“Everything for the front! Everything for victory!”, The slogan of the Communist Party, formulated in the Directive of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of June 29, 1941 … and proclaimed on July 3, 1941 on the radio in a speech by the Chairman of the State Defense Committee I. V. Stalin. Expressed the essence of the program that was developed by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet government to transform the country into a single military camp.
Great Patriotic War 1941 - 1945. Encyclopedia
According to the memoirs of A. I. Mikoyan on June 30, 1941, I. V. Stalin in the party - Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Molotov, Malenkov, Voroshilov and Beria, without any of his participation decided to create the State Defense Committee (GKO), give him full power in the country, transfer to him the functions of the Government, the Supreme Soviet and the Central Committee of the party. Considering that “there is so much power in the name of Stalin in the consciousness, feelings and faith of the people” that this would facilitate their mobilization and leadership of all military actions, they agreed to put the former all this time at their nearest dacha I. V. Stalin at the head of the State Defense Committee. And only after all this I. V. Stalin returned to running the country and its armed forces again. The Soviet Union with all its full might was involved in the war with Germany. But only not for the sake of defeating the Nazis in Germany, but to prevent their further breakthrough deep into the Soviet Union.
July 1 K. A. Umansky "again met with Welles and gave him an application for the necessary military supplies from the United States, consisting of 8 points and including fighters, bombers, anti-aircraft guns, as well as some equipment for aircraft and other factories." In Moscow, V. Molotov told the head of the British mission, MacFarlane, that "the present moment is the most suitable" for intensifying the activity of British aviation in West Germany, in the occupied territory of France and for the landing of troops in the cities mentioned by Beaverbrook. "If, said Molotov, General MacFarlane cannot consider this issue, then it may be advisable to refer it to England, to the military cabinet."
"One of the important acts of the Soviet government, which to a certain extent gave direction to changes in the state apparatus, was the decree of July 1, 1941" On the expansion of the rights of People's Commissars of the USSR in wartime. " Under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Committee for Food and Clothing Supply of the Soviet Army and the main directorates for supplying the branches of the national economy with coal, oil, and timber were formed. In the process of reorganization of the state apparatus, there was a sharp reduction in the staff of the people's commissariats, institutions and management levels. Specialists from institutions were sent to factories and factories, to production. The work of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the system of planning and supplying the economy were reorganized. Departments of weapons, ammunition, shipbuilding, aircraft building and tank building were created in the State Planning Committee. Based on the assignments of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Defense Committee, they developed plans for the release of military equipment, weapons, ammunition by enterprises regardless of their departmental subordination, monitored the state of material and technical support, and controlled the state of material and technical support of military production."
On June 30, 1941, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) approved the national economic mobilization plan for the III quarter of 1941 developed by the State Planning Committee of the USSR on the basis of the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR dated June 23, 1941 - “the first planning document aimed at transferring the national economy of the USSR on a war footing ". As we remember on June 24, 1941, in case of failure of the main version of V. D. Sokolovsky, decisions were made to create a tank industry in the Volga region and the Urals, as well as an evacuation council. With the beginning of the implementation of the backup version of the plan, V. D. Sokolovsky, these decisions began to be implemented. On July 1, the State Defense Committee decided to transfer the Krasnoye Sormovo plant to the production of T-34 tanks, and the Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant to the production of the KV-1. "Thus, an integrated base of the tank building industry was created." “On July 4, the State Defense Committee instructed the commission headed by the Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee N. A. Voznesensky "to develop a military-economic plan for ensuring the country's defense, bearing in mind the use of resources and enterprises existing on the Volga, Western Siberia and the Urals, as well as resources and enterprises exported to these areas in the order of evacuation." On July 16, 1941, the State Defense Committee reassigned the evacuation council to itself.
July 3, 1941 I. V. Stalin personally appealed to the peoples of the USSR, but no longer with an appeal to beat the enemy both on Soviet and on his own territory, but with an appeal to unite in a protracted struggle with the enemy and beat him wherever he appears. Soviet troops left the Lvov ledge, which had suddenly become unnecessary, and the country began organizing long-term resistance to the enemy in the territory occupied by him. I. V. Stalin was appointed People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, the Headquarters of the High Command was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, intermediate strategic leadership bodies were created - the main commands of the troops of the North-West, West and South-West directions. On July 16, 1941, the State Defense Committee issued an order to shoot the former commander of the Western Front, General of the Army Pavlov, the former chief of staff of the Western Front, Major General Klimovskikh, the former chief of communications of the Western Front, Major General Grigoriev, and the former commander of the 4th Army of the Western Front, Major General. Korobkov.
In early July 1941, the Soviet leadership met the proposals to allow "Poles, Czechs and Yugoslavs to create national committees in the USSR and form national units for a joint fight with the USSR against German fascism … and … the restoration of the nation states of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia." In particular, "on July 5 in London, with the mediation of England, negotiations began between" the Soviet and Polish governments in exile. “On July 30, after many bitter disputes, an agreement was reached between the Polish and Russian governments. Diplomatic relations were restored, and a Polish army was to be created on Russian territory, subordinate to the Soviet High Command. Borders were not mentioned, except for the general statement that the 1939 Soviet-German treaties regarding territorial changes in Poland were "no longer valid" (W. Churchill, World War II).
The restoration of the defense line by the Red Army in the Western direction predetermined the collapse of the Barbarossa plan (part 3, diagram 2). “By July 1 (that is, in the first 8 days of the war), as a result of the hard work of the party and state bodies, 5, 3 million people were called up” (PT Kunitskiy. Restoring the broken strategic defense front in 1941). July 14, 1941, in full accordance with the May 1941 proposal of G. K. Zhukov on the construction of new fortified areas on the rear line Ostashkov - Pochep (part 2, scheme 2), "together with the troops of the 24th and 28th armies, nominated here a little earlier", the newly created 29th, 30th, 31st I and the 32nd armies united “in the front of the reserve armies with the task of occupying the line of Staraya Russa, Ostashkov, Bely, Istomino, Yelnya, Bryansk and preparing for a stubborn defense. Here, to the east of the main defensive line, which ran along the Western Dvina and Dnieper rivers and had already been broken by the enemy, a second line of defense was created. On July 18, the Stavka decided to deploy another front on the distant approaches to Moscow - the Mozhaisk line of defense - with the inclusion of the 32nd, 33rd and 34th armies "(By the roads of trials and victories. Combat path of the 31st army).
On the territory occupied by the enemy, a partisan movement and sabotage were organized. The formation of divisions of the people's militia began. “On June 27, the Leninsky City Party Committee [g. Leningrad - approx. author] appealed to the High Command of the Red Army with a request to allow the formation of seven volunteer divisions from the workers of the city. This permission was obtained. On this basis, on June 30, all regions of Leningrad began to form divisions, which soon became known as militia divisions."
“At a meeting of the secretaries of the Moscow regional, city and district party committees of the capital, convened by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in the Kremlin on the night of July 1–2, party organizations were asked to lead the creation of volunteer divisions of the Moscow people's militia. On July 3, 1941, the decree on the creation of the people's militia was adopted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Moldova, on July 6 - by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, on July 7 - by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Council of People's Commissars and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. On the same days, the corresponding decisions were made by the regional, regional, city and district committees of the party of the Russian Federation."
“On June 29, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) sent a directive to the leaders of the party and Soviet organizations of the front-line regions, in which, along with the general tasks of the Soviet people in the struggle against the Nazi invaders, they determined the tasks and responsibilities of local party, Soviet, trade union and Komsomol organizations in the deployment of a nationwide partisan struggle in the rear of the German fascist army. … On June 30, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine formed an operational group for the deployment of partisan warfare ", and the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus adopted and sent out to the localities directive No. 1" on the transition to underground work of party organizations in areas occupied by the enemy."
On July 1, 1941, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus approved directive No. 2 on the deployment of partisan warfare behind enemy lines, on July 4, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of the Karelo-Finnish SSR issued a decision similar to Directive No. 1 of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus, and 5-6 July, the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine "made a special decision to create armed detachments and organizations of the party underground in areas threatened by fascist occupation." On July 18, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) introduced a special decision "on organizing the struggle in the rear of the German troops", which supplemented and concretized the directive of June 29. In it, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) demanded from the central committees of the communist parties of the union republics, from the regional and district committees of the party, to improve the leadership of the struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines, to give it "the broadest scope and combat activity."
“In July 1941, the Military Council of the North-Western Front adopted a resolution on the creation of a department under the political administration, which was entrusted with the work of organizing partisan detachments and directing their combat activities. He received the name of the 10th department of the political administration - by the date of the adoption of the resolution. … subsequently, by decision of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), such departments were created throughout the army in the field. " The head of the 10th department of the political administration of the North-Western Front A. N. Asmolov was given the task: “to help accelerate the creation of partisan forces in the front zone, to engage in the selection and military training of command personnel, to establish contact with those who are already fighting behind enemy lines. In a word … to take over the operational leadership of partisan actions "in the sector of the North-Western Front. His “conversation with the head of the political department, divisional commissar K. G. Ryabchim … ended like this: "Go to the personnel officers, comrade Asmolov, select people for the department, and if necessary, for the partisan detachments."
“On July 20, 1941, the Military Council [North-West - approx. author] of the front approved the Instructions on the organization and actions of partisan detachments and groups. It began with the words: “The partisan movement behind enemy lines is a national movement. It is called upon to play a huge role in our Patriotic War. " … Printed in 500 copies, the instruction was sent to the party committees of the front-line areas that were part of the North-Western Front. Several dozen copies were sent to the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, from where they were sent to other fronts. According to Soviet studies, this was the first instruction for organizing partisan actions in the Great Patriotic War. She undoubtedly played a role in generalizing the accumulated experience of partisan struggle against the fascist invaders.
In connection with the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of July 18, 1941, "On organizing the struggle in the rear of the German troops" and in order to resolve emerging issues in the organization and leadership of partisan forces, the Front Military Council held an expanded meeting in the second half of July, in which many commanders and political workers, as well as party activists of the front-line city and district committees. … at the meeting, a very important issue was resolved about the unification of partisan detachments into larger units - partisan brigades. … A few days later, the Front Military Council approved the plan for the formation of the first partisan brigades. … For the first time in the history of the Great Patriotic War, the most expedient form of unification of armed partisan forces was found, which made it possible to successfully operate behind enemy lines in modern warfare. …
The tense days of July 1941, associated with the creation of partisan brigades and detachments, ended with the formation of significant partisan forces in the front line. It was possible to report to the Front Military Council and the Leningrad Regional Party Committee that 43 partisan detachments had been created on the territory of the southeastern districts of the Leningrad region, numbering about 4 thousand fighters and united in six partisan brigades. Part of the partisans had already been deployed across the front line and launched partisan operations in the rear of the 16th German army from Army Group North, operating against the troops of the North-Western Front."
According to the memoirs of the chief of the Leningrad headquarters of the partisan movement, secretary of the regional party committee M. N. Nikitin, “in July-August 1941, 32 districts of the district party committee of the Leningrad region became illegal. Already during the occupation, the Pskov interdistrict party body was created. Illegal committees were headed by 86 secretaries of district and city committees, who led them before the war. 68 representatives of the regional committee left for the districts”. In August and September 1941, partisan detachments and sabotage groups were created in almost all the areas occupied by the Nazis in the Kalinin region”(Pskov Partisan. Collection).
In Belarus on July 13, 1941, on the initiative of I. Starikov and P. K, Ponomarenko, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Belarus, a partisan school was created - the Operational Training Center of the Western Front. Already in July-August 1941, the first partisan detachments began hostilities … and … the first underground district committees began to lead the struggle behind enemy lines."
“In the western regions of Ukraine, it was not possible to complete all the work on the formation of partisan detachments and the party underground before their capture by fascist troops. … In the second half of July, the formation of partisan detachments, sabotage groups and the party underground began in all regions of the Left-Bank Ukraine. Here, the bases of weapons and foodstuffs were created in advance”. In particular, after I. Stalin's speech on July 3, 1941, S. A. Kovpak began the creation of partisan bases in the Putivl region. In addition to partisan detachments, the activities of party and Komsomol organizations were launched in Ukraine.
“On July 7, 1941, in the regional committee of the CP (b) U, comrade Burmistenko and the secretary of the Kiev regional committee of the CP (b) U, comrade Serdyuk, held a meeting of the secretaries of the city committees and district committees of the CP (b) U, at which exhaustive instructions were given on the evacuation of material assets, people and the creation of underground Bolshevik organizations and partisan detachments to fight behind enemy lines. As a result, in most cities and districts of the region, during July and August 1941, underground district committees of the CP (b) U, underground sabotage groups and partisan detachments with a network of secret apartments and a material base were created. In the city of Kiev, the underground city committee of the CP (b) U was abandoned. … In the districts of the city, 9 underground district committees of the CP (b) U and 3 party, Komsomol organizations and sabotage groups were created. … In the districts of the region, 21 underground city committees and the district committee of the CP (b) U were created. " “In total, in 1941 in Ukraine, 13 regional and more than 110 district, city, district and other underground party bodies began to work. Every day they led the selfless struggle of the Soviet patriots against the invaders."
Nevertheless, in the summer of 1941, the partisan struggle in the occupied territory was still in its infancy. Only “by the spring of 1942, it covered a huge territory - from the forests of Karelia to the Crimea and Moldova. By the end of 1943, there were over a million armed partisans and underground fighters. All this was achieved by the Soviet political and military leadership as a result of, in fact, brilliant improvisation, from scratch, practically from scratch.
According to I. Starinov's recollection, “loyal to Lenin's instructions, Mikhail Vasilyevich Frunze and other Soviet commanders did a lot to study the objective laws of partisan actions and to prepare for a partisan war in the event of an attack on the USSR by any aggressor. They took an active part in this training from 1925 to 1936 and the then People's Commissar of Defense K. E. Voroshilov. During the period of repression against the military, the training of partisans was stopped. All the partisan bases prepared in advance were liquidated, a large number of mine explosives were removed from secret warehouses and transferred to the army, and the tens of thousands of foreign rifles and carbines available in these warehouses, hundreds of foreign machine guns and millions of cartridges for them were simply destroyed.
The worst thing was that in 1937-1938, well-trained partisan cadres were repressed, who were shot, who were exiled, and only those who accidentally changed their place of residence or, fortunately, found themselves in distant Spain, survived participation in a battle with a fascist. The very idea of the possibility of waging a partisan war by us was buried. The new military doctrine ruled out a long-term strategic defense for the Red Army, prescribing in the shortest possible time to respond to the enemy's blow with a more powerful one, to transfer hostilities to the territory of the aggressor. Naturally, in the cadre troops, neither the commanding officers, let alone the rank and file, received the knowledge that would enable them to act confidently behind enemy lines."
Meanwhile, the opponents of the USSR took the military failures of the Soviet Union extremely seriously. In Germany, on June 30, 1941, the final version of Directive No. 32 was adopted. As already mentioned above, Hitler's strategists were counting already from the fall of 1941, after the defeat of the USSR, to reduce the Wehrmacht from 209 divisions to 175, to allocate 65 divisions as occupation forces in Russia (of which 12 armored and 6 motorized), increase the number of tropical divisions, aviation and navy for the subsequent confrontation between Great Britain and the United States of America. It was planned to begin the conquest of Egypt, the Suez Canal region, Palestine, Iraq and Iran. In the future, the German fascist leadership hoped, having annexed Spain and Portugal to Germany, quickly seize Gibraltar, cut off England from its sources of raw materials and undertake a siege of the island.
On July 3, 1941, further plans were discussed at the General Headquarters of the German Ground Forces: the occupation of the industrial regions of the USSR after the crossing of the Western Dvina and the Dnieper River and the offensive of the Wehrmacht in the Middle East. On July 15, 1941, the requirements for the occupation and protection of Russian territory were detailed. It was assumed that “as soon as the Russian troops located east of the Dnieper-Dvina line were largely defeated, the operations would have to be continued, if possible, only by motorized formations, as well as by those infantry formations that would finally remain on Russian territory. The main part of the infantry formations should start the return march in early August after reaching the Crimea-Moscow-Leningrad line. The German armed forces were to be reduced from 209 divisions to 175 formations.
The European part of Russia was divided into four state formations - the Baltic States, Russia, Ukraine and the Caucasus, for the occupation of which two army groups were allocated, consisting of 65 German formations, as well as one Italian and Spanish corps, Finnish, Slovak, Romanian and Hungarian formations:
Baltic States - 1 security division, 8 infantry division;
Western Russia (Central Russian industrial region and the northern Volga region) - 2 security divisions, 7 infantry divisions, 3 td, 1 md, one Italian corps;
Eastern Russia (Northern and Southern Urals) - 1 security division, 2 infantry divisions, 4 td, 2 md, one Finnish formation;
Western Ukraine - 1 security division, 7 infantry division; one Slovak and Romanian compound;
Eastern Ukraine (Don-Donetsk industrial region and the Southern Volga region) - 2 security divisions, 6 infantry divisions, 3 td, 2 md, 1 cd, one Hungarian formation;
Caucasus, Transcaucasia, the Caucasus-Iran group - 2 security divisions, 4 infantry divisions, 3 guards, 2 td, 1 md, one Spanish corps.
On July 2, at the imperial meeting in Japan, the "Program of the Empire's National Policy in accordance with the changes in the situation" was adopted, which provided for "the continuation of the war in China and the simultaneous completion of preparations for war both against the United States and Great Britain, and against the Soviet Union. From the transcript of the imperial meeting (Gozen Kaigi) on July 2, 1941: … Our attitude towards the German-Soviet war will be determined in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact. However, for now we will not intervene in this conflict. We will covertly increase our military training against the Soviet Union, maintaining an independent position. During this time, we will conduct diplomatic negotiations with great caution. If the German-Soviet war develops in a direction favorable to our empire, we, resorting to armed force, will resolve the northern problem and ensure the security of the northern borders. …
By the decision of the imperial conference, an armed attack on the USSR was approved as one of the main military and political goals of the empire. Having made this decision, the Japanese government essentially tore up the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact signed only two and a half months ago. The adopted document did not even mention the Neutrality Pact”. Despite the pressure and threats from Germany, “Japan was preparing to attack the USSR on condition that the Soviet troops were clearly defeated in the war with Germany. Minister of War Tojo stressed that the attack should occur when the Soviet Union "becomes like a ripe persimmon, ready to fall to the ground." …
In accordance with the decision of the imperial conference on July 2, 1941, the General Staff of the Army and the Ministry of War of Japan developed a complex of broad measures aimed at speeding up preparations for conducting offensive operations against the Soviet armed forces in the Far East and Siberia. In Japanese secret documents, he received the cipher name "Kantogun Tokushu Enshu" ("Special Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army") - abbreviated as "Kantokuen". On July 11, 1941, the imperial headquarters sent a special directive No. 506 to the Kwantung Army and the Japanese armies in North China, which confirmed that the purpose of the "maneuvers" was to strengthen the readiness to attack the Soviet Union. " "Kantokuen" was based first on the operational-strategic plan of war against the USSR, developed by the General Staff for 1940, and from the first half of July 1941 - on the "Project of Operations in Current Conditions" (Koshkin A. A. "Kantokuen" - "Barbarossa" in Japanese).
In accordance with the schedule for the completion of the preparation and conduct of the war, on July 5, 1941, the high command of the armed forces of Japan “issued a directive … on the conduct of the first stage of mobilization … 850 thousand soldiers and officers of the Japanese army "(Koshkin AA" Kantokuen "-" Barbarossa "in Japanese). On July 16, Matsuoka resigned.
“On July 25, President Roosevelt responded to the Vichy Act by freezing Japanese funds in the United States, including the Philippine Army, led by its Commander-in-Chief, General Douglas MacArthur, and warning Petain that the United States might consider it necessary to occupy French possessions in the Caribbean in self-defense. … According to many, this was exactly the moment when the US should have taken over the French West Indies. However, the President, on the advice of the US Secretary of State, decided to refrain from such advice. His decision was justified by subsequent events, although at that time in the Ministry of the Navy it caused regret, and among some part of the public this decision, assessed as the "pacification" of the Axis powers, was severely criticized "(Morison S. E. American Navy in World War II: Battle of the Atlantic).
Perhaps, it can be assumed that, contrary to popular belief, if conservative circles in England and America came to power, confrontation with Germany and Japan could quickly transform into a division of the world into spheres of influence. In any case, as Franz Halder notes in his diary, on June 30, 1941, Hitler discussed the issues of the unification of Europe as a result of a joint war against Russia and the possibility of overthrowing Churchill in England by conservative circles. “Hitler's confidence that a solution to the issue with respect to Russia would be reached in September 1941 determined his cautious strategy in the war in the Atlantic Ocean. "There should be no incidents with the United States until mid-October." However, Russia stubbornly held on”(SE Morison, American Navy in World War II: The Battle of the Atlantic).
On July 27, 1941, in connection with the dragging out of hostilities in the East in Germany, a plan of operation against the industrial region of the Urals was considered, which provided not so much an occupation as an expedition to destroy the Ural industrial region. The operation was to be “carried out by motorized forces with a force of eight armored and four motorized divisions. Depending on the situation, separate infantry divisions are involved in it (to protect rear communications). … The operation should be carried out in full observance of surprise, with the simultaneous performance of all four groups. Its goal is to reach the Ural industrial region as soon as possible and either hold, if the situation allows, the captured, or retreat again after the destruction of vital structures by specially equipped and trained detachments."
“In the summer of 1941, the Kwantung Army deployed battle formations of six armies and a separate group of troops against the USSR, not counting the reserve. In accordance with the Kantokuen plan, three fronts were formed for the conduct of hostilities: the eastern one, consisting of four armies and a reserve, the northern one, consisting of two armies and a reserve, and the western one, consisting of two armies. By early August, the group allocated for the invasion of the Soviet Union was basically prepared. The deadline for making a decision to start the war, August 10, was approaching. However, the ruling circles of Japan showed indecision, expecting the defeat of the Soviet Union in the West "(Koshkin AA" Kantokuen "-" Barbarossa "in Japanese). On September 6, 1941, at the imperial meeting, due to the failure of the German plan "Barbarossa", as well as the introduction of Soviet and British troops into Iran on August 25, 1941, the implementation of the "Cantokuen" plan was canceled in 1941, which, incidentally, "did not mean abandoning the Cantokuen plan.", but only postponed the date of its implementation "(Koshkin AA" Kantokuen "-" Barbarossa "in Japanese).
“At the beginning of July 1941, the Soviet government proposed to England to conclude an agreement on an alliance in the struggle against fascist Germany and her accomplices. On this occasion, negotiations were held in Moscow with the British Ambassador S. Cripps. " Having presented on July 8, 1941, I. V. To Stalin, "the text of Churchill's personal message, Cripps noted that the most important part of the British message, he considers the decision of the British Admiralty to take action in the Arctic." In turn, I. V. Stalin raised the issue of Iran, pointing out the threat to both the Soviet oil fields in Baku and the British colony in India due to the large concentration of Germans in Iran and Afghanistan.
“On July 10, the Soviet leader again received S. Cripps. The British ambassador stated that he had telegraphed to London and requested that the question of Iran be considered immediately. Having promised to consult with R. Bullard, S. Cripps suggested that "perhaps the military will have to support diplomatic measures." On the same day, the British commander-in-chief in India, General A. Wavell, warned his government about the German danger in Iran and about the need to "stretch out our hands together with the Russians through Iran." … On July 11, 1941, the cabinet instructed the chiefs of staff to consider the desirability of actions in Persia together with the Russians in case the Persian government refuses to expel the German colony that was active in this country "(Orishev AB, Clash of reconnaissance. 1936-1945)
As a result of negotiations I. V. Stalin and S. Cripps on July 12, 1941 signed the Soviet-British agreement "On joint actions in the war against Germany." The agreement obliged the parties to provide each other with all kinds of assistance and support in the war against Nazi Germany, and also not to negotiate and not conclude an armistice or peace treaty, except with mutual consent. … Despite the fact that the agreement was of a general nature and did not indicate specific mutual obligations, it testified to the interest of the parties in the establishment and development of allied relations. " Raising the Iranian issue I. V. Stalin wanted, as in March 1941, to link the security of India from the German invasion from Iran with the opening of a second front in Europe against Nazi Germany. Having offered British assistance in ensuring the security of India, I. V. Stalin called on the British government on July 18, 1941 to create a front against Hitler in the West in Northern France and in the North in the Arctic.
However, the deplorable state of affairs on the Soviet-German front predetermined the failure of I. V. Stalin, to link the entry of British and Soviet troops into Iran with the opening of a second front against Nazi Germany in Europe. Having proposed to Moscow on July 19, 1941 to bring troops into Iran, W. Churchill, at the same time, “in a message to Stalin received on July 21, 1941 … could bring the Soviet front "at least the smallest benefit" (Orishev A. B. Clash of reconnaissance. 1936-1945). As a result, I. V. Stalin had to come to terms with the fact that the entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran on August 25, 1941 was linked by Britain with the military-technical assistance of the USSR. He had to wait a year for the conclusion of an alliance treaty against Germany between the Soviet Union and England - until May 1942, and the opening of a second front in Northern France for three years - until May 1944.
As for American aid, the issues related to it were resolved in the United States for a long time either extremely slowly or were not resolved at all, and the matter was replaced by endless verbiage. In contrast to the United States, the Military Cabinet of Great Britain on July 26, 1941 “unanimously decided to send 200 Tomahawk fighters to Russia as soon as possible. It should not be surprising, therefore, that “the first cargo of the Allies that arrived in Arkhangelsk on August 31, 1941 with the Dervish convoy (7 transports and 6 escort ships) were British. … It is interesting that although military supplies to our country from the United States began a few months after the start of the war, they went for a normal fee, and the US President Franklin Roosevelt officially signed the Lend-Lease Law for the USSR only on June 11, 1942 (Krasnov V., Artemiev A. About lend-lease supplies to the fleet).
Summarize. With the beginning of the implementation of the backup version of the plan, V. D. Sokolovsky, the Soviet Union immediately began to turn into a unified battle camp to repel the invasion of Nazi Germany. The State Defense Committee headed by I. V. Stalin. The Headquarters of the High Command was reorganized into the Headquarters of the High Command. July 3, 1941 I. V. Stalin personally appeals to the peoples of the USSR with an appeal to unite in a protracted struggle with the enemy and beat him wherever he appears.
The rights of People's Commissars of the USSR expanded during wartime. Under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the Committee for Food and Clothing Supply of the Soviet Army and the main directorates for supplying the branches of the national economy with coal, oil, and timber were formed. The work of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, the system of planning and supplying the economy were reorganized. In the Volga region and in the Urals, an integrated base of the tank-building industry was created. The State Defense Committee reassigned the evacuation council to itself and instructed a special commission “to develop a military-economic plan for ensuring the country's defense, bearing in mind the use of resources and enterprises existing on the Volga, Western Siberia and the Urals, as well as resources and enterprises exported to these areas in the order of evacuation.
The newly formed units created the Ostashkov-Pochep rear line and the Mozhaisk defense line. On the territory occupied by the enemy, the organization of the partisan movement, underground activities and sabotage began. The formation of divisions of the people's militia began. After the first setbacks of the Red Army, Germany and Japan began to take measures to implement plans for the joint occupation of the Soviet Union. However, the restoration of the defense line by the Red Army in the Western direction predetermined the collapse of the Barbarossa plan, after which both Directive No. 32 and the Cantokuen plan were not implemented.
An attempt by I. V. Stalin's efforts to link the entry of Soviet and British troops into Iran with the opening of a second front in Europe failed. Troops entered Iran, but the Soviet Union received only military-technical assistance in return. The second front was opened by the Allied forces in 1944 - after the successive failure of the Soviet and German blitzkriegs, the war became extremely difficult and protracted.
The Soviet Union still had its great victories ahead of it at Stalingrad and Kursk, in Belarus and the Ukraine, in Berlin. However, they all became possible thanks to the first invisible and unremarkable victory in the hot summer of 1941 - the disruption of the Barbarossa plan and the prevention of the joint occupation of the Soviet Union by Germany and Japan. And this victory is inextricably linked with the plan of V. D. Sokolovsky, who was evidently first because of his secrecy, and then out of unwillingness to raise the topic of the catastrophe of the Western Front and the crisis of the Red Army in the summer of 1941, unpleasant for the Soviet political and military leadership, remained unknown.
