Adolf Hitler and the Bulgarian Tsar Boris III.
With the destruction of the French army by the Nazis, and the naval forces by a recent British ally, the question arose on whose corpse America would go further to its longed-for world domination - England, Germany or the Soviet Union. Hitler undoubtedly wanted, together with Britain, led by Chamberlain or Halifax, to destroy the USSR - it was for this that he saved the British Expeditionary Force, began to create an invading army in the USSR and repeatedly offered peace to England.
However, since Churchill had established himself in power in England, determined to destroy Nazi Germany in alliance with the USSR, Hitler now had to decide on his further actions. And either, having removed Churchill from power, return Chamberlain, Halifax or Edward to control the country for a joint campaign against the USSR, or continue cooperation with Stalin and, together with the USSR, destroy Great Britain, or, without ending the war with England, drive Germany to slaughter and attack the Soviet Union …
The latter option was the least acceptable to Hitler, but he would have been quite happy with the destruction of Britain in alliance with the USSR. As part of this strategy, Hitler handed Stalin materials on the Anglo-French planning of the bombing of Baku so that in exchange for the security of the southern borders of the USSR, he would agree to help Germany destroy Britain. The intrigue was that in the current clash of interests, the decisive word was not with Berlin, but with Washington. And the further course of hostilities, the outcome of the war and the post-war order of the world depended on what America will make the final decision.
“For the first time, the question of delimiting the sphere of influence in the Balkans between Germany, Italy and the USSR, as well as the participation of the USSR in the war with England, was raised by Germany on March 4, 1940, during the war between the USSR and Finland, Germany's preparation of the occupation of Norway, Holland, Belgium and France, as well as the end by France and England of preparations for the occupation of Norway and the invasion of the Soviet Union from the territory of Finland (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria // https://topwar.ru/38865 -sovetskoe-strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-5-bitva-za-bolgariyu.html). As we can see, Hitler was quite satisfied with the format of the Soviet sphere of influence in the form of military bases of the Red Army in controlled territories without their inclusion in the USSR, and he was not averse to exchanging the Balkans on the same terms. In turn, Stalin, fearing the penetration of Germany into the sphere of influence of the USSR, before establishing his full control in it, was not disposed to its further expansion.
However, as soon as in May 1940 in the Baltic republics there were massive popular demonstrations, Stalin immediately raised the issue of delimiting the sphere of influence in the Balkans between the USSR, Germany and Italy. In particular, “at the end of May, the USSR Charge d'Affaires in Rome Gelfand and the German Ambassador Mackensen discussed the need to solve the Balkan problem by joint efforts of Germany, Italy and the USSR, and on June 3, 1940, V. Molotov, in a conversation with the German Ambassador to the USSR, Schulenburg, asked to immediately request Berlin "does this statement of Mackensen reflect the point of view of the German and the point of view of the Italian government on this issue" (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria. Ibid).
"On June 9, 1940, the USSR and Japan, with the active assistance of Germany and Italy, concluded an agreement on the demarcation of the Soviet-Manchu border" (Leontyev M. Big Game. - M.: AST; SPb.: Astrel-SPb, 2008. - P. 188) … “On June 17-21, 1940, in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, after the May mass demonstrations, people's democratic governments were created and additional contingents of Soviet troops were introduced. … On June 20, 1940, the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Italy to the USSR A. Rosso, who arrived from Rome after an exchange of ambassadors, announced Italy's readiness to assist the USSR in a peaceful settlement of the Bessarabian issue. On June 23, 1940, F. Schulenburg told V. Molotov the answer to I. von Ribbentrop - the agreement concluded by the Soviet Union with Germany in August 1939 is valid for the Balkan issue, and the agreement on consultations extends to the Balkans. …
On June 25, 1940, V. Molotov made a statement to A. Rosso, calling it the basis for a lasting agreement between Italy and the USSR. The statement spoke of the USSR's territorial claim to Romania, the Black Sea straits and the entire southern and southeastern Black Sea coast in exchange for the division of the remaining territory of Turkey between Italy and Germany, as well as the recognition of the USSR as the main Black Sea power in exchange for the recognition of Italy's superior position in Mediterranean Sea. Acting within the framework of the August 1939 treaty and the agreement on a joint solution of the Balkan issue, the Soviet Union presented claims to Romania on June 28, 1940, for the return of Bessarabia, which had been torn away in 1918 and Bukovina inhabited by Ukrainians. The demands of the USSR against Romania by Germany and Italy with respect to Bessarabia were fully supported, and with respect to Bukovina, the USSR, since the August 1939 treaty did not apply to it, going towards Germany, limited its claims to its northern part. As a result, Romania on June 28 - July 2, 1940 returned the entire Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 5. Battle of Bulgaria. Ibid.).
To put pressure on Churchill, on the eve of the peace initiative on July 13, 1940, Hitler ordered to prepare a landing operation against England by the beginning of September. On July 19, 1940, in full accordance with his program statement at Mein Kampf, the rescue of the British expeditionary forces at Dunkirk, the preservation of France's sovereignty, colonies, army and navy and an increase in the number of German mobile units, Hitler offered peace to England in order to participate in a joint struggle with the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, in July 1940, parliamentary elections were held in the Baltic republics and on July 21, 1940, the People's Seimas of Latvia and Lithuania, as well as the State Duma of Estonia, proclaimed Soviet power in the Baltic States and appealed to the Soviet government with a request to admit these countries to the USSR. In response, Hitler on the same day demanded that von Brauchitsch begin preparations for war with the USSR in the fall of 1940 with the armed forces of Germany, consisting of 120 divisions.
Meanwhile, Chamberlain and Halifax signed in their utter impotence, and Churchill predictably rejected the proposed peace on July 22, 1940. On June 24, 1940, the chief of staff of the American army, General Marshall, announced the need to help the British. According to him, “if the British show that they can withstand a German strike and, receiving a little help, hold out for a year, then from the point of view of our security it is advisable to transfer them some military materials and weapons” (Yakovlev N. N. USA and England in World War II //
Under the circumstances, Hitler tried to negotiate with Edward, who had fled from the headquarters of the united allied command in May 1940, about his return to England. However, on July 28 in Lisbon, R. Hess, that "at the moment … not ready to risk a civil war in Britain for the return of the throne, but the bombing could bring Britain to its senses and, perhaps, prepare the country for his imminent return from the Bahamas, which he then took over at the suggestion of Churchill." (Preparation by GD Hitler, inc. How Britain and the USA created the Third Reich //
Since the attempts to remove Churchill from power ended in failure, on July 31, 1940, Hitler announced his intention to defeat the USSR in the spring of 1941. The postponement was due to the newly appeared threat from England and the need to increase the Wehrmacht to 180 divisions. 120 divisions were still allocated for operations in the East, while 60 additional divisions were planned to be deployed in the West: 50 divisions in France, 3 in Holland and Belgium, 7 in Norway. On August 1, 1940, the Windsors headed from Lisbon to the Bahamas, and Hitler issued Directive No. 17, according to which he tried to reason with the British and prepare the country for Edward's early return with large-scale air raids. Meanwhile, the air battle for Britain, which began on August 13, ended in the defeat of the Luftwaffe. The victorious Battle of Britain not only strengthened the spirit of the British, but also finally swept Edward out of the political scene. Operation Sea Lion finally lost its relevance and was postponed first to the second half of September, then to October 1940, and then to the spring of 1941 altogether.
On March 31, 1940, the Karelian ASSR, which is called for growth, was transformed into the 12th Union Soviet Socialist Republic - Karelo-Finnish. In August 1940, the Soviet Union accepted the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Union Soviet Socialist Republics: on August 2, 1940, the Moldavian SSR was formed within the USSR, on August 3, Lithuania was included in the USSR., August 5 - Latvia, August 6 - Estonia. After the final establishment of the western borders of the USSR, the General Staff of the Red Army began to develop a plan for the defense of the new border.
On August 19, 1940, a plan was developed to defeat the Wehrmacht units in East Prussia with a blow from the Bialystok salient. Of the total composition of the Red Army in 226 divisions and 24 tank brigades, 179 divisions and 14 tank brigades were allocated for operations in the West. 107 divisions and 7 tank brigades were allocated to strike from the Bialystok salient to the Baltic coast. 11 divisions and 3 tank brigades were allocated to the Northern Front, 61 divisions and 4 tank brigades to the South-Western Front (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preventive strike // https://topwar.ru /37961-sovetskoe-strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-1-kontrnastuplenie-i-preventivnyy-udar.html).
Scheme 1. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the deployment plan of August 19, 1940 Source: Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preventive strike //
However, Stalin, in view of the imminent confrontation with Germany over the Balkans, instructed the General Staff to supplement the plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army with an option with the deployment of the main grouping of Soviet troops south of the Pripyat Marshes, and the plan of September 18, 1940 provided for an alternative option for a strike from the Lvov salient. Of the total composition of the Red Army in 226 divisions and 25 tank brigades, 175 divisions and 15 tank brigades were allocated for operations in the West. 94 divisions and 7 tank brigades were allocated to strike from the Lvov salient to Krakow. 13 divisions and 2 tank brigades were allocated to the Northern Front, 68 divisions and 6 tank brigades to the South-Western Front (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preventive strike. Ibid.).
Scheme 2. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the deployment plan of September 18, 1940 Source: Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preemptive strike. In the same place.
Meanwhile, this plan was developed in case of aggravation and rupture of relations with Germany. In case of their deepening and development, the Soviet political leadership was presented with a plan for the defeat of the Finnish armed forces by the Red Army. Since military operations were planned to be conducted with a friendly position of Germany against the Finnish army, a grouping three times superior in number of divisions was created from units of LenVO, PribOVO, ZOVO, KOVO, KhVO, OVO, MVO, ArchVO, SKVO, PrivO and URVO (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preemptive strike. Ibid.).
Scheme 3. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army against Finland according to the deployment plan of September 18, 1940 Source: Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preemptive strike. In the same place.
In the plan of October 5, 1940, the composition of the Red Army was increased by 42 divisions and 18 tank brigades from 226 divisions and 25 tank brigades to 268 divisions and 43 tank brigades. The strike group was increased by 32 divisions, 13 tank brigades and was brought up to the number of 126 divisions and 20 tank brigades, which made it possible to deepen the strike to Breslau. The plan was developed in the form of a counterattack against the aggressor, Germany, who had invaded the territory of the USSR, provided for a long period of mobilization and deployment of new divisions in wartime and was adopted on October 15, but already in the October 1940 mobplan, the composition of the Red Army was increased by another 24 divisions to 292 divisions and 43 tank brigades. Having brought the number of the strike grouping to 134-150 divisions and 20 tank brigades, the General Staff was able to ensure its access to the Baltic coast to encircle the Wehrmacht grouping in East Prussia. All three strategic deployment plans assumed a German strike against the Western Front on Minsk from the Suwalki and Brest area (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preventive strike. Ibid).
Scheme 4. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the deployment plan of October 5, 1940 Source: Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preemptive strike. In the same place.
Despite the existence of a well-developed alternative, the option with the deployment of the main forces of the Red Army north of the Pripyat bogs continued to be considered the main one, and therefore, in the event of a break in relations with Germany following the results of the upcoming negotiations on the division of spheres of influence in the Balkans on October 11, 1940, People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko, on November 17-19, 1940, one two-sided game was planned in the north-western direction on the topic "Offensive operation of the front with a breakthrough of the UR" Prussia (Bobylev PN Rehearsal of the catastrophe // https://www.rkka.ru/analys/kshu/main.htm; Russian archive: Great Patriotic War. Vol. 12 (1-2). On the eve of the war. the leadership of the Red Army on December 23–31, 1940 - M.: TERRA, 1993 //
Meanwhile, the Soviet leadership still retained the hope of deepening relations with Germany, the joint division of the Balkans into spheres of influence, the annexation of Finland, South Bukovina, the Black Sea straits to the USSR, and therefore the plan for a counterattack against Germany provided for the parallel development of plans for conducting military operations against Finland, Romania and Turkey. … In particular, the headquarters of the Leningrad Military District was instructed to “develop a plan of operation S-Z. 20 "(" revenge in the North-West "), which was based on the plan of September 18, 1940, taking into account the planned increase in the composition of the Red Army" (S. Lebedev. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preventive strike. Ibid.).
In the summer of 1940, the British Empire alone confronted Germany with Italy, which had joined it, which the United States did not fail to take advantage of. In August 1940, in Ogdenburg, New York, US President F. D. Roosevelt and Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King “agreed to establish the United States-Canada Permanent Joint Defense Council as an advisory body. Provided for the deployment of American troops in Canada, military supplies and joint consultations. The military-political ties between the two countries legitimized the actual military control of the United States over all of North America. This agreement caused dissatisfaction in London, because for the first time in the history of the Commonwealth, Canada allowed itself to conclude such a major international agreement without consulting Great Britain and without taking into account its interests (Recent history of the countries of Europe and America. XX century: Textbook for students. institutions: 2 hours / Under the editorship of A. M. Rodriguez and M. V. Ponomarev - M.: Humanitarian publishing center VLADOS, 2001. - Part 1: 1900-1945. - P. 162).
Meanwhile, on September 2, Churchill himself was personally forced to lease eight strategic bases in British possessions in the western hemisphere in Newfoundland, Bermuda and Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, Santa Lucia, Trinidad and British Guiana for a period of 99 years. exchange for 50 destroyers built during the First World War, which, according to Roosevelt, were "at their last gasp", decommissioned from the American fleet and subject to sale for scrap in bulk for 250 thousand dollars. Since initially Churchill intended to receive the destroyers from his "good friend" Roosevelt for free, in the form of a generous gift, a demonstration of the bonds that bind the Anglo-Saxon world without any concessions on his part, then later he did not even think to hide his dissatisfaction with this treaty, comparing it with the then relations between the USSR and Finland (Treaty "destroyers in exchange for bases" // https://ru.wikipedia.org; Yakovlev N. N. Ibid).
Meanwhile, Hitler began to hammer together a sphere of German influence in the Balkans without taking into account the interests of the USSR. “On August 30, by the decision of the second Vienna arbitration of Germany and Italy, the territory of northern Transylvania was transferred to Hungary, Romania received a guarantee of its new borders, and on September 7, 1940, the Romanian-Bulgarian agreement was signed on the transfer of the territory of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria. The arbitration decision of Germany and Italy on the Romanian issue without the participation of the USSR and the guarantee of new pages for Romania … put an end to the USSR's claims to South Bukovina, violated Article 3 of the August 1939 non-aggression treaty between Germany and the USSR on consultations on issues of interest to both parties, as well as an agreement on the joint solution of the USSR, Germany and Italy of the Balkan question (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria. Ibid.).
On September 6, 1940, Hitler issued an order to begin the redeployment of German ground forces to the East. On September 13, 1940, Italian troops invaded Egypt from the territory of Cyrenaica and dug in near the town of Sidi Barrani, 90 km from the border. On September 27, 1940, a pact of three powers was concluded - Germany, Italy and Japan. “On September 22, 1940, Germany entered into an agreement with Finland on the transit of German troops to Northern Norway through Finland, which was perceived in Moscow as an invasion of the Soviet sphere of influence. Italy's invasion of Greece on October 28, 1940, again violated the agreement on a joint solution of the Balkan issue by the USSR, Germany and Italy. …
Since Germany was almost ready to create a new German sphere of influence in the Balkans, "Count Schulenburg from Moscow … advised Ribbentrop on October 30 not to announce the proposed annexation of Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Bulgaria to the Axis powers before Molotov's arrival and to consult first with the Russian Foreign Minister" … With a favorable outcome of the negotiations, V. Molotov planned to propose a peaceful action in the form of an open declaration of the four powers (Germany, Italy, Japan and the USSR) “on the condition of preserving the British Empire (without mandated territories) with all those possessions that England now owns, and on condition of non-interference in European affairs. and immediate withdrawal from Gibraltar and Egypt, as well as with the obligation to immediately return Germany to its former colonies and immediately grant India the rights of dominion."
Already on the eve of the negotiations, I. Stalin hastily telegraphed V. Molotov: “If it comes to a declaration, then on behalf of the comrades I am submitting an amendment: I propose to delete the paragraph on India. Motives: we are afraid that the counterparties may perceive the India clause as a trick aimed at starting a war. " In case of successful completion of the negotiations, it was planned to schedule a new visit by I. von Ribbentrop to Moscow to sign a new, broader treaty between Germany and the USSR "(Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 5. Battle of Bulgaria. Ibid.).
In turn, Hitler in November 1940, in negotiations with Molotov, sought not so much a "full-fledged alliance" with Moscow as a pretext for disengagement. He assured Molotov in every possible way that “the war for England had already ended, but once let slip that Germany was waging a war against England not to life, but to death. Instead of recognizing the sphere of interests demanded by Moscow, Hitler demanded that it “come to terms with the German invasion of the Soviet sphere of interests in Finland, the formation of a German sphere of influence in the Balkans, and the revision of the Montre Convention on the Straits instead of handing them over to Moscow. A. Hitler refused to say anything specifically about Bulgaria, referring to the need for consultations with partners in the tripartite pact - Japan and Italy.
The negotiations ended there. Both sides agreed to continue negotiations through diplomatic channels, and I. von Ribbentrop's visit to Moscow was canceled. V. Molotov was disappointed with the outcome of the negotiations”. Meanwhile, for the sake of solving the main problem associated with the acquisition of colonies by Germany and the victory over England, Hitler, in principle, agreed to the demands of Molotov and was already inclined towards an alliance with Moscow. According to him, “the coalition between Germany and the Soviet Union will be an irresistible force and will inevitably lead to complete victory. …
He was dissatisfied with the guarantees that the Russians agreed to give Bulgaria, but he remarked, somehow absently, that minor issues should be subordinated to solving the main problems. W. Churchill admitted that “it is difficult to even imagine what would happen as a result of an armed alliance between the two great continental empires, possessing millions of soldiers, with the aim of dividing the spoils in the Balkans, Turkey, Persia and the Middle East, having India in reserve, and Japan - an ardent participant in the "sphere of the Great East Asia" - as its partner "(Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria. Ibid.).
Not having the authority to independently decide the fate of Germany, Hitler turned to the gray cardinal of Nazi Germany, Franz von Pappen, one of the last leaders of the Weimar Republic, who took a direct part in Hitler's coming to power in Germany, who had a hand in the Anschluss of Austria, which opened the way for Germany to the East, and now, being in Turkey as the German ambassador, who was picking up a master key to the doors to Iran and India. According to the memoirs of F. von Pappen, “information about the guarantees offered to Bulgaria by Molotov allowed me to get a clear idea of the price we would have to pay for a full-fledged alliance with the Russians. We were at the crossroads of history. I could understand how tempting Hitler must have seemed to be to oppose the British Empire and the United States with his alliance with the Russians. His decision could change the face of the world.
With this thought, I told him before leaving: "Do not forget that in January 1933 you and I joined forces in order to protect Germany - and with it the whole of Europe - from the Communists." … Choosing between the inevitably leading to victory of the coalition of Germany with the USSR and the inevitably ending defeat of Germany in a war on two fronts with Britain and the Soviet Union, A. Hitler chose the defeat of Germany. It must be assumed that the main goal of A. Hitler, as well as the people behind his back, was not the creation of Great Germany and its acquisition of living space, and not even the fight against communism, but precisely the destruction of Germany in the battle with the Soviet Union "for the sake of American national interests (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria. Ibid).
“On November 20, 1940, Hungary openly joined the tripartite alliance, on November 23 - Romania, and on November 24 - Slovakia. By creating a new German sphere of influence in the Balkans, A. Hitler actually abandoned a full-fledged alliance with the USSR (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria. Ibid.). Meanwhile, on November 25, 1940, Bulgaria's refusal to join the Pact of the Three was interpreted by Moscow as an invitation to a full-fledged alliance, and on the same day V. Molotov gave a new detailed response to I. von Ribbentrop's proposal to create an alliance.
“As preconditions, the Soviet side put forward demands for the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Finland, the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, the provision of bases for Soviet land and sea forces in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, as well as the recognition of territories south of Batum and Baku in the direction of the Persian Gulf is the sphere of interests of the Russians. The secret article suggested holding a joint military action in case of Turkey's refusal to join the alliance."
Since Moscow, having confirmed its demands, refused to follow in the wake of German policy as a junior partner, on November 29, December 3 and 7, 1940, the Germans held operational-strategic games on maps, in which “three stages of the future Eastern campaign were worked out, respectively: the border battle; the defeat of the second echelon of Soviet troops and entry to the Minsk-Kiev line; the destruction of Soviet troops east of the Dnieper and the capture of Moscow and Leningrad (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 5. Battle of Bulgaria. Ibid.). Meanwhile, despite the fact that the Soviet government made all possible concessions and not only did not raise the issue of Sovietization, but even agreed to preserve the monarchy in the country, “On November 30, 1940, Bulgaria refused Soviet security guarantees.
The belief of the Soviet leaders that Germany and Bulgaria would accept the Soviet proposals was such that on December 18 the Bulgarians had to explain to the Soviet leadership a second time that Bulgaria had indeed rejected the Soviet proposal, "after which, on the same day, Hitler finally approved and put into effect the plan" Barbarossa "(Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 5. Battle of Bulgaria. Ibid.). Thus, we can say that although subsequently (Bulgaria did not participate in the war against the USSR due to the fact that the Bulgarians had great sympathy for the Russians as liberators from the Turkish yoke "(Bulgarian operation // https://ru.wikipedia.org) because of her, ultimately provoked a conflict between the USSR and Germany. "Preparations for war with the Soviet Union had to begin immediately and end by May 15, 1941" (Papen F. Vice-Chancellor of the Third Reich. Memoirs of a political leader of Hitlerite Germany. 1933–1947 / Translated from English by MG Baryshnikov. - M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2005. - P. 459).
In view of the unfavorable outcome of the negotiations with Germany and Bulgaria by the Soviet General Staff, “the date of the game was postponed and linked to the end of the December meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army, while the scope of the game expanded significantly: in addition to the game in the north-western direction, a second game was also envisaged - in the south -western direction (On the eve of the war. Proceedings of the meeting of the senior leadership of the Red Army on December 23-31, 1940, op. cit.). “The lists of the leadership and participants of the first game were prepared on December 13-14 and approved on December 20, 1940. The same documents for the second game were prepared and approved only on the day of its beginning - January 8, 1941”(Bobylev PN Ibid).
The meeting of the senior command staff of the Red Army, at which new forms and methods of the combat employment of troops were considered, was held in Moscow from 23 to 31 December 1940. “During the discussion … of the report of the commander of the Moscow military district I. V. Tyulenev, Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District V. D. Sokolovsky expressed the idea of the need to revise the attitude to defense, which, in his opinion, like an offensive, was capable of solving not only secondary, but also the main task of military operations - the defeat of the main forces of the enemy. For this V. D. Sokolovsky suggested not to be afraid of a short-term surrender of a part of the territory of the USSR to the enemy, let his strike forces go deep into the country, crush them at prepared lines, and only after that begin to implement the task of capturing enemy territory (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 2. The plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR // https://topwar.ru/38092-sovetskoe-strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-2-plan-razgroma-vermahta-na-territorii-sssr.html) …
"At the end of the meeting in early January 1941, the Soviet General Staff held two military-strategic games on maps in order to determine the most effective variant of the Red Army's strike against Germany - north or south of the Pripyat swamps to the Baltic Sea, bypassing the fortifications of East Prussia." In the first game, the strike of the "eastern" forces, led by Pavlov from the Bialystok salient, turned out to be extremely sensitive to the enemy's counterattack. At the same time, the "eastern" (USSR) led in the second game by Zhukov, striking from the Lvov ledge, quickly defeated the "southern" (Romania), "southwestern" (Hungary) and began a rapid advance into the territory of the "western" (Germany). "It was this deployment option that was approved as the main one" (S. Lebedev. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preventive strike. Ibid.).
In the first case, the "offensive of the" western "developed from East Prussia in the direction of Riga and Dvinsk, and from the regions of Suwalki and Brest - in the direction of Baranovichi. … The most dangerous strike was considered to be from the Suwalki region to Grodno, Volkovysk, with access to the rear of the left-flank armies of the North-Western Front”(PN Bobylev Ibid). The assumption of the Wehrmacht strike on the Western Front troops from Suwalki and Brest to Baranovichi went against all previous installations and turned out to be erroneous, however, it was further developed in all subsequent plans for the deployment of the Red Army in the West, caused an error in determining the direction of the main attack of the Army Group Center forces, incorrect the location of the troops of the Western Front to repel the attack, predetermined the encirclement and defeat of the Western Front, as well as the disruption of the entire strategic plan of the Soviet command to defeat the shock groups of the Wehrmacht on the line of the Western Dvina - Dnieper rivers in June 1941 (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War War. Part 2. Plan of the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR. Ibid.).
Following the results of the game, on February 1, 1941, G. K. Zhukov, N. F. Vatutin, and for I. V. Sokolovsky, a new position of deputy chief of staff for organizational and mobilization issues was specially introduced. At the same time N. F. Vatutin began to develop a plan for a preemptive strike against Germany from the Lvov salient, and V. D. Sokolovsky - to the development of a plan to defeat the enemy in the depths of the territory of the USSR. “In February 1941, a new mobilization plan was adopted, providing for the transfer of the Red Army in pre-war time to the staff of 314 divisions (22 divisions deployed from 43 tank brigades were added to the previous 292 divisions). In addition, apparently, everything was ready for the formation of several dozen more divisions with the beginning of hostilities (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preventive strike. Ibid).
Beginning on December 30, 1940, consultations on the problem of the Straits with Italy, Moscow launched an epic diplomatic "Battle for Bulgaria" with Berlin. “On January 10, 1941, Germany and the USSR signed an agreement regulating territorial issues in Lithuania, and already on January 13, Moscow reminded Berlin about the existence of an unresolved problem between Germany and the USSR regarding Bulgaria. In addition, on January 17, 1941, V. Molotov reminded Berlin that … “the Soviet government has repeatedly pointed out to the German government that it considers the territory of Bulgaria and the Straits as a security zone of the USSR and that it cannot be indifferent to events that threaten the security interests of the USSR … In view of all this, the Soviet government considers it its duty to warn that it will regard the appearance of any foreign armed forces on the territory of Bulgaria and the Straits as a violation of the security interests of the USSR."
Taking Sidi-Barani, Bardia, Tobruk and Beda-Fomm by February 7, the British victoriously completed the offensive launched on December 9, 1940 on the positions of the Italian troops in Libya, which lost more than 130 thousand people and 380 tanks in two months of hostilities. On February 2 (according to other sources, on February 8, 1941) an agreement was signed allowing German troops to enter the territory of Bulgaria, and on February 10, W. Churchill, trying to involve the USSR in the war between England and Germany, made an unexpected decision to stop the British offensive at El Ageila and transfer most and the best part of them from Egypt to Greece, which saved the Italian troops from the danger of being completely driven out of North Africa. … In connection with the difficult situation, arriving in Libya on February 14, 1941, German and Italian troops were immediately thrown into battle. …
On February 18, 1941, Bulgaria and Turkey signed an agreement on Turkey's non-intervention in the event that Bulgaria allowed German troops to enter its territory. England was furious at such actions of her ally. The Germans, not believing in such luck, suspecting the Turks of insincerity and continuing to fear a Turkish strike against Bulgaria in the event of a German attack on Greece, developed a project to seize the Bosphorus and oust Turkish troops from Europe.
On February 27, 1941, Italy gave its final answer on the Black Sea straits, from which it was clear that Italy did not play any role in this issue, and that A. Hitler had been simply deceiving the Soviet leadership since the November negotiations with Moscow. On February 28, V. Molotov warned Berlin against Bulgaria joining the Pact of Three without the participation of the USSR in it and the entry of German troops into Bulgarian territory, since the Soviet leadership would perceive such an action as a violation of the security of the USSR. Nevertheless, on March 1, 1941, Bulgaria nevertheless joined the tripartite alliance. V. Molotov reiterated that the introduction of German troops into Bulgaria would be regarded by the Soviet leadership as a violation of the security of the USSR and would henceforth refuse to further support Germany.
Despite the Soviet warning on March 2, 1941, the 12th German army entered Bulgaria, and on March 5, 1941, British troops landed in Greece. Prior to this, the British military presence in Greece was limited to aviation units. … On March 17, A. Hitler ordered the need to expel the British from the Balkans. … A new clash between Germany and England in Europe, this time in Greece, became inevitable. At the same time, Britain's position was so difficult that, due to its insolvency, on March 11, the US Congress ratified the Lend-Lease Act, which allows the supply of weapons and strategic materials to all those who are fighting and will fight against the fascist bloc, regardless of their solvency”(Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria. Ibid.).
The Kremlin regarded Hitler's invasion of the Soviet sphere of interests as nothing more than a declaration of war. On March 11, 1941, the USSR approved a plan for a preventive attack on Germany on June 12, 1941, and the start was made to increase the composition of the Red Army to 314 divisions. “The new plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army on March 11, 1941 provided for the concentration of a shock group in 144 divisions as part of the troops of the Southwestern Front, and apparently assumed a preventive strike by the troops of the Southwestern Front on Germany to the Baltic coast, with the aim of encircling and routing immediately the entire grouping of German troops in the East (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preemptive strike. Ibid).
Scheme 5. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the strategic deployment plan of March 11, 1941. Reconstruction of the author. Source: S. Lebedev. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preemptive strike. In the same place.
“Thus, although the withdrawal of significant British forces from North Africa cost England quite dearly, on March 24, 1941, the German Afrika Korps carried out an offensive in North Africa that led to the loss of Cyrenaica by the British by April 11, the siege of Tobruk and the capture of General Nime and Lieutenant General Richard O'Connon - one of the best experts in North Africa, he fulfilled his task - the Soviet Union did decide to attack Germany. In order to prevent the breakthrough of the German Afrika Korps towards the Japanese troops, which equally threatened both British India and Soviet Central Asia, the USSR and England began to develop plans for the occupation of Iran.
Scheme 6. Joint actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army and Great Britain in accordance with the strategic deployment plan of March 11, 1941. Reconstruction of the author. Source: S. Lebedev. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 1. Counteroffensive and preemptive strike. In the same place.
On March 26, 1941, Yugoslavia joined the tripartite alliance, but literally the next day, a military coup took place in the country with the support of British and Soviet intelligence. … Considering the planned date for the start of hostilities against the Soviet Union … A. Hitler … demanded to strike at Yugoslavia with lightning speed, with merciless cruelty, coordinating it in time with the invasion of Greece. On April 5, 1941, a treaty of friendship and non-aggression was signed in Moscow between the USSR and Yugoslavia. The treaty was everywhere regarded as public support of the USSR for Yugoslavia, which was met with great displeasure in Germany. The next day, April 6, 1941, the offensive of the Wehrmacht began, and subsequently the troops of Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, against Yugoslavia and Greece.
On April 11, 1941, England offered the Soviet Union to provide direct military support to Germany's opponents, but the Soviet Union limited itself to publicly condemning Hungary for a joint attack with Germany on Yugoslavia. On April 15, 1941, A. Hitler designated the island of Crete as the ultimate goal of the attack on Greece. On April 18, 1941, England again proposed to the USSR to begin rapprochement, otherwise threatening the Soviet Union with rapprochement with Germany, however, the Soviet leadership placed the blame for the unstable Anglo-Soviet relationship entirely on England.
Yugoslavia surrendered on April 17, 1941, and the evacuation of Greek and British troops from Greece began on April 24. On April 25, 1941, A. Hitler signed Directive No. 28 on the Mercury landing operation on Crete, and on April 30, 1941, he ordered the completion of the strategic deployment to the East by June 22, 1941, although according to the Barbarossa plan of December 18, 1940, preparation the campaign was scheduled to be completed by May 15, 1941. The postponement of the start of Operation Barbarossa was caused by the military operation of the Wehrmacht in Greece and Yugoslavia. …
“On April 13, Schulenburg arrived in Berlin from Moscow. On April 28 he was received by Hitler, who delivered a tirade in front of his ambassador about the Russian gesture towards Yugoslavia. Schulenburg, judging by his recording of this conversation, tried to justify the behavior of the Soviets. He said Russia was alarmed by rumors of an impending German attack. He cannot believe that Russia will ever attack Germany. Hitler said that the events in Serbia served as a warning to him. What happened there is for him an indicator of the political insecurity of states. But Schulenburg adhered to the thesis underlying all his communications from Moscow. “I am convinced that Stalin is ready to make even greater concessions to us. Our economic representatives have already been told that (if we make a timely application) Russia will be able to supply us up to 5 million tons of grain per year. " On April 30, Schulenburg returned to Moscow, deeply disappointed by his meeting with Hitler. He had the clear impression that Hitler was leaning towards war. Apparently, Schulenburg even tried to warn the Russian ambassador in Berlin Dekanozov about this and waged a stubborn struggle in these last hours of his policy aimed at Russian-German understanding."
According to P. Sudoplatov by the defeat of Yugoslavia, “Hitler clearly showed that he did not consider himself bound by official and confidential agreements - after all, the secret protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact provided for preliminary consultations before taking any military steps. And although both sides actively consulted on the division of spheres of influence from November 1940 to March 1941, an atmosphere of mutual distrust persisted in their relationship. Hitler was surprised by the events in Belgrade, and we, for our part, are no less surprised by his rapid invasion of Yugoslavia. I have to admit that we did not expect such a total and so quick defeat of Yugoslavia. … Moreover, Bulgaria, through which the German troops passed, although it was in the zone of our interests, supported the Germans."
Impressed by the German victories in Greece and Yugoslavia, the Soviet leadership canceled the preemptive strike against Germany planned for June 12, 1941, began to improve its relations with Germany, undermined by the events in Yugoslavia, and "demonstrate an emphatically loyal position towards Berlin." In particular, on April 1, 1941, a military coup took place in Iraq, whose entire economy was placed at the service of the interests of England. The new government embarked on a course of weakening its dependence on England. Germany and Italy provided military assistance, and the Soviet Union either on May 3 or May 13 recognized the new state.
In addition, on April 13, 1941, the Soviet Union signed a neutrality treaty with Japan. “On May 7, diplomatic representatives of Belgium and Norway were expelled from Russia,” on May 8, the Soviet Union “severed diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, and on June 3 with Greece. … During the Soviet-German consultations on the Middle East held in Ankara in May, the Soviet side stressed its readiness to take into account German interests in this region. " At the same time, in the event of an attack by Germany, V. D. Sokolovsky "of the defeat of the shock units of the Wehrmacht on Soviet territory on the line Zapadnaya Dvina - Dnieper. "And when in April 1941 the British informed Stalin about the approaching German attack, he replied:" Let them go … - we are ready to accept them! " (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria. Ibid.).
Thus, we established that in March 1940 Hitler proposed to Stalin to divide the Balkans as a junior partner, while maintaining the influence of national governments in the Soviet sphere and ensuring control over them through Soviet military bases. Stalin insisted on equal relations and, in order to fully control the countries from the Soviet sphere of influence, decided to include them in the USSR with subsequent Sovietization. Disgruntled Hitler, in response in July 1940, decided to attack the USSR with 120 divisions with the support of Britain. However, after Chamberlain and Halifax were unable to secure peace with Britain to Hitler, Churchill was not intimidated by the threat of a German invasion of England, and the bombing did not force the British to accept Edward for the second time as a weak-willed puppet in the hands of a powerful master, in order to implement American national interests, he was forced to agree to attack on the USSR alone, and to stop the new threat from Britain, he decided to increase the Wehrmacht by 60 divisions - from 120 to 180.
As for the Soviet pre-war strategic planning, on August 19, 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army conceived a blow to the Bialystok grouping of 107 divisions and 7 tank brigades from 226 divisions and 24 tank brigades of the Red Army to bypass the fortifications of East Prussia and go to the Baltic to surround them. On September 18, this plan, at the suggestion of Stalin, was supplemented with a variant of the strike of the Lvov grouping in 94 divisions and 7 tank brigades from 226 divisions and 25 tank brigades of the Red Army to Krakow. On October 5, by increasing the composition of the Red Army to 268 divisions and 43 tank brigades, and the strike force to 126 divisions and 20 tank brigades, the strike was deepened to Breslau. After the increase in the October mobplan of the Red Army to 292 divisions and 43 tank brigades, and the shock group to 134-150 divisions and 20 tank brigades, the blow was again brought to the Baltic, again having achieved the encirclement of the eastern group of the Wehrmacht. The plan envisaged a concentric attack by the Germans on Minsk, was designed for a counterattack against the aggressor who had invaded the territory of the USSR, and therefore provided for a significant period of mobilization, concentration and deployment of new divisions in wartime. In parallel, in the event of an alliance with Germany against Great Britain, the USSR began to work out plans for conducting military operations against Finland, Romania and Turkey.
Since a war on two fronts for Germany was a real and inevitable suicide, Hitler again in November 1940 proposed to Stalin to divide the Balkans on the same terms of junior partnership. Stalin again raised the issue of equality of relations and, in exchange for help in the destruction of Great Britain, demanded Bulgaria, the Black Sea, the Straits and access to the Indian Ocean. Hitler was almost ready to agree to Stalin's terms, but he was curbed by his curators and obediently gave the order to develop a plan of attack on the Soviet Union to overthrow British world domination and the maximum weakening of the Soviet Union for the subsequent acquisition by America of the coveted hegemony at the cost of Germany's defeat in World War II.
In view of Hitler's rejection of the expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence, Stalin unilaterally announced Bulgaria's entry for the security of the USSR into the Soviet sphere of interests. After the January war games on the maps of 1941, the option with a strike from the Lvov salient was adopted as the main one, and the supposed concentric strike of the Germans was reduced from Minsk to Baranovichi, which predetermined the catastrophe of the Western Front in the summer of 1941. In addition to Vatutin's plan to defeat the Wehrmacht in Germany, the development of a plan for the Sokolovsky defeat of the Wehrmacht in the USSR began. In turn, Churchill decided to stop the American plan to prolong the conflict and began to impose on Stalin a plan for the joint defeat of Germany in a short-lived blitzkrieg. In response, the Americans supplemented their strategy of indirect actions against Britain with direct intervention, taking control of Canada, the Atlantic and beginning to enslave Britain with Lend-Lease supplies.
After Hitler's invasion of Bulgaria in March 1941, Churchill sent troops to Greece, and Stalin accepted Vatutin's plan for a preemptive attack on Germany on June 12, 1941 from the Lvov salient with the support of British troops from Greece, and began the planned wartime increase in the Red Army from 226 divisions and 25 armored brigades up to 314 divisions (292 divisions plus 22 divisions deployed from 43 armored brigades). At the same time, to expand the British bridgehead in the Balkans, British and Soviet intelligence carried out an anti-German coup in Yugoslavia, and to cover British India and Soviet Central Asia from the breakthrough of the German Afrika Korps in Britain and the USSR, a plan for a joint invasion of Iran began. However, after the lightning defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece by Nazi Germany in April 1941, Stalin refused to openly support Churchill, took a wait-and-see attitude and re-established relations with Hitler, canceled Vatutin's plan for a preventive attack on Germany, accepting instead Sokolovsky's plan to defeat the Wehrmacht in the USSR.
Table 1. Grouping of the Red Army according to the materials of the pre-war Soviet strategic planning of 1940-1941. Compiled from: Note of the USSR NO and the NGSh KA to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov of August 19, 1940 on the foundations of the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the USSR in the West and in the East for 1940 and 1941 // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 95 // www.militera.lib.ru; Note of the USSR NO and the NGSh KA to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov dated September 18, 1940 on the bases of the deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East for 1940 and 1941 // 1941 Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 117 // www.militera.lib.ru; Note of the USSR NO and the NGSh KA to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov dated October 5, 1940 on the fundamentals of the deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East for 1941 // 1941. Collection documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 134 // www.militera.lib.ru; Note of the USSR NO and the NGSh KA dated March 11, 1941 // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 315 // www.militera.lib.ru
