The demarcation line between the Wehrmacht and the Red Army. August 1939.
Source:
On December 24, 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union by its resolution "On the political and legal assessment of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 1939" condemned the secret additional protocol to the treaty, which delimited the "spheres of interests" of the negotiating parties from the Baltic to the Black Sea, from Finland to Bessarabia. In 2009, on the eve of his visit to Gdansk, in an article for the Polish newspaper Gazeta Wyborcza, Russian Prime Minister V. Putin called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact immoral.
In July 2009, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Stalinism and Nazism "as regimes equally responsible for unleashing World War II, as ideologies that pose the threat of genocide and crimes against humanity." Throughout the European space, it was proposed to establish a Day of Remembrance for the Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, tying it to the date of the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This recommendation was followed by the parliaments of Estonia and Latvia, and the Polish Seimas adopted a resolution on September 23, 2009, in which it called the USSR an aggressor that unleashed World War II together with Germany. In turn, the US Embassy in Estonia, on the occasion of the 72nd anniversary of the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in 2011, issued a statement in which, along with Nazi Germany, it blamed the USSR for the outbreak of World War II.
On November 5, 2014, during his meeting with young scientists and history teachers at the Museum of Modern History, V. Putin noted the ongoing controversy over the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and separately drew attention to the accusations of the Soviet Union in the partition of Poland. As we can see, ultimately these accusations lead to blaming the USSR for the outbreak of World War II, first together with Nazi Germany, and then in its place. Moreover, until the revision of the date of the start of World War II, as happened, for example, in the case of the Czech Television and Radio Company, on the morning air of which on September 18, 2014 it was said that “the events of September 17, 1939 opened the Second World War in Europe”.
To move the discussion to a new level, V. Putin proposed to conduct "a comprehensive in-depth study of what happened before World War II" and in serious research "show that such were the methods of foreign policy then" (meeting with young scientists and history teachers, https://kremlin.ru). As for my humble opinion, the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was essentially just one of the links in the chain of events directed by Chamberlain to surrender Poland and France to Germany, and England to America.
In the spring of 1939, the commander-in-chief of the French army, General Gamelin, told the Polish minister of defense that if Germany, having invaded Poland, concentrated all its forces against it, then “France could start hostilities with its main forces on the fifteenth day of mobilization. … As one young official later recalled, Gamelin argued that if the war really began, then French troops would enter Germany as easily as a knife goes into butter. Michel Debre, who was part of Reynaud's inner circle in the Ministry of Finance and who later became prime minister, heard the commander of the allied forces on the Western Front, General Georges, express a similar confidence (May ER Strange Victory / Translated from English - M.: AST; AST MOSCOW, 2009. - S. 225, 295-296).
At the same time, in order to prevent the defeat of Germany by France, the leaders of America and Chamberlain, who joined them, jointly insisted on the adoption of the plan of economic war by the French after Germany's attack on Poland. This method of warfare is “a kind of war that does not imply a“rapid attack,”but leads to a slow … exhaustion. This is a hidden war aimed at limiting the sources of … well-being of enemies”(M. Zolotova, Abduction of Europe: an energy inevitability //
As the professor of American history E. R. May, “General Gamelin … believed that … the Germans had little chance of victory, and time was working for the Allies. Gamelin had reason to hope that the allies would win without even throwing all their forces into battle. Almost all the leaderships of both France and Great Britain were convinced that Germany would not be able to wage a long war. It was believed that it already lacked iron ore, oil and other important resources. The Allies believed that the blockade would starve the Germans to death, as had already happened in the First World War.
This belief was also supported by the expectation of material assistance from the United States - and the actions taken by the American government, albeit modest so far, seemed to justify these expectations. For example, the U. S. Congress amended the 1937 Neutrality Act. Instead of prohibiting the sale of war materials to any belligerent countries, the act now permitted the sale to those belligerent countries that were able to pay in cash and take out the materials on their own ships - naturally, with the favorable attitude of the British Navy (May E. R., op.. - S. 312-313).
At the same time, with all its undoubted merits, the economic war of France and England against Germany had its own Achilles heel - neutral countries, primarily Scandinavian ones, which could supply Germany with goods and raw materials. However, relying on Scandinavia alone in such a serious confrontation with Chamberlain was problematic, since aid from Scandinavia alone could be relatively easily cut off by France, especially since the path from Sweden and Norway to Germany lay across the sea, and the range of resources and materials from this region was narrow enough. The problem was fundamentally solved only by the friendly neutrality of the USSR towards Germany - it was extremely difficult for France to attack Scandinavia and the USSR at the same time, the USSR, after the defeat of Poland, acquired a land border with Germany, the range of strategic materials for Germany, the USSR could significantly expand, which in the end should have been guaranteed to break the blockade of Germany and to ensure its subsequent and inevitable all-crushing blow to France.
Thus, Chamberlain's second step aimed at destroying France was to create conditions for establishing a trade partnership between Germany and the USSR, disrupting a new Franco-Soviet rapprochement, as well as replacing the negotiations between Britain and France with the Soviet Union on the economic blockade of Nazi Germany in the event of its attack on Poland with unacceptable for Poland and perceived with hostility by negotiations on military assistance to her by the Red Army. Ultimately, in April 1939, three negotiation processes began in Europe.
The first were led by England and Germany to sign the second Munich Agreement of England, France, Germany and Italy with the aim of further advancing Germany to the East. For their initiation in April 1939, England, through the Bank for International Settlements, transferred 5 million pounds sterling of Czech gold to the German Treasury, which at the market rate was about 80 million marks."On May 3, 1939, at a government meeting, N. Chamberlain expressed a desire to resume the Anglo-German economic negotiations, which were interrupted in connection with the capture of Czechoslovakia by Germany" (London Talks (1939), The second negotiations were conducted by Germany with the USSR. Their goal was to conclude a trade agreement and a non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR with the aim of non-interference by the USSR in the military actions of Germany in Poland and France. “The first steps towards the conclusion of the Soviet-German alliance were made in April. Negotiations were conducted with the greatest caution and were held in an atmosphere of mutual distrust, since each side suspected the other that it was perhaps simply trying to prevent it from reaching an agreement with the Western powers. Stagnation in the Anglo-Russian negotiations spurred the Germans to use this opportunity to quickly reach an agreement with the Russians "(Liddell Garth B. G. World War II. - M.: AST; SPb.: Terra Fantastica, 1999 // https:// militera.lib.ru / h / liddel-hart / 01.html).
The third in a row negotiations were conducted by Britain and France with the USSR on the conclusion of a defensive alliance against Germany. "On April 15, 1939, through his ambassador in Moscow, Chamberlain asked the Soviet government if it agreed to give unilateral guarantees to Poland and Romania?" (Shirokorad A. B. Great intermission. - M.: AST, AST MOSCOW, 2009. - P. 281). In response, M. Litvinov handed over to the British ambassador an official proposal of the Soviet government on the conclusion by Britain, France and the USSR of an agreement on the provision of mutual assistance in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states.
“On this occasion, Winston Churchill wrote:“If, for example, upon receipt of the Russian proposal, Chamberlain replied: “Good. Let the three of us unite and break Hitler's neck "- or something like that, the parliament would have approved it … and history could have taken a different path" (Shirokorad AB Ibid). However, "the position of the prime minister was adamant: he" would rather resign than sign an alliance with the Soviets. " … The invitation, sent by the Soviet side to Halifax, to personally join the negotiations, Chamberlain rejected with a remark: the minister's visit to Moscow "would be too humiliating" (BM Falin. To the background of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany // Score of World War II. Who and when began war? - M.: Veche, 2009. - P. 86).
Meanwhile, “Daladier believed that an alliance with the Soviets would help keep Hitler in check. … Gamelin, for his part, doubted that Poland or Romania would be able to hold out against the German army for a long time - therefore, following the instructions given to him, he began to plan a French offensive to help these countries. Consequently, he approved of rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the hope that if war did break out, Germany would have to fight on two fronts. Gamelin, together with Daladier, managed to put pressure on his skeptical colleagues, and on April 24, France invited London to join negotiations with the USSR on possible military cooperation.
Chamberlain and Halifax hated communism. … However, like Daladier in Paris, Chamberlain and Halifax had to reckon with public opinion. Among the Labor opposition, pro-Moscow sympathies have always been strong, and after the provision of guarantees to Poland, Lloyd George joined it, who … was perceived by many as a strong politician, capable of leading the country if necessary. He declared in the House of Commons: "If we act without the help of Russia, we will fall into a trap." Therefore, despite their deep personal disgust for the Soviets, Chamberlain and Halifax ultimately agreed to send a Franco-British mission to Moscow”(May ER, op. Cit. - p. 218), replacing the current topic of Soviet support the economic blockade of Germany by Britain and France, an unacceptable for Poland topic of assistance to her by the Soviet Union. But "both in London and in Paris this position of Poland (" with the Germans we risk losing our freedom, with the Russians we will lose our soul ") knew very well" (Last Sunday // https://vilavi.ru/prot/100508 /100508-1.shtml).
Unlike the hapless allies, Hitler soberly assessed the significance of the coming economic confrontation. “On April 6, 1939, the beginning of negotiations between Great Britain and Poland on the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact was announced, which Hitler used as an excuse to terminate the German-Polish treaty of 1934. He announced this on April 28. At this point, Germany had only one non-aggression pact left - with Lithuania. In an effort to isolate Poland, Germany made proposals to conclude such pacts to Latvia, Estonia, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden”(Aman P. Non-aggression pacts; development and operational use in Europe 1922-1939 // https://militera.lib.ru / research / coalitions / 01.html).
On May 22, 1939, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Italy and Germany in Berlin, in order to confirm the main provisions of the Anti-Comintern Pact, signed the German-Italian Treaty of Alliance and Friendship. The "Steel Pact" contained the parties' obligations of mutual assistance and alliance in the event of hostilities with any third country and agreements on broad cooperation in the military and economic spheres "and was intended to show the inviolability of the alliance between Germany and Italy (Events preceding World War II // https://itar-tass.com/info/1410032). On May 31, Germany signed a non-aggression pact with Denmark, which was a significant contribution to ensuring the security of Germany's trade with Norway and Sweden.
Since, in the event of an attack on Poland, Chamberlain imposed on France a plan of waging an economic war against the Nazis, the Allies for their victory over Germany had enough to get the USSR to support the economic blockade of Germany. Chamberlain used military negotiations to stop the rapprochement of the USSR with France and force it to rapprochement with Germany. Not surprisingly, “negotiations with Russia went sluggishly, and on May 19 this whole issue was raised in the House of Commons. The short debate, which was of a serious nature, was actually limited to speeches by party leaders and prominent former ministers. " (W. Churchill. World War II. Part I, volumes 1-2 // https://militera.lib.ru). "Under the influence of the ever-growing opposition, the Anglo-French plenipotentiaries in Moscow received instructions on 27 May 1939 to speed up the negotiations," which in spite of everything remained "slow, like a funeral procession." (Shirokorad A. B. Decree. Cit. - p. 284).
Unlike the British, “Gamelin sincerely wanted to reach an understanding on military issues. Therefore, he chose General Joseph Aimé Dumenc for the French delegation - an outstanding staff planner, one of the most influential supporters of the mechanization of the army. In the future, he was going to appoint Dumenok as a non-official of his headquarters, if he had a chance to take command of the allied forces (May ER Decree. Op. - pp. 218-219). The British “assigned the most important mission on June 12 to Strang, a capable official who, however, had no weight or influence outside the Foreign Office. … The appointment of such a minor person was actually insulting. It is unlikely that Strang could penetrate the upper cover of the Soviet organism. In any case, it was already too late”(W. Churchill, ibid.).
On May 28, 1939, Japan invaded Mongolia. In early June, on the slopes of Mount Bayan-Tsagan, the Japanese army suffered significant losses. “The result of these battles was that in the future, as Zhukov later noted in his memoirs, the Japanese troops“no longer risked crossing to the western bank of the Khalkhin-Gol River”. All further events took place on the eastern bank of the river. However, Japanese troops continued to remain in Mongolia, and the Japanese military leadership was planning new offensive operations. Thus, the focus of the conflict in the Khalkhin-Gol region remained. The situation dictated the need to restore the state border of Mongolia and radically resolve this border conflict. Therefore, Zhukov began to plan an offensive operation with the aim of completely crushing the entire Japanese group located on the territory of Mongolia”(Fights on Khalkhin Gol, The USSR's support for its ally threatened to escalate into a full-scale war not only in the Far East, but also in Europe. The fact is that on June 5, 1939, Japan pledged to “automatically enter into any war started by Germany, provided that Russia would be Germany's adversary. The Japanese expected a similar obligation on the basis of reciprocity from the Germans. … Tokyo involved in its anti-Soviet adventure … also Washington. On June 30, 1939, Roosevelt informed the Soviet plenipotentiary Umansky that the Japanese side proposed to him for the future joint Japanese-American exploitation of the riches of Eastern Siberia almost to Lake Baikal (V. M. Falin, op. Cit. - pp. 79, 92).
On June 7, 1939, Estonia and Lithuania signed non-aggression pacts with Germany, containing a secret article obliging Tallinn and Kaunas "in agreement with Germany and in accordance with its advice to implement all military security measures against Soviet Russia" (Falin BM Decree. cit. - p. 91). “Thus, Hitler was able to easily penetrate into the depths of the weak defense of the belated and indecisive coalition directed against him” (W. Churchill, ibid.). England and France, despite the fact that "Moscow twice, in April and May 1939, offered the Western great powers to provide joint guarantees to the Baltic republics" (Dyukov A. R. "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" in questions and answers. - M.: Foundation "Historical Memory", 2009. - p. 29), deliberately did not give the Baltic limitrophes (border countries) guarantees similar to those previously reported in Poland and Romania. "That is, they specially left the Baltic corridor for Hitler to maneuver the left wing of the Wehrmacht when attacking the USSR!" (A. Martirosyan On the Way to World War //
"On July 8, the Japanese side began active hostilities again," but on July 11, the Japanese were "pushed back to their original positions. The defense line on the eastern bank of Khalkhin Gol was fully restored. … From 13 to 22 July, there was a lull in the hostilities, which both sides used to build up their forces. On July 23, the Japanese, after artillery preparation, launched an offensive on the right-bank bridgehead of the Soviet-Mongolian troops. However, after two days of fighting, having suffered significant losses, the Japanese had to retreat to their original positions”(Fights at Khalkhin Gol. Ibid.).
In the meantime, London was clearly inviting Tokyo to "turn more abruptly to the north, and thus make the Drang nach Osten more attractive in Hitler's eyes." Raising the uprising in Xinjiang, British agents tried to block the main flow of Soviet aid to China, and in a joint statement of July 24, 1939, the governments of Great Britain and Japan, the so-called. In the Arita-Craigi agreement, London did “completely take the side of Japan in its aggression against China” (V. M. Falin, op. Cit. - p. 81). Since "detente in Anglo-Japanese relations deprived the grounds for hopes of concluding a German-Japanese alliance directed against the Western powers, Hitler and Ribbentrop began to speed up political negotiations with the Soviet Union" (Aman P. Ibid.) And on July 22, TASS published a report on the resumption of Soviet-German trade and credit negotiations in Berlin.
“The receipt of information about the upcoming start of negotiations in Moscow with the military missions of Great Britain and France” (Aman P. Ibid.) Also contributed to the beginning of the Soviet-German negotiations. The very next day, July 23, 1939, the Soviet government proposed to start them immediately. “Since the British delegation left for Moscow by a longer sea route, Daladier and Gamelin had to show patience. Chamberlain wrote to Ide that the obvious zeal of the French, who are impatient to conclude an agreement with the Soviets, is "extremely disgusting to him" (May ER, op. Cit. - p. 219). Meanwhile, “Hitler's goal in negotiations with the USSR was not only to hinder his agreement with the Western powers, but also to achieve a political settlement with him. … It was at this time that the Reich's economic planning department, in studying the possibilities of providing the country with military materials in the event of a blockade by Great Britain, made the following conclusion: "Full provision is possible only with raw materials from Russia (friendly to us) …" (Aman P. Ibid.).
“On July 24, Karl Schnurre, advisor to the East European referent of the Department of Economic Policy of the German Foreign Ministry, in a conversation with the Soviet Charge d'Affaires G. A. Astakhov, after discussing current economic issues, outlined a plan for improving German-Soviet political relations opinion exchange). The German plan included: 1) the conclusion of a trade and credit agreement; 2) normalization of relations in the field of the press and cultural relations, the establishment of an atmosphere of mutual respect; 3) political rapprochement.
At the same time, Schnurre noted that the repeated attempts of the German side to raise this topic were ignored by the Soviet side. On July 26, Schnurre continued to develop this topic, inviting Astakhov and Deputy Trade Representative EI Babarin to the restaurant on the instructions of Ribbentrop. The third point of the plan was somewhat concretized by the German side: "either a return to what happened before, or a new agreement that will take into account the vital political interests of both parties" (German-Soviet Trade Agreement (1939), https:// ru. wikipedia.org).
"On August 3, Ribbentrop made his first official statement on the topic of German-Soviet rapprochement, which, in particular, contained an allusion to the division of spheres of influence." In his words, “on all issues related to the territory from the Black to the Baltic Sea, we could easily agree … As for Poland, we are following the developing events carefully and calmly. In case of provocation from Poland, we will settle the issue with Poland within a week. In case of this, I made a subtle hint at the possibility of concluding an agreement with Russia on the fate of Poland”(Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, Arriving in Moscow only on August 11, “the British mission did not have the authority from its government to sign the relevant agreements. It consisted of secondary persons and had instructions "to reduce the military agreement to the most general conditions possible" (Shirokorad AB Decree. Cit. - pp. 284-285). Since the British delegation "had no powers, no plan, either, they did not want to talk about the passage of Soviet troops … the negotiations did not end with anything" (Bezymensky L. A. Hitler and Stalin before the battle. - M.: Yauza; Eksmo, 2009. - S. 225), finally reaching a dead end by 14 August.
Meanwhile, on August 15, 1939, Goering promised to report to Hitler "about his positive attitude towards the new Munich conference of the four powers without the participation of Poland and the Soviet Union, provided that England agree to the" solution of the Danzig question "(Bezymensky L. A. Decree, op. P. 218). On the same day, the British ambassador to Germany Henderson and the French Coulondre adopted the German “point of view that a separate Polish-German war was impossible. … Coulondre said home … that France will show firmness towards Hitler and at the same time tell Warsaw that she needs moderation and should control her provincial officials, in whose hands lies the question of the treatment of the German minority "(Weizsäcker E., von. Ambassador of the Third Reich. Memoirs of a German diplomat. 1932-1945 / Translated by FS Kapitsa. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007. - P. 216).
Parallel to Goering on August 15, I. von Ribbentrop informed V. Molotov about his readiness "to come to Moscow on a short-term visit in order to present the views of the Fuehrer to Mr. Stalin on behalf of the Fuehrer." In this situation, Stalin made the only decision that corresponded to the interests of the USSR, and agreed to accept Ribbentrop in Moscow”(Shirokorad AB Decree, op. - p. 293). “The approach of the deadlines set by Hitler for the start of Operation Weiss and the need to ensure that the USSR did not interfere in the Polish plans of Germany forced the German side to put pressure on the Soviet side to move immediately to the third step as soon as possible. On August 17, 1939, the Soviet leadership expressed its interest in a two-stage approach to improving Soviet-German relations - the first and mandatory step is the signing of a trade agreement and the second step after a certain time period should be the prolongation of the 1926 Treaty or the signing of a new non-aggression treaty - at the request of Germany "(German-Soviet trade agreement (1939). Ibid.).
On August 19, 1939, the trade agreement was signed. The agreement provided for “the granting of a loan by Germany to the USSR in the amount of 200 million German marks, for a period of seven years out of 5% for the purchase of German goods within two years from the date of signing the Agreement. The agreement also provides for the supply of goods from the USSR to Germany in the same period, that is, within two years in the amount of 180 million German marks. … The German side expected to receive over the next two years raw materials worth 180 million Reichsmarks - first of all: timber, cotton, coarse grains, oil, phosphates, platinum, raw fur, gasoline and other goods with greater or less potential for converting into gold. The Soviet side intended to receive from the German side, in addition to military goods, mining equipment, equipment for the oil, chemical and steel industries, equipment for power plants, forging and pressing equipment, metal-cutting machines, locomotives, turbines, ships, metals and other goods (German-Soviet trade agreement (1939), ibid.).
On the same day, August 19, 1939, "Ambassador Schulenburg sent to Germany the text of the draft Soviet non-aggression pact" (Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - p. 295). Hitler received it the next day, August 20. Meanwhile, the Japanese planned a new offensive in the Khalkhin Gol area on 24 August. However, the Soviet-Mongolian troops, having launched the offensive on August 20, forestalled the offensive of the Japanese troops, surrounded them and destroyed them at the end of August. “On August 21, London was offered to accept Goering on August 23 for negotiations, and Moscow - Ribbentrop to sign a non-aggression pact. Both the USSR and England agreed! " (Meltyukhov MI Soviet Union and the political crisis of 1939 // Score of World War II. Who and when started the war. Decree. Op. - p. 184). As a result, "since August 21, the British special services' Lockheed-12a, which was supposed to deliver Goering to a secret meeting with Chamberlain and Halifax, and the Fuhrer's personal Junkers, allocated to Ribbentrop for a flight to the Soviet capital, were stationed on the Tempelhof airstrip" (Falin BM Decree.oc. - p. 93).
"Proceeding from the need, first of all, to sign an agreement with the USSR, on August 22, Hitler canceled Goering's flight, although this was reported to London only on August 24" (Mikhail Meltyukhov The main lie of Viktor Suvorov // The lie of Viktor Suvorov. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2008 // https://militera.lib.ru/research/nepravda_vs-2/01.html). “The British Prime Minister, who was unable, as in the previous year, to fly to Germany as an 'angel of peace', sent a letter to Hitler on 22 August. It contained three main points: England is ready to support Poland, England is ready to come to a common understanding with Germany, England can act as a mediator between Berlin and Warsaw "(E. Weizsäcker, von. Op. Cit. - p. 218).
“The Soviet Union did not want to fight against Germany alone; it was not possible to conclude an alliance with England and France. It only remained to negotiate with Germany …”(AR Dyukov, op. Cit. - p. 31). “On August 23, 1939, Molotov and Ribbentrop in Moscow signed the Non-Aggression Pact between Germany and the USSR. … In addition, the parties signed a secret additional protocol to the treaty in which Germany and the USSR divided Europe into spheres of influence - part of Poland and Lithuania withdrew to Germany, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, part of Poland and Bessarabia to the USSR (Shirokorad A. B. Decree.oc. - pp. 294-295).
As soon as "Ribbentrop left the premises and only his own people remained, Stalin said:" It seems that we managed to lead them "(Kuznetsov N. G. The day before // https://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/kuznetsov-1/29.html). Hitler was given a note informing him of the conclusion of an agreement with Moscow during dinner. “He ran his eyes over her, for a moment, blushing before his eyes, he turned to stone, then hit the table with his fist so that the glasses trembled and exclaimed:“I caught them! I caught them! " But in a second he regained control of himself, no one dared to ask any questions, and the meal went on as usual”(A. Speer Memoirs //
It should not be forgotten that the treaty was signed during the armed clash between the USSR and Japan. “In this situation, the actions of Berlin were perceived by Tokyo as a betrayal. Japan protested to Harmony, pointing out that the Soviet-German agreement contradicted the Anti-Comintern Pact, in which the parties pledged "without mutual consent not to conclude any political agreements with the USSR." On August 28, the Japanese cabinet of ministers headed by Kiichiro Hiranuma, a supporter of the war with the USSR, resigned "(Dyukov AR Decree. Op. - p. 94).
Although the Soviet-Mongolian troops defeated the Japanese grouping on Khalkhin Golle at the end of August 1939, the fighting in the air continued until September 15. According to A. B. Shirokorada, “this war was quite comparable in scale with the German-Polish war in September 1939. On the Khalkhin Goll River, the Red Army used more tanks than there were in the entire Polish army. Japanese losses doubled the losses of the German army in September 1939.
There is no doubt that the defeat of the Japanese at the Khalkhin Goll River had the desired effect. But the result of this defeat would be a disaster for, say, the Polish or Finnish army, but for the Japanese Empire it was just an unsuccessful operation, or, simply put, a pinprick. And it was the treaty with Germany that put an end to the undeclared war in the Far East. I note that after major battles on Lake Khasan and on the Khalkhin Goll River on the Soviet-Manchu border from 1937 to September 1939, military clashes periodically took place. But after the signing of the treaty and until August 8, 1945, it became relatively quiet on the border”(Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - pp. 291, 298).
Thus, it is completely unacceptable to start a conversation about the fatal year for world peace in 1939 and starting the search for those responsible for the outbreak of World War II, everything, as usual, ultimately ultimately comes down to only the Soviet-German non-aggression pact and the secret annex to it. And not only because of the reluctance of a number of researchers to consider the so-called. "Arita-Craigi agreement", Halifax-Raczynski pact, secret article to the German non-aggression pacts with Estonia and Lithuania, secret annex to the Anglo-Polish Mutual Assistance Agreement or excluding the possibility of the existence of a secret protocol to the German-Polish non-aggression pact.
As we found out, in the spring of 1939, Chamberlain continued to implement the plan imposed on him by America to defeat France, destroy the USSR and collapse the long-term dominance of Great Britain on the world stage. Engaging France in the war with Germany, doing everything possible to resume Soviet-German relations, preventing Franco-Soviet rapprochement, concluding an agreement with Japan behind the back of the Soviet Union and thus destroying all chances of creating a united anti-fascist front, Chamberlain essentially signed both Poland and and France a death sentence, consistently betraying them to the Nazis - almost giving them up for slaughter. By opposing the conduct of a full-fledged war, Britain saved Germany during its invasion of Poland from the inevitable defeat of France, and used the economic war to cover the concentration and deployment of the Wehrmacht to attack and defeat France.
The Soviet Union, with its non-aggression pact with Germany, tried to prevent a second Munich, a war on two fronts with the West and the East, and to win some time before the inevitable clash with Germany, since after France it was inevitably to become the next victim. At the same time, the Soviet Union was not able to completely eliminate the threat of a new collusion between England and France with Nazi Germany and fascist Italy. Chamberlain, still not completely resigned to the role of the closest, but still the junior partner of the Americans, prepared for revenge and a second Munich. As for Hitler, he too, mindful of Churchill, showed an interest in rapprochement with Chamberlain. In 1939, the world was on the brink of an imminent war. However, what it would be was decided among themselves by the two countries fighting for world domination - England and America. It was they who led the world to the now inevitable war, and it was they who determined its final character. As for Germany and the USSR, they were pawns ahead of the main figures on the geopolitical battlefield in the dispute for global dominance between America and England.
