In the epic of the South Korean ferry "Sewol", the reasons for the crash of which the previous article was devoted, there is another very important point: why are there so many dead? 304 people is a lot. Especially considering that the ferry sank not so far from the coast, in the shipping and fishing area, there were merchant and fishing vessels nearby. Weather conditions and current in general did not impede the rescue operation. Not a storm, not a typhoon, and so many dead. Why?
As far as I can tell, in South Korea, the reasons for the failure of the rescue operation were essentially as little concerned as the reasons for the phenomenal ferry crash. Ultimately, all the blame fell on Captain Lee Jun Suk and some of the other crew members. The investigation into the actions of the Coast Guard began in the summer of 2014, but was soon discontinued and resumed only at the end of 2019, already under the new president of South Korea. Then a special investigative group was created to investigate the actions of the service, as well as to investigate possible forgery and concealment of documents and evidence (in particular, recordings from surveillance cameras installed on the ferry). A number of officials were indicted in February 2020, and so far this process has not been completed. Hysteria and political interests in this case turned out to be more important than a detailed investigation of the incident.
In my opinion, this issue should be given some attention, not only because of the desire to unravel the mysterious story, but also because the story of an unsuccessful rescue operation does a good job of revealing how South Koreans react to a stressful situation, how they act in conditions that require personal initiative and ingenuity., and how their government service, responsible for the protection of maritime borders, worked. After this story, I began to value the combat capability of the South Korean army and navy much less. They, of course, have guns, tanks, planes and ships, but with the ability to act in an uncertain situation, to act quickly and accurately, they have obvious problems.
Could the ship be saved?
So, at 8.40 local time on April 16, 2014, the ferry banked sharply, its cargo shifted and the ship began to sink. Was there anything you could do about it?
The first and most obvious solution is to take the water into the ballast tanks on the starboard side to try to straighten the vessel. This was done because high columns of water are visible in the footage of the sinking ferry, escaping from the open kingstones. Kingstones open and close from the bridge, but who exactly did this remains unknown. This could have been done by the capital Lee Jong Sok or the first assistant Kang Won Sik - the person directly responsible for the loading and stability of the vessel. It didn't help them anyway.
Difficulties arise with the second solution. In the practice of the merchant marine, the team usually leaves the ship with a dangerous list (the example of the Cougar Ace car carrier was given), and then the Coast Guard takes care of it. In the Soviet instructions on the fight for the damage of the ship, issued by the Ministry of the USSR Navy, it is only said that the captain should try to land the ship on a nearby aground and wait for the rescuers. However, "Sewol" did not have such an opportunity. The nearest island of Pyongphundo (1.7 miles to the south) was a volcanic rock and, apparently, did not have suitable shoals. Besides, there was a peak in the tide. Secondly, the chief mechanic Park Ki Ho at 8.52 ordered the cars to stop and the engine room to be evacuated. Of course, the ship without a course could not get to any shallow.
It is also known that the captain at 8.52 ordered the second mate Kim Yong Ho to start the sump pumps, to which he received a reply that the pumps were not working. At 8.54 the captain ordered the chief mechanic to go down to the engine room and start the pumps, but this order was not carried out. It is difficult to say how much the pumps would have helped them, maybe they could have won 5-10 minutes, no more: the ferries do not have a counter-flooding system. In any case, Sewol was left without pumps.
On this, the battle for survivability was lost. Thus, even before the first signal for help, it became clear that the rescue of passengers can only be in boats.
Traces of panic
This is according to the common reasoning of people, in principle, ready to act in a critical situation. But, I will repeat my observation of the first article, the unexpected roll and transition of the vessel into an emergency state with the inevitable prospect of flooding in itself, became shocking and demoralizing facts for them. An incomprehensible blow, then a lurch in a calm sea is something that cannot be.
I asked connoisseurs of the Korean mentality how the South Koreans behave in such a situation. The answer was unequivocal: stupor. Such a situation will unbalance the hardened "Moremans", but the South Koreans are inherently highly heightened (against ours) emotionality. The third assistant, Park Han Gul, was crying, which is understandable for a young woman in such a mess. What was the male society doing on the ferry bridge at this time?
Here I must say that the assessment of the situation seriously depends on the sources used. The famous Korean scholar Konstantin Asmolov compiled his description based on media reports. I used another source in my analysis: the work of Kwon I Suk "System Theoretic Safety Analysis of the Sewol-Ho Ferry Accident in South Korea", defended in 2016 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. This researcher clearly had access to investigative materials, which he quotes more fully than the press, for example, he names who exactly contacted the coastal services at one time or another. It was on the basis of his data that I conducted my analysis of the team's actions, which gave interesting results.
So at 8.55 a distress call was sent to the Jeju Vessel Traffic Service. The press did not indicate who submitted it, but Kwon Yi Suk mentions the name - the first assistant of Kang Won Sik. According to the transcripts of the negotiations published by CNN, he said that the ship was capsizing right now (which is not entirely true), asked to be put in touch with the coast guard and said that the ferry was located off the island of Pyongphundo. This is strange, since they were far away from Jeju, the final destination of the route. At 9.07 am, the first officer changed the communication channel and contacted the nearby Chindo service. There was little Jeju could do, however, contacted the Coast Guard in Mokpo, from where Patrol Ship No. 123 was immediately dispatched.
In my opinion, the key to understanding the situation on the bridge lay in radio communications. Based on the information provided by Kwon Yi Suk, I have compiled a list of who and when conducted these negotiations:
8:55 a.m.: Jeju is Kang Won Sik's first assistant.
9 hours 7 minutes: Jindo is Kang Won Sik's first assistant.
9 hours 14 minutes: Jindo - helmsman of Park Kyung Nam.
9 hours 21 minutes: Jindo is the first assistant to Shin Chung Hoon.
9 hours 24 minutes: Jindo is the second assistant to Kim Yong Ho.
9 hours 25 minutes: Jindo - helmsman of Park Kyung Nam.
9 hours 26 minutes: ship number 123 - helmsman Pak Kyung Nam.
9 hours 28 minutes: Jindo and Ship No. 123 - Kim Yong Ho's second mate.
9 hours 37 minutes: Jindo is the second assistant to Kim Yong Ho.
In addition, there were also calls to the ferry service in Chindo, which clarified the situation on the ferry.
According to this list, the question arises: are not too many people participating in negotiations with the coast? Usually radio contacts are assigned to one officer so that others can deal with urgent matters. And right there at the microphone there are two first assistants, a second assistant and a helmsman to boot. We see how the microphone passed from hand to hand, almost literally.
At 9.25 am the dispatcher of the service in Chindo informed the ferry that the captain had to make the final decision and demanded to hurry with the decision. The dispatcher can be understood: in less than 15 minutes he managed to communicate with four different persons who demanded from him to save them. The dispatcher's replica can only be construed as a polite request to maintain order.
This situation can only be explained by the panic that gripped the senior officers of the team. During this time, they did nothing to save the passengers, they did not even contact the passenger deck. Passenger Liaison Officer, who was on the passenger deck, Kang Hae Sun, at 8.52 minutes on his own initiative ordered the passengers to stay in their seats. He never received any orders from the bridge. His decision was clearly dictated by fears that the movement of passengers could accelerate the list of the vessel. Not the best solution, of course. However, at 9.53, when the ship began to submerge, at his own peril and risk, he gave the order to the passengers to escape.
Ship riot
In this whole story, it is far from clear what Captain Lee Jun Suk was doing during the crash. In the press and in court hearings, the emphasis was on the fact that he "escaped from the ferry", although his actions, orders and words should be given priority attention. Still, the person is responsible.
Kwon Yi Suk's data, as well as an interview with the helmsman Oh Yeon Seok (he gave several interviews with different content), show that the captain was giving orders. But they were not executed. The order to turn on the sump pumps was not followed. At 8.56, the capital ordered second mate Kim Yong Ho to notify passengers to put on life jackets and clothing. By itself, this order indicates the intention of the captain to begin the evacuation. The second mate did not obey the order because he didn’t turn on the warning system. At 09.27 the captain repeated his order, the second mate passed it to the passenger deck, but did not make sure that the order was accepted, understood and followed.
But the crew members did a lot without the captain's orders. These are negotiations with the shore, and two attempts to drop the boats. First, at 9:14 am, the helmsmen Jo Joong Ki and Oh Yeon Suk made an attempt, and at 9:44 am, the first mate Kang Won Sik and the helmsman Park Kyung Nam. They referred to the fact that the list was too large and they did not get to the boats (which is not entirely true).
Radio communications with the shore, in which at least four persons took part, without a captain, non-observance of orders and taking actions without an order - what is this if not chaos on the bridge? Or, more precisely, what if not a riot on the ship, direct disobedience to the captain in a critical situation?
It is known that at the same time there were telephone conversations with the office of the Chonghejin Heung shipping company, which owned the ferry, in which the captain and first mate Kang Won Sik took part. There were many calls, at least seven, including, according to Kwon Yi Suk, five calls were made by the first assistant. The first was at 9.01, the last at 9.40. This raised serious questions: did they have nothing to do besides this? Moreover, the content of the calls was never published. In light of all that has been said, I think this little chest opens simply: it was about who exactly is in command of the ship. Lee Jung Suk reported to the office that the team did not obey him, and then the company office was apparently sorting out the relationship with the first assistant Kang Won Sik, either demanded obedience to the captain, or, perhaps, demanded to take control. We'll find out someday.
In general, the investigation had to make a detailed reconstruction of the events, finding out who and where exactly was at each specific moment in time, what he said, to whom and about what, what he did and what he saw. Without this, it is absolutely impossible to understand the degree of guilt of each crew member. But, apparently, this was not done.
My version of the background of all this is as follows: Lee Jong Suk was a temporary captain working on a very low-paid one-year contract, which for the 69-year-old captain, who had spent about forty years at sea, was clear evidence of his low income and social status. He most likely was not perceived by the regular team members as a real captain. In a critical situation, a conflict arose between him and the first mate - apparently, the informal leader of the permanent crew of the ferry, who became the main prerequisite for numerous victims. They spent precious time, while the ferry was not tilting too much and it was possible to help the passengers get out, they spent on sorting out the relationship. Then it got too late, already at 9.20 the roll exceeded 50 degrees, and many passengers were trapped in their cabins. Oleg Kiryanov, who went to the Sevol in Chechzhudo, drew attention to the transverse corridors of the passenger decks, which, when heeling and capsizing, turned into inaccessible shafts. Most of the passengers were unable to get out of the cabins and climb to the starboard side.
Note that it was possible to jump from the port side; it would save many lives, all other things being equal. But for this it was necessary to give the order to leave the ship no later than 9.00-9.10. And later there were still chances. At this time, apparently, the conflict on the bridge reached its climax, and its participants had no time for passengers.
Those who blame the captain for all sins should ask the question: what would you yourself do in such a situation when the team does not obey you and does not follow orders?
Lie about the captain
The role of the rescuers, in particular, the crew of the ship No. 123 and its captain Kim Kyung-il, who was appointed "the commander of the scene", in my opinion, was reduced only to the fact that they exacerbated the catastrophe that had already broken out. They initially had very little ability to help; they did not have enough people and equipment to quickly haul 476 passengers - an overwhelming task for a 14-man crew. A patrol ship with a displacement of 100 tons could not take them all on board, and they did not have the opportunity to provide medical assistance to the victims. True, there were various ships at sea around, and the service in Chindo still at about 9:00 called them to go to the aid of the ferry.
But what Kim Kyung Il has done is somewhat outside the scope of a reasonable approach. Firstly, he had no connection either with the ferry (the ship approached him at 9.30, when the crew was still on board and negotiated with Chindo), or with the service in Chindo. Blind Salvation.
Secondly, a smart solution would be to shout into a megaphone for passengers to get out and jump overboard. Kim Kyung Il first said that the megaphone was being used. But under investigation, in August 2014, he changed his testimony and said that he panicked so much that he did not instruct his crew to get inside the ferry and did not order the passengers to leave the ship. The surviving passenger Kim Sung Mok has repeatedly stated in interviews that no instructions were given from the helicopters or the ship to leave the ship. About 40 minutes remained before the decks were submerged in the water, several dozen people could have escaped. Kang Hae Sun, upon hearing the order from outside, would undoubtedly duplicate it over the on-board network.
Thirdly, Kim Kyung Il initially limited himself to sending the boat to the bridge of the ferry, which had already tilted to the very water, and removed the crew members from it, including Captain Lee Jung Suk.
This event gave the whole story a touch of surrealism. The captain's departure to the boat at 9.46 was recorded on video, which was widely published. There were so many lies about this that one wonders how you can lie like that, having a documentary record. The captain was said to have "escaped", although in the video, he goes to the boat without much haste. They also talked about the fact that he was allegedly "first in line", although there is no queue for the frames. It was alleged that he was wearing a life jacket, when in reality he was not. And so on and so forth.
Most importantly, it was argued that the captain had not put on a uniform and was trying to impersonate a passenger. The precariousness of this accusation lies in the fact that the passenger is unlikely to be on the bridge. Access to the bridge is limited, and it was already impossible to get up there from the passenger deck with such a heel. The fact that the captain was without uniform is explained by the fact that the disaster found him in his cabin on vacation, and he did not have time to get dressed. Rescuers claimed they did not know he was the captain. But a medical worker in the port, assisting him, asked the rescuers who he was, and received the answer that he was the captain of the ferry.
Finally, in the Korean press, emotions were splashed for a long time that the captain should be the last to leave the ship, and Lee Jung Suk fled. This is a good maritime custom, of course. However, South Korean law does not at all oblige the captain to remain on the ship in the event of an accident (just like the Soviet manual for the naval fleet; the captain can lead the fight for survivability from wherever it is more convenient for him). The heating of emotions was carried out with the help of an amusing fake, worked with scissors and glue.
I will cite in the original first two articles from the Korean Seafarer's Act:
Article 10
A captain shall not leave his / her ship from the time cargoes are loaded and passengers start to go on board until the time all cargoes are unloaded from his / her ship and all passengers leave his / her ship: Provided, that except for cases where there is a special reason that he / she should not leave his / her ship, such as abnormal weather conditions, etc., this shall not apply where he / she has appointed a person who is to perform his / her duties on his / her behalf from among officers.
Article 11
Where a ship is in critical danger, a captain shall take all the measures necessary to rescue human lives, the ship and cargoes.
And now another option - as it was quoted in the press, in particular, in the newspaper "Hankuryo":
A captain shall not leave his / her ship from the time cargoes are loaded or passengers start to go on board until the time all cargoes are unloaded or all passengers leave his / her ship. At times when a ship is in critical danger, a captain shall take all measures necessary to rescue human lives, the ship and cargoes.
Highlighting allows you to reveal exactly where the Korean propagandists walked with the scissors, what piece they threw away and what they wrote in. In article 10 of the law, it is quite obvious that we are talking about the usual conditions of navigation or anchorage in the port, since the captain can appoint a deputy for himself. It was this piece that was cut out, giving the law a perverse meaning. Well, aren't they handsome?
Well, why all these tricks? I think, in order to hide the extremely unseemly role of the coast guard and in particular the captain of the ship No. 123 Kim Kyung Il. Lee Jun Suk went to the lifeboat, of course, deliberately. First, he needed a transmitter to report the situation to the shore (the ferry's radio had already stopped working). Second, he probably intended to urge rescuers to step up their actions. They have been chatting around the ferry for 15 minutes, and the rescue has not actually begun. Apparently, an impartial conversation took place between Lee Jun Suk and Kim Kyung Il on board. The ferry captain probably demanded that he come to the ship, since one rubber boat would not be enough for all passengers.
The captain of the patrol ship was, of course, afraid. The ferry is big and capsizes, but its boat is small. In general, it all ended with Kim Kyung Il simply gagging Lee Joon Suk, using the authority of the scene captain given to him by the Coast Guard.
Approximately 20 minutes later, at 10.18, the ferry sank, the remaining passengers were killed. When the leadership of the Coast Guard realized what they had done, they began to compose all these amusing stories about the "unrecognized captain" who "escaped first." To admit that such demands were made by Lee Jun Suk, and to admit that they did not help him in any way, meant taking responsibility for the deaths of more than 300 people and sitting down for a long time. The aged ferry captain looked like an ideal "scapegoat", it was only necessary to create a negative reputation for him, to put him in prison, where he would soon die.
If in the place of Kim Kyung Il there were a strong-willed and initiative person, driven by a sense of duty and ready to take risks, he could do a lot and save many people. He could level out the general discord and inconsistency in the organization of the operation. But he had to act on his own, at his own peril and risk, which Kim Kyung Il did not.
This is the story that comes out.
If we talk about the guilty, then I would put first mate Kang Wok Sik in the first place, apparently the initiator of insubordination to the captain. The second place is taken by the captain of the ship No. 123 Kim Kyung Il. Ferry captain Li Zhong Sok in this case is a victim of circumstances and was condemned clearly unfairly.
