The first salvo of the Second World War. Source: www.rech-pospolita.ru
As noted by V. M. Falin, “it is usually omitted that the Soviet side, after the signing of the [Moscow - SL] treaty, tried to maintain contacts with London and Paris. Molotov told the French ambassador Najiar: "The non-aggression pact with Germany is not incompatible with the alliance of mutual assistance between Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union." However, official and semi-official signals from Moscow, recommending the "democrats" not to cut the mooring lines, were ignored. The British and French defiantly turned away from yesterday's negotiating partner. But the tendency of the Tories to find a consensus with the Nazis increased by an order of magnitude "(BM Falin. To the prehistory of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Germany // Score of World War II. Who and when started the war? - M.: Veche, 2009. - P. 95) …
On August 24, 1939, in a conversation with the USSR Chargé d'Affaires in Germany N. V. Ivanov, 1st Secretary of the US Embassy Heath expressed "the hope that everything will end peacefully, with the second Munich, that the President of the United States of America Roosevelt is already going to take some steps" (Year of the Crisis, 1938-1939: Documents and Materials. In 2 vol. T. 2. June 2, 1939 - September 4, 1939 / Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. - M: Politizdat, 1990. - S. 322). Indeed, Roosevelt addressed “the king of Italy (23 August), Hitler (24 and 26 August), and the Poles (25 August). The content of the appeals echoed the American exhortations that a year before that they had pushed the ground for the Munich agreement”(Falin B. M. op. Cit. - pp. 97-98).
Meanwhile, “On August 25, 1939, in London, the Anglo-Polish alliance was finally formalized and signed in the form of a Mutual Assistance Agreement and a secret treaty. Article 1 of the Anglo-Polish Mutual Assistance Agreement reads: “If one of the Treaty Parties is drawn into hostilities with a European state by aggression arranged by the latter against the said Treaty Party, the other Treaty Party will immediately provide the Treaty Party involved in hostilities with all the necessary from her support and help. " Under the "European state", as it followed from the secret treaty, they meant Germany "(Strange War // https://ru.wikipedia.org). On the same day “the last English merchant ship left Germany” (Shirokorad AB Great intermission. - M.: AST, AST MOSCOW, 2009. - P. 344).
"Not trusting his Italian allies, Hitler in the middle … August 25, thought he could involve the Western powers in the deal" (E. Weizsacker, von. Ambassador of the Third Reich. Memoirs of a German diplomat. 1932-1945 / Transl. FS. Kapitsa. - Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2007. - S. 219) and “to the British call“not to commit the irreparable”he replied with a proposal (transmitted through Ambassador Henderson on August 25) to join the couple on the following conditions: a) return of Danzig and the Polish corridor to the composition of the Reich; b) German guarantees of new Polish borders; c) reaching an agreement on the former German colonies; d) refusal to change the German borders in the West; e) arms limitation. In turn, the Reich would have pledged to defend the British Empire from any external encroachment. … The Fuehrer provided the above with a note: nothing terrible will happen if the British declare, for reasons of prestige, "a show of war". The thunderstorm will only serve to purify the atmosphere. It is only necessary to speak in advance of the key elements of future reconciliation.
After the meeting with Henderson, Hitler contacted Mussolini. He was pleased with the interview with Duce and at 15:00 gave the order to put into effect the Weiss plan. The attack on Poland was to take place at dawn on 26 August. However, everything went through the stump deck. … The Italian Embassy notified Berlin that Rome was not ready for war. At 17:30, the French ambassador to Berlin warned that his country would fulfill its obligations to Poland. At about 18:00, the BBC broadcast a message that the Anglo-Polish union treaty had entered into force. Hitler did not yet know that the news - Italy would not take part in the attack on Poland - had been conveyed to London and Paris before the ally. General Halder, chief of the Wehrmacht headquarters, wrote in his diary: "Hitler is at a loss, there is little hope that through negotiations with Britain it is possible to break through the demands rejected by the Poles" (Falin B. M. op. Cit. - pp. 95-96). “On the evening of August 25, Hitler withdrew the order for the offensive, which had already been printed, fearing that England would eventually enter the war, and the Italians would not do it” (E. Weizsäcker, von. Op. Cit. - p. 219). “In the meantime, V. Keitel received an order to immediately stop the advance of the invasion forces to the lines designated according to the Weiss plan, and to present the begun redeployment of troops as“exercises”(V. M. Falin, op. Cit. - p. 96).
On August 26, Henderson flew to London and at a meeting of the British government said: "The real value of our guarantees to Poland is to enable Poland to come to a settlement with Germany" (Falin B. M. op. Op. - p. 97). On the same day, the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Great Britain, I. M. Maisky wrote in his diary: “In general, the air smells like new Munich. Roosevelt, the Pope, Leopold of Belgium - everyone is trying openly. Mussolini is doing his best behind the scenes. Chamberlain sleeps and sees "appeasement" in his dream. If Hitler shows at least a minimum of pliability, last year's story may repeat itself. But will it show? Everything depends on Hitler.”
Meanwhile, Hitler, through the Swede Dahlerus, sent "to London a proposal for a full-blooded alliance: the British will help Germany return Danzig and the corridor, and the Reich will not support any country -" neither Italy, nor Japan or Russia "in their hostile actions against the British Empire. Earlier, G. Wilson, on behalf of Premier Chamberlain, beckoned Hitler with the possibility of canceling the guarantees issued by London to Poland and a number of other European countries. Now the Reich Chancellor was putting on the line everything that he had promised both Rome and Tokyo, and the still lukewarm pact with Moscow”(V. Falin, op. Cit. - pp. 96-97). In turn, N. Chamberlain apparently already agreed to a new treaty with A. Hitler - “read the statement of N. Chamberlain at a cabinet meeting on August 26, 1939:“If Great Britain leaves Mr. Hitler alone in his sphere (Eastern Europe), then he will leave us alone”(Falin BM, op. cit. - p. 92).
“On August 27, Hitler told his loyal supporters that he adheres to the idea of a 'total solution', but could agree to a phased settlement. All the same, the second culmination of the crisis is approaching, since Hitler did not get what he wanted”(E. Weizsäcker, von. Op. Cit. - p. 222). On the same day, N. Chamberlain “informed his cabinet colleagues that he made it clear to Dahlerus: the Poles could agree to the transfer of Danzig to Germany, although the prime minister did not hold any consultations on this matter with the Poles” (Falin BM Decree, op.. 97). According to the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Great Britain I. M. Maisky, Hitler's plan was “to secure the neutrality of the USSR, defeat Poland within three weeks and then turn to the West against England and France.
Italy is likely to remain neutral, at least during the first stage of the war. It is about this that Ciano spoke recently in Salzburg with Ribbentrop and then in Berchtesgaden with Hitler. The Italians do not want to shed blood over Danzig, a war over the German-Polish dispute would be extremely unpopular in Italy. In addition, the fighting qualities of the Italian army are highly questionable. The economic situation in Italy is sad. It has no oil, no iron, no cotton, no coal. If Italy took part in the war, it would be a heavy burden in the military and economic sense on Germany. Therefore, Hitler in the end did not object to Italy remaining neutral. Germany has already mobilized 2 million people. Three days ago, another 1.5 million people were called up for arms. With such forces, Hitler hopes to realize his plan alone”(Documents of the USSR's foreign policy, 1939. T. XXII. Book 1. Decree. Op. - p. 646).
28 August Henderson returned to Berlin and at 10 o'clock. 30 minutes. in the evening handed Hitler the answer from the British Cabinet. Its essence boiled down to the fact that “the British government recommends the resolution of the difficulties that have arisen through peace negotiations between Berlin and Warsaw and, if this is accepted by Hitler, promises further consideration at the conference of those more general problems that he raised in a conversation with Henderson on the 25th … At the same time, the British government firmly declares its intention to fulfill all obligations in relation to Poland (Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR, 1939. T. XXII. Book 1. Decree. Cit. - p. 679). “The Fuhrer listened to Henderson with half an ear. A few hours before the reception of the British ambassador, Hitler decided on his own: the invasion of Poland - September 1”(V. M. Falin, op. Cit. - p. 97).
“The next day, August 29, in his response to this message, Hitler demanded the transfer of Danzig and the“corridor”to Germany, as well as ensuring the rights of the German national minority in Poland. The message emphasized that, although the German government is skeptical about the prospects for a successful outcome of negotiations with the Polish government, it is nevertheless ready to accept the British proposal and begin direct negotiations with Poland. It does this solely due to the fact that it has received a "written declaration" about the desire of the British government to conclude a "treaty of friendship" with Germany "(Year of Crisis, 1938-1939: Documents and Materials. In 2 volumes. Vol. 2. Decree. cit. - p. 407).
Thus, Hitler agreed to direct negotiations with Poland and asked the British government to use its influence so that a plenipotentiary representative of Poland would arrive immediately. However, this part of the answer was “framed in such a way as if Hitler was awaiting the arrival of the Polish Gakhi in Berlin. … Hitler demands in advance Poland's consent to the return of Danzig and the "corridor" to Germany. Direct negotiations should only authorize this, and moreover, serve to "settle" Polish-German relations in the economic field, which, obviously, should be understood as the establishment of Germany's economic protectorate over Poland. The new border of Poland must be guaranteed with the participation of the USSR "(Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR, 1939. T. XXII. Book 1. Decree. Op. - p. 681).
According to E. von Weizsacker, “at two or three o'clock in the morning on August 29, general enthusiasm reigns in connection with a very rosy message from the Scandinavian emissary who visited Chamberlain. Goering said to Hitler: “Let's stop the all-or-nothing game. To which Hitler replied: “All my life I have played on the principle of“all or nothing”. Throughout the day, the mood fluctuates between the greatest friendship with England and the outbreak of war at all costs. Relations between us and Italy are getting colder. Later in the evening, all Hitler's thoughts seem to be associated with the war, and only with it. “In two months, Poland will be over,” he says, “and then we will hold a big peace conference with the Western countries” (E. Weizsäcker, von. Op. Cit. - p. 222).
Meanwhile, Ribbentrop, in a conversation with the USSR Chargé d'Affaires in Germany N. V. Ivanov asked to inform the Soviet government that “the change in Hitler’s policy towards the USSR is absolutely radical and invariable. … The agreement between the USSR and Germany, of course, is not subject to revision, remains in force and is a turn in Hitler's policy for many years. The USSR and Germany will never and under no circumstances use weapons against each other. … Germany will not participate in any international conference without the participation of the USSR. On the issue of the East, it will make all its decisions together with the USSR (Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR, 1939. T. XXII. Book 1. Decree. Op. - p. 680).
According to E. von Weizsäcker, on August 30, the leadership of the Third Reich was waiting for “what England would do, whether she (as she intended) Poland to negotiate” (E. Weizsäcker, von. Op. Op. P. 222), and with Ribbentrop's words on this very day “from the German side were counting on the arrival of a Polish representative” (Year of the Crisis, 1938-1939: Documents and Materials. In 2 volumes. Vol. 2. Decree. op. - p. 339). On the same day, the British cabinet held a meeting at which Halifax stated that the concentration of troops by Germany to strike at Poland "is not an effective argument against further negotiations with the German government" (Falin B. M. Decree. Op. - p. 97).
At the end of the meeting, a message was immediately sent to Berlin with Henderson, in which the British government agreed “to use its influence in Warsaw in order to persuade the Polish government to enter into direct negotiations with Germany, provided that the status quo was maintained during the negotiations. all border incidents are stopped and the anti-Polish campaign in the German press is suspended. … After the "peaceful solution" of the Polish question, the British government will agree to convene a conference to discuss the more general issues (trade, colonies, disarmament) raised by Hitler during his meeting with Henderson on August 25 "(Year of Crisis, 1938-1939: Documents and Materials. In 2 volumes. T. 2. Decree.oc. - S. 353). According to E. von Weizsacker, Henderson, who came at midnight, was treated by Ribbentrop “like a rabble, saying that we are getting closer to war. The radiant Ribbentrop went to Hitler. I am desperate. A little later I am present during Hitler's conversation with Ribbentop. Now I finally understand that war is inevitable”(E. Weizsäcker, von. Op. Cit. - p. 222).
During the meeting, Ribbentrop told Henderson that “until midnight, nothing was heard from the Poles on the German side. Therefore, the question of a possible proposal is no longer relevant. But to show what Germany intended to offer if a Polish representative came, the Reich Foreign Minister read out the attached German … proposals: 1. The Free City of Danzig, on the basis of its purely German character and the unanimous will of its population, immediately returns to the German Reich. 2. The region of the so-called corridor … will decide for itself whether it belongs to Germany or Poland. 3. For this purpose, a vote will be taken in this area. … To ensure an objective vote and to guarantee the extensive preparatory work necessary for this, the said region, like the Saar region, will be subordinated to an immediately formed international commission, which will be formed by the four great powers - Italy, the Soviet Union, France and England (Year of Crisis, 1938-1939: Documents and materials. In 2 volumes. Vol. 2. Decree. cit. - pp. 339-340, 342-343).
Since the British government, through Henderson, suggested that “the German government should begin negotiations in the normal diplomatic way, that is, to convey his proposals to the Polish ambassador so that the Polish ambassador would be able, in agreement with his government, to prepare for direct German-Polish negotiations.”On August 31, Ribbentrop asked Polish Ambassador to Germany Lipski about his possible negotiating powers. To which Lipsky "declared that he was not authorized to negotiate" (Year of the crisis, 1938-1939: Documents and materials. In 2 volumes. Vol. 2. Decree. Op. - p. 355). On that day, Hitler “again indifferently reacted to all options, ordered an offensive against Poland, although he knew that nothing had changed. In other words, Italy will remain on the sidelines, and England, as promised, will help Poland "(E. Weizsacker, von. Op. Cit. - p. 219).
Meanwhile, "Mussolini proposed to England and France to convene on September 5 a conference of England, France, Italy and Germany to discuss the" difficulties arising from the Treaty of Versailles. " This proposal met with support in London and Paris, which on September 1, instead of providing the promised assistance to Poland, continued to search for ways to pacify Germany. At 11.50, France notified Italy of its consent to participate in the conference if Poland was invited to it”(MI Meltyukhov September 17, 1939. Soviet-Polish conflicts 1918-1939. - M: Veche, 2009. - p. 288). On the same day I. M. Maisky sent an extraordinary telegram to the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of the USSR: “In the last 2-3 days, the press department of the foreign office recommends that the press behave calmly and not attack the USSR. At the same time, the press department declares to all journalists - English and foreign - that the fate of war and peace is now in the hands of the USSR, and that if the USSR wanted it, it could prevent the outbreak of war by its interference in the ongoing negotiations. I get the impression that the British government is preparing the ground for trying to blame the USSR for the war or for the new Munich "(Documents of the USSR's foreign policy, 1939. T. XXII. In 2 books. Book. 1. Decree. Op. - S. 682).
According to E. von Weizsäcker, “Ciano's diaries show that at the last stage, at least after August 25, there were close contacts between Rome and London, incompatible with the Roman-Berlin alliance” (E. Weizsäcker, von. Decree op. P. 221). In France, “Bonnet begged for time for another attempt at negotiations. He said that Mussolini, if agreed by France and Great Britain, was ready to intervene, as was the case in 1938. … Daladier ordered Bonnet to prepare an appeal to Mussolini with a positive answer, but so far the British reaction is not known, not to send it. The next day, Halifax said that although the British government could not go to another Munich conference, it did not reject the possibility of a peaceful solution. An official message was sent to Rome.
And at this time the German troops crossed the Polish border”(May ER Strange victory / Translated from English - M.: AST; AST MOSCOW, 2009. - P. 222). “Having ratified the non-aggression pact with Germany in less than 5 minutes, the USSR avoided on September 1, 1939, being plunged into a pool without a bottom” (V. M. Falin, op. Cit. - p. 99). In the meantime, “Chamberlain continued to carry on with the idea of a peace agreement, which would be followed by a conference like the Munich meeting of the heads of England, France, Germany and Italy. He thought that there was still time, since France was delaying in declaring war, and Halifax also believed that war should not be declared yet”(May ER, op. Cit. - p. 223). “At 21.30 on September 1, Polish Foreign Minister Beck told the French ambassador:“Now is not the time to talk about the conference. Now Poland needs help to repel aggression. Everyone asks why England and France have not yet declared war on Germany. Everyone wants to know not about the conference, but about how soon and how effectively the obligations arising from the alliance will be fulfilled”(MI Meltyukhov, op. Cit. - p. 289).
“On September 2, G. Wilson, on behalf of the prime minister, notified the German embassy: the Reich could get what it wants if it stops military operations against Poland. "The British government is ready (in this case) to forget everything and start negotiations" (Falin B. M., op. Cit. - p. 98). “Early in the morning, the Italians made their last attempt … to achieve an armistice” (E. Weizsäcker, von. Op. Cit. - p. 224).“At 10.00 on September 2, after negotiations with Britain and France, Mussolini told Hitler that“Italy informs, of course, leaving any decision to the Fuehrer, that there is still an opportunity to convene a conference of France, England and Poland on the following basis: 1) the establishment of an armistice, according to which the troops will remain in their currently occupied positions; 2) convocation of the conference in 2-3 days; 3) the resolution of the German-Polish conflict, which, given the current situation, will be favorable for Germany … Danzig is already German …, and Germany already has in its hands a pledge that secures the largest part of its demands. If the proposal of the conference is accepted, then it will achieve all its goals and at the same time eliminate the war, which already today looks like a general and extremely prolonged one”. In response, the Fuehrer said: “During the last two days, German troops advanced extremely quickly across Poland. It is impossible to declare what was obtained in blood as obtained as a result of diplomatic intrigues … Duce, I will not yield to the British, because I do not believe that peace will be preserved for more than six months or a year. Under these circumstances, I believe that, in spite of everything, the present moment is more suitable for war. " …
At 17.00 on September 2, England announced to Italy that “it would accept the plan for Mussolini’s conference on only one condition … German troops must be immediately withdrawn from the Polish regions. The British government decided to give Hitler until noon today to withdraw his troops from Poland. After this period, Great Britain will open hostilities. " At the same time, speaking in parliament, Chamberlain said that "if the German government agrees to withdraw its troops from Poland", then England will "consider the situation the same as it existed before the troops crossed the Polish border." It is clear that the parliamentarians were outraged, but the German side was given to understand that a compromise was possible. Despite the fact that in Paris it became known about Warsaw's negative attitude to the convening of the conference, its allies continued to hope for this opportunity, and, unlike England, France was not opposed to German troops remaining on Polish territory "(Meltyukhov M. I.. Op. Cit. - pp. 288-290).
Chamberlain was almost one step away from the conclusion of a second Munich, but his “time had already run out. The Tory "backbenchers" threatened to revolt in the government faction if the government did not immediately declare war. The twelve ministers met in the Cabinet of Treasury Secretary Sir John Simon for a private meeting. They decided to tell Chamberlain that the government no longer had the right to wait, no matter how France behaved. Shortly after midnight on September 3, Chamberlain called a cabinet vote. The next morning, the prime minister, who looked "depressed and aged", delivered a radio message to the nation: "Everything I have worked for, everything I believed in during my career has been destroyed." He complained to his sisters that “the House of Commons was uncontrollable”, and some of his colleagues “rebelled” (May ER, op. Cit. - pp. 223-224).
Considering that "the broad masses of the English and French peoples hated and despised fascism, its methods and goals" (Blitzkrieg in Europe: War in the West. - M.: ACT; Transitbook; SPb.: Terra Fantastica, 2004. - p. 17) the positions of Hitler's pacifiers were indeed extremely shaky, fragile and unstable. To prevent an explosion of discontent, Chamberlain was forced to renounce peace with the Nazis and the conclusion of the second Munich agreement. On September 3, England, followed by France, declared war on Germany. Among other things, “on the same day, Winston Churchill was asked to take the post of First Lord of the Admiralty with the right to vote in the Military Council” (Churchill, Winston // https://ru.wikipedia.org) and in the morning of September 4 he “took leadership of the ministry "(W. Churchill. World War II //
Thus, the British thwarted Chamberlain's conclusion of a new quadripartite alliance, while Churchill returned to power and began to implement his plan for an Anglo-Soviet alliance against Nazi Germany. “The Franco-Polish agreement was signed on 4 September already ex post facto. After that, the Polish ambassador to France began to insist on an immediate general offensive”(Strange War. Ibid.). Among other things, Great Britain used the resources of all Commonwealth countries to wage war: on September 3, 1939, the governments of Australia and New Zealand declared war on Germany, and the British Parliament passed a law on the defense of India, on September 5, the Union of South Africa entered the war, and on September 8, Canada … The United States declared its neutrality on September 5, 1939.
At the same time, upon a close look, no catastrophe happened and Hitler had every reason to believe that “if they [England and France] declared war on us, it’s in order to save their face, and besides, it doesn’t mean that they will fight”(Meltyukhov MI Decree. op. - p. 290). On September 4, E. von Weizsacker passed the British Embassy on Wilhelmstrasse several times and “saw how Henderson and his assistants packed their luggage - as if there was complete agreement between England and Germany, there was nothing like a demonstration or expression of hatred” (Weizsacker E., background. Decree.oc. - p. 224). This is in stark contrast to the events of August 4, 1914, when Germany was at war with Great Britain, and "a huge" roaring crowd "threw stones at the windows of the British Embassy, and then moved to the nearby Ablon Hotel, demanding the extradition of British journalists. who stopped there”(Ahamed L. The Lords of Finance: Bankers who turned the world upside down / Translated from English - M: Alpina Publishers, 2010. - P. 48).
And only the official entry of Churchill into the War Cabinet on September 5 as Minister of the Navy seriously alarmed Hitler. “With the ill-fated press report in hand, Goering appeared on the doorstep from Hitler's apartment, plopped down into the nearest chair and said wearily:“Churchill is in his study. This means that the war is really starting. Now we have a war with England. " From this and some other observations, it was possible to understand that such an outbreak of war did not correspond to Hitler's assumptions. … He saw in England, as he once put it, "Our enemy number one" and still hoped for a peaceful settlement with him "(Speer. A. Third Reich from within. Memoirs of the Reich Minister of War Industry. 1930-1945 // https:// wunderwafe.ru/Memoirs/Speer/Part12.htm).
Fearing the beginning of active hostilities by Britain and France, Hitler, according to E. von Weizsäcker, “was surprised and even felt out of place” (E. Weizsäcker, von. Op. Cit. - p. 219). Indeed, “in order to crush Poland, the Germans had to throw almost all their troops against it” (V. Shambarov “Strange War” // https://topwar.ru/60525-strannaya-voyna.html). At the same time, “Berlin was well aware of the danger of the activation of the Anglo-French armed forces, which was all the higher because the Ruhr industrial region was actually located on the western border of Germany within the radius of action not only of aviation, but also of long-range artillery of the Allies.
Possessing overwhelming superiority over Germany on the Western Front, the Allies had full opportunity in early September to launch a decisive offensive, which, most likely, would be fatal for Germany. The participants in the events from the German side unanimously argued that this would mean the end of the war and the defeat of Germany”(Meltyukhov MI Decree, op. - p. 299). According to Keitel, “during an offensive, the French would have stumbled upon only a weak curtain, and not a real defense” (V. Shambarov, ibid.). “General A. Jodl believed that“we never, neither in 1938, nor in 1939, were actually able to withstand the concentrated blow of all these countries. And if we did not suffer defeat back in 1939, it was only because about 110 French and British divisions that stood in the West during our war with Poland against 23 German divisions remained completely inactive."
As General B. Müller-Hillebrand noted, “the Western powers, as a result of their extreme slowness, missed an easy victory. They would have easily got it, because along with other shortcomings of the German wartime land army and rather weak military potential … the stocks of ammunition in September 1939 were so insignificant that in the shortest time the continuation of the war would have become impossible for Germany. " According to General N. Forman, “if these forces (the allies - MM), which had a monstrous superiority, would then probably join the Dutch and the Belgians, the war would inevitably end. The resistance of Army Group C could last for several days at best. Even if this time was used to move troops from east to west, it would still not help. In this case, any action would be meaningless. In Poland, it would be necessary to stop fighting even before decisive successes were achieved, and to the west, the divisions would not have made it in time and were defeated one by one - of course, if the enemy had an energetic, purposeful leadership. At the latest in a week, the Saar mines and the Ruhr area would have been lost, and in the second week the French could send troops wherever they deemed necessary. To this it should be added that the Poles would also regain freedom of action and put their army in order."
Lieutenant General Z. Westphal believed that “if the French army undertook a major offensive on a wide front against the weak German troops covering the border (it is difficult to name them softer than the security forces), then there is almost no doubt that it would have broken through the German defense, especially in the first ten days of September. Such an offensive, launched before the transfer of significant German forces from Poland to the West, would almost certainly give the French the opportunity to easily reach the Rhine and maybe even force it. This could significantly change the further course of the war … Not taking advantage of the temporary weakness of Germany on the Western Front for an immediate strike, the French missed the opportunity to put Hitler's Germany in jeopardy of a heavy defeat. " Thus, England and France, remaining true to their policy of "appeasement" and not preparing for a real war with Germany, missed a unique chance, together with Poland, to squeeze Germany in the grip of a war on two fronts, and already in September 1939. inflict a decisive defeat on her. However, events developed differently, and as a result, “refusing to take advantage of the situation at the very beginning of the war, the Western powers not only left Poland in trouble, but also plunged the whole world into five years of destructive war” (Meltyukhov MI Decree, op. S. 299-301).
"In 1965, the major (and usually very cautious) German historian Andreas Hilgruber was forced to write:" A French attack on the weak German Siegfried line … could, as far as can be judged, lead to the military defeat of Germany and thus to the end of the war. " Four years later, Albert Merglen defended his doctoral dissertation at the Sorbonne, analyzing in detail the French and German forces on the Western Front during the German campaign in Poland. His conclusions were consistent with those of Hilgruber. Later, he published an essay in which he developed a plausible scenario for the defeat of Leeb's group - just as the Germans defeated French troops in 1940. While composing the script, he applied not only the scrupulousness of a scientist, but also his many years of experience as a professional military man - after all, Merglen became a historian after retiring with the rank of Major General of the French elite paratroopers "(May ER, op. Cit. - p.. 301-302).
Meanwhile, all of Hitler's fears were in vain. “The plans of Chamberlain did not include the use of force on Germany” (Falin B. M., op. Cit. - p. 98). He once again betrayed France, saying, they say, he does not think that "it is necessary to conduct a merciless struggle" (Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - p. 341), convincingly insisting "that France should not take any offensive actions" (May ER, op. Cit. - p. 302) and allowing Hitler to destroy Poland without hindrance. In view of Britain's categorical position, France was forced, instead of starting full-fledged hostilities and the early defeat of Germany as a result of a blitzkrieg (German: Blitzkrieg from Blitz - "lightning" and Krieg - "war"), to agree to conduct an economic war - fr. Drôle de guerre "A Strange War", eng. Phoney War "Fake, fake war" or The Bore War "Boring war", it. Sitzkrieg "The Sitting War". Active military operations were conducted exclusively by the naval forces of the opposing sides and were directly related to the blockade and economic war. “Taking advantage of the inaction of England and France, the German command stepped up its strikes in Poland” (Meltyukhov MI Decree, op. - p. 301). However, “the leaders of the allied powers were not embarrassed by the inaction of their armies: they hoped that time was working for them. Lord Halifax once remarked: “The pause will be very useful to us, both to us and to the French, because in the spring we will become much stronger” (Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - p. 341).
The fact is that “the allies, who, based on the experience of the First World War, continued to consider themselves safe behind the Maginot Line, were preparing to wrest the strategic initiative from Germany by intensifying actions in peripheral theaters and tightening the economic blockade. Germany made up for the losses incurred and was preparing for an offensive on the Western Front, since in a positional war of attrition she was doomed to defeat (Blitzkrieg in Europe: War in the West. Decree. Op. - p. 5). As we recall, “Germany was highly dependent on the supply of iron ore from Northern Sweden. In winter, when the Baltic Sea froze over, this ore was delivered through the Norwegian port of Narvik. If Norwegian waters are mined or if Narvik itself is captured, ships will not be able to deliver iron ore. Churchill ignored the Norwegian neutrality: “Small nations should not tie our hands when we fight for their rights and freedom … We should rather be guided by humanity than by the letter of the law” (Shirokorad A. B. Decree. Op. - pp. 342-343) …
According to J. Butler, “the British Ministry of Economic War thought:“To avoid the “complete collapse of its industry,” Germany, according to our calculations, had to import from Sweden at least 9 million tons in the first year of the war, that is, 750 thousand tons each. tons per month. The main iron ore basin in Sweden is the Kiruna-Gallivare region in the north, close to the Finnish border, from where ore is transported partly through Narvik to the Norwegian coast and partly through the Baltic port of Luleå, with Narvik being an ice-free port, while Luleå is usually frozen in ice from mid-December to mid-April … Further south, about 160 km northwest of Stockholm, lies a smaller iron ore basin. There are also more southerly ports, of which the most important were Oxelosund and Gavle, but in winter no more than 500 thousand tons could be sent through them monthly due to the limited capacity of the railways. Thus, if it was possible to cut off the supply of ore to Germany through Narvik, then in each of the four winter months it would receive ore by 250 thousand tons less than the minimum necessary for it and by the end of April it would receive less than 1 million tons, and this would at least supply its industry is in a very difficult position (Shirokorad AB Decree. op. - p. 343).
As noted by E. R. May “in the French and English cabinets and in the Anglo-French military liaison committee, established in September 1939, the main subject of discussion was economic war. Ministers, senior officials, leading army and navy officers tracked German imports and exports, collected information on industrial production, analyzed changes in living standards, and rumors about German morale. On average, they devoted four times as much time to discussing the problems of economic war as studying the situation on the land front. The fact that the proportion was reversed on the German side was responsible for both German success in 1940 and later German failures.
Such great attention to the economic aspects of the war has set its priorities in the collection of intelligence information. The French intelligence agency was reorganized in September 1939; from it emerged the Economic Intelligence Service (SR), called the "Fifth Bureau". … The Fifth and Second Bureaus have consistently supported General Gamelin's belief that Germany could collapse on its own. … Gamelin clearly trusted these predictions. " Moreover, he “was still relatively careful. … According to Leger [in 1933-1940, Secretary General of the French Foreign Ministry - S. L.], the German case has already been lost. Villelyum [Chief of the General Staff of the French Air Force - SL] heard an English general say at Georges's headquarters: “The war is over. It has already been won. " He also saw the officers of Georges' operations headquarters work out the terms of peace and hang on the wall a map of Germany, divided into five parts.
At the end of the year, Genevieve Taboui will write to L'Ovre: “It seems indisputable to everyone that the Allies have won the war” (May ER Decree, op. P. 312-314). “The British were firmly convinced that the Nazi economic system was about to collapse. It was assumed that everything was devoted to the production of weapons and Germany actually does not have the raw materials necessary for waging a war. The chiefs of staff reported: "The Germans are already exhausted, they are in despondency." England and France could only hold their defensive lines and continue the blockade. Germany will collapse then without further struggle”(Shirokorad AB Decree. Op. - p. 341). “In a letter to Roosevelt on November 5, 1939, Chamberlain expressed confidence in the imminent end of the war. Not because Germany will be defeated, but because the Germans will understand that it is possible to become impoverished in war”(Falin B. M., op. Cit. - p. 98). Everything, probably, would have been so in reality, had not Chamberlain declared another "ostentatious war", this time an economic one. After all, as we already know, “to declare war is not yet to fight” (Blitzkrieg in Europe: War in the West. Decree. Op. - p. 19).
Thus, we established that Chamberlain, having agreed to the implementation of the American plan to defeat Poland, France and the USSR, at the last moment decided to replay the situation in his favor and suddenly returned to his previous idea of concluding a quadrilateral alliance and the subsequent destruction of the USSR under British auspices. Hitler initially wanted to ignore Chamberlain's proposal, but after pressure from Duce he agreed. In turn, Mussolini had already agreed to convene a second Munich, and both England and France agreed to the return of Danzig, the Corridor and the colonies to Germany. The invasion of German troops into Poland on September 1, 1939 was to be legitimized already during the conference.
Meanwhile, the convocation of the second Munich never took place - due to its acute rejection by British society. England and France declared war on Germany, but Chamberlain, who repented and returned to the implementation of the American plan, prevented the French blitzkrieg and insisted on waging an economic war, thereby betraying Poland to be torn apart by the Nazis. And having begun to sabotage the Sitzkrieg, Chamberlain signed the death warrant for France as well. In spite of everything, by the Americans he was already, figuratively speaking, deleted from the list of the nomenclature - Churchill was introduced to the government, who at the first opportunity, i.e.at the slightest blunder of Chamberlain, he was supposed to take his post as prime minister and begin to implement a plan for America to gain hegemony at the expense of Germany. As we remember, this plan provided for the destruction of Germany by the joint efforts of England and the USSR, the subsequent assistance of England to America as a junior partner in the destruction of the USSR and thus gaining the longed-for world domination by the Americans.
