110 years ago, on May 27-28, 1905, the Tsushima naval battle took place. This naval battle was the last decisive battle of the Russo-Japanese War and one of the most tragic pages in the Russian military chronicle. The Russian 2nd Squadron of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Zinovy Petrovich Rozhdestvensky suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Imperial Japanese Navy under the command of Admiral Togo Heihachiro.
The Russian squadron was destroyed: 19 ships were sunk, 2 were blown up by their crew, 7 ships and ships were captured, 6 ships and ships were interned in neutral ports, only 3 ships and 1 transport broke through to their own. The Russian fleet lost its combat core - 12 armored ships intended for linear squadron combat (including 4 newest battleships of the Borodino class). Out of more than 16 thousand of the squadron's crew, more than 5 thousand people died and drowned, more than 7 thousand people were captured, more than 2 thousand were interned, 870 people came out to their own. At the same time, Japanese losses were minimal: 3 destroyers, more than 600 people were killed and wounded.
The Tsushima battle became the largest in the era of the pre-dreadnought armored fleet and finally broke the will of the military-political leadership of the Russian Empire to resist. Tsushima inflicted terrible damage on the Russian fleet, which had already lost the 1st Pacific Squadron in Port Arthur. Now the main forces of the Baltic Fleet have died. Only by enormous efforts was the Russian Empire able to restore the fighting efficiency of the fleet for the First World War. The Tsushima catastrophe caused enormous damage to the prestige of the Russian Empire. Petersburg succumbed to social and political pressure and made peace with Tokyo.
At the same time, it should be noted that in the military-strategic respect, Tsushima meant little, despite the severe losses of the fleet and the negative moral effect. Russia lost control over the situation at sea long ago, and the fall of Port Arthur with the death of the 1st Pacific Squadron put an end to this issue. The outcome of the war was decided on land and depended on the moral and volitional qualities of the military and political leadership and resources of the countries. Japan was completely exhausted in military-material, economic-financial and demographic terms
The patriotic upsurge in the Japanese Empire has already died out, suppressed by material difficulties and severe losses. Even the Tsushima victory generated only a short burst of enthusiasm. The human resources of Japan were depleted, old people and almost children were already among the prisoners. There was no money, the treasury was empty, despite the financial support of the United States and England. The Russian army, in spite of a streak of setbacks, mainly caused by an unsatisfactory command, only entered into full force. A decisive victory on land could lead Japan to a military and political catastrophe. Russia had the opportunity to throw the Japanese out of the mainland and occupy Korea, return Port Arthur, and win the war. However, St. Petersburg broke down and under the pressure of the "world community" went to a shameful peace. Russia was able to take revenge and regain its honor only under J. V. Stalin, in 1945
Start of the hike
Underestimation of the adversary, shappy-handed moods, extreme self-confidence of the government, as well as sabotage of certain forces (like S. Witte, who convinced everyone that Japan would not be able to start the war earlier than 1905 due to lack of money), led to the fact that Russia at the beginning of the war did not have sufficient forces in the Far East, as well as the necessary shipbuilding and repair capacities. At the very beginning of the war, it became obvious that the Port Arthur squadron needed to be strengthened. The need to strengthen the naval forces in the Far East was repeatedly pointed out by Admiral Makarov, but nothing was done during his lifetime.
The death of the battleship "Petropavlovsk", when almost the entire crew of the flagship was killed, together with the squadron commander Makarov, had a negative impact on the combat capability of the Pacific squadron. An adequate replacement for Makarov was never found until the end of the war, which was yet another evidence of the general degradation of the Russian Empire and, in particular, the rottenness and weakness of the military leadership. After that, the new commander of the Pacific Fleet, Nikolai Skrydlov, raised the issue of sending significant reinforcements to the Far East. In April 1904, a decision was made in principle to send reinforcements to the Far East. The 2nd Pacific Squadron was headed by the Chief of the Main Naval Staff Zinovy Petrovich Rozhestvensky. Rear Admiral Dmitry von Felkerzam (he died a few days before the Battle of Tsushima) and Oskar Adolfovich Enquist were appointed junior flagships.
According to the original plan, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was to strengthen the 1st Pacific Squadron and create a decisive naval superiority over the Japanese fleet in the Far East. This led to the unblocking of Port Arthur from the sea, disruption of the sea communications of the Japanese army. In the long term, this was to lead to the defeat of the Japanese army on the mainland and the lifting of the siege of Port Arthur. With such a balance of forces (battleships and cruisers of the 2nd Pacific Squadron plus the squadron battleships of the 1st Pacific Squadron), the Japanese fleet was doomed to defeat in open battle.
The formation of the squadron proceeded slowly, but the events in the Yellow Sea on August 10, 1904, when the 1st Pacific Squadron under the command of Vitgeft (died in this battle) could not use the available opportunities to inflict serious damage to the Japanese fleet and break through part of the forces to Vladivostok, forced speed up the start of the hike. Although after the battle in the Yellow Sea, when the 1st Pacific Squadron practically ceased to exist as an organized combat force (especially with regard to morale), it refused to break through to Vladivostok and began to transfer people, guns and shells to the land front, the campaign of Rozhdestvensky's squadron had already lost original meaning. By itself, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was not strong enough for independent action. A more sensible solution would be to organize a cruising war against Japan.
On August 23, a meeting of representatives of the naval command and some ministers was held in Peterhof under the chairmanship of Emperor Nicholas II. Some participants warned against the hasty departure of the squadron, pointing out the poor training and weakness of the fleet, the difficulty and duration of the sea voyage, and the possibility of the fall of Port Arthur before the arrival of the 2nd Pacific squadron. It was proposed to postpone the dispatch of the squadron (in fact, it had to be sent before the start of the war). However, under pressure from the naval command, including Admiral Rozhdestvensky, the issue of sending was resolved positively.
Completion and repair of ships, supply problems, etc. delayed the departure of the fleet. Only on September 11, the squadron moved to Revel, stood there for about a month and moved to Libau to replenish coal reserves and receive materials and cargo. On October 15, 1904, the 2nd squadron departed from Libau, consisting of 7 battleships, 1 armored cruiser, 7 light cruisers, 2 auxiliary cruisers, 8 destroyers and a transport detachment. Together with the detachment of Rear Admiral Nikolai Nebogatov, which later joined the forces of Rozhdestvensky, the composition of the 2nd Pacific Squadron reached 47 naval units (of which 38 were combat). The main combat force of the squadron consisted of four new squadron battleships of the Borodino type: Prince Suvorov, Alexander III, Borodino and Oryol. More or less they could be supported by the fast battleship "Oslyabya", but it had weak armor. The skillful use of these battleships could lead to the defeat of the Japanese, but this chance was not used by the Russian command. The cruising component of the squadron was planned to be strengthened by the purchase of 7 cruisers abroad in order to seriously increase the power of Rozhdestvensky's squadron, but this was not done.
In general, the squadron was very diverse in striking power, armor, speed, maneuverability, which seriously worsened its combat capabilities and became a prerequisite for defeat. A similar negative picture was observed in the personnel, both command and private. The personnel were hastily recruited, they had poor combat training. As a result, the squadron was not a single combat organism and could not become one during a long campaign.
The campaign itself was accompanied by big problems. It was necessary to go about 18 thousand miles, not on the way of its own repair base and supply points. Therefore, the issues of repair, supply of ships with fuel, water, food, treatment of the crew, etc. had to be solved by ourselves. To avoid a possible attack by Japanese destroyers on the way, the admiral kept the Rozhdestvensky route of the squadron secret, deciding to enter French ports without prior approval, relying on the military alliance of Russia and France. The coal supply was transferred to a German trading company. She had to supply coal in the places indicated by the Russian naval command. Some foreign and Russian companies took over the food supply. For repairs on the way, we took with them a special ship-workshop. This vessel and a number of other transports with cargo of various purposes constituted the squadron's floating base.
An additional stock of ammunition required for shooting practice was loaded onto the Irtysh transport, but shortly before the start of the campaign, an accident occurred on it, and the transport was delayed for repairs. The ammunition was removed and sent by rail to Vladivostok. The Irtysh, after repairs, caught up with the squadron, but without shells, delivering only coal. As a result, already poorly trained crews were deprived of the opportunity to practice shooting along the way. To clarify the situation on the route, special agents were sent to all the states near the shores of which the Russian fleet passed, who were supposed to monitor and inform Admiral Rozhdestvensky about everything.
The campaign of the Russian squadron was accompanied by rumors of an ambush of Japanese destroyers. As a result, the Gull incident occurred. Due to the mistakes of the command in the formation of the squadron, when the squadron passed Dogger Bank on the night of October 22, the battleships first attacked the British fishing vessels, and then fired at their cruisers Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. The cruiser "Aurora" received several injuries, two people were injured. On October 26, the squadron arrived in Vigo, Spain, where it stopped to investigate the incident. This led to a diplomatic conflict with England. Russia was forced to pay a large fine.
On November 1, the Russian ships left Vigo and arrived in Tangier on November 3. Having loaded fuel, water and food, the fleet, according to a previously developed plan, split up. The main part of the 2nd Pacific Squadron, including new battleships, went around Africa from the south. Two old battleships, light ships and transports under the command of Admiral Voelkersam, which, according to their draft, could pass the Suez Canal, moved through the Mediterranean and Red Seas.
The main forces approached Madagascar on December 28-29. January 6-7, 1905they were joined by the Voelkersam detachment. Both detachments joined up in the bay of Nosy-be on the west coast of the island, where the French allowed anchorage. The march of the main forces bypassing Africa was extremely difficult. British cruisers followed our ships up to the Canary Islands. The situation was tense, the guns were loaded and the squadron was preparing to repel the attack.
There was not a single good stop along the way. The coal had to be loaded directly into the sea. In addition, the squadron commander, in order to reduce the number of stops, decided to make long transitions. Therefore, the ships took in large quantities of additional coal. For example, new battleships, instead of 1,000 tons of coal, took 2,000 tons, which, given their low stability, was a problem. In order to receive such a large amount of fuel, coal was placed in rooms that were not intended for this - batteries, living decks, cockpits, etc. This greatly complicated the life of the crew, who suffered from the tropical heat so much. The loading itself, in the midst of ocean waves and intense heat, was a difficult matter, taking up a lot of time from the crews (on average, battleships took 40-60 tons of coal per hour). People exhausted by hard work could not rest properly. In addition, all the premises were littered with coal, and it was impossible to engage in combat training.
Hike photo source:
Change of task. Continuation of the hike
In Madagascar, the Russian squadron was stationed until March 16. This was due to the fall of Port Arthur, which destroyed the original tasks of the squadron. The original plan to unite the two squadrons in Port Arthur and intercept the enemy's strategic initiative was completely destroyed. The delay was also associated with complications in the supply of fuel and problems with the repair of ships in the roads.
Common sense demanded that the squadron be called back. The news of the fall of Port Arthur inspired even Rozhdestvensky with doubts about the expediency of the campaign. True, Rozhestvensky limited himself only to a resignation report and hints about the need to return the ships. After the end of the war, the admiral wrote: “If I had even a spark of civil courage, I should have shouted to the whole world: take care of these last resources of the fleet! Don't send them to extermination! But I didn't have the spark I needed.”
However, negative news from the front, where after the battles of Liaoyang and Shahe and the fall of Port Arthur, the battle of Mukden took place, which also ended with the withdrawal of the Russian army, forced the government to make a fatal mistake. The squadron was supposed to arrive in Vladivostok, and this was an extremely difficult task. At the same time, only Rozhestvensky believed that a breakthrough of the squadron to Vladivostok would be good luck, at least at the cost of losing some of the ships. The government still believed that the arrival of the Russian fleet on the theater of operations would change the entire strategic situation and allow to establish control over the Sea of Japan.
Back in October 1904, the well-known naval theorist Captain 2nd Rank Nikolai Klado, under the pseudonym Priboy, published a number of articles in the Novoye Vremya newspaper devoted to the analysis of the 2nd Pacific Squadron. In them, the captain gave a detailed analysis of the performance characteristics of our and enemy ships, comparing the training of the naval command and crews. The conclusion was hopeless: the Russian squadron had no chance of encountering the Japanese fleet. The author sharply criticized the naval command and personally the admiral-general, Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who was the Chief Commander of the Fleet and the Naval Department. Klado proposed to mobilize all the forces of the Baltic and Black Sea fleets. So, on the Black Sea there were four battleships of the "Catherine" class, the battleships "Twelve Apostles" and "Rostislav", the relatively new pre-dreadnought "Three Saints", the "Prince Potemkin-Tavrichesky" was almost completed. Only after such a mobilization of all available forces could a reinforced fleet be sent to the Pacific Ocean. For these articles, Klado was stripped of all ranks and dismissed from service, but further events confirmed the correctness of his main idea - the 2nd Pacific Squadron could not successfully resist the enemy.
On December 11, 1904, a naval conference was held under the chairmanship of General-Admiral Alexei Alexandrovich. After some doubts, it was decided to send reinforcements to Rozhestvensky's squadron from the remaining ships of the Baltic Fleet. Rozhestvensky initially took the idea negatively, believing that "rot in the Baltic Sea" would not strengthen, but weaken the squadron. He believed that it was better to reinforce the 2nd Pacific Squadron with Black Sea battleships. However, Rozhdestvensky was denied the Black Sea ships, since it was necessary to bargain with Turkey so that the battleships would be allowed through the straits. After it became known that Port Arthur fell and the 1st Pacific Squadron died, Rozhdestvensky even agreed to such a strengthening.
Rozhdestvensky was ordered to wait for reinforcements in Madagascar. The first to arrive was the detachment of Captain 1st Rank Leonid Dobrotvorsky (two new cruisers "Oleg" and "Izumrud", two destroyers), which was part of Rozhdestvensky's squadron, but fell behind due to the repair of ships. In December 1904, they began to equip a detachment under the command of Nikolai Nebogatov (3rd Pacific Squadron). The detachment included the battleship Nikolai I with short-range artillery, three battleships of coastal defense - General-Admiral Apraksin, Admiral Senyavin and Admiral Ushakov (the ships had good artillery, but had poor seaworthiness) and an old armored cruiser "Vladimir Monomakh". In addition, the guns of these battleships were badly worn out during the training of personnel. In general, the 3rd Pacific Squadron did not have a single modern ship, and its combat value was low. The ships of Nebogatov left Libava on February 3, 1905, on February 19 - they passed Gibraltar, on March 12-13 - Suez. Another "catching up squadron" (the second echelon of Nebogatov's squadron) was being prepared, but for various reasons it was not sent to the Pacific Ocean.
Rozhestvensky did not want to wait for the arrival of Nebogatov's detachment, looking at the old ships as an extra burden. Hoping that the Japanese would not have time to quickly fix the previously received damage and bring the fleet to full readiness, the Russian admiral wanted to break through to Vladivostok, and decided not to wait for Nebogatov. Relying on the base in Vladivostok, Rozhestvensky hoped to develop operations against the enemy and fight for supremacy at sea.
However, problems with the supply of fuel delayed the squadron for two months. All this time there was a drop in the combat capability of the squadron. They shot a little and only at fixed shields. The results were poor, which worsened the morale of the crews. Joint maneuvering also showed that the squadron was not ready to perform the assigned task. Forced inaction, the nervousness of the command, the unusual climate and heat, the lack of ammunition for firing, all this negatively affected the morale of the crew and reduced the combat effectiveness of the Russian fleet. Discipline fell, which was already low (there was a significant percentage of "penalties" on the ships, who were gladly "exiled" on a long voyage), cases of disobedience and insults of command personnel, and of gross violation of order on the part of the officers themselves, became more frequent.
Only on March 16, the squadron began to move again. Admiral Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest route - through the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. The coal was received in the open sea. On April 8, the squadron sailed off Singapore and on April 14 stopped at Kamran Bay. Here the ships had to carry out routine repairs, take coal and other reserves. However, at the request of the French, the squadron moved to Wangfong Bay. On May 8, Nebogatov's detachment arrived here. The situation was tense. The French demanded the speedy departure of the Russian ships. There was a fear that the Japanese would attack the Russian squadron.
Action plan
On May 14, Rozhdestvensky's squadron continued the march. To break through to Vladivostok, Rozhdestvensky chose the shortest path - through the Korea Strait. On the one hand, it was the shortest and most convenient route, the widest and deepest of all the straits connecting the Pacific Ocean with Vladivostok. On the other hand, the route of the Russian ships ran near the main bases of the Japanese fleet, which made a meeting with the enemy very likely. Rozhestvensky understood this, but thought that even at the cost of losing several ships, they would be able to break through. At the same time, giving up the strategic initiative to the enemy, Rozhestvensky did not accept a detailed battle plan and limited himself to a general setting for a breakthrough. This was partly due to the poor training of the squadron crew; during a long voyage, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was only able to learn to sail together in a wake column, and could not maneuver and perform complex rearrangements.
Thus, the 2nd Pacific Squadron was instructed to break through to the north, to Vladivostok. The ships were supposed to fight off the enemy in order to break through to the north, and not beat him. The battleships of all the detachments (the 1st, 2nd and 3rd armored detachments of Rozhdestvensky, Fölkersam and Nebogatov) were to act against the Japanese battleships, maneuvering to the north. Some of the cruisers and destroyers were given the task of protecting the battleships from attacks by Japanese destroyers and transporting command to serviceable ships in the event of the death of the flagships. The rest of the cruisers and destroyers were supposed to protect auxiliary ships and transports, remove crews from dying battleships. Rozhestvensky also determined the order of command. In the event of the death of the flagship of the battleship "Prince Suvorov", Captain 1st Rank N. M. Bukhvostov, the commander of "Alexander III", took command, in case of failure of this ship - Captain 1st Rank P. I. Serebryannikov on battleship "Borodino", etc.
Commander of the Russian squadron Zinovy Petrovich Rozhestvensky
