashvili regime the so-called “black” and “gray” export of military equipment. This became especially characteristic in the post-conflict period. A huge amount of weapons was transferred free of charge, or at dumping prices. Most of the weapons were supplied from the presence of the armed forces of the respective countries. Many transactions were carried out in secret and were not declared anywhere. From the point of view of military-technical cooperation in recent years, Georgia can be described as a "black hole".
In this regard, military exports to Georgia in the period after the end of the conflict and up to the present time cannot be fully calculated. Nevertheless, certain statistics are available and are constantly being updated, since data on many of the implemented contracts become known much later after the actual transfer of weapons. At the moment, TsAMTO estimates the identified arms exports to Georgia over the past two years in the range of 20 to 25 percent. from its real volume.
However, even from the identified supplies, the list of which is given below, it can be judged that the military potential of Georgia in terms of equipping weapons and military equipment has not only been restored, but also exceeds the pre-war level.
UKRAINE
Georgia has chosen Ukraine as a strategic ally in the supply of arms and military equipment. Ukraine carried out active arms supplies to Georgia up to the moment Viktor Yanukovych was elected president (that is, until February 2010).
According to the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, published shortly after the end of the conflict, Ukraine planned to supply Georgia with 25 BTR-80, 20 BMP-2, 3 MLRS "Smerch", 12 units. 152-mm self-propelled howitzers 2S3 "Akatsiya", 50 MANPADS "Igla-1" and 400 missiles for them, 10 combat helicopters, 300 SVD sniper rifles, 10 thousand AK-74 assault rifles, 1 thousand RPG-7V, 60 million rounds 5, 45x39, 30 million rounds 7, 62x39, 5 thousand rounds for RPG-7V, anti-tank mines (25 tons), anti-personnel mines (70 tons), 100 engines for T-55 tanks. In addition, Ukrspetsexport prepared documents for the supply of technical complexes to Georgia for Su-25 attack aircraft. In the fourth quarter of 2008, it was planned to deliver to Georgia 12 new MBT T-84U "Oplot".
Much of the above data is uncontrollable and unidentifiable. Below are only identified shipments.
In 2009, Ukraine supplied Georgia with 10 T-72 MBTs, as well as 3 BTR-80s from the Armed Forces (estimated cost $ 3.3 million). In the same year, the contract for the supply of 25 BTR-70s was completed (it is estimated that in 2009 the last batch of 10 vehicles was delivered).
In addition, in 2009, 20 Igla MANPADS from the Armed Forces were delivered (estimated at $ 1 million), 40 units. MANPADS "Strela" from the Armed Forces (2 million dollars) and the next batch of ATGM "Kombat" (the number is not known). Before the conflict, 400 ATGMs of this type were delivered.
The delivery of 4 Kolchuga-M RER radars was planned for 2008 (one station was previously delivered). Perhaps not all RER radars in 2008 were delivered before August. In this case, part of the deliveries fell on the end of 2008.
In July 2009, the former general director of the state-owned company Ukrspetsexport, Sergei Bondarchuk, said that "Ukraine has fulfilled and continues to fulfill the previously concluded contracts for the supply of weapons to Georgia."
S. Bondarchuk confirmed the fact of deliveries to Georgia of air defense systems "Osa", "Buk", RER "Kolguga-M" radar, Mi-8 and Mi-24 helicopters, infantry fighting vehicles, small arms (most of these deliveries were made before the conflict began).
ISRAEL
In 2006-2008. Israel carried out a program to modernize 165 T-72 MBTs to the level of T-72-SIM-1 ($ 100 million). This program was reportedly not fully implemented prior to the outbreak of the conflict. That is, probably several dozen MBTs (presumably 35 units) could be upgraded after the end of hostilities.
In 2006, the Georgian Armed Forces ordered 40 Hermes-450 UAVs worth about $ 400 million. In 2007-2008. from 8 to 16 UAVs were delivered. The rest of the deliveries are calculated for the period 2009-2011. (estimated at 8 UAVs per year).
According to reports, Israel has not limited itself to supplying Georgia with unmanned aerial vehicles. In particular, Israel planned to supply the Georgian army with a large batch of small arms and ammunition through the Bulgarian firm "Arsenal" - 50 thousand AKS-74 assault rifles, about 1,000 RPG-7 grenade launchers and almost 20 thousand 40-mm grenades for them. as well as about 15 thousand 5, 56-mm assault rifles.
BULGARIA
In 2009, 12 units were delivered from the Bulgarian Armed Forces to the Georgian Armed Forces. 122-mm D-20 field artillery guns (estimated at $ 2 million), as well as 12 units. 122 mm MLRS RM-70 (estimated at $ 6 million).
TURKEY
In 2009, Turkey transferred 70 Ejder armored personnel carriers ($ 40 million) to the Georgian Armed Forces. In 2009, the contract for the supply of 100 Cobra armored vehicles was completed. It is estimated that in 2009 the last 30 Cobra armored vehicles were delivered. For the Georgian Coast Guard in 2009, Turkey supplied a patrol boat (type not known).
FRANCE
In the summer of 2010, Eurocopter signed a memorandum of intent with Georgia for the purchase of two AS-332 Super Puma helicopters for delivery in 2012. (estimated $ 30 million).
USA
In September 2009, the United States offered to supply Georgia with a large consignment of weapons, military equipment and ammunition worth more than $ 100 million. According to available data, in response to a request from official Tbilisi for military assistance, an offer was sent to Georgia for the supply of air defense systems, anti-tank systems, automatic small arms and ammunition for them.
The proposed nomenclature of weapons included the Patriot air defense system, the Stinger and Igla-3 MANPADS in handheld and transportable versions, the Javelin and Helfire-2 anti-tank systems, as well as a large number of cartridges for small arms. There is no reliable data on the implementation of all or part of these supplies.
It should be noted that the largest financial resources in terms of providing military assistance to Georgia in the post-conflict period, the United States focused not on the supply of weapons, but on the restoration of military infrastructure and training of personnel of the Georgian army.
In general, the identified imports of Georgia's arms in 2009 amounted to 65 million dollars against 85.2 million dollars in 2006, 247.6 million dollars in 2007 and 265.7 million dollars in 2008. This suggests that supplies in the post-conflict period were extremely closed.
RESTORATION OF MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE
During the hostilities, the greatest material damage was inflicted on the military infrastructure of Georgia. These are military bases, warehouses, airfields, ports and communication facilities. The post-war reconstruction of the infrastructure of the Georgian Armed Forces has become the most expensive undertaking. It was carried out mainly with funding from extrabudgetary sources. This is various types of assistance that Western countries provided for the "restoration" of the Georgian economy.
In particular, US and NATO "military humanitarian aid" funds were used to rebuild the infrastructure. In general, the United States has reserved $ 1 billion for military assistance to Georgia. Some of these funds have already been spent in the period after August 2008. Similar assistance was provided by the North Atlantic Alliance within the framework of programs aimed at strengthening the defense, economy and security of Georgia.
PERSONNEL TRAINING OF THE GEORGIAN ARMY
The combat readiness and morale of the Georgian army were deemed extremely low following the conflict. In this regard, the United States focused special attention on the further training of the Georgian Armed Forces.
In January 2009, the two countries signed a "Charter on Strategic Partnership", in accordance with which the United States committed itself to modernizing the Georgian army and increasing the country's defense capability. At the same time, the term “strengthening the defense capability of Georgia” meant, first of all, the education and training of personnel of the Georgian Armed Forces, which was recognized as much more important than the supply of weapons.
In August 2009, US military instructors began a 6-month training program in Georgia for military personnel who were sent to Afghanistan in the spring of 2010.
The rotation of the Georgian battalion in Afghanistan takes place once every six months, so in 2010 American instructors will train two more battalions in Georgia. The rotation of the Georgian Armed Forces contingent in Afghanistan is also a convenient pretext for the tacit transfer of American arms to Georgia. The dispatch of the Georgian contingent and equipment from Afghanistan to Georgia is carried out by US military transport aircraft and is not controlled by anyone. That is, along with the rotation of the Georgian contingent, the option of a parallel supply of weapons that were in service with the US Armed Forces in Afghanistan (primarily light armored vehicles, small arms, communications equipment) is not excluded.
It should be noted that the military assistance of Western countries is being carried out against the background of the increasingly "closed" military budget of Georgia. In 2009, despite the fact that the country's GDP fell by more than $ 1 billion, military spending was initially allocated $ 519 million. However, as the practice of recent years has shown, the military budget is being revised several times already in the course of its execution, and in the direction of a significant increase. That is, the final data on the military budget for 2009 should be significantly higher.
CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION
Summing up the results of the two years that have passed since the end of the conflict, it should be noted that the restoration of Georgia's military potential in such a short time seriously complicated the military-political situation in the Caucasus and made a new "relapse" of aggression on the part of Georgia quite probable.
It is obvious that it is beneficial for the Western countries to maintain a constant hotbed of tension on the southern borders of Russia. In these conditions, Russia is forced to constantly keep a reinforced grouping of forces and means in the Caucasus direction, since only the Russian military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is a deterrent factor from the attempts of the Saakashvili regime to unleash a new large-scale conflict in the Caucasus.
