During the First World War, the territory of Persia turned into an arena of hostilities and subversive activities of agents of the belligerent powers. The north of the country was occupied by Russian troops, and the southern part was occupied by Great Britain. In the north, west, south of Persia, an anti-imperialist movement arose, especially strong in Gilan, where the Jengeli partisan detachments operated [1].
At the beginning of March 1917, in Tehran, news was received from Russia about the February Revolution, about the abdication of the emperor. Political changes in Petrograd echoed loudly in the political circles of Persia. The head of the Russian diplomatic mission, pointing to these sentiments, wrote to Petrograd: “The slogan“Without annexations and self-determination of nationalities”engendered great hopes in the hearts of the Persians, and their main goal now is to strive to get rid of the Anglo-Russian tutelage, to convince us to abandon the agreement 1907 - from the division of Persia into zones of influence”[2].
At the same time, the Provisional Government of Russia, in principle, was not going to abandon the expansionist policy pursued by tsarism in Persia. The Russian bourgeoisie intended not only to preserve the positions it had won in Persia, but also to expand them. The Persians' hopes for a radical change in Russian policy towards their country did not come true. [3]
In its address "To All Working Muslims of Russia and the East," the Soviet government defined the principles of its foreign policy towards Persia. “We declare that the agreement on the partition of Persia has been torn and destroyed. As soon as hostilities cease, the troops will be withdrawn from Persia and the Persians will be provided with the right to freely determine their fate”[4].
State flag of the RSFSR
Flag of Persia under the Qajar dynasty
A serious blow to British plans in Persia was dealt by the statement of the Soviet government on the rejection of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907. In fact, the first legislative act of the Soviet government - the Decree on Peace - meant the denunciation of this agreement, and in the appeal “To all working Muslims of Russia and East "Council of People's Commissars proclaimed that" the agreement on the partition of Persia has been torn and destroyed "[5].
Taking into account that “among the Persian people there are doubts about the future fate of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907,” the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on January 27, 1918 sent a note to the Persian envoy categorically confirming this decision of the Soviet government. [6] Thus, the British were deprived of the legal basis, relying on which they ruled in southern Persia and hoped to seize the whole country. The NKID's note also declared invalid all other agreements that in any way limited the sovereign rights of the Persian people.
“The external factor that had a great influence on the development of the internal political situation in Iran was the October Revolution in Russia. This influence was varied. On the one hand, Soviet Russia announced the abolition of all unequal treaties between the tsarist government and Iran and the transfer of property that belonged to Russian subjects in Iran to it, and the cancellation of all debts of the Iranian government. This, of course, created favorable conditions for strengthening the Iranian statehood. On the other hand, the party-state leadership of Russia, being held captive by the dominant thesis (actually elevated to a theoretical postulate) about the imminent accomplishment of the world revolution, pursued a policy of exporting the revolution, although it verbally condemned it. Iran found itself among the countries that felt the consequences of this policy with all its might …”[7].
Despite the fact that the Persian government was under the strong influence of the British colonialists, it officially recognized the Soviet government in December 1917. [8] There are several reasons for this move. Without the establishment of official relations between the two states, it is impossible in a short time to implement the agreement of the Soviet government on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Persia. The ruling circles of Persia were directly interested in this, since they were afraid of the revolutionary influence of Russian soldiers on the masses of their country. It is also necessary to take into account the internal struggle in the ruling camp of Persia. The increased aggressiveness of British imperialism prompted the most far-sighted representatives of the Persian ruling circles to seek rapprochement with Soviet Russia. [9]
Towards the end of World War I, British liberals advocated a more flexible policy in Persia and a rejection of the direct imperial course. However, the former Viceroy of India Curzon, becoming foreign minister, did not want to reckon with the dictates of the times and hatched the idea of establishing a British protectorate over Persia. Curzon believed that the departure from the Persian arena of tsarist Russia created real prerequisites for the implementation of such a plan.
Curzon substantiated his foreign policy concept in a memorandum drawn up in 1918. Curzon was aware of the scale of the influence of the ideas of a new Russian revolution on the Persians, which caused him anxiety. He wrote: "… if Persia is left alone, there are many reasons to fear that it will be subject to Bolshevik influence from the north …" Further developments largely confirmed Curzon's forecasts. Seeking the implementation of the plan developed by Curzon, British diplomats made a lot of efforts to bring Vosug od-Dole back to power in Tehran. Back in May 1918, the British envoy Ch. Marling began secret negotiations with the Shah's court, promising in the event of the removal of Samsam os-Saltana and his cabinet ministers and the appointment to the post of Prime Minister Vosug od-Dole, to pay a monthly subsidy to Ahmed Shah Kajar. the amount of 15 thousand fogs.
Ahmed Shah
In 1918, in order to suppress the national liberation movement, transform Persia into a colony and a springboard for intervention against Soviet Russia, the British imperialists occupied the entire country. Under British control, on August 6, 1918, the Vosug od-Doule government was formed. Great Britain imposed on him an enslaving agreement in 1919, according to which it received the right to reorganize the Persian army, send its advisers to the state institutions of Persia, etc.
The Vosug od-Doule government pursued a policy that was hostile to the Soviet Republic. With his connivance, on November 3, 1918, the Soviet mission in Tehran was defeated, and in August 1919, near the Persian port of Bandar Gez, the White Guards murdered Soviet envoy I. O. Kolomiytseva. [10]
On June 26, 1919, the government of the RSFSR again turned to the government of Persia, which laid out the foundations on which Moscow would like to build its relations with Tehran. [11]
“On August 9, 1919, an agreement was signed between Iran and Great Britain, negotiations on which began at the end of 1918. It provided Great Britain with the opportunity to establish its control over all spheres of Iranian economic and political life, as well as over the armed forces … … The agreement sparked a storm of protests in Tehran's political circles. Representatives of the Tehran bazaar, the country's main economic center, strongly condemned the agreement. The influential representative of the commercial capital Moin ot-Tojjar and Imam-Jome (imam of the main mosque in Tehran) said that the agreement was directed "against the interests of the country." They described it as a serious threat to Iran's independence”[12].
Britain's desire to establish its protectorate over Persia displeased its ally, France. The conclusion of the 1919 agreement exacerbated the Anglo-French rivalry in the Near and Middle East. The position of the US government, with which Tehran sought to establish friendly contacts during this period, was also openly hostile.
The Soviet leadership took a more radical position. In a special address "To the Workers and Peasants of Persia" published on August 30, 1919, it characterized him as enslaving and declared that "it does not recognize the Anglo-Persian treaty implementing this enslavement" [13].
“Lord Curzon in every possible way sought the refusal of the Iranian leadership to establish official relations with Moscow … Iranian Foreign Minister Nosret al-Doule Firuz-Mirza, who was in London, in an interview with the correspondent of the Times newspaper, the text of which was published on April 6, 1920, positively commented on the actions of the government of Soviet Russia. He stressed the great importance for Iran of Moscow's cancellation of unequal treaties and agreements concluded between Tsarist Russia and Iran. Lord Curzon, during a meeting with Firuz Mirza, exerted open pressure on him to persuade the Iranian government to abandon the idea of establishing official relations with the Soviet government. However, the government of Vosug od-Doule on May 10, 1920 turned to the Soviet government with a proposal to establish state relations between Iran, on the one hand, and the RSFSR and the Azerbaijan SSR, on the other”[14].
The note was received by the Soviet side on May 20, 1920. This day is considered the date of the establishment of Russian-Iranian diplomatic relations.
On the other hand, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Persia created serious political difficulties for the British colonialists. From a purely military point of view, the occupation of the entire country by their troops was now becoming a relatively easy undertaking, but the noble action of the Soviet government inspired the Persian patriots to fight for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Persia. The British diplomat and historian G. Nicholson admitted that after the departure of the Russian troops "the British were left alone as occupiers and the whole force of the Persians' indignation fell upon them" [15].
Not confining itself to the withdrawal of troops, the Soviet government took a number of other measures to establish friendly and equal relations with the Persian people. Initially, diplomatic relations with Persia were carried out through the Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, Assad Khan. [16] The appointment of a Soviet diplomatic representative to Tehran was of great importance. The only Russian diplomat in Persia who recognized the Soviet power was the former vice-consul in the city of Khoy N. Z. Bravin. He became the first Soviet representative in Persia. On January 26, 1918, Bravin arrived in Tehran as a Soviet diplomatic agent. [17]
Persian historian and diplomat N. S. Fatemi writes in his book that Bravin conveyed a message to the Persian government signed by V. I. Lenin, in which it was said that the Soviet government instructed Bravin to enter into negotiations with the government of the Shah of Persia to conclude friendly treaties, the purpose of which is not only to strengthen good-neighborly relations in the interests of both states, but also to fight the British government together with the people of Persia.
The letter also indicated that the Soviet government was ready to correct the injustices committed by the tsarist government by renouncing all tsarist privileges and treaties that violate the sovereignty of Persia, and to build future relations between Russia and Persia on free agreement and mutual respect for peoples. [18]
The Persian government, referring to the cancellation by the Soviet government of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, appealed to the British representative in Tehran with a request to withdraw British troops from the country. In addition, two statements were made to the diplomatic corps. The first said that Persia considered canceled all agreements that infringe on its independence and territorial inviolability. In the second, in connection with the upcoming withdrawal of Russian and Turkish troops from Persia, it was proposed to withdraw others as well, i.e. British troops. [19]
The policy of the Soviet government had a strong influence on the situation in Persia. "Lenin's letter, Chicherin's declaration on Soviet policy towards Persia and Bravin's activities in Tehran meant more than the army and trains with ammunition" [20].
G. V. Chicherin
On July 27, 1918, the government of Samsam os-Soltane adopted a resolution on the official cancellation of all agreements and concessions concluded with tsarist Russia, “in view of the fact that the new Russian State made the freedom and independence of all nations, and in particular the abolition of privileges and treaties, the subject of its desires, received from Persia, which was declared officially and unofficially. The Persian government decided to inform representatives of foreign powers in Tehran and diplomatic representatives of Persia abroad about this.
Although this act represented only an official recognition by the Persian side of what had already been done by the Soviet government, the statement by the Os-Soltane government was perceived as a general rejection of unequal treaties with all foreign powers.
This course of events alarmed the British. Curzon made a special statement in the House of Lords that the question of canceling the Anglo-Russian agreement could be considered only after the end of the world war. [21] C. Marling told the Shah that "the implementation of the decisions of the Council of Ministers is tantamount to Iran's declaration of war on England" [22].
Under direct pressure from Ch. Marling, the Shah resigned the Os-Soltane cabinet. In early August, the British protege, Vosug od-Dole, came to power again.
In general, the end of the First World War brought very little results to Persia. The end of hostilities on the Persian territory did not lead to peace and tranquility. Great Britain in a new situation, when its main rival and ally Russia withdrew from Persia, decided to extend its influence throughout the country. She explained this with a desire to contain the offensive of Bolshevism on her position in the Middle East. On the other hand, anti-British, pro-democratic movements in the northern provinces of the country and local separatist uprisings of semi-nomadic societies posed a new threat to the ruling Qajar dynasty and its main support - the landed aristocracy. Nevertheless, the stratum that ruled in Tehran, which until recently was on the verge of death, undertook a number of actions aimed at reviving the authority of the central government and its positions in the field of international relations. The most important part of these measures was the attempt to establish diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, as well as the desire to receive an invitation to the Paris Peace Conference with the right to vote. [23]
Initially, in the documents of the Entente powers concerning the peace conference, Persia, as well as Afghanistan, Turkey and Thailand, was regarded as “not a completely sovereign state seeking a more independent status” [24]. But soon in one of the draft foundations of a peace treaty with Germany, drawn up by the US State Department, it was already said: “The independence of Persia is recognized in the treaties that the central powers intended to conclude with Russia. In May 1918 g. Persia denounced the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 after it was denounced by the Bolshevik government of Russia. It is hardly possible that the independent statute of Persia was not confirmed by a peace treaty and the presentation of the right to be a party to its signing”[25].
The memorandum prepared by the Persian government for the Paris Peace Conference included demands for the abolition of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, the liquidation of foreign consular courts and the withdrawal of consular guards, the abolition of concessions, etc. This was a tribute to the sentiments of the wider Persian public, which enthusiastically greeted the Soviet government's statement on the abolition of all unequal treaties and agreements with Persia. Even the reactionary government of Vosug od-Doule could not ignore these agreements. [26]
On May 11, 1920 the newspaper "Rahnema" published an article "We and the Bolsheviks." Describing the policies of Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States as "Machiavellian", the newspaper further wrote: other nations by force of bayonets. We don't think so. Bolshevism is peace, creation, and not a method of politics. The policy of the Bolsheviks cannot resemble the policy of the present European states”[27].
In May 1920, Soviet troops were brought into the territory of Gilan to oppose the British. During the Soviet-Persian negotiations, the idea of creating a mixed commission to establish control over the simultaneous withdrawal of British and Soviet troops from Persia was put forward and received approval from both sides. As a result, on December 15, 1920, Churchill was forced to announce to the House of Commons the impending withdrawal of British troops from Persia. Thus, the denunciation of the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1919 and the expulsion of the British from Persia were predetermined. [28]
Soon after coming to power, the government of Moshir al-Dole announced its desire to begin negotiations with Soviet Russia and restore relations with it. “Only during the period of the cabinet of Moshir al-Dole (July 4 - October 27, 1920) the Iranian government spoke in favor of restoring relations with Soviet Russia and concluding an agreement with her. By a government decision, the Iranian ambassador to Istanbul, Moshaver al-Mamalek (the same Moshaver who led the Iranian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference) was appointed head of an emergency mission sent to Moscow to conduct negotiations and prepare a draft Soviet-Iranian treaty. He arrived in Moscow in early November 1920, when the Sepakhdar Azam cabinet was formed in Tehran, continuing the course of his predecessor towards Russia. The talks in Moscow were quite successful, which strengthened the position of opponents of the Anglo-Iranian agreement. Undoubtedly, it was the success of Moshaver's talks in Moscow that became one of the reasons for the refusal of the Supreme Soviet, created in November in Tehran, to approve the Anglo-Iranian agreement. Iranian society was inspired by the negotiations. The mood of hope and anxiety that prevailed in Iran of those days was very figuratively expressed by the Rahnema newspaper: we have the opportunity to see and better look at the issues that have surrounded us from all sides, and to choose for ourselves a firm and more stable course. A bright light flashed from the North, and the source of this light or fire, depending on how we look at it, is Moscow … The last telegrams from Moshaver al-Mamalek, the proposals of the Soviet government, the possibility of establishing a different, new policy on the part of our northern neighbor - all to a certain extent this clarifies our political horizons and draws deep attention to itself. But on the other hand, it still makes our position so difficult that the slightest mistake, one wrong step can plunge us into an abyss of danger and bring on us the enmity of one of those two political centers that stand in their constant rivalry, ready to fight with each other”” [29].
On August 18, 1920, in Moscow, a note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Persian government, Moshir os-Soltane, dated August 2, 1920, transmitted through the Persian Chargé d'Affaires in London, was received., the Persian government appoints ambassador extraordinary to the Soviet government in Istanbul, Moshaver al-Mamalek, who is entrusted with the negotiation. August 27 G. V. Chicherin replied that the Soviet government would be happy to receive Moshaver ol-Mamalek. [30]
On the eve of the start of the Moscow talks, the British forced the government of Moshir al-Dole to resign. On November 1, a major feudal lord Sepakhdar Azem was appointed prime minister. In Persia, this was perceived by many as a surrender to Great Britain. However, the new government did not dare to openly declare its recognition of the 1919 agreement. It was forced to take into account the anti-imperialist sentiments of the broad strata of the Persian public. Mass rallies and demonstrations took place in the country, the participants of which demanded the expulsion of the British occupiers and the conclusion of an agreement with Soviet Russia.
The government published an appeal to the population, which said: “All measures of the government in foreign and domestic policy, especially in relation to the Anglo-Iranian agreement, will not be changed. It will continue the policy of the previous government and will not take any steps to implement it until the agreement is approved in the Mejlis”[31].
The British government, embittered by the successful course of the Soviet-Persian negotiations, on December 19, 1920, demanded that the Persian government immediately convene the Mejlis to ratify the Anglo-Persian treaty. The Extraordinary Supreme Council of Persia, convened in this regard, taking into account the growth of the national liberation movement in the country and the successful course of the Soviet-Persian negotiations, did not obey the British demands for the ratification of the Anglo-Persian treaty and recommended to take a wait-and-see attitude, and on December 31, 1920, approved the draft Soviet-Persian treaty. And, despite the intrigues of British diplomats, the Soviet-Persian treaty was signed on February 26, 1921 in Moscow. [32] The agreement, among other things, confirmed the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet and Persian sides.
“Both parties were interested in this settlement (agreement - PG). Soviet, because it needed to protect itself from a repetition of the British and any other intervention from Iranian territory. The Iranian government, because the partnership with Russia made it possible to get rid of annoying British interference in Iranian affairs and to pursue a more independent foreign policy”[33].
The British occupation and the reactionary policies of Vosug od-Dole triggered an even more powerful wave of the national liberation movement. On February 21, 1921, units of the Persian Cossacks under the command of Reza Khan carried out a coup d'état. The new government headed by Seyid Ziya-ed-Din (in which Reza Khan later became Minister of War) sought to prevent the development of the democratic movement. At the same time, under public pressure, it was forced to announce the annulment of the Anglo-Persian agreement of 1919.
On February 21 (according to the Persian calendar - 3 khuta), 1921, a coup d'etat took place in Tehran. The coup of the 3 Khuta reflected a change in the alignment of Persian class forces. If the previous governments were predominantly the governments of the feudal aristocracy, now a landlord bourgeois bloc has come to power, in which the national bourgeoisie enjoyed a certain influence. [34]
During the events of the "3 Khuta", the popular masses of Persia and the public demanded the establishment of friendly relations with Soviet Russia. Chairman of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (6) G. K. Ordzhonikidze, informing G. V. Chicherin about the coup in Tehran, drew attention to the fact that one of the Tehran newspapers had placed on the first page a draft Soviet-Persian treaty and an appeal: "Union with Russia is the salvation of Persia."
The Soviet government announced its renunciation of all unequal treaties and agreements concluded to the detriment of Persia by the tsarist government with third countries. All concessions and property received by tsarism on its territory were returned to Persia. Persia's debts to tsarist Russia were canceled. Both sides agreed to equally enjoy the right of navigation in the Caspian Sea. In addition, the Persian side pledged to conclude an agreement on granting the RSFSR the right to fish in the southern part of the Caspian. Of particular importance was Art. 6, which provided for joint measures in the event of armed intervention by the imperialists. [36]
There is no reason to consider Reza Khan's policy pro-Soviet. It was a policy of rational nationalism, which excluded excessive dependence on any of the strong powers. But objectively at that time, rapprochement with Moscow was in the interests of Persia more than the restoration of British patronage. [37] The Kremlin did not fail to take advantage of this, including Persia in its sphere of influence.
Notes (edit)
[1] Dzhengelians (from Persian jengel - "forest") are participants in the partisan anti-imperialist movement in Gilan, which began in 1912. For more details, see: History of Iran. XX century. M., 2004, p. 114-128.
[2] Soviet Russia and neighboring countries of the East during the Civil War (1918-1920). M., 1964, p. 88.
[3], p. 87-88.
[4] Soviet Russia …, p. 93.
[5] Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR. T. I. M., 1957, p. 35.
[6] Ibid, p. 91-92.
[7] Iran. Power, reforms, revolutions (XIX – XX centuries). M., 1991, p. 42–43.
[8] Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR. T. I, p. 714.
[9] Soviet Russia …, p. 173.
[10] See: Soviet Russia …, p. 197-212.
[11] Essays on the history of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. T. II. M., 2002, p. 55.
[12] Iran: Influence of the October Revolution ideas. - In the book: The October Socialist Revolution and Middle East. Lahore, 1987, p. 62-63.
[13], p. 97-98.
[14] Ibid, p. 100.
[15] Curson: the last phase. 1919-1925. L., 1934, p. 129 (cited in the book: A. N. Kheifets Soviet Russia …, p. 179).
[16] Essays on the history of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 53
[17] Soviet Russia …, p. 179-180.
[18] Diplomatic History of Persia. N. Y., 1952, p. 138 (the content of the letter is set out in the book: A. N. Kheifets Soviet Russia …, p. 180).
[19] Soviet Russia …, p. 182.
[20] (cited in the book: Soviet Russia …, p. 184).
[21] Soviet Russia …, p. 185.
[22] Quoted. from the book: National liberation movement in Iran in 1918-1920. M., 1961, p. 40.
[23] Due to its unjustified territorial claims, Iran was not allowed to participate in the Paris Peace Conference. For more details see:, p. 103.
[24] Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States. 1919. The Paris peace conference. Vol. I. Washington, 1942, p. 73 (quoted from the book: Soviet Russia …, p. 203)
[25] Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States. 1919. The Paris peace conference. Vol. I. Washington, 1942, p. 310 (cited from the book: Soviet Russia …, p. 203).
[26] Soviet Russia …, p. 203-204.
[27] Quoted. according to the book: Soviet Russia …, p. 226.
[28] See: Soviet Russia …, p. 262-264.
[29] Iran: opposition to empires (1918-1941). M., 1996, p. 50-51.
[30] Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR. T. III. M., 1959, p. 153.
[31] Quoted. from the book: National liberation movement in Iran in 1918-1920. M., 1961, p. 110.
[32] The failure of British policy in Central Asia and the Middle East (1918-1924). M., 1962, p. 69-70.
[33] Systemic history of international relations. T. 1. M., 2007, p. 205.
[34] For more details see: On the nature of the coup of the 3 Khuta // Peoples of Asia and Africa. 1966, no. 5.
[35] Soviet diplomacy and the peoples of the East (1921-1927). M., 1968, p. 58.
[36] History of diplomacy. T. III., P. 221-222. See also: Soviet-Iranian relations in treaties, conventions and agreements. M., 1946.
[37] System history …, p. 206-207. For more details see: R. A. Tuzmukhamedov. Soviet-Iranian relations (1917-1927). M., 1960.
