Alfred Thayer Mahan once wrote that no country that has a land "frontier" will achieve the same level of sea power as a country that does not have one and is insular - insular, or isolated, isolated.
Some domestic readers have translated frontier as "border", meaning simply the state border of this country with another. This is not true given the context. In the middle and second half of the nineteenth century, when Mahan began to create, the concept of "American frontier" meant anything, just not just a border - it was rather a front of the nation's efforts, materialized as a line on a map, a challenge facing American colonists, a front of application efforts, the front of expansion, the horizon in the achievement of which was the national idea, albeit not formalized. In the years when Mahan wrote his book, the expansion into the lands of the Indians had already ended and the entire territory of what was then North America was occupied by Europeans and the Africans they brought in, but it ended “just” - literally. Here is what Mahan himself wrote about this "frontier":
The center of power is no longer on the seashore. Books and newspapers compete with each other in describing the amazing development and still underdeveloped wealth of the interior regions of the mainland. Capital gives the highest profitability there, labor finds the best applications. The border areas are neglected and politically weak, the shores of the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific are absolute, and the Atlantic coast is compared to the central Mississippi valley. When the day comes when shipping operations will again be sufficiently paid, when the inhabitants of the three maritime frontiers realize that they are not only militarily weak, but comparatively poor in their lack of national shipping, their combined efforts may be of great service in rebuilding our maritime power. …
Mahan meant exactly this - the front for the application of efforts, the border, but not between countries, but the border of what is achievable for the country and the people, which this people had to push back, and it had to be so strong that it could not be avoided. The frontier is, figuratively speaking, a "national task on the ground." For Russia, at different times, such "frontiers" were the advancement to Siberia, the advancement to Central Asia, the conquest of the Caucasus, and at least the advancement to Berlin. Oil development at Samotlor. BAM. All this required a lot of resources. The masses of steel, gunpowder, warm clothing, firewood and industrial wood, food, liquid fuel, tools and, most importantly, people. The time of people and their strength. Often - their lives and health.
The same British were spending these resources on naval power. The Russians could never afford it - the land "frontier" demanded its own.
Is it so now? Absolutely, nothing has changed. Our country is still full of both economic, economic and military tasks on earth. And they require resources. Diesel fuel, man-hours, spare parts for bulldozers, cement, antibiotics, warm overalls and self-propelled artillery pieces. They demand, after all, money. And they are of such a nature that we cannot get away from their implementation.
This means that we will always lose to nations that do not have a "frontier" on earth, lose in what resources we can attract to build our sea power. They can always throw more on the scales.
Does all this mean that we are a priori doomed to be the weakest side? Are there any recipes for the poor to compensate for the impossibility of throwing all resources at sea power? There is. Let's start with organizational issues and consider an example of how the poor side can to some extent neutralize the lack of resources for the creation of combat forces through a smart approach to the issue.
Porridge from an ax, or an example of how to make three divisions from four regiments
Let us first consider the situation using the example of naval aviation, which for our country with isolated naval theaters of operations is the only maneuverable force after a "big" conflict has passed into a "hot" phase. Naval aviation, even shock, like the former MRA, even anti-submarine, is very expensive. On the other hand, the main fleets must have it; we do not and will not have another way to concentrate the prohibitively dense volley of anti-ship missiles for the enemy. Let's say the risk assessments tell us that in the Northern and Pacific fleets we need to have at least a three-regimental air division. And one more shelf to the Baltic and the Black Sea. In total, thus, you need two divisions and two regiments, a total of eight regiments and two divisional directorates. This is a need.
But then Her Majesty the economy intervenes, which tells us: "No more than five regiments for the entire fleet." There is no money, and there never will be.
How to get out?
The solution, which will be presented below, can be considered in some way a benchmark for the poorest side. Unable to win extensively, by drawing more and more funds into circulation, the poor may well wriggle out “intensively”, that is, organizationally - no matter who asserts what. To some extent, of course.
The solution is as follows
We are deploying air division directorates at the Pacific Fleet and Northern Fleet, we form all divisional subordination units for them, if it is required to provide them with reconnaissance or some special air units, we do it.
Then we form the shelves. One at the Northern Fleet, we include it in the division, the second in the same way at the Pacific Fleet. We get one quasi-division from one regiment. These regiments are constantly operating in their theater of operations with their divisional directorates.
At the second stage, we are deploying a regiment in the Black and Baltic Seas. At normal times, these regiments train in their theaters.
But in the unusual, they are transferred to the Northern Fleet or Pacific Fleet and are included in the division as the second and third "numbers". Everything, the necessary striking force in the theater of operations has been received. When necessary, we threw a three-regimental division into battle. Inflicted losses on the enemy and gained time? Flight of a pair of regiments from the Pacific Ocean to the North, joining the Northern Fleet Air Division and taking off to strike. And if it turns out to be the fifth regiment in a row? This is a reserve. If, in a situation where the Black Sea and Baltic regiments went under the division headquarters somewhere in the North, you need to strike sharply at the enemy in the Black Sea? For this we have a reserve regiment. By the way, it can be used as part of an air division instead of the Black Sea or Baltic, leaving "in reserve" another air regiment that knows its theater of operations well.
Let's compare. In the case of "extensive" development, we would have two divisional directorates, six regiments in divisions, and two more separate ones - under one in the Baltic and the Black Sea. There are eight regiments in total.
And what do we have if the “solution for the poor” is applied?
Two divisional directorates, and first four, and then five regiments - exactly according to economic possibilities.
And now attention - how many forces can the same Pacific Fleet be thrown into the attack in the event of a “solution for the poor”? Three-regimental division. What about normal military development? Same.
And on the Northern Fleet the same picture. Both in the case of sufficient financial resources, and in the case of insufficient ones, we throw a three-regimental division into battle. Only when solving for the poor, the divisions in the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet have two common regiments, which, in fact, turn single-regiment quasi-divisions into full-fledged shock three-regiment, "roaming" from the theater of operations to the theater of operations. Thus demonstrating the importance of maneuver.
Yes, this solution has a drawback - you can have only one division at a time, the second at this time will be a single-regiment (or, if the last reserve regiment is included in it, then a two-regiment) ersatz. With the redeployment of the Baltic and Black Sea regiments to the same Pacific Fleet, there, at the Pacific Fleet, the required three-regiment division "grows", but the Baltic and the Black Sea are "exposed".
But who said that the enemy's pressure on different theaters of operations spaced thousands of kilometers apart would be synchronized? And that it will be necessary to have aviation in different places at the same time? It is quite possible to create conditions under which aircraft could operate in several places in turn. And, most importantly, who said that the war will generally be with such an enemy who can push simultaneously both on the Kola Peninsula and on Kamchatka? A war with the United States is possible, its probability is growing, but this probability is still very small. The likelihood of a grappling with Japan is several times higher, and the likelihood of a "border incident" with Poland is higher than the likelihood of a war with Japan - and also several times.
It should be admitted that the solution with "nomadic" regiments is quite working, as well as with air divisions "framed" in such a specific way. You just need to regularly practice such things in exercises.
The problem is that, due to the inevitable losses in a war, the strike force of naval aviation according to the second option will decrease faster than according to the first. But there is still no choice! In addition, something can be fully compensated for by combat training, for example, the losses in each combat sortie from well-trained air regiments will be lower.
This is the strength of the poor.
This is the proof that, having money only for 4-5 regiments instead of 8 required, you can have attacking groups of sufficient strength, simply by maneuvering. This is the solution for the poor in terms of organizational and staff structures. Poor does not mean weak. The poor man can be strong. If he's smart and fast.
The article “We are building a fleet. Consequences of "inconvenient" geography " a similar example was considered with the surface fleet - ships in reserve in each of the fleets and a "hot" reserve crew, which can be used in any of the fleets, and even be transferred from fleet to fleet. Such decisions require a high level of personnel training, high morale, discipline, but if everything is ensured, this side that is experiencing a shortage of resources for naval development can get more than if guided by the traditional approach.
But the most important thing in a "naval economy" is adequate shipbuilding costs. Historical experience suggests that the fleet is significantly more expensive than the ground forces during intensive shipbuilding; the rest of the time, everything is not so dramatic. This means that the key to building a "fleet of the poor" - a strong fleet for little money, is the application of appropriate approaches to both the design of ships and their construction.
Ships for the poor
In 1970, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt became the Commander of Naval Operations of the United States Navy. Zumwalt had his own, very solid and clear vision of how the US Navy should develop in a situation when the enemy, the USSR Navy, dramatically accelerated the construction of new ships, especially submarines, and built them at a pace that the United States could not keep up with then.
For example, the aircraft-carrying cruiser "Kiev" was laid down in 1970, in 1972 it was already launched, in 1975 it was already at sea and planes flew from it, and in 1977 it was included in the fleet. In 1979, the USSR already had two shipborne aircraft carrier groups in two fleets. In 1980, the Yak-38 was tried to be used in Afghanistan, after which these aircraft began to fly, albeit very badly, but they could already be assigned combat missions of limited scope. So quickly, carrier-based aviation and the aircraft carrier fleet were never created from scratch, and Zumvalt had something to fear, especially since the USSR built submarines even faster and in large quantities, actively experimenting with products inaccessible to the United States of technology, for example, titanium hulls.
At that moment, the United States was not in the best condition. The economy was stormy, and a little later the 1973 oil crisis also began to affect. In fact, it was clear that the long and bloody war in Vietnam had already been lost, or at least not won. And it was in such conditions that the Americans had to jerk their naval power up to such a level that the Soviet Union, which was actively investing in the fleet, would have no chance in case of war. This could only be done by increasing the number, but with a simultaneous decrease in cost.
In more detail, what Zumwalt wanted to do, and what his followers did already under Reagan, are described in the article "It's time to learn from the enemy" … The methods used by the Americans are described in detail, and attention should be focused on the following.
First, a quote from Zumwalt:
A fully high-tech navy would be so expensive that it would be impossible to have enough ships to control the seas. Fully low-tech navies will not be able to withstand certain [some. - Translation] types of threats and perform certain tasks. Given the need to have both enough ships and reasonably good ships at the same time, the [Navy] must be a combination of high-tech and low-tech [navies].
Zumwalt saw this as a huge mass of simple and cheap ships, with deliberately curtailed capabilities, led by a very small number of ultra-advanced and high-tech warships, made to the "limit of technology."
Of all that Zumwalt planned, we are only interested in the project that he was given to realize almost completely - the frigate of the class "Oliver Hazard Perry". And not so much the frigate itself, which is well studied and described in domestic periodicals and literature, as the design principle applied in its creation.
We are talking about the so-called "Design to cost" principle or "Design at a given cost". The Americans strictly adhered to only one parameter - the price of the designed subsystems and structures of the ship, abandoning some seemingly correct design solutions and forcibly "cutting off" the possible functionality of the ship. To eliminate technical risks, many systems were tested on ground test benches, for example, a power plant. Only proven subsystems and only cheap materials were used.
The result was a series of ships of the same type, which before the arrival of the Arleigh Burke destroyers was the most massive in the world. "Perry" became the real workhorses of the US Navy, they were part of all battle groups deployed by the Americans in the world, they fought with Iran in the Persian Gulf, and then - there with Iraq, providing the basing of helicopters that "cleaned" the oil-producing platforms occupied by the Iraqis which they turned into fortified defensive posts. Although initially the frigate was not intended for anti-submarine operations, but later, with its pair of anti-submarine helicopters, it began to be used for this purpose as well.
Elmo Zumwalt's high-end approach, design at a given cost, and the principles listed in the article mentioned above, which the Americans applied in relation to the construction of their navies, allowed them to receive one dollar more ship than the USSR could get on it. In fact, the Americans, being a richer country than the USSR, used the methods of the poor in their naval development, and the USSR behaved like a rich country, and as a result lost the arms race. And "Perry" here is just one example, in fact, there were such examples throughout. One "Harpoon" instead of a giant zoo of Soviet anti-ship missiles, torpedoes, submarines - the list is long.
To understand how all of the above works in practice, especially in our realities, let's conduct an intellectual exercise and see how the American "principles of the poor" look like against ours.
Two fleets
Consider two countries - Country A and Country B, or further A and B. They both build a fleet. Both of them are not very rich, although A is richer than B. But the tasks they face are comparable. To simplify the issue, we believe that both there and there the ruble is the currency, there is no inflation, and they can use the same ship subsystems.
Let's take as a starting point “minus the first” year of the shipbuilding program implementation, when there was no money for the fleet yet, but it was clear that next year there would be money. For our country, it was about 2008.
By minus the first year, A and B were in approximately the same position. Their fleets were literally “on their knees”, because in previous years it was not possible to receive funding even for the repair and maintenance of ships in a technically ready state for going to sea. This crisis in A and B lasted quite a long time and most of the fleet was cut on needles in both countries. But there were also differences
In A, the fleet continued to wait for funding. The crisis turned out to be not only economic, but also ideological, many people in the country simply did not understand why they needed a fleet at all, moreover, there were such people even among the command staff. As a result, the fleet existed by inertia, the ships rotted, and little by little they got up "for good" forever.
In B, despite the crisis, the understanding of the need for the fleet never disappeared. It was clear that sooner or later he would be needed, but how to survive without money? In B, the fleet came to the conclusion that there would be no money for a long time and began to implement a deliberate strategy of survival in difficult conditions. An inspection of all "living" ships was carried out, for each one of four possible decisions was made:
1. The ship remains in service
2. The ship gets up for conservation "according to all the rules", but without repairs (there is no money for repairs).
3. The ship gets up for conservation as a donor of components for other ships of the same class.
4. The ship is written off and sold for scrap regardless of anything, including its residual resource, valuable mechanisms are removed, the rest is put into the furnace.
In the absence of stable funding, this program looked like just a giant conveyor belt of death. Even quite running units were cut, crews and staffs were absolutely ruthlessly reduced, and combat ships capable of going out to sea became "piece goods."
Once upon a time, fleets A and B were the same in size and consisted of dozens of pennants. And in the "minus first" year, A had twenty-five first ranks in service, while B had only eight, although the condition of B's ships was much better, because other expenses were mercilessly cut to repair them. At the same time, however, B had ten more ships left for conservation "for restoration", while A had five and in worse condition, looted completely for spare parts. Only two of these five could be "revived", and that was very expensive and time-consuming. B has all ten. And for each running ship in B, there were two crews.
But then the realization came that it was time to build.
Both countries reviewed their objectives. In A, the navy received a political order from above to ensure the use of long-range cruise missiles. In B, such a task was also set. But naval commanders B had a clear and clear understanding of what war at sea was and how it was waged. They understood that with or without cruise missiles, the main enemy of surface ships was submarines. They understood that the ship lives for a long time and the tasks in front of it during its service life can arise very different, and in different places. And they also remembered that it was worth keeping the fleet "alive" without funding, and not just letting it go, and were going to count every penny.
And then came the "first" year, the year when the money appeared.
In A, there was merry chaos. Having received instructions from the General Staff to provide a missile salvo and money from the Treasury, A quickly designed a series of small missile ships. These ships could launch cruise missiles from a universal vertical launch system for eight missiles, they could attack surface targets from it and conduct artillery fire. They had problems with seaworthiness, but no one set the task of ensuring their combat use in the far sea zone. The laying of such ships began very quickly, of which it was planned to build ten units. The price of each was to be ten billion rubles, a total of one hundred billion.
B didn’t have a hundred billion for ships. It was only thirty-five. And there was a clear understanding that it was impossible to miss this last money. And that missiles are missiles, but no war at sea will ever come down to them alone. Therefore, Fleet B began to focus on small multipurpose corvettes. In B, they were designed for a given cost. The corvette had a sonar system of several GAS and torpedo tubes, as well as the same missile launcher for eight missiles as in small missile ships A.
In an effort to reduce the price, B deliberately simplified each ship. So, instead of a hangar for a helicopter, a place was left for it, for the future. A sliding light shelter hangar was developed, but it was not purchased. There was not a single system that had to be developed from scratch, only modifications of the existing one were accepted. As a result, B produced corvettes that were quite capable of fighting submarines, having slightly better air defense than A's missile ships, the same cannon, and significantly better seaworthiness and cruising range.
The command of Fleet B, in principle, sought to ensure that these corvettes could be used in battle groups together with the old first ranks in terms of speed and seaworthiness. In addition, the engineers of B cheated - they provided for a reserve of space for more powerful diesel generators, the main power cables could transmit current twice as much as needed, all the equipment that is part of the ship's electronic weapons could be dismantled without entering the plant. just a crane and personnel. Engineers B analyzed the dynamics of the growth of the mass and dimensions of various equipment (the same radars) and provided for reinforcement and reinforcement of the decks where in the future it might become necessary, and the free volume required in their opinion, where possible. For this, too, it was necessary to sacrifice something in the design of the case.
As a result, B received two corvettes of 15 billion rubles each. For the remaining five, one of the "running first ranks" was repaired, and it also received a slight upgrade - the ability to fire new missiles from its old launchers, which had to be slightly modified. In terms of its missile salvo, this first rank turned out to be the same as two corvettes - 16 cruise missiles of a new type.
Two years later, B had on the stocks two corvettes in readiness of 40% and one repaired first rank.
Country A had two RTOs on sea trials, and three more under construction, for another five a contract was signed.
By the beginning of the third year of the shipbuilding program, B was able to allocate another thirty-five billion. But the command of the fleet was tasked with strengthening the detachment of forces in the far sea zone. Fleet B reacted simply - contracts were signed for two more corvettes. Moreover, since there was no need to conduct any developmental development, some saved money was formed, for which sets of helicopter hangars were purchased for all four corvettes. These hangars made it possible to store helicopters on ships for a long time and formally gave the admirals a reason to declare that corvettes were capable of operating in the DMZ. However, it was so. The remaining five billion B were spent on repairs and minor modernization of another first rank, according to the same program as the first.
In A, the situation was different - the political leadership demanded the presence of patrol ships in areas where there was a risk of pirate attacks on merchant ships. At the same time, the rocket ship program continued, they continued to be built.
Given the task of patrolling, Fleet A came up with patrol ships - simple and cheap. They, frankly, were not optimal for such tasks, but at the very least, it would be possible to drive pirates to them (with restrictions). Each ship cost A only six billion rubles, and there were six planned. Thus, to the hundred billion rubles that have already been allocated and partially spent on missile ships, thirty-six more for patrol ships were added. B by that time was in the process of assimilating seventy billion.
By the beginning of the fourth year of the shipbuilding program, an anti-piracy attack had fallen on B. Now, the politicians also demanded from the B fleet to ensure the fight against pirates. Funding was allocated for this, the same as received by Fleet A
But in B there were people who did differently than in A. Instead of designing some kind of anti-piracy ships, Parliament B pushed through the legalization of private military companies, and authorized them to conduct such activities with the money of the shipowners. This immediately removed the problem of protecting ships flying the B flag or owned by B citizens and flying flags of convenience.
True, the political leadership continued to demand patrolling of pirate-hazardous zones, and not by first rankings, each exit of which cost a lot of money, but by small and inexpensive ships, as in A. And Fleet B answered this requirement. Namely, he laid down more corvettes. Here are just an incomplete package. They did not have an air defense system, there was only a regular place for it and wiring, there were no sonar stations, although they could also be installed later, there was no bomb and air defense systems, there were only places for their installation. And there was no rocket launcher either. Everything was drowned out. As a result, one corvette stood at only nine billion per unit, and four units were built, and much faster than full-fledged ones. But they were immediately with hangars.
By the end of the sixth year, A had six MRKs in service, and two patrolmen out of six, B had three corvettes in service, one in trials and four "naked" corvettes in construction, 70% ready.
By the beginning of the seventh year, shipbuilding programs were revised in A and B.
In A, under pressure from lobbyists, they decided to build four more RTOs of ten billion each. In addition, the first rankings began to pour in - they had not done any repairs for a long time. However, in A there was no clear theory of why they needed a fleet and what it should do, so the repair of the first ranks was planned according to the "push to the maximum" scheme. The ships were planned to be seriously rebuilt, and such repairs came out at 10 billion per ship. The number of cruise missiles, which were supposed to embark on the modernized ship, was supposed to be 16 units. At first, we decided to try one - a lot of new systems in an old case meant a high technical risk. Additional funds allocated for RTOs and the repair of the old large ship amounted to fifty billion.
In B, everything was also revised. It turned out that the pirates were killed by mercenaries of one of the nearby monarchies, and they were killed so harshly that there was no one to give birth to new ones. The number of attacks on ships sank to a few times a year. Patrol corvettes were no longer needed, but the task of continuing the construction of the fleet was still in place. But the military had an answer here - it is easy to turn patrol corvettes into real ones, you just need to throw out the plugs and covers, and put the equipment and weapons not previously installed in their regular places. Six billion for each of the four ships, twenty-four in total. This was quite within the power of the budget of B. In addition, B could allocate another ten billion for the fleet. We decided to use this money to repair and, as before, it is easy to modernize a couple of first ranks from the "running gear".
By the beginning of the eleventh year of the shipbuilding program, the world had changed. The danger of war, including naval war, has grown.
By that time, all funds had already been mastered in A and all MRK and patrol vessels had been handed over. 14 RTOs and six patrol vessels. One of the first ranks was in the final stage of a complex and "charged" modernization. The rest of the previously available ones required urgent repairs, which had not been done all these years. 186 billion rubles were spent.
By that time, B had delivered eight multifunctional corvettes with the possibility of using cruise missiles. In addition, four new first rank out of eight available running gears were repaired and re-equipped with new missiles.
All of the above required 140 billion rubles.
During the shipbuilding program, both A and B wrote off one rank first in terms of wear. B planned to take from storage and restore another one of the same for about five billion. A did not have such an option, what they had "in storage" had long since rotted away.
Now let's count.
For 186 billion rubles, A received 112 missile cells - 8 each for 14 MRKs. Another 16 at the same cost were expected in the future on the renovated first rank. A total of 128 missiles on sea carriers.
It was possible to ensure the deployment of 6 deck helicopters at sea on patrol ships.
B had a different statistic - 64 cruise missiles on corvettes and 64 on refurbished first ranks. All in all, the same 128 cruise missiles in a salvo. The ratio of the number of first ranks has also changed - both countries lost one "running" ship, but B introduced another from conservation, and A did not introduce anything.
In terms of the number of helicopters deployed at sea, the B fleet won - 8 corvettes provided eight helicopters at sea, and not 6, as in B.
At the same time, over the years of the shipbuilding program, A had a colossal "hole" in the anti-submarine defense - those ships that A put into operation were unable to fight submarines, while B was enough to load PLUR corvettes into the launchers instead of cruise missiles.
Now in A they were deciding how best to act - they urgently needed anti-submarine ships, which still needed to be designed. It was assumed that these would be either corvettes, like in B, at 15 billion per unit, or simpler ships, unable to take helicopters on board, and use cruise missiles, at 8 billion per unit, at least 8 ships. And there was an urgent need to repair the first rankings left over from the old times. Shipyards A could revive no more than two ships in two years. And there were 23 of them in service and one for modernization. According to the forecasts of the "profile" Central Research Institute, at such a time period, at least four ships will not see repairs, they will have to be written off earlier, leaving twenty units in service.
As a result, both new anti-submarine ships and repairs of old ones rose at least 164 billion over the next decade, with the receipt of eight small anti-submarine ships and ten repaired and deeply modernized first ranks (plus the one that has already been repaired).
Twenty years after the start of the shipbuilding program, A would have:
- 11 repaired and modernized ships of the 1st rank, 16 cruise missiles each;
- 9 partially combat-ready first ranks, with the possibility of repair and modernization, and are in great need of such;
- 14 RTOs with 8 cruise missiles;
- 6 almost unarmed patrol vessels;
- 8 small anti-submarine ships (small corvettes without a take-off pad and cruise missiles);
- helicopters at sea on new ships - 6;
- rocket salvos - 288 missiles.
It would have spent 350 billion rubles, and for the repair of another 9 first ranks it would have been necessary to have 90 billion rubles in the next ten years.
B would have:
- 17 repaired first rank ships with new missiles instead of old ones and minor upgrades. 16 cruise missiles;
- 15 already built URO / PLO corvettes (assuming that a simple and small ship can be built in 4 years). If necessary - 8 cruise missiles;
- 1 corvette under construction, deadline for delivery - 1 year;
- volleys - 392 missiles + in a year another 8. There will be 400 in total;
- helicopters at sea on new ships - 15 and one more in a year.
Spent - 325 billion All future money for the fleet will go not to repair old ships, but to build new ones, including first ranks.
It is easy to see this: B spent less money on the fleet, and at first much less, but at the same time ended up with a fleet that is significantly stronger than A. So, for example, B at the time of the end of the comparison has 15 anti-submarine ships in service and one in completion … A has only 8 and each of them is worse than B.
Moreover, at the beginning of the third decade, A still has a weight on its feet in the form of old and unmodernized ships that are in their fourths - in the real world, bringing them to a combat-ready state is not always possible. Then B will begin to build already modern first rankings, and country A will have to decide whether to cut old ships and build new ones, or save on new ones, but restore old ones. Both, in the end, will increase the advantage of B in forces. In addition, fleet A is much more expensive to operate - it solves the same tasks worse, but with a large number of ships, which means more crews, housing, money for salaries, berths, fuel, and ammunition for combat training are needed.
Plus the factor of the fact that B has only one type of new ship (the old first rankings will be taken out of the brackets, who knows what is there), and A has three types - MRK, patrol and IPC / corvette. And this is ununification, a triple set of spare parts and so on.
What if B had as much money as A? At the very least, this would mean that in the same time frame, B would have received another corvette, and the first rank restoration program would have finished a couple of years earlier. Or maybe it would have been possible not to lose one of the ships by age. Then B would have 18 first ranks with modern weapons against 11 for A, and as a result, with an additional corvette, the missile salvo of B would have 424 missiles against 288 for A. And this despite the fact that A, how stung was invested in MRK! And B has more than twice as many ships for anti-submarine defense!
But the most interesting was ahead. Any ship has a tendency to age. Its radar is aging, air defense systems and electronics are becoming obsolete.
A has no answer to this challenge of the time. When their RTOs become obsolete in their electronic and radio-technical weapons, it will not be easy to modernize them.
And B in corvettes has a stock of internal volumes, electrical power and excessively reinforced foundations for various equipment. Where A will have to change ships or overload them at the manufacturing plant, B will decide everything much easier. And many times cheaper. Again.
This is how it works. This is how the presence of a sane shipbuilding strategy allows a poor country for less money to get a more combat-ready, and, in some positions, even more numerous fleet than a rich but stupid enemy can build. This is the strength of the poor, those who wisely spend every penny. Do not compare countries A and B with Russia - they are both Russia. Only one - real, stupid and as a result of no combat-ready fleet. The second is virtual, able to count money and knowing what she wants. Countries A and B are not illustrations of real shipbuilding programs, after all, Russia also has 20380, the "analogue" of which has not been compared. Countries A and B illustrate the APPROACH to shipbuilding. The first one is real, the one that is. The second is the one we must come to if we want to have a normal fleet.
Let's draw some conclusions for a "poor" country seeking naval power.
1. The massive fleet of such a country is built according to the "Design for a given cost" scheme.
2. The mass fleet of such a country is built within the framework of the doctrine of naval warfare, which this country professes. He is the instrument for the implementation of such a doctrine.
3. The mass fleet consists of multifunctional ships, which allows to have one multifunctional ship instead of two or three specialized ones.
4. All these ships are the same.
5. Repairs and upgrades of old ships are carried out in a timely manner and in a reasonable amount, without a total restructuring of the entire ship, except for some special circumstances when such restructuring is justified.
6. In the absence of money for the maintenance of the fleet, its combat strength is immediately optimized "to the budget," and the existing ships are stored in compliance with the maximum requirements for such an operation, ideally through repairs. The situation cannot be brought to the point of mass wear and tear of ships.
7. When appointing the cost of the future ship, the need to have the maximum number of them is taken into account.
Using such methods, it will be possible to maintain an acceptable balance of power with most real opponents - even if their fleets are larger, ours will be strong enough to either keep them from war in general, or together with the Aerospace Forces and the army, prevent them from winning it.
However, there is also something else.
By someone else's hands
Back to Mahan.
In his quote about a country with a land "frontier", which will always lose at sea to those countries that do not have this "frontier", there is a continuation that seriously supplements the meaning of this Maehan statement. Here it is:
The alliance of powers can, of course, lead to a change in the balance.
And it changes everything. Yes, a country like Russia will not be able to "invest" in naval power, like England or the United States. Or like Japan. But you can find such allies, an alliance with whom will help change the balance of power in our favor, now with them.
Let's add something of our own to what Mahan wrote - you can also create such allies. And such actions fit into our goals at sea like nothing else.
There is a theory, and, for example, in Germany it was once even formalized, that the presence of an adequate and strong fleet attracts the allies. Supporters of this theory cite the example of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of the early twentieth century. Today before our eyes there is another example - a country with a powerfully developing military fleet - China, has acquired, albeit situational and, possibly temporary, allies no less than the Russian Federation.
Of course, this is not only and not so much about the navy. But it is also a fact that the two weakest countries in comparison with the United States - Russia and China - are joining their efforts against the hegemon. Including at sea.
And now the United States, inclined to confrontation with both Russia and China, is forced to calculate the balance of power, starting from TWO opposing fleets.
Thus, it is worth understanding: with a lack of your own sea power, you need to look for allies who have it, at least some. Mahan wrote about this, many countries have done this, modern Russia has successfully done this once - in the case of China.
And you also need to be able to create such allies. From scratch.
There is a well-known and popular statement that the United States does not fight alone. This is not entirely true, but even in Vietnam they managed to attract a large military contingent of Australia, and - unofficially - tens of thousands of volunteers from Thailand and South Korea. The United States strives to create coalitions everywhere, whether permanent or not, even formalized, though not, no difference: the more supporters you gather under your wing, the more chances that in a given situation someone will take on part of the combat missions, although would be on their shores. This applies to war at sea more than anything else.
And it's worth seeing how they do it. Question: why does Spain need aircraft carriers? That is, why are they at all, understandable, but what about Spain? And nevertheless, the Americans first gave this country their "Cabot", then the documentation for the failed SCS, according to which they first built the "Prince of Asturias" for themselves, and then its smaller copy for … Thailand! At first glance, who does not need such a ship at all, but in fact it was the most faithful ally of the United States in Asia.
Let's call a spade a spade - the United States actively contributes to the growth of the power of the naval forces of its friendly countries. They transfer ships, planes, helicopters, conduct training.
It is worth learning this from them.
Consider, for example, the potential benefits of properly (these are the keywords here) transforming Iran into a country with a strong navy. First, it will allow Iran to be tied to Russia technologically - some of the systems on their ships should not have local analogues and be Russian-made. Secondly, just like the Russia-China link (no matter how “loose” and temporarily it may be), it will change the balance of power at sea.
Oddly enough, but for many Iranians, sea power is a fad. As usual, we do not know anything about this, but this is really so.
They will go to great lengths to help them build an efficient fleet. For example, on the obligation to wait for Diego Garcia in case of any aggravation between the United States and Russia in the Pacific Ocean or in the Barents Sea. Iran is one of three countries that actually fought the United States at sea during the Cold War. And, naturally, they lost. There may be certain revanchist sentiments there, and Russia may well use them, having received as a reward for this sales for naval equipment, work for the design bureau, the market for spare parts and new pain for our potential friends, which will force them to keep an enhanced outfit of forces not only in the Persian Gulf, but always in the Indian Ocean. A trifle, but nice. Especially when on someone else's money and someone else's hands.
If you wish, you can find a lot of such options. All of them will cost money not to us, but to other countries, they will all take away the forces and money of the hegemon, and, perhaps, someday they will give us real allies.
Summarize
Despite the fact that Russia will never be able to concentrate on the navy as many resources as countries free of problems and challenges on land can, this problem is not insurmountable. It can be reduced to negligible organizational methods.
These include replacing the missing troops and their forces by maneuvering from other theaters of operations and bringing the staff of command structures to a state where they could manage such maneuverable reserves without any problems. It is worth starting with the revival of the centralized control of the fleet from the General Staff of the Navy and the Main Command.
In shipbuilding, it is necessary to eliminate all the chaos that accompanies it in Russia, to build a series of multifunctional ships of the same type with a reduced cost, which would correspond to the real threats emanating from the sea. In principle, a lot has already been written about this, but it is not superfluous to repeat it.
It is important to maintain good relations with China, which has problems with the United States and the ocean-going fleet.
Separately, it is worth taking a closer look at the possibility of creating naval forces for some countries so that they could divert some of the forces of a potential enemy to themselves, complicate the military-political situation for him and facilitate the sale of domestic weapons. It will also be useful for strengthening bilateral relations. Together, these measures will help prevent other countries from maintaining significant military superiority over Russia, at least such that will allow them to guarantee us defeat in one theater or another.
The poor may well be too strong, even for the rich. If he wants to.
