Commander of the Western Front, General of the Army G. K. Zhukov, member of the Military Council N. A. Bulganin, chief of staff, Lieutenant-General V. D. Sokolovsky. Autumn 1941. Source:
With regard to Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War, as a rule, two mutually exclusive options are put forward - either a preventive attack or a blank defense. Both of these options have the same weak link - the deployment of the Army Group of the Reserves of the High Command on the line of the Western Dvina - Dnepr rivers. When attacking, these armies should be in a strike grouping; during defense, they should be behind the First Strategic Echelon, but not in the depths of Soviet territory. The creation in April 1941 of a purely defensive ATBR and a purely offensive airborne command at a time again contradicts both of the most common options. Meanwhile, these inconsistencies are easily eliminated on the assumption that on the eve of the war in the Soviet Union such a defense plan was adopted, which provided for the short-term surrender of a part of the USSR territory to the enemy, the defeat of his strike groups on the previously prepared boundary of the Western Dvina - Dnieper rivers and the subsequent liberation of Europe from the Nazi yoke during 1941.
In December 1940, at a meeting of the top commanding staff of the Red Army, Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District Vasily Danilovich Sokolovsky declared the defense's ability “to solve not only secondary, but also the main task of military operations - the defeat of the main forces of the enemy. To do this, he suggested not to be afraid of a short-term surrender of part of the territory of the USSR to the enemy, let his strike forces go deep into the country, crush them on pre-prepared lines and only after that begin to implement the task of seizing the enemy's territory "(Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 2. Plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR // https://topwar.ru/38092-sovetskoe-strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-2-plan-razgroma-vermahta-na-territorii-sssr. html). At the beginning of January 1941, two military-strategic maps were played. In the first game, Zhukov at the head of the "western" (Germany), inflicting a short counterattack at the base of the offensive of the "eastern" (USSR) bypassing the fortifications of East Prussia, questioned its effectiveness. In the second game, Zhukov, now heading the "eastern" (USSR), struck south of the Pripyat swamps, quickly defeated the "southern" (Romania), "Southwestern" (Hungary) and began a rapid advance into the territory of the "western" (Germany) …
According to the results of the games, Zhukov was appointed the new chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. And it was Zhukov who, having incorrectly estimated the depth of the blow of the German troops against the Western Front, made fatal adjustments to all subsequent plans for the defeat of Germany. From now on, Soviet troops planned to repel the Wehrmacht offensive not on Minsk, as before, but on Baranovichi, which did not correspond to the plans of the German command and was the reason for the defeat of the troops of the Western Front, the collapse of the plan to defeat the Wehrmacht on the territory of the Soviet Union and the subsequent liberation of Europe from the Nazis in 1941. In turn, Sokolovsky was appointed to the specially created position of the second deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, after which he began to develop a plan for the defeat of Germany in the depths of the territory of the USSR,while the first deputy of Zhukov, Vatutin, began to develop a plan for a preemptive strike against Germany. To implement these plans, “a new mobilization plan was adopted, providing for the transfer of the Red Army to the staff of 314 divisions in pre-war time (22 divisions deployed from 43 tank brigades were added to the previous 292 divisions of the October 1940 mobilization plan).
By February 7, the British had routed Italian forces in Libya. However, instead of completely expelling the Italians from North Africa, Churchill decided on February 10 to stop the advance of British troops near El-Ageila and to transfer most and the best part of them from Egypt to Greece. Due to the difficult situation, German troops arriving in Libya from February 14, 1941, were immediately thrown into battle, and already on March 24, 1941, the German Afrika Korps, having launched an offensive by April 11, expelled the British from Cyrenaica and laid siege to Tobruk. Meanwhile, Churchill was not so short-sighted and was well aware of his actions. The fact is that at the beginning of February 1941 Germany entered into an agreement with Bulgaria, allowing German troops to enter its territory. In this connection, Churchill got a chance, having waived the solution of the tactical task of expelling Italians from North Africa, to solve the strategic task of defeating the Nazis together with the Red Army.
In early March, Hitler invaded the Soviet sphere of interest in Bulgaria, which Moscow viewed as a declaration of war. To confront the Nazis, England and the USSR began to coordinate their efforts. On March 5, 1941, British forces landed in Greece to open a new Balkan front against the Third Reich. In turn, on March 11, 1941, the USSR approved a plan for an attack on Germany on June 12, 1941, and a start was made to increase the composition of the Red Army to 314 divisions. In the Lvov salient, for the encirclement and defeat of almost all German troops in the East at the expense of the troops of the South-Western Front and the armies of the RGK, it was supposed to concentrate a shock group in 144 divisions, which were supposed to provide the Red Army with a blow up to the Baltic (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 16. Crossroads of history // topwar.ru/73396-amerika-protiv-anglii-chast-16-perekrestok-dorog-istorii.html).
To stop the Wehrmacht threat to the British possessions in the East, in March 1941, the USSR and England began developing a plan for the introduction of Soviet and British troops into northern and southern Iran. It is noteworthy that when entering Iran on August 25, 1941, the Soviet Union referred to Article 6 of the Soviet-Iranian treaty of February 26, 1921. “Unlike the USSR, Great Britain did not have any treaty or agreement with Iran that gave it the right to send troops. … The actions of the British side in relation to Iran from the standpoint of international law can be described as occupation. This in no way stopped the British. “In his memoirs, W. Churchill, with open cynicism, explained the position of the British side in these events:“Inter arma silent leges”(when the weapon speaks, the laws are silent - Latin proverb)” (Orishev AB Iranian knot. Clash of intelligence. 1936 –1945 // - M.: Veche, 2009. - P. 167).
On March 26, 1941, Yugoslavia joined the tripartite alliance, but literally the next day, a military coup took place in the country with the support of British and Soviet intelligence. The entry of Yugoslavia into the war against Germany would greatly increase the strength of the British and Soviet offensives. In response, on April 1, 1941, in Iraq, Prime Minister Rashid Ali al-Gailani, at the head of the pro-German forces, carried out a military coup against Great Britain and overthrew the British-controlled government of Nuri Said (Iraqi operation // https://ru.wikipedia.org). Although the new government of Rashid Ali-Gailani declared “its intention to abide by the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of alliance, Churchill in London was torn and thrashed. Huge reserves of Iraqi oil fell into the hands of the Germans! In addition to all the troubles … a real threat looms over the Suez Canal, the strategic oil pipeline and the oil fields of Najd (A. Nemchinov. Oligarchs in black uniforms //
On April 6, 1941 Hitler invaded Yugoslavia and Greece. "On April 11, 1941, England offered the Soviet Union to provide direct military support to Germany's enemies, but the Soviet Union limited itself to publicly condemning Hungary for a joint attack with Germany on Yugoslavia" (S. Lebedev. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 5. Battle for Bulgaria / / https://topwar.ru/38865-sovetskoe-strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-5-bitva-za-bolgariyu.html). “Despite the difficult situation in Egypt, Churchill ordered the start of the transfer of troops to the borders of Iraq” (A. Nemchinov, ibid.). “On April 16, the government of Rashid Ali was informed that, in accordance with the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, Great Britain intends to transfer troops through Iraqi territory to Palestine. There were no official objections ", but" On April 17, Rashid Ali, on behalf of the "Government of National Defense", turned to Nazi Germany for military assistance in the event of a war with Britain "(Iraqi operation. Ibid.).
"On March 31, German troops in Libya went on the offensive and by April 15 threw back the British units to the Egyptian border and thereby endangered the most important artery of the British Empire - the Suez Canal" (Zhitorchuk Yu. V. So who is to blame for the tragedy of 1941? / / https://www.litmir.co/br/?b=197375&p=69). Meanwhile, for its decisive blow, "Germany could not remove a single division from the Soviet border" (A. Nemchinov, ibid.). In turn, the British completed the transport of their troops to Iraq by April 29. “After the landing of British troops in Basra, Rashid Ali demanded that they be quickly redeployed to Palestine and not deliver any new units until those who had already arrived in Iraq were withdrawn. In this regard, London informed the Ambassador to Iraq, Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, that Britain does not intend to withdraw its troops from Iraq, nor does it intend to inform Rashid Ali about the movement of its troops, since Rashid Ali came to power illegally as a result of a coup. " operation. Ibid.).
On April 17, 1941, Yugoslavia surrendered, on April 30, Greece. On April 30, 1941, Hitler, in connection with the operation in the Balkans, postponed the completion of the strategic deployment to the East from May 15 to June 22, 1941. In turn, Stalin, after the defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece by Germany, as well as the second expulsion of the British from the continent, refused to deliver a preemptive strike against Germany, instead of him, in the event of German aggression, he adopted Sokolovsky's plan to defeat the shock units of the Wehrmacht on Soviet territory at the border of the Western Dvina rivers. - Dnepr, began to improve its relations with Germany, undermined by the events in Yugoslavia, and “to demonstrate an emphatically loyal position in relation to Berlin” (Zhitorchuk Yu. V. Ibid.). On May 7, the USSR expelled diplomatic representatives of Belgium and Norway, on May 8 it severed diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia, and on June 3 with Greece. "On May 12, the USSR recognized the government of Rashid Ali, and on May 18, diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the warring [with Britain - SL] Iraq" (Iraqi operation. Ibid.). "During the Soviet-German consultations on the Middle East, which took place in May in Ankara, the Soviet side emphasized its readiness to take into account German interests in this region" (Yu. V. Zhitorchuk, ibid.).
In the March 1941 plan of the year, only 13 divisions were allocated to the border with Iran - it was required, firstly, to assemble a grouping of 144 divisions as part of the Southwestern Front, and secondly, to collect the required number of troops on the border with Japan. The vagueness of relations between the USSR and Japan demanded a constant build-up of Soviet troops as part of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts - 30 divisions in the plan of August 19, 1940, 34 divisions in the plan of September 18, 1940, 36 divisions in the plan of October 14, 1940, and 40 divisions in plan of March 11, 1941. In April 1941, the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with Japan, which was immediately used to increase troops on the border with Iran at the expense of the troops of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts. In particular, if in the plan for the deployment of the Red Army on March 11, 13 and 40 divisions were allocated to the border with Iran and Manchuria, then in the plan of May 15, it was already 15 and 27, and in June 1941, even 30 and 31. The entry of Soviet troops into Iran in the event of a German attack on the USSR, Stalin wanted to exchange for the opening of a second front by Britain in Europe.
Table 1. Grouping of the Red Army outside the western borders of the USSR based on the materials of the pre-war Soviet strategic planning of 1938-1941. Compiled from: Note of NGSh KA NO USSR K. E. Voroshilov from March 24, 1938 about the most probable opponents of the USSR // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 2 / Appendix No. 11 // www.militera.lib.ru; Note of the USSR NO and the NGSh KA to the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov of August 19, 1940 on the foundations of the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the USSR in the West and in the East for 1940 and 1941 // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 95 // www.militera.lib.ru; Note of the USSR NO and the NGSh KA to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov dated September 18, 1940 on the bases of the deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East for 1940 and 1941 // 1941 Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 117 // www.militera.lib.ru; Note of the USSR NO and the NGSh KA to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks to I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov dated October 5, 1940 on the fundamentals of the deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the West and in the East for 1941 // 1941. Collection documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 134 // www.militera.lib.ru; Note of the USSR NO and the NGSh KA dated March 11, 1941 // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 315 // www.militera.lib.ru; Note by the USSR NO and the NGSh KA to the chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars I. V. Stalin of May 15, 1941 with considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 2 / Document No. 473 // www.militera.lib.ru; Information on the deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR dated June 13, 1941 in case of war in the West // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 2 / Document No. 550 // www.militera.lib.ru; Drig E. Mechanized corps of the Red Army in battle: The history of the armored forces of the Red Army in 1940-1941. - M., 2005; Kalashnikov K. A., Feskov V. I., Chmykhalo A. Yu., Golikov V. I. Red Army in June 1941 (statistical collection). - Novosibirsk, 2003; Kolomiets M., Makarov M. Prelude to "Barbarossa" // Front illustration. - 2001. - No. 4.
“The plans for covering the borders with border military districts, the task assigned to the RGK Army Group, created on June 21, 1941, and the proposal of G. K. Zhukov on the construction of a new fortified area on the rear line Ostashkov - Pochep allows to restore the plan of defeat of the enemy on the territory of the USSR, conceived by the Soviet military command. It was necessary, firstly, to reliably cover the flanks of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, the Bialystok and Lvov ledges, as well as Moldova, by deploying anti-tank brigades in tank-hazardous areas. Secondly, in the weak center, letting the enemy go to Smolensk and Kiev, interrupt the supply routes of the German units with a concentric strike of the troops of the Western and Southwestern Fronts to Lublin-Radom and defeat the enemy at the prepared lines in the Western Dvina-Dnieper area. Thirdly, to occupy the area of the Narew and Warsaw rivers. Fourth, after completing the formation of new armies, by a blow from the region of the Narew River and Warsaw to the Baltic coast, encircle and destroy the German troops in East Prussia. Fifthly, by throwing out the airborne corps in front of the ground forces of the Red Army, to liberate Europe from the Nazi yoke. In case of a breakthrough of German troops through the barrier of the armies of the second strategic echelon, it was envisaged to create a fortified area on the Ostashkov-Pochep line (S. Lebedev. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 2. Ibid).
Scheme 1. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the May plans to cover the border of the border military districts of 1941 and the task set in June 1941 for the group of reserve armies. Reconstruction by the author. Source: S. Lebedev. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 2. The plan of the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR // topwar.ru
In April 1941, to implement Sokolovsky's plan, changes were made to the February mobilization plan - the composition of the Red Army, by reducing divisions from 314 to 308, was replenished with 10 anti-tank brigades and 5 airborne corps. Directorates of the 13th, 23rd, 27th, and later the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies were created. “In the second half of April 1941, the hidden transportation of troops from internal districts to border districts begins” (Zakharov MV General Staff in the pre-war years [collection]. - M.: AST: LYUKS, 2005. - P. 398). At the beginning of May, the leadership of the Red Army ordered the border military districts to develop plans to cover the border with their own forces of the First Strategic Echelon, instructing on May 13, 1941, the armies of the RGK of the Second Strategic Echelon to begin concentrating on the Western Dvina-Dnepr line. On May 15, 1941, in case of a failure of the plan to defeat the enemy on the territory of the USSR, Zhukov suggested I. V. Stalin to approve his proposal to start the construction of fortified areas on the rear line Ostashkov - Pochep, and if Germany does not attack the Soviet Union, then provide for the construction of new fortified areas in 1942 on the border with Hungary.
“On May 27, the command of the border districts was ordered to immediately begin the construction of field command posts (front and army) in the areas outlined in the plan and to speed up the construction of fortified areas. In late May - early June, a call was made from 793, 5 to 805, 264 thousand conscripts for Large Training Camps (BTS), which made it possible to staff 21 divisions of border districts to full wartime staff, as well as significantly replenish other formations. In addition … everything was ready for formation with the outbreak of hostilities. (242nd, 243rd, 244th, 245th, 246th, 247th, 248th, 249th, 250th, 251st, 252nd, 254th, 256 th, 257 th, 259 th, 262 th, 265 th, 268 th, 272 th and 281 th) and 15 cavalry (25 th, 26 th, 28 th, 30 th, 33rd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 52nd, 53rd, 55th) divisions (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 2. Ibid.).
On May 1, Iraqi forces began a siege of the British Air Force base in Habbaniyah. On May 2, with a preventive attack, the British opened hostilities, defeating Iraqi positions in front of their airbase by May 6. On the same day, General Denz signed an agreement with Germany “on the transfer of military materials, including aircraft, from sealed warehouses in Syria and their delivery to Iraq. France has also agreed to allow the transit of German weapons and war materials, and has placed several air bases in northern Syria at Germany's disposal. … From May 9 to May 31, about 100 German and 20 Italian aircraft arrived at the Syrian airfields”(Iraqi operation. Ibid.). On May 13, supplies of military supplies from Syria began. "In response, Britain began bombing military facilities in Syria on May 14, 1941, demanded that the Free French start hostilities in Syria as soon as possible and provided its troops for this operation" (Syrian-Lebanese operation // https:// ru. wikipedia.org).
“On May 27, the British launched their attack on Baghdad. … Germany was unable to provide any significant assistance to its allies in Iraq, since its troops were already concentrating for an attack on the USSR. … On May 29, the German military mission left Iraq, On May 30, after a series of minor clashes with the Iraqi militia, the British entered Baghdad. Rashid Ali-Gailani and several of his close associates fled the country. On May 31, 1941, Iraq signed an armistice and the British occupied the most important strategic points (Iraqi operation. Ibid.). “The pro-British government has returned to power in Iraq. Next came the turn of the rebellious General Denz. From the second half of May, the British fleet tightly blocked the Syrian coast. The RAF disabled all airfields. General Denz was left to himself, and he had only one thing to do - to sell his life at a higher price”(A. Nemchinov, ibid.).
On May 10, 1941, Hitler's deputy for the leadership of the Nazi party, R. Hess, flew to England, but his attempt to negotiate with the pro-German forces was unsuccessful. On May 18, 1941, the most powerful battleship of Nazi Germany, the Bismarck, launched its first, and as it turned out last, campaign. On May 24, during a battle with a detachment of British ships, he destroyed the English battle cruiser Hood, but on May 27 he was sunk by English battleships. On May 19, 1941, the British in East Africa achieved the surrender of the 230 thousandth group of Italian troops. In two centers of resistance, separated from each other, only 80,000 Italian soldiers continued to resist.
During the airborne operation of the German army, which lasted from May 20 to June 1, 1941, the island of Crete was captured. Impressed by the significant losses, Hitler permanently excluded the parachute troops from his plans. On June 8, British troops and units of the Free French army entered Syria. “But unlike the fleeting Iraqi campaign, here the British were drawn into protracted and stubborn battles. Only on July 11 did the Syrian rebels surrender”(A. Nemchinov, ibid.). On June 15, 1941, Croatia joined the tripartite pact. On June 18, a treaty of friendship and non-aggression was signed between Germany and Turkey. On June 21, 1941, the British took Damascus.
In the meantime, the Red Army prepared to repulse the German aggression. On June 14, the Odessa Military District was allowed to allocate the management of the 9th Army. On June 15, 1941, the leadership of the border military districts received an order to withdraw the deep corps to the border from June 17. On June 18, the first echelons of covering armies began to move into the field defense areas on the state border, and on June 20, the withdrawal to the field command posts of the 9th Army, Northwestern and Southwestern Fronts began. On June 21, 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks decided to create the Southern Front as part of the 9th and 18th armies, Zhukov was entrusted with the leadership of the Southern and South-Western Fronts, Meretskov - the North-Western Front, and the 19th, 20th - I, the 21st and 22nd armies, concentrated in the reserve of the High Command, united into a group of reserve armies led by Budyonny. The headquarters of the group was located in Bryansk, and its formation ended by the end of June 25, 1941.
Scheme 2. The grouping of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army troops by June 22, 1941. Strategic deployment of the Red Army troops in the West. The image is clickable. Source: S. Lebedev. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 3. The collapse of the plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR // topwar.ru
During 1941, Stalin repeatedly and from various sources received information about Germany's readiness to attack the USSR. Regarding Chiang Kai-shek's warning, the General Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern G. Dimitrov on June 21, 1941 asked V. Molotov for instructions for the Communist Parties, to which V. Molotov replied: “The situation is unclear. A big game is being played (Bezymensky LA Hitler and Stalin before the fight. - M.: Veche, 2000 // https://militera.lib.ru/research/bezymensky3/27.html). In the evening of June 21, 1941, Stalin, after long doubts, agreed to declare full combat readiness in the border districts, and a directive was sent to the troops, which said that during June 22-23 a sudden attack by German troops on the fronts of these districts was possible, and an attack could start with provocative actions. The Soviet troops were tasked with being in full combat readiness, meeting a possible surprise attack from the enemy, but at the same time not succumbing to any provocations that could cause major complications. In the Baltic, operational readiness number 1 was announced at 23.37 pm The Black Sea Fleet announced an increase in readiness at 1.15 pm The transfer of Directive 1 to the districts was completed only at 00.30 minutes on June 22, 1941 and was not implemented everywhere.
Declaring full combat readiness on the night of June 22, the Soviet leadership believed that Germany would start the war with provocative actions and the Red Army had a couple more days for the final deployment and reliable cover of the state border. At the same time, Germany attacked the Soviet Union on the morning of June 22, 1941 with all its forces and means allocated for aggression, which was a complete surprise for the Soviet troops covering the state border. There were huge gaps in the border at the forefront of the invasion of the Wehrmacht strike forces. In spite of everything, the Soviet leadership greeted the beginning of the war with restraint, calmly and in a working order, starting the systematic implementation of a set of measures to transfer the country to a war footing.
On June 22, 1941, mobilization was announced, the next day, the Headquarters of the Main Command of the Armed Forces of the USSR was created. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted resolutions that determined the tasks of the party and Soviet bodies in wartime conditions, the fight against parachute assault forces and enemy saboteurs in the frontline zone, the protection of enterprises and institutions, and the creation of fighter battalions. To ensure the strictest order in the front-line zone and organize a merciless struggle against enemy sabotage groups, the institution of front-line and army chiefs of protection of the military rear was introduced. In addition, on June 25, 1941, a directive of the USSR NO was confirmed the need to create an army group RGK on the Zapadnaya Dvina-Dnepr line.
On June 22, 1941, Molotov addressed the Soviet people. According to him, the Soviet government gave the Red Army troops the order to repel the attack and expel the German troops from the territory of the USSR and expressed its unshakable confidence that the Soviet army, aviation and navy would deal a crushing blow to the aggressor. At the same time, in order to defeat the enemy, the people must provide all the needs of the Red Army, Navy and Aviation. Thus, "The Red Army and all our people will once again lead a victorious patriotic war for the Motherland, for honor, for freedom" (V. M. Molotov's speech on the radio on June 22, 1941 // https://ru.wikipedia.org). In his speech, in fact, Molotov outlined the main milestones of the main version of Sokolovsky's plan - to defeat the shock units of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR, and then develop a victorious offensive against Germany. Since the occupation was planned, there was no short-lived need for either the partisan movement or the party underground. Before the decisive blow of the Red Army against Germany, Stalin was to turn to the Soviet people, and the Headquarters of the High Command was deployed to the Headquarters of the Supreme Command.
In response to Churchill's proposed assistance, the Soviet government declared that "it would not want to accept British assistance without compensation and … in turn is ready … to provide assistance to England." On June 27, 1941, Molotov, in response to a request from British Ambassador Stafford Cripps, to clarify the scale and amount of assistance that the parties could provide to each other, "declared the desirability of a common political line towards Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan." On June 28, Secretary of Supply Beaverbrook stated that "if the Soviet Government raised the issue of closer military cooperation with the British Government, the British Government would gladly discuss what could be done." According to him, the British government is ready to take all possible measures to weaken the pressure of the Germans on the USSR. As a "personal proposal" Beaverbrook suggested that England could not only intensify the bombing of West Germany and Northern France, but also send part of its fleet to the Murmansk and Petsamo area for naval operations against the Germans and even make major raids on the northern French coast, up to the temporary seizure of ports such as Cherbourg or Le Havre (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 3. The collapse of the plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR // https://topwar.ru/38337-sovetskoe- strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-3-krah-plana-razgroma-vermahta-na-territorii-sssr.html).
Roosevelt was irritated by Churchill's unchanging desire "for this war to end like the others - by the expansion of the empire." His goal was to destroy Pax Britannica to the core and to establish a secure unipolar American world, Pax Americana, on its ruins. Since for this America it was necessary not only to destroy Nazi Germany, but also to weaken the Soviet Union as much as possible, a member of the Democratic Party, Senator from Missouri and future US President Harry Truman on June 23, 1941, in an interview with The New York Times, suggested helping the losing side: “If we see that Germany is winning, then we should help Russia, and if Russia is winning, then we should help Germany, and thus let them kill as much as possible, although I do not want to see Hitler in the victors under any circumstances. … None of them thinks to keep their promises”(Truman, Harry //
It should be noted that America's aid did not mean that the USSR was included in the orbit of a free democratic world. Even during the Great Patriotic War, the USSR for the United States still continued to be, if not a rogue state - a "rogue state", "a bully state" or a "scoundrel", then at least admitted to the democratic camp for a while, out of necessity, a totalitarian outsider … “For the United States, the principles and doctrines of the communist dictatorship [were - S. L.] are as intolerant and alien as the principles and doctrines of the Nazi dictatorship” and the fact that the Soviet Union fought with Germany did not mean “defending them, fighting for or agreement with the principles of international relations ", which the Americans adhere to (Reader on Contemporary History. In three volumes. Volume 2 // https://historic.ru/books/item/f00/s00/z0000022/st023.shtml). It is noteworthy in this regard, the opinion of Acting President, voiced at a press conference on June 23, 1941. US Secretary of State S. Welles: "Hitler's armies are today the main threat to the American continent." In full accordance with Roosevelt's doctrine, after the destruction of the Wehrmacht by the Red Army, the USSR immediately became the main danger for America.
Meanwhile, in the central sector of the Soviet-German front, the 3rd German Panzer Group, moving north of the Soviet 6th, 7th and 8th ATBRs, 6th, 11th and 17th MKs allocated for its destruction, " easily overcame the weak barrier of the 128th rifle division and rifle battalions of the 23rd, 126th and 188th Soviet rifle divisions that were just being advanced to the border on the border, scattered the 5th tank division near Alytus and freely rushed to Vilnius, and then further to Minsk ". In turn, the 2nd tank group, bypassing the Brest fortress with the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions of the 28th battalion caught by surprise, also rushed to Minsk, reached its southern outskirts on June 27 and established communication with the 3rd tank a group that broke into the city a day earlier. The remnants of the 3rd, 10th and parts of the 13th and 4th armies of the Western Front (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 3. Decree. Op.) Were encircled near Minsk and were defeated.
Scheme 3. Expected by the Soviet command and the real direction of the strike of the 3rd Panzer Group. Copied from: Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of World War II. Part 3. The collapse of the plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR // topwar.ru
"On July 3, 1941, at the Headquarters of the Main Command of the German Ground Forces, further plans for the occupation of the industrial regions of the USSR and the offensive of the Wehrmacht in the Middle East were discussed after the crossing of the Western Dvina and Dnieper" (Lebedev S. Military and political crisis of the Soviet Union of 1941 // http: / /regnum.ru/news/1545171.html), and Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces Halder stated in his diary: “In general, it can now be said that the task of defeating the main forces of the Russian ground army in front of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper has been completed. I believe that the statement of one captive corps commander that to the east of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper we can meet the resistance of only individual groups, which, taking into account their numbers, will not be able to seriously interfere with the advance of the German troops, is correct. Therefore, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the campaign against Russia was won within 14 days "(Halder F. Voenny diary, 1941-1942 / Translated from German by I. Glagoleva. - M.: AST; St. Petersburg: Terra Fantastica, 2003. - S. 76–77).
On June 26, 1941, in connection with the crisis situation on the Western Front, the 16th Reserve Army of the High Command in the South-Western direction received an order to transfer army formations to the Smolensk region. Soon after that, the 19 Army also received an order to redeploy to the Vitebsk direction. On June 29, 1941, due to the encirclement of the Western Front, the collapse of the main version of Sokolovsky's plan and the transition to its backup version, the SNK and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) sent a directive to the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions to mobilize all forces and means to defeat the fascist invaders. The directive determined the main program of action for organizing the resistance to fascist Germany, for transforming the country into a single military camp under the slogan “Everything for the front! Everything for victory ", by mobilizing all forces and resources to defeat the enemy."
The directive stated that the purpose of the Nazi attack was to destroy the Soviet system, seize Soviet lands and enslave the peoples of the Soviet Union. The homeland was in the greatest danger and the entire Soviet people must quickly and decisively reorganize all their work on a war footing. For this, it was ordered to defend every inch of Soviet land. Subordinate all your rear activities to the interests of the front. In the event of the forced withdrawal of the Red Army units, evacuate, and if it is impossible to destroy all valuables and property. In areas occupied by the enemy, create partisan detachments and sabotage groups to fight parts of the enemy army. To manage this activity in advance, under the responsibility of the first secretaries of the regional and district committees, create a reliable underground from the best people (Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks dated 1941-29-06 //
Meanwhile, in the Kremlin on the evening of June 29, they still did not have detailed information about the catastrophe of the Western Front. Alarmed by the lack of communication with the troops in Belarus, Stalin went to the People's Commissariat of Defense on the spot to deal with the situation at the outposts of Timoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin. At first, Stalin calmly tried to clarify the situation at the front near Zhukov for up to half an hour. However, then, not having achieved his goal, Stalin, dejected by the unsuccessful course of hostilities on the Western Front and the collapse of Sokolovsky's plan, exploded, shouted at Zhukov and brought him to tears. At the exit from the People's Commissariat, he said that "Lenin left us a great legacy, we - his heirs - pissed away all this …" and left for his nearest dacha. On the evening of June 30, members of the Politburo came to Stalin, announced their intention to create a State Defense Committee headed by Stalin and transfer to him all power in the country. Only after that did Stalin regain control over the country and its armed forces, on July 1, 1941, he returned to his working Kremlin office, and on July 3, 1941, he addressed the peoples of the USSR with the main provisions of the directive of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of June 29, 1941 …
According to Stalin, now the question has already arisen about the life and death of the Soviet state, about whether the peoples of the Soviet Union should be free or fall into enslavement. And now the entire Soviet people must rise up to defend the Motherland together with the Red Army. It is necessary to immediately reorganize all work on a war footing, subordinating everything to the interests of the front and the tasks of organizing the defeat of the enemy. The Red Army and all citizens of the Soviet Union must defend every inch of Soviet land, fight to the last drop of blood for Soviet cities and villages. In case of the forced withdrawal of the Red Army units, do not leave any valuables or property to the enemy. In the areas occupied by the enemy, create partisan detachments. Thus, Stalin's attempt, together with Britain, to defeat Germany during 1941 ended in failure. The heavy burden of the exterminator of the Nazi hordes fell to the share of the USSR. Having failed his own plans, Stalin was destined to realize the plans of the United States of America: "Our war for the freedom of our Fatherland will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and America for their independence, for democratic freedoms" (JV Stalin's speech on the radio on July 3, 1941 / /
The Soviet government and the Red Army immediately began to implement the fallback version of Sokolovsky's plan. Soviet troops left the Lvov ledge, which had suddenly become unnecessary, and the organization of long-term resistance to the enemy in the territory occupied by him began in the country. I. V. Stalin was appointed People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, … Partisan movement and sabotage were organized on the territory occupied by the enemy. The formation of divisions of the people's militia began (Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 4. The collapse of the "Barbarossa", "Cantokuen" plan and Directive No. 32 // https://topwar.ru/38570-sovetskoe-strategicheskoe-planirovanie-nakanune-velikoy-otechestvennoy-voyny-chast-4-krah-plana- barbarossa-kantokuen-i-direktivy-32.html).
On July 14, 1941, in full accordance with the May 1941 proposal of G. K. Zhukov on the construction of new fortified areas on the rear line Ostashkov - Pochep, "together with the troops of the 24th and 28th armies, nominated here a little earlier," the newly created 29th, 30th, 31st and 32nd armies were united “To the front of the reserve armies with the task of occupying the line of Staraya Russa, Ostashkov, Bely, Istomino, Yelnya, Bryansk and preparing for a stubborn defense. Here, to the east of the main defensive line, which ran along the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers and had already been broken by the enemy, a second line of defense was created. On July 18, the Stavka decided to deploy another front on the distant approaches to Moscow - the Mozhaisk line of defense - with the inclusion of the 32nd, 33rd and 34th armies in it "(Afanasyev N. M., Glazunov N. K., Kazansky P. A.., Fironov NA By the roads of trials and victories. The combat path of the 31st army. - M.: Voenizdat, 1986. - P. 5).
Diagram 4. Defensive line Ostashkov - Pochep. Lopukhovsky L. Vyazemskaya catastrophe of 1941. - M.: Yauza, Eksmo, 2007. Scheme 11 // www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1002602/29/Lopuhovskiy_Lev_-_1941._Vyazemskaya_katastrofa.html
“On July 12, 1941, the Soviet-British agreement“On joint actions in the war against Germany”was signed. The agreement obliged the parties to provide each other with all kinds of assistance and support in the war against Nazi Germany, and also not to negotiate and not conclude an armistice or peace treaty, except with mutual consent. … Despite the fact that the agreement was of a general nature and did not indicate specific mutual obligations, it testified to the interest of the parties in the establishment and development of allied relations. " As before, Stalin again wanted to link the security of India from the German invasion from Iran with the opening of a second front in Europe and on July 18, 1941, offering British assistance in ensuring the security of India, called on the British government to create a front against Hitler in the West in Northern France and in the North in the Arctic "(Lebedev S. Soviet strategic planning on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Part 4. Ibid).
However, in the new force majeure circumstances, he had to come to terms with the fact that the entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran was linked by Britain with the military-technical assistance of the USSR. On July 26, 1941, the British War Cabinet unanimously decided to send 200 Tomahawk fighters to Russia as soon as possible. On August 25, 1941, Soviet and British troops entered Iran, on August 31, 1941, the first British cargoes arrived in Arkhangelsk with the Dervish escort (7 transports and 6 escort ships), and on September 8, 1941, an agreement was signed that determined the location of the Soviet and British on the territory of Iran. As a result of the conclusion of an alliance treaty against Germany between the Soviet Union and England, Stalin had to wait a year - until May 1942, and the opening of a second front in Northern France for three years - until May 1944.
A backup version of Sokolovsky's plan thwarted the Barbarossa plan, prevented Japan from entering the war on the side of Germany, and prevented the complete defeat of the Red Army and the catastrophe of the USSR in 1941. Despite this, he, along with the reasons for the failure of the main version of Sokolovsky's plan, was consigned to oblivion and forgotten. Stalin placed all the blame for the failure of his pre-war plans on the command of the Western Front. The reprisal was quick and extremely severe. “On June 30, the front commander, General of the Army, Hero of the Soviet Union D. G. Pavlov was removed from command and arrested on July 4. After a short investigation, Pavlov was sentenced to death. Together with him were shot on July 22: the front chief of staff, Major General V. E. Klimovskikh and the chief of communications of the front, Major General A. T. Grigoriev. Front artillery chief Lieutenant-General N. A. The cry and the commander of the 14th mechanized corps, Major General S. I. Oborin was arrested on July 8 and then shot; the commander of the 4th Army, Major General A. A. Korobkov was removed on July 8, the next day he was arrested and shot on July 22”(Western Front (Great Patriotic War) //
Thus, in February 1941, a change of milestones took place in the General Staff of the Red Army. Firstly, the parallel development of Vatutin's plan to defeat Germany as a result of a preemptive strike and Sokolovsky to create a giant trap for the Wehrmacht strike groups on the territory of the USSR began. Secondly, the new chief of the General Staff Zhukov, having misjudged the direction and depth of the intended attack by the Wehrmacht on the troops of the Western Front, doomed both plans to guaranteed failure. At the same time, Churchill decided to give up the expulsion of the Italians from North Africa to involve the USSR in the war with Germany and defeat the Nazis together with the Red Army.
In March, Hitler invaded the Soviet sphere of influence in Bulgaria. Churchill immediately brought British troops into Greece for joint action with the Red Army, while Stalin decided to attack Germany on June 12, 1941 and encircle the main Wehrmacht in the East with a blow from the Lvov salient towards the Baltic. For the safety of British possessions in the East, England and the USSR began to work out a plan for the introduction of troops into Iran, and to increase their influence on Germany, they made a coup in Yugoslavia and overthrew the pro-German government.
In response, the Germans overthrew the pro-British government in Iraq and, defeating Yugoslavia with Greece, expelled the British from the continent. Churchill undertook to restore order in Iraq, Syria and East Africa, while Stalin, abandoning a preemptive strike, began to establish relations with Hitler, and in case of his aggression, he accepted Sokolovsky's plan and began to deploy the Army Group of the Reserve of the High Command on the border of the Western rivers. Dvina - Dnipro. After the German attack on the USSR on June 22, 1941, Molotov, in his address to the Soviet people, announced the imminent return of the occupied territory of the USSR, the defeat of the Wehrmacht and the liberation of Europe from the Nazis, and later suggested that the British open a second front in Europe in exchange for the joint introduction of Soviet and British troops to Iran.
Meanwhile, the main version of Sokolovsky's plan, as a result of an incorrect assessment of the direction and depth of the proposed attack by the Wehrmacht on the Western Front, the encirclement and defeat of its troops, was failed. After that, immediately began the implementation of his fallback. Having turned to the Soviet people, Stalin has already announced a long confrontation with Hitler's Germany, called to fight to the death for every inch of Soviet land, to deploy a partisan movement and sabotage in the occupied territory. The Western Front was recreated from the units of the Second Strategic Echelon, and the Ostashkov - Pochep defensive line was created from the Third in the Moscow direction. Sokolovsky's plan, despite its role and significance, was consigned to oblivion and forgotten.
