In an ugly atmosphere of political instability in the Russian capital and on the outskirts, rallies at the front itself, the Provisional Government's distrust of the generals, the Headquarters and the headquarters of the fronts developed plans for a summer offensive. True, the generals did not know whether it would be possible to withdraw the soldiers from the trenches, whether the troops, who had tasted various "freedoms and rights", would agree to die.
The troops held a meeting, agreeing to the opinions of almost every speaker and immediately forgetting about it, listening to the next one, who could say completely opposite things. In the same division, all too often one regiment issued a decree to attack, while the other agreed only to defend, in the third, nothing was decided, they stuck bayonets into the ground and went home on their own, "where the Germans could not reach" and where it was necessary to take participation in the redistribution of land. At the same time, mass desertion could occur immediately after the "unanimous and triumphant" decision to fight to the bitter end. As a result, the entire army resembled a madhouse. And in these conditions, the Provisional Government, dependent on the West, and the allies demanded that the Headquarters attack.
The main job of persuading the troops fell on the committees headed by the former terrorist Savinkov, on the "popular" generals and Kerensky. Kerensky visited the Southwestern Front and traveled around the corps intended for the attack. These days he received the half-joking, half-contemptuous nickname of "the chief persuader." Kerensky, who at one fell swoop at the behest of the Masonic "backstage" soared to the very heights of power, clearly admired himself, believed in his "magical influence" and "indescribable popularity" among the people and troops, in his "military leadership".
The main idea of the offensive, which was postponed from the spring of 1917 to the summer, was adopted even before the February Revolution under Alekseev. The main blow was to be delivered by the armies of the Southwestern Front under the command of General A. E. Gutor with the forces of the 11th and 7th armies in the direction of Lvov, and the 8th army towards Kalush. The rest of the Russian fronts - the Northern, Western and Romanian - were to deliver auxiliary strikes in order to distract the enemy and support the armies of the Southwestern Front.
Kerensky at the front
Offensive
On June 16 (29), 1917, the artillery of the Southwestern Front opened fire on the positions of the Austro-German troops. In fact, the Russian command was left with one strong argument - numerous artillery. 3 thousand guns destroyed enemy positions, involuntarily raising the morale of the Russian troops. For a greater uplift of spirits, General Gutor ordered to extend the artillery preparation for another two days. On June 18 (July 1), the 11th and 7th armies went over to the offensive, which attacked Lvov: the first, bypassing from the north - to Zborov - Zlochev, the second from the front - to Brzezany. The 8th Army was supposed to conduct an auxiliary offensive against Galich in the Dniester valley and monitor the Carpathian direction.
The first two days brought some success to the advancing troops. The Austro-German troops were shocked by the powerful artillery barrage. In addition, the enemy did not expect that the Russians were still capable of organizing such a serious offensive operation. In some areas, 2-3 lines of enemy trenches were captured. The 9th Austro-Hungarian Corps at Zborov, which held the defensive in front of the troops of the 11th Army of General Erdeli, was defeated and withdrawn to the reserve, it was replaced by the 51st German Corps. Finnish riflemen and Czechoslovak units especially distinguished themselves in the Battle of Zborov. The Finnish riflemen captured the heavily fortified Mount Mogila, which was considered impregnable. And the blow of the Czechoslovakians shocked the Austro-Hungarian troops, which consisted of Czechs in large part.
In a telegram from AF Kerensky to the Provisional Government on June 18 (July 1), 1917, Kerensky proclaimed: "Today is a great triumph of the revolution, the Russian revolutionary army has gone on the offensive with great enthusiasm." However, the success was brief. There was nothing to develop the first successes - there were no cavalry in the direction of the attacks, and the overwhelming part of the infantry decomposed. Selective shock units that began the offensive were largely knocked out by this time. The Austro-German command quickly recovered and took measures to eliminate the breakthrough. Instead of supporting the bleeding parts, the reserves held meetings and passed resolutions on "no confidence" in the capitalist government and "a world without annexations and indemnities." The 11th Army's offensive stopped, it continued only an artillery battle. On June 22 (July 5), the troops of the 11th Army tried to attack again, but without noticeable success. The enemy has already taken measures to strengthen the defense.
A similar situation was on the line of the 7th Army of General Belkovich. The shock group of the army (four corps) moved with great impulse and occupied 2-3 fortified enemy lines. The center of Botmer's southern German army was pushed aside at the Battle of Brzezan. However, already on the night of 19 and in the afternoon of 19 (July 2), the fierce counterattacks of the German-Turkish troops in general nullified our success. Terrain conditions did not allow providing full-fledged artillery support. And our infantry had already lost its former fighting qualities: the first impulse faded away, the troops quickly froze, went over to the defensive, but they did not show their former stamina. Of the 20 infantry divisions of the 7th Army: 8 divisions attacked, 2 - held the defense in a passive sector, and 10 - held a meeting in the rear. It was not for nothing that Ludendorff noted: "These were no longer the former Russians."
The front commander, General Gutor, still hoped to strengthen the armies and resume the offensive. He reinforced the 11th army with two corps from Volhynia and the Romanian front, and the 7th army with a guard. The auxiliary offensive of Kornilov's 8th Army should facilitate the main operation. The commanders of the armies and corps expressed fear: they saw that in the failed offensive, only those who still retained their fighting spirit went on the offensive and the best of them died. That a huge exhausted army is at any moment ready to break out of obedience and no one can stop the mass of soldiers. But Kerensky did not see this. He believed that the army was close to a serious victory, which would strengthen the prestige of the Provisional Government in the country and abroad.
On June 23 (July 6), 1917, Kornilov's army attacked the 3rd Austro-Hungarian army of Terstiansky in the Bystritsa valley. On the first two days of the offensive, 16th Corps diverted the enemy's attention to the south. On June 25 (July 8), under the thunder of 300 guns, the 12th corps of General Cheremisov went on the attack. The front of the Austrian army was broken through at Yamnitsa. The 26th Austro-Hungarian Corps was completely defeated (its remnants were disbanded and poured into the 40th German Reserve Corps). During the day, the enemy lost more than 7 thousand people and 48 guns only as prisoners. The entire Bystritsa valley was in our hands. On June 26 (July 9), our troops repelled enemy counterattacks. The approaching German reinforcements and the 13th corps were thrown back. The German southern army hastily bent its right flank, which was exposed after the destruction of the 26th corps. In these battles, the regiments of the 11th and 19th divisions and the new Kornilov shock regiment distinguished themselves.
On June 27-28 (July 10-11), our troops continued to push forward. Affected by the fact that the 8th Army inherited the Brusilov and Kaledin traditions. Kornilov continued them, he was loved and respected by both officers and soldiers. The shock wedge of the 12th corps broke through to Lomnitsa, on the right flank of the army, the Zaamurians took Galich with a quick blow. At the same time, units of the 1st and 4th Zaamur divisions took 2 thousand prisoners and 26 guns. The 164th division was able to suddenly attack the Germans and took Kalush, the Germans fled. In this dashing assault on Kalush, our troops took 1,000 prisoners and 13 guns. The commander of the 3rd Austrian army, Terstiansky, was dismissed, and the commander-in-chief of the Austro-German front, Leopold of Bavaria, sent Litzman to Lomnitsa, who had already saved the Austro-Hungarian troops a year ago. For the next two days, Kornilov equalized the front, pulled up the lagging troops. The lack of large masses of cavalry in the right place, the constant problem of our army in this war did not allow us to develop a breakthrough. In addition, Lomnica was heavily flooded, interfering with the advance of the troops, the enemy destroyed the crossings.
Commander-in-Chief Gutor planned to resume the offensive on June 30 (July 13). The 11th Army was supposed to attack Zlochev, the 7th - to pin down the enemy forces frontally, the 8th Army - to attack Rogatin and Zhidachev. With two-sided coverage of the 11th and 8th armies, it was planned to clamp the South German army in pincers. In the coming days, at the direction of the Headquarters, the Western, Northern and Romanian fronts were supposed to launch an offensive. However, happy with the "democracy", the troops of the Western, Northern and Romanian fronts again accepted to hold meetings, vote, did not want to attack, and the operation was postponed for several days. On the Southwestern Front, because of the rallies of the soldier masses, the offensive was also postponed from day to day and waited until the enemy pulled up reserves and launched a counteroffensive.
Kornilov in front of the troops
German counteroffensive
The Austro-German command did not wait for the Russians to finish the rallies and prepared their counterstrike. Berlin knew that the French army was not planning serious operations on the Western Front. Even on the eve of the Russian offensive, 7 selected Guards divisions of the 3rd and 10th corps were sent from France to the Russian front. The administrations of these corps remained in France, and the troops became part of the 23rd reserve, 51st and Beskydy corps of the Zlochevsky detachment. These troops arrived in Galicia after the Russian offensive of the 11th and 7th armies collapsed. Two divisions were sent to rescue the 3rd Austrian army at Lomnica, and the rest went to Zborov, forming the Zlochevsky detachment of General Winkler on the right flank of the 2nd Austro-Hungarian army. The Austrians reinforced their troops with divisions from the Italian front. The commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front, Prince Leopold of Bavaria, ordered the Zlochevsky detachment to launch a counteroffensive in the general direction of Tarnopol in order to regain the lost positions. For this, the Zlochevsky detachment was brought up to 12 divisions (11 of them German) and aimed at the left flank of the Russian 11th Army.
The regrouping of our troops had not yet been completed, when at dawn on July 6 (19), the Austro-German troops launched a swift counteroffensive, prepared by a short but crushing blow of 600 guns and 180 mortars. The Ash was hit by the 25th hull, which did not show even the minimum stamina. The decomposed 6th Grenadier Division mutinied and the whole corps fled. From the Grenadier Division, which lost its rank, it was possible to collect about 200 people. The corps left the enemy about 3 thousand prisoners and 10 guns. The Germans were overwhelmed by this success. They attacked the neighboring 5th Siberian Corps, but the 6th Siberian Division repelled the attack. The Germans did not touch the Siberians anymore and transferred the blow to the south.
The flight of the 25th Army Corps led to a general collapse. His retreat led to the retreat of the 17th corps. General Erdeli tried to counterattack with the 49th Corps, but he was thrown back and these troops were drawn into the general whirlpool of retreat. The 1st Guards and 5th Army Corps retreated after them. The 11th Army was falling apart and spontaneously rolled back. The right flank of the 7th Army, exposed by the flight of the 11th Army, was under attack, and General Belkovich began to withdraw it beyond the Zolotaya Lipa. Desertion has reached unimaginable proportions. So, one shock battalion, sent to the rear of the 11th Army as a detachment, in the area of the town of Volochisk, detained 12 thousand deserters in one night.
The commissars of the 11th Army in their telegram to the command described the situation as follows: “In the mood of the units recently moved forward by the heroic efforts of the minority, a sharp and disastrous turning point was defined. The offensive breakthrough was quickly exhausted. Most of the parts are in a state of increasing decay. There is no longer any talk of power and obedience, persuasions and convictions have lost their strength - they are responded with threats, and sometimes with executions … Some units leave their positions without permission, without even waiting for the enemy's approach. For hundreds of miles to the rear, there are lines of fugitives with and without guns - healthy, vigorous, feeling completely unpunished. Sometimes whole parts leave like that …”.
On July 8 (21), it was already a disaster for the entire Southwestern Front. On the same day, General Gutor was removed from command. Brusilov appointed Kornilov commander-in-chief of the front. "On the fields that cannot be called battlefields, there is sheer horror, shame and disgrace, which the Russian army did not know from the very beginning of its existence" - this is how Kornilov described the position of his front. He ordered the 11th and 7th Armies to withdraw beyond Seret. At the same time, the 8th Army had to be pulled back, and only occupied Galich and Kalush were given up without a fight.
The Zlochevsky detachment of the enemy, moving almost without encountering resistance, turned from the east direction almost at a right angle to the south. The rear of the 7th Russian army was hit. General Winkler, crushing the 11th Army, attacked the 7th Army in the flank and rear. Fortunately, the Germans had no cavalry. The Bavarian Cavalry Division was previously sent under Galich to contain Kornilov's 8th Army. Otherwise, the situation for the Russian rear services would have become simply terrible. The entire group of Böhm-Ermoli troops (the 2nd Austro-Hungarian Army, the South German Army and the 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army) went on the offensive. The South German army pressed on the 7th Russian army from the front. The 3rd Austro-Hungarian Army carefully followed the 8th Army, not daring to attack it. The Austro-German command, not yet realizing the size of the catastrophe that had befallen the enemy, ordered the troops not to bury further than Tarnopol and the Seret line.
On July 9 (22), the 11th and 7th armies reached Seret, but could not hold out on this line. In the 11th Army, the 45th Corps, which came to the aid on its left flank, began to hold a meeting and also ran. In the 7th Army, the 22nd Corps voluntarily left the front. The right flank of the 8th Army - the 3rd Caucasian Corps - was exposed and began to withdraw. The new commander of the 8th Army, General Cheremisov, ordered the troops to retreat to Stanislavov. Meanwhile, Kornilov tried to save the situation from complete collapse with tough and energetic measures. The "death squads" from the collapsed front line, where they simply drowned in the mass of alarmists, protesters and deserters, were taken to the rear, where they began to play the role of detachments. The fleeing units were detained, the deserters were caught, the rioters were shot on the spot. The general and panicky flight of 10-11 (23-24) July began to transform into a retreat, albeit hasty and disorderly. From the Northern Front to Bukovina, the control of the 1st Army of Vannovsky was transferred. The new 1st Army received the 8th Army's left-flank corps. General Erdeli received the Special Army, and the former commander of the Special Army, General Baluev, led the 11th Army.
On July 10 (23), the 11th Army was at Stryp. During the four days of the military catastrophe caused by the consequences of the "democratic" February revolution, our troops gave up everything that was obtained by the immeasurable valor and blood of hundreds of thousands of Russian soldiers during the four months of brutal battles of the Brusilov breakthrough in 1916. Winkler's detachment attacked Tarnopol, but was driven back by the Russian guard. The Russian guard defeated the Prussian one again. Against the background of the general collapse, the regiments of the 1st and 2nd Guards Divisions fought valiantly. On July 11 (24), there were stubborn battles for Tarnopol. Having shot down the 7th Army, the South German Army went out to the messages of the 8th Army, threatening it with encirclement. The 8th Army had to leave Stanislavov. On July 12 (25), the Germans shot down the 5th Army Corps, and the guards, which went out to the flank, left Tarnopol. The 7th Army surrendered Buchach and Monasterzhiska. The Strypa line was lost. On the same day, the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army launched an offensive, the Russian 1st Army, putting up resistance, slowly began to withdraw in connection with the general retreat of the Southwestern Front.
On the evening of July 12 (25), Kornilov signed an order for a general retreat to the state border. Chervonnaya Rus and Bukovina yielded to the enemy. On July 13-14 (26-27), our troops finally left Galicia, on the 15th our troops retreated beyond the Zbruch. As a result, the Russian troops stopped on the Brody-Zbarazh line, r. Zbruch. By energetic and decisive measures, Kornilov established relative order in the rear and enabled the commanders to restore order in the troops.
Intoxicated by his successes, Count Botmer decided to force the Zbruch and invade Podolia. On July 16 (29), the South German army attacked along the entire front and, unexpectedly for themselves, the Germans and Austrians received a tough rebuff. On July 17 (30), the Austro-German troops again tried to attack, but met with resistance from the 7th and 8th armies. The next day, the Southern Army again attacked along the entire front, but achieved only local successes. The Austro-German and Turkish troops were exhausted. Kornilov ordered a general counteroffensive. This was his last order as commander-in-chief of the front. On July 19, he was appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief and surrendered the front to General Baluev. On July 19 (August 1), Russian troops overthrew the German Beskid corps and the 25th Austro-Hungarian. Gusyatin was repulsed, the enemy was thrown back beyond Zbruch. The eight-day battle on Zbruch ended with the victory of Russian arms, but it remained in the shadow of a general defeat and the collapse of the country and the army.
Outcomes
Kerensky's "offensive", caused by pressure from the allies and the Provisional Government, which wanted to raise its prestige within the country and among the Entente powers, completely failed. The warnings of the generals, who pointed out that the decomposed troops, unwilling to fight for the "bourgeois and capitalists" any longer, were at best only capable of defending themselves, were not heard. In the early days, the Russian troops, using the accumulated artillery arsenal, the weakening of the Austro-German troops on the Eastern Front, achieved some success, especially the 8th Army of Kornilov. But soon the most combat-ready units, including the "death battalions", were drained of blood, there was no cavalry to develop a breakthrough, the infantry did not want to attack, the soldiers deserted en masse, held meetings, left positions even without enemy pressure. As a result, when the enemy command deployed reserves and organized a counterattack, the front of the advancing armies simply collapsed. The Germans more often than not simply walked forward without encountering resistance. Those units that were still fighting back simply could not resist, as their neighbors fled. Thus, the front rolled back to the state border, all the fruits of the heavy, bloody battles of previous campaigns were lost. Kornilov, appointed by the front commander, brought relative order with great difficulty and stopped the enemy's counteroffensive.
The Western and Northern Fronts, which were to deliver the auxiliary strikes, found themselves in a similar situation. The troops simply did not want to fight. The northern front "advanced" on July 8-10 (21-23), but the attack failed. The front headquarters reported to Headquarters: “Only two divisions out of six were capable of the operation … The 36th division, which had taken two enemy trench lines and was marching on the third, turned back under the influence of shouts from behind; The 182nd Division was driven to bridgeheads by force of arms; when the enemy opened artillery fire on divisional units, they opened indiscriminate fire on their own. From the 120th division, only one battalion went into the attack. "Only the Revel Death Shock Battalion fought bravely. But the shock sailors were poorly trained and suffered terrible casualties.
The offensive of the Western Front was carried out by the forces of the 10th Army. The commander-in-chief of the front Denikin knew that the troops would not fight. He came up with the only trick, leaked information about the offensive to the newspapers so that the enemy would not withdraw troops from his front to the direction of the main attack. For three days, an artillery barrage was carried out at the front, which in places completely destroyed the enemy's defense line, in places completely demoralized him. However, of the 14 divisions intended for the offensive, only 7 went into the attack, of which 4 were combat-ready. As a result, the Russian troops who did not want to fight returned to their positions by the end of the day. At a meeting at Headquarters on July 16 (29), the commander-in-chief of the Western Front, General Denikin, reported: “The units moved to the attack, marched two or three enemy trench lines in a ceremonial march and … returned to their trenches. The operation was thwarted. I had 184 battalions and 900 guns in the 19-verst sector; the enemy had 17 battalions in the first line and 12 in reserve with 300 guns. 138 battalions were brought into battle against 17, and 900 guns against 300”. Thus, our troops had a huge numerical advantage, but could not use it, since they were completely decomposed.
The June offensive noticeably heated up the situation among the revolutionary units of the Petrograd garrison, who did not want to go to the front. Anarchists and Bolsheviks were gaining popularity among them. 3-5 (16-18) July, there were performances by soldiers of the 1st Machine-Gun Regiment, workers of Petrograd factories, Kronstadt sailors under the slogan of the immediate resignation of the Provisional Government and the transfer of power to the Soviets. The unrest took place with the direct participation of the anarchists and part of the Bolsheviks. This led to a tightening of the policy of the Provisional Government. Kerensky replaced Lvov as head of government, retaining the portfolio of the minister of war and naval. Kornilov was appointed supreme commander. Petrograd and the Petrograd garrison calmed down the 45th Infantry and 14th Cavalry Divisions that arrived from the front (this shows that Tsar Nicholas had a chance of military liquidation of the February-March coup). The Bolshevik Party was accused of espionage and sabotage in favor of Germany. Trotsky, Krylenko and some other activists were arrested (though they were quickly released). Lenin and Zinoviev fled from Petrograd and went into an illegal position. True, no convincing evidence of Lenin's espionage activities was ever presented.
Meeting of the troops of the Petrograd garrison
