In the navies of different countries, there are many concepts that suit some countries and not others. For example, an all-nuclear submarine fleet is not suitable for Russia for both economic and geographical reasons. Non-nuclear submarines are not needed by the United States for anything, except for their potential transfer to Taiwan. Small countries generally don't need aircraft carriers.
One such concept is the "ocean corvette". There have been examples of such ships in history, and now some states in the ranks have ships that are somewhat similar to them.
Does Russia need this type of warship? Right now, no. Russia does not need such ships right now. However, when pursuing an active foreign policy, which Russia is clearly striving for, the Navy may face a lot of relatively simple combat missions in regions of the world very far from our shores, and on the other hand, there may be a need for a sharp increase in the combat strength of the Navy, and, what is important, without a corresponding increase in funding. The latter, generally speaking, can be considered guaranteed.
And if such conditions really develop, then, perhaps, the concept will be in great demand. And to use it, you should study it along with all the pros and cons. And for this it is worth paying attention to some examples and analogies.
Flower-class
The risk of war with Germany and, as a result, the risk of a submarine war on the Atlantic communications of the British put the latter in front of the most severe necessity: it was necessary very quickly, in an incredibly short time, to build or take somewhere a multitude of escort ships capable of somehow protecting convoys from submarines. If the old, World War I times, large surface ships, which the British assigned to the convoys at first, could fight against the surface raiders, then something else was needed against the submarines.
Shortly before the war, the British reclassified all "sloops" - colonial ships of small displacement, in which speed was sacrificed for range, into corvettes. But it was clear that they would not be enough.
They were not enough, as a result, at the first stage of the war, in addition to sloops and other available light ships, the British received (in exchange for a network of military bases!) 50 old dilapidated destroyers from the US Navy, also belonging to the period of the First World War. As one British officer put it, "the worst ships in the world." This was obviously not enough, and somehow armed civilian ships, for example, fishing trawlers, en masse to guard the convoys.
This was obviously a workaround and did not work well. What was needed was massive, simple and cheap escort ships capable of "closing" the ASW missions of convoys on the crossing, at least somehow capable of carrying out an ocean crossing, and, if necessary, waging a battle with submarines in the open ocean. They were the Flower-class corvettes.
The British worried about these ships too late, the order for the first batch of new corvettes was issued just a few months before the start of World War II. The first "Flowers" began to enter service in the Royal Navy in August-September 1940, the rest of the Allies and Dominions began to receive them later. A total of 294 corvettes of various modifications were built.
Flowers were pure wartime ships. These were small, thousand-ton ships with appalling habitability. Their weapons were many times worse than those of the sloops: 1 102-mm cannon for firing at submarines on the surface, two machine guns of 12.7 mm for firing at air and surface targets, two Lewis machine guns chambered for 0.303 inches (7.7 mm). But for the destruction of submarines, the corvettes had two Mk.2 bombers and 40 depth charges - the special anti-submarine designation affected.
Later, a slightly enlarged modification was designed and built with slightly better habitability, an anti-aircraft machine gun and a Hedgehog rocket launcher.
The hull design was based on a whaling ship, as a result, such ships could be built by many shipyards.
In order to save money, the ships had only one valolinium, and also in order to save and facilitate the recruitment of crews, instead of the usual turbines, the ships were equipped with a 2750 hp steam engine, just like the whaling prototype. Two boilers fired crude oil. The speed of the corvette barely reached 16, 5 knots.
But he had a radar and sonar.
These corvettes have become a vital means of defending convoys. The number of attacks they thwarted is overwhelming. The number of submarines that they sank during the war is not so great - 29 units. But their main task was to ensure the safety of the ships of the convoys and they carried it out.
"Flowers" were an example of an ocean corvette: a small ship with limited functionality, simple and cheap, with low performance characteristics, but massive and really capable of performing combat missions in the ocean. These corvettes played a critical role in the Battle of the Atlantic and for the British they are one of the symbols of victory over Germany. The corvette was built in two versions, each of which was then gradually modernized.
Let us list some general points in the concept that Flower was built on:
- maximum simplicity and mass character ("more ships for less money");
- saving on everything, except for what is needed to complete the combat mission (PLO, and not so much by destroying German submarines as by preventing the attack of the convoy);
- the presence on board of everything necessary for the performance of the main task - PLO;
- tactical and technical characteristics, reduced to the minimum permissible level in order to save and reduce production costs;
- the ability to operate in the open ocean. The latter should be specially stipulated: at small dimensions, this ship literally threw like a chip on the waves, but usually it retained stability and could use depth charges, which was required of it.
After the war, the class of ocean-going corvettes disappeared: there was no need to solve the tasks that these ships solved during the Second World War. Small ships remained in the fleets of many countries, but basically now their specialization was now different.
Modernity
The increase in the size of warships was unchanged throughout the post-war years, this was due to the explosive growth of the required volumes for electronic weapons, generating capacities, cable routes, missile weapons, hangars for helicopters, sonar equipment. The corvettes were not spared either; today they are larger than some destroyers of the Second World War. So, the corvettes of the project 20380 of the Russian Navy have a total displacement of more than 2400 tons. However, even against the background of modern large corvettes, there are examples that stand out in this part.
One of these types of ships is the corvette of the Indian Navy "Kamorta" type. This ship, created as an anti-submarine, is distinguished by the fact that it is oversized for its composition of weapons. It's too big for the weapon set it carries. For example, in comparison with the domestic project 20380, "Kamorta" has neither a missile system for striking surface targets, nor a corresponding radar, the gun from the Indian ship is more likely to perform air defense missions (76 mm) than for the shock from the Russian ship (100 mm). At the same time, the Indian ship is 2 meters wider than the Russian at the waterline, only 70 centimeters wider (its width is equal to that of the American frigates "Oliver Hazard Perry"), but the total displacement is about 870 tons higher.
Unlike the 20380, Camorta pays great attention to the comfort of the crew, which makes it easier for him to stay at sea for a long time. The Kamorta's cruising range is 4000 nautical miles, and the autonomy is 15 days, which corresponds to our ship.
"Kamorta" can not be called an ocean corvette, although this ship is a little closer to it than ours because of habitability.
But it has something in common with the "Flowers", namely, "slaughtered" for the task of performance characteristics. This ship has a full set of anti-submarine weapons and a good anti-aircraft missile system "Barak" for a corvette. But the shock capabilities of this ship are zero. At the same time, he is quite capable of moving in the ocean and, apparently, using torpedo weapons in case of rather serious excitement. The result is savings.
The low speed hints that he may have been invented as an escort. The escort ship does not need speed, but it is quite possible to save money on a power plant with a low speed.
The Indians clearly did not try to make a multipurpose ship, but they did not spare the volume for a specialized anti-submarine corvette, providing it with good seaworthiness. For reference: if it were not for the helicopter, then all the weapons of the "Kamorta" would fit in the 1100-1300 tons of displacement. And there are more than 3000 tons of full.
Another example of an overgrown corvette is the criticized Russian ship of project 20386. Those wishing to get acquainted with what this project is about can read the articles “ Worse than a crime. Construction of project 20386 corvettes - error », « Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam" and " Is the rework of the 20386 project contemplated?". In addition to these technical and tactical issues, another one was identified for the project: the 6RP gearbox, which was considered as the basis for the power plant of this ship, is created on the basis of the P055 gearbox, "around" which the power plant of the wonderful frigates of Project 22350 is being built. The problem is that LLC Zvezda -reducer ", which produces both gearboxes, will simply not master two series, and you will have to choose: either leave 22350 in production, or instead start building 20386 in some version, even in a large version, in the original.
Common sense dictates that you choose frigates that are much more powerful and valuable for the fleet.
Among other things, the ship was lit up in a political scandal: figures from the shipbuilding industry seem to have tried to convince the president that his re-laying is the laying of a new ship. As a result, it turned out badly, details in the article “ 2019 Shipbuilding Riddle, or When Four Equals Five ».
The project is definitely harmful for the country. But one noteworthy aspect is worth noting: this ship, with all its global shortcomings, has better seaworthiness than previous corvettes. It has a common "ideological" moment with the Kamorta: in its original version, it is oversized for the intended composition of the weapon. Due to this and due to the fact that specific contours are used for the hull, the ship is distinguished by better seaworthiness than the corvettes of the 20380 project, and less loss of speed in waves.
This does not make the idea of its construction correct, but the question of creating just a simple and cheap corvette with a composition of weapons similar to project 20385, and simplified electronic weapons for cheapness and mass production, but in an enlarged body and with an increased range, would be worth considering. And that's why.
In the Northern Fleet, the weather conditions are very harsh even in summer, and three-point excitement is almost the norm, and excitement is stronger very often.
In such circumstances, a corvette larger than the 20380/5 could be very useful. In addition, our ships mainly go on long voyages and combat services from the Northern Fleet. And taking into account the fact that the underwater threat is not decreasing, the presence of a good anti-submarine unit with minimal restrictions on the use of weapons in waves would not be superfluous.
Nevertheless, it is worth repeating: while this is not particularly necessary, Russia in its current status will do without ocean corvettes.
But everything can change. In what case can such ships be useful?
Corvette as a tool of expansion
As you know, for a long time the supply of the Syrian army was carried out with the help of landing ships of the Navy, their shuttle flights were widely known as the "Syrian Express". What is less known is that at first the fleet had nothing to do with these shipments: they were handled by the ATO, the Department of Transport Support of the Ministry of Defense. It was necessary to switch to the use of ships under the naval flag after chartered ships with ammunition and military equipment for the Syrians began to be stopped, detained in ports of third countries and inspected. The case was clearly heading for a blockade, and then the Navy entered the business. You can read about the role of the fleet in saving Syria in the article “ Russian Navy against the US and the West. Example from recent transactions ».
But an attempt to repeat something similar in Libya would have been impossible. Even if Russia really needed it. Right now, a "Libyan express" from Turkey is operating in Libya, which actively supports the Turkish fleet, and on the Turkish territory itself there are Turkish aviation forces ready for immediate use in the Libyan war. What if Russia needed for some reason (we will not discuss it now) to secure control over the entire Libyan territory? And if, at the same time, President Mursi or someone like him, a protege of the Muslim Brotherhood (banned in the Russian Federation) and a great friend of Recep Erdogan would still be in power in Egypt?
Russia would have to retreat just as it does now. Retreat because it would not have had any strength to run its Libyan Express in parallel to the Turkish "Libyan Express", to provide it with military protection in the form of a strike force of the Navy, capable of preventing an open attack by ships and vessels with military cargo, and convoy forces capable of protecting these ships and vessels on the transitions from supposedly accidental or not accidental, but anonymous attacks by someone's submarines, drones, unmarked fighters from the Cold War that arrived from nowhere, some ragamuffins on motorboats who, by chance, have high-class professional training and similar threats.
Libya is a different story. But at present, Russia is actively working on economic penetration into Africa. So far, our total trade turnover with the “black continent” is not large, it does not even reach a billion dollars, but it is growing, and the presence of Russian companies in Africa is growing, and the question of whether these investments will have to be protected one day will sooner or later arise. And then everything with which we were late in Libya may suddenly be needed.
Including some "African express". And if there are countries in the world that are not interested in the reliable and uninterrupted operation of this express, and if these countries have navies, then an overgrown corvette with a long range, capable of using weapons in high seas, will be very useful.
There are other considerations as well.
At the moment, the domestic fleet is still largely composed of ships of the Soviet period. But they are not eternal. At the same time, after the massive decommissioning of the BOD, it will be extremely difficult to quickly reimburse these ships. The PLO of ship strike groups operating in the far sea zone will have to be carried either by the ships themselves performing strike missions, or by the corvettes of Project 20380, of which only 10 units were laid down for the entire Navy (and a couple more 20385). At the same time, corvettes have worse seaworthiness and lower speed compared to large ships. It turns out that frigates 22350, which, it seems, will be our main ships in the far sea zone, will have to perform shock missions, engage in anti-submarine defense, and repel air strikes. It looks a little realistic.
At the same time, as already mentioned, difficult times await us in terms of financing: money will be allocated, but in such quantities that it will not be possible to build a full-fledged fleet in the traditional way.
It is here that a simple, cheap and massive anti-submarine ship appears to help large surface ships, which, nevertheless, can maneuver at the same speed and use weapons while rolling, if necessary. In some cases, this will be quite useful. The ocean corvette is quite responsible for the concept of "more fleet for less money". The threats that were listed above, such a corvette may well withstand.
conclusions
One of the ways to very quickly and inexpensively increase the size of the fleet, capable of operating in the far sea zone, is the construction of ships, a subclass of which can be defined as "ocean corvette".
Such a ship is a corvette, the hull of which is increased to a size that allows it to conduct military operations in the DMZ, far from the coastline, with the excitement characteristic of such areas. It also requires a cruising range comparable to that of large surface ships, and comparable to their speed. At the same time, in order to save money and speed up construction, the expansion of the composition of weapons and armaments on board the corvette to values corresponding to the size of the ship is not carried out. It is possible and acceptable to build such ships as specialized, for example, anti-submarine.
Such ships will be able to operate in the detachments of warships in the DMZ, but at a price they will be close to normal "corvettes".
Separately, it is worth mentioning that in the conditions of the Northern theater of operations, these ships will be more suitable than traditional corvettes or warships smaller than corvettes.
This solution has not only advantages but also disadvantages. For example, the narrow specialization of ocean corvettes is unlikely to allow them to be used for anything other than their main purpose.
Being more expensive than "normal" corvettes, they will have the same combat capabilities with them, with the exception of restrictions on the use of weapons in waves and range.
Being cheaper than full-fledged warships, they will also require the training of a comparable number of personnel for the formation of crews, and from the point of view of managing naval formations, they will complicate this process as much as a full-fledged warship.
For these reasons, the ocean corvette, on the one hand, cannot be considered a fully demanded solution that should be immediately implemented. However, such a decision in the near future may still turn out to be in demand and necessary, which means that it is necessary to work out the concept of such a ship and comprehensively study the possibilities that it can give, and the circumstances in which we should have it.
