Let's summarize. In recent years, it has been possible to identify a large group of interrelated documents, gradually reflecting the development of operational plans of the Red Army at the turn of the 30s and 40s. All these plans are offensive plans (invasions into the territory of neighboring states). Since the summer of 1940, all variants of the Grand Plan have been a single document, changing only in insignificant details from month to month.
Nobody found any other plans. Considering that there were many who wanted to find a "strategic defense plan" or at least the notorious "counterattack in response to Hitler's aggression" DID NOT HAVE.
Mark Solonin
During the discussion in December 1940 at a meeting of the senior command personnel of the Red Army, the report of the commander of the Moscow military district I. V. Tyulenev, Chief of Staff of the Moscow Military District V. D. Sokolovsky expressed the idea of the need to revise the attitude towards defense, which, in his opinion, like an offensive, was capable of solving not only secondary, but also the main task of military operations - the defeat of the main forces of the enemy. For this V. D. Sokolovsky proposed not to be afraid of a short-term surrender of a part of the territory of the USSR to the enemy, let his strike forces go deep into the country, crush them on pre-prepared lines, and only after that proceed to the implementation of the task of seizing the enemy's territory.
I. V. Stalin highly appreciated the idea of V. D. Sokolovsky and in February 1941 appointed him to the specially created post of the second deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army. Thus, in February 1941, the first deputy G. K. Zhukova N. F. Vatutin began to develop a plan for a preemptive strike against Germany, and his second deputy V. D. Sokolovsky - to the development of a plan to defeat the enemy in the depths of the territory of the USSR. Probably the creation by W. Churchill of a threat to the interests of Germany in the Balkans was approved by I. V. Stalin in the need for a preemptive strike on Germany, in connection with which on March 11, 1941, he approved a plan for a preemptive strike on Germany on June 12, 1941 (part 1, diagram 10).
However, Germany's lightning defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece in April 1941, as well as the secondary expulsion of the British from the continent and the speed of preparation and implementation by Germany of the defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece, which was unusual for the Red Army, prompted I. V. Stalin to abandon the already approved plan for a preemptive strike against Germany and to accept the plan of V. D. Sokolovsky. In April 1941, a new plan began to be implemented - the commander of the ZOVO troops D. G. Pavlov was instructed by the USSR People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to develop a plan for the operational deployment of the district's armies, changes were made to the mobilization plan - the composition of the Red Army was replenished with 10 anti-tank brigades and 5 airborne corps by reducing divisions from 314 to 308, and directorates were created. The 13th, 23rd, 27th, and later the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd armies began to concentrate the Red Army troops in the West.
The plan provided for cover by the troops of the North-Western and Western fronts of the directions to Siauliai-Riga, Kaunas-Daugavpils, Vilnius-Minsk, Lida-Baranovichi, Grodno-Volkovysk, Ostrolenka-Bialystok on one side and the offensive by the troops of the Western and South-Western fronts on the river line Narew and Warsaw, as well as a concentric strike on Lublin with a further exit to Radom on the other. Obviously, from the region of the Narew and Warsaw rivers, in the future, coming to the coast of the Baltic Sea, it was necessary to surround the East Prussian grouping of the Wehrmacht. To accomplish this task, border cover areas were created on the border of the USSR with Germany, and all mobile units were assembled in the 13th and 4th armies. The western front was supposed to include 61 divisions, including 6 divisions of the RGK army in the Lida-Slonim-Baranovichi area.
The main difference between the April border cover plan and all previous strategic deployment plans is the creation of cover areas, the occupation of the area of the Narew and Warsaw rivers, as well as the encirclement of the East Prussian group of the Wehrmacht with access to the Baltic Sea coast from the Warsaw area, and not Krakow-Breslau. The anti-tank brigades were supposed to prevent the breakthrough of the Wehrmacht units to Riga, Daugavpils, Minsk, Baranovichi and Volkovysk, stopping the motorized corps of the German army at Siauliai, Kaunas, Lida, Grodno and Bialystok, and the airborne corps abandoned in the rear of Germany were to help the ground forces of the Red Armies to liberate Europe from the German invaders (diagram 1).
Speaking on May 5, 1941, before graduates and teachers of military academies, I. Stalin announced his refusal to take a preemptive strike against Germany. In his opinion, the Wehrmacht is invincible only as long as it is waging a liberation struggle. Consequently, attacking Germany, the USSR will inevitably suffer defeat from the invincible Wehrmacht leading a war of liberation, while allowing Germany to attack the USSR, the Soviet Union will turn the previously invincible Wehrmacht, forced to wage an aggressive, unjust war, into an ordinary mortal army, which will inevitably be defeated by the leading liberation, righteous war of the invincible Red Army.
Otherwise, on May 6, 1941, the very next day after the Kremlin speech by I. V. Stalin, or on May 14-15, 1941, the leadership of the Red Army ordered the border military districts to develop plans to cover the border with forces of exclusively military districts, without any involvement of the RGK armies, and on May 13, 1941, to begin concentrating the RGK armies on the Western Dvina-Dnepr line. The leadership of the KOVO was ordered to accept the operational group of the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District, the 34th rifle corps, four rifle and one mountain rifle divisions. Arrival of units and formations was expected from May 20 to June 3, 1941. On May 25, an order was received from the General Staff to begin the advance by June 1, 1941, to the Proskurov, Khmelniki area of the 16th Army.
As we already know on May 15, 1941 I. V. Stalin refused to implement the proposed by G. K. Zhukov of the plan of a preventive strike against Germany (part 1, diagram 12). At the same time, in one package with a proposal for a preemptive strike against Germany, in case the plan to defeat the enemy on the territory of the USSR was disrupted, on May 15, 1941, G. K. Zhukov suggested I. V. Stalin to approve his proposal to start the construction of fortified areas on the rear line Ostashkov - Pochep, and if Germany does not attack the Soviet Union, then provide for the construction of new fortified areas in 1942 on the border with Hungary.
Meanwhile, on May 27, the command of the border districts was ordered to immediately begin the construction of field command posts (front-line and army) in the areas outlined in the plan and to speed up the construction of fortified areas. In late May and early June, a call was made from 793, 5 to 805, 264 thousand conscripts for Large Training Camps (BTS), which made it possible to staff 21 divisions of border districts to full wartime staff, as well as significantly replenish other formations.
In addition, everything was probably ready for the formation with the beginning of hostilities of several new directorates of the armies and dozens of divisions. Already in June 1941, the directorates of the 24th and 28th armies were created, in July the Red Army was replenished with the directorates of 6 more armies (29th, 30th, 31st, 32nd, 33rd and 34th), 20 rifle (242nd, 243rd, 244th, 245th, 246th, 247th, 248th, 249th, 250th, 251st, 252nd, 254 th, 256 th, 257 th, 259 th, 262 th, 265 th, 268 th, 272 th and 281 th) and 15 cavalry (25 th, 26 th, 28 th, 30th, 33rd, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 47th, 48th, 49th, 50th, 52nd, 53rd, 55th) divisions … And this is in the conditions of disruption of mobilization in the Baltics, Belarus and Ukraine. In addition to personnel, in the first month of the war, divisions of the people's militia were also formed - the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th divisions of the Leningrad People's Militia Army (LANO), 1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 17th, 18th, 21st divisions of the Moscow People's Militia (MNO), a significant number of which were later reorganized into regular rifle divisions. Most of the new units and formations left for the front in mid-July - early August 1941. Moreover, in August 1941, the process of forming new armies and divisions not only did not end, but, on the contrary, increased significantly.
Plans for covering the borders with border military districts, the task assigned to the RGK army group created on June 21, 1941, and the proposal of G. K. Zhukov on the construction of a new fortified area on the rear line Ostashkov - Pochep allows to restore the plan of defeat of the enemy on the territory of the USSR conceived by the Soviet military command. It was necessary, firstly, to reliably cover the flanks of Soviet troops in the Baltic states, the Bialystok and Lvov ledges, as well as Moldova, by deploying anti-tank brigades in tank-hazardous areas. Secondly, in the weak center, letting the enemy go to Smolensk and Kiev, interrupt the supply routes of the German units with a concentric strike of the troops of the Western and Southwestern Fronts on Lublin-Radom and defeat the enemy on the prepared lines in the Western Dvina-Dnieper area.
Thirdly, to occupy the area of the Narew and Warsaw rivers. Fourth, after completing the formation of new armies with a blow from the area of the Narew River and Warsaw to the Baltic coast, encircle and destroy the German troops in East Prussia. Fifthly, by throwing out the airborne corps in front of the ground forces of the Red Army, to liberate Europe from the Nazi yoke. In case of a breakthrough of German troops through the barrier of the armies of the second strategic echelon, it was envisaged to create a fortified area on the Ostashkov - Pochep line (diagram 2).
This scheme is not only not something alien to Soviet military planning, but, having its direct analogs in it, fits perfectly into it. In particular, during the Battle of Kursk in 1943, the idea of defeating the enemy with a counteroffensive by the Red Army, against the enemy previously exhausted by defensive actions, was brilliantly implemented. It should be especially noted that in the Battle of Kursk V. D. Sokolovsky, apparently in tribute to his 1941 defensive plan, carried out Operation Kutuzov, while N. F. Vatutin, in tribute to his 1941 offensive plan, carried out Operation Rumyantsev. The strike to the Baltic coast from the Bialystok salient was practiced in the first strategic game of the General Staff of the Red Army in January 1941 (part 1, diagram 8). The encirclement of the East Prussian grouping of German troops by a blow from the area of the Narew-Warsaw River to the Baltic coast was brought to life in May 1945.
From the end of May - the beginning of June 1941, the advance of the RGK armies to the West began with a concentration period of the end of June - beginning of July 1941 on the Zapadnaya Dvina-Dnepr line. The 19th Army (34th, 67th Rifle, 25th Mechanized Corps) was transferred from the North Caucasian Military District to the Cherkassy region, Belaya Tserkov. The 20th Army (20th, 61st, 69th, 41st RC and 7th MK) advanced to the Smolensk, Mogilev, Orsha, Krichev, Chausy and Dorogobuzh area, 21st Army (66th, 63rd, 45th, 30th, 33rd rifle corps) was concentrated in the area of Chernigov, Gomel, Konotop, the 22nd army (62nd and 51st rifle corps) moved to the Idritsa, Sebezh area, Vitebsk. The 16th Army was transferred from May 22 to June 1 to the Proskurov, Khmelniki area. In addition, the Kharkiv Military District received the task of moving the 25th Rifle Corps to the Lubna area into the operational subordination of the commander of the 19th Army by June 13. At the same time, the troops of the 24th and 28th armies were preparing for redeployment.
June 6, 1941 G. K. Zhukov agreed with the proposal of the leadership of the OdVO secretly, at night, to withdraw to the border the management of the 48th rifle corps and its 74th rifle division, as well as the 30th rifle division to strengthen the 176th division, whose forces were clearly not enough to cover the front 120 kilometers away. On the night of June 8, all these formations reached the Baltsk region. On June 12, 1941, the NPO issued a directive on the deployment of divisions and districts located in the depths closer to the state border. On the same day, the KOVO command was notified of the arrival of the 16th Army in the district from June 15 to July 10, 1941, as part of the army management with service units, the 5th mechanized corps (13th, 17th tank and 109- I motorized division), the 57th separate tank division, the 32nd rifle corps (46th, 152nd rifle divisions), and the command of the ZapOVO - on the arrival in the district from June 17 to July 2, 1941 of the 51st and 63rd 1st rifle corps.
June 13, 1941 People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Tymoshenko and Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov asked I. V. Stalin, to bring the troops of the border military districts on alert and deploy the first echelons according to the plan for a preventive attack on Germany, redirecting parts of the second strategic echelon to the border with Germany (part 1, scheme 13). Stalin took time to think, the fruit of which was the TASS report, transmitted to the German ambassador on June 13, 1941 and published the next day. The message refuted rumors about the presentation of any claims to the USSR and the conclusion of a new, closer agreement, about the preparations of Germany and the USSR for war against each other.
June 14, 1941 I. V. Stalin, fearing the escalation of open mobilization into war, from the implementation of the deployment plan of June 13, 1941 S. K. Timoshenko and G. K. Zhukov finally refused and the echelons of the 16th Army, according to the testimony of Lieutenant General K. L. Sorokin, who received the baptism of fire in 1941 as a brigade commissar in the position of head of the political propaganda department of the 16th Army, accelerated their movement towards their own plan, V. D. Sokolovsky to the deployment line:
“Echelons rush westward past the stations like ordinary freight trains, freight trains. Stops only at remote stations and crossings. …
On the way, we learned about the TASS report of June 14th. It refuted rumors spread by foreign news agencies about the concentration of German troops on the western borders of our Motherland and their preparation for an attack on the USSR. The message stressed that the German and Soviet sides strictly adhere to the non-aggression pact. Meanwhile, our echelons suddenly accelerated their movement, and now the area of the future deployment of the army - Shepetovka, Starokonstantinov - has already been identified. "Is this a simple coincidence: the TASS message and the courier speed of our trains moving to the old western border of the country?" - I thought."
On June 15, 1941, the leadership of the border military districts received an order to withdraw the deep corps to the border from June 17. According to I. Kh. Baghramyan in KOVO, the 31st rifle corps was supposed to approach the border near Kovel by June 28, the 36th rifle corps was supposed to occupy the border area of Dubno, Kozin, Kremenets by the morning of June 27, the 37th rifle corps had to was to concentrate in the area of Przemysl; The 55th Rifle Corps (without one division remaining in place) was ordered to reach the border on June 26, the 49th - by June 30.
In ZAPOVO, the 21st sk was moved to the Lida area, the 47th sk - Minsk, the 44th sk - Baranovichi. In PribOVO, from June 17, 1941, by order of the district headquarters, began redeployment of the 11th rifle division of the 65th sk. Following from the Narva area by rail from the morning of 1941-21-06, it concentrated in the Sheduva area. On June 22, 1941, most of it was still en route. The management of the 65th sk and the 16th rifle division had the task of arriving by rail in the region of Keblya (10 km north of Shauliai) and Prenai, respectively, but due to the lack of wagons, they did not interfere with loading. The Baltic National Rifle Corps remained in their places of permanent deployment.
On June 14, the Odessa Military District was allowed to allocate an army administration and on June 21, 1941, it was allowed to withdraw it to Tiraspol, that is, to transfer the control of the 9th Army to a field command post, and the commander of the Kiev Special Military District was ordered to withdraw the administration of the Southwestern Front to Vinnytsia. On June 18, 1941, at the direction of the General Staff, this period was postponed to June 22. The Directorate of the Western (ZAPOVO) and Northwestern (PribOVO) fronts by the order of the General Staff of June 18 was allowed to be withdrawn to field command posts by June 23, 1941. On June 20, 1941, the withdrawal to the field command posts of the 9th Army, Northwestern and Southwestern Fronts began. The management of the Western Front was not withdrawn to the field command post from Minsk.
On June 18, the commander of the PribOVO gave a verbal order for the first echelons of the 8th Army to enter the field defense areas at the state border, the headquarters of the 8th Army to be stationed in the Bubyan area (12-15 km south-west of Shauliai) by the morning of June 19, and 3 -m and 12th MK - for the transition to the border area. From the morning of June 19, units of the 10th and 90th Rifles of the 10th Rifle Division and the 125th Rifle Division of the 11th Rifle Division began to enter their areas and during the day deployed in the cover areas. On June 17, 1941, the 48th Rifle Division of the 11th RC began moving in marching order from Jelgava to the Nemakshchay area, until 22:00 on 1941-21-06 she was on a day trip in the forest south of Siauliai and continued the march with the onset of darkness. Since June 17, the 23rd Rifle Division, by order of the district command, made the transition from Daugavpils to its border protection area, on which its two rifle battalions were located. On the night of June 22, the division set out from the Pagelizdiai area (20 km south-west of Ukmerge) to the Andrushkantsi area for further movement to the indicated area. On the night of June 22, the 126th Rifle Division set out from Zhiezhmoryai to the Prienai region. The 183rd Rifle Division of the 24th RC went to the Riga camp and until nightfall on June 21 was in the area of Zosena, Sobari, 50 km west of Gulbene. In KOVO, the 164th Rifle Division departed from the summer camp to its place of border cover, and the 135th Rifle Division began redeploying to its camp.
On June 21, 1941, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) decided to create the Southern Front as part of the 9th and 18th armies. Control of the Southern Front was entrusted to the headquarters of the Moscow Military District, and the 18th Army to the Kharkov Military District. By the same resolution G. K. Zhukov was entrusted with the leadership of the Southern and Southwestern Fronts, and K. A.. M. Budyonny, a group of reserve armies. The headquarters of the group was to be located in Bryansk. The formation of the group ended by the end of June 25, 1941. According to M. V. Zakharov, by June 21, 1941, the main forces of the 19th army, except for the 25th mechanized corps, which followed by rail, and eight rifle divisions of the 21st army (6 other divisions were still on the way) were already in the designated concentration areas. The 20th and 22nd armies continued to move into new areas. “The Army Group was tasked with reviving and starting to prepare the defensive line of the main line of the strip along the line of Sushchevo, Nevel, Vitebsk, Mogilev, Zhlobin, Gomel, Chernigov, the Desna River, the Dnieper River to Kremenchug. … The group of troops had to be ready by special order of the High Command to launch a counteroffensive”(part 3, diagram 1).
Ultimately, out of 303 divisions, 63 divisions were deployed on the northern and southern borders, as well as as part of the troops of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts, while 240 divisions were concentrated in the West, with 3 armies and 21 divisions allocated to the Northern Front, North-Western and The Western fronts - 7 armies and 69 divisions, and the Southwestern Front - 7 armies and 86 divisions. Another 4 armies and 51 divisions were deployed as part of the front of the armies of the RGK, and 2 armies and 13 divisions were to concentrate in the Moscow area with the beginning of hostilities. The armies in the Moscow area were intended, depending on the situation, either to reinforce the troops north or south of the Pripyat bogs, in case of a successful plan to defeat the enemy on the Western Dvina - Dnieper line, or to cover Moscow on the Ostashkov - Pochep rear line, the construction of which by G. K. Zhukov suggested starting on May 15, 1941, in the event of the failure of the plan to defeat the enemy on the Zapadnaya Dvina - Dnieper line.31 divisions were allocated to the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts, 30 divisions were allocated to the troops of the Transcaucasian, Central Asian and North Caucasian military districts, and 15 divisions, mainly of the North Caucasian military district, with the beginning of the war should, under favorable circumstances, descend to the West.
If we compare the scheme of the actual deployment of the Red Army on the eve of the Great Patriotic War and the scheme provided for by the strategic deployment plan of the Red Army of June 13, 1941, then both the similarities and differences of both deployment schemes become immediately visible. The similarity lies in the fact that in both cases, out of 303 divisions of the Red Army, 240 divisions were allocated to the West, 31 divisions were allocated to the troops of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts, 30 divisions from the Transcaucasian, Central Asian and North Caucasian military districts, and with the beginning of hostilities from the composition of these districts, 15 divisions departed to the West. The difference lies in the different structure of the deployment of troops concentrated in the West - if in the plan of June 13, 1941, the bulk of the troops were concentrated at the border and in the front-line RGK, then in real deployment, the front of the RGK armies was created at the expense of the troops of the border grouping on the Western Dvina-Dnepr line.
As we can see, both the concentration and the deployment of the Red Army to the West before the start of the Great Patriotic War were carried out in full accordance with the plan of V. D. Sokolovsky, not N. F. Vatutin - the formations of the armies of the border military districts moved to the border, and the internal ones - to the Zapadnaya Dvina-Dnieper line. There are many parameters that would seem to unambiguously confirm the implementation of V. D. Sokolovsky. Let's note some of them. Firstly, the armies of the RGK began their advance to the West on May 13, 1941, after abandoning the March plan for a preventive strike against Germany and before G. K. Zhukov to I. Stalin of a new plan on May 15, 1941. Secondly, both proposed by G. K. Zhukov's plans for a preemptive strike against Germany were rejected by I. Stalin. Thirdly, the RGK army group on the Zapadnaya Dvina-Dnieper line was created at the expense of the Southwestern Front grouping intended to deliver a preemptive strike against Germany. Fourthly, for a reserve intended to strengthen the border grouping of the Red Army, the armies of the RGK were withdrawn too far from the border, deployed not compactly, at railway junctions, for ease of transportation, but at a wide defensive line. Fifth, if the armies of the RGK were intended to strengthen the border grouping of the Red Army, they would not have been united into the front, they would not have created a front headquarters, and they would not have set the task of reconnaissance of the terrain in order to create a defensive line.
Sixth, if in January 1941 I. S. Konev, accepting the troops of the North Caucasian Military District, received from the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR S. K. Tymoshenko's instruction that he is leading one of the armies of the grouping intended to deliver a preemptive strike against Germany, then “at the beginning of June … in the event of an offensive by the Germans in the South-Western theater of military operations, on Kiev, to inflict a frontal blow - to drive the Germans into the Pripyat swamps”. Seventh - all armies of the RGK were reinforced with mechanized corps. Everything, except for the 21st Army, although there was an opportunity for this, because the 23rd Mechanized Corps remained behind it in the area of its permanent deployment. And it is understandable why - if the 19th army was to drive the Germans into the Pripyat swamps, then the 21st army had to destroy the Germans in the Pripyat swamps, and the mechanized corps had absolutely nothing to do in the swamp, except to get bogged down. Eighth, after the start of the war, the armies of the RGK continued their deployment on the Zapadnaya Dvina-Dnepr line, and on June 25, 1941, by the directive of the USSR NO, the need for a front of the RGK armies was confirmed. Ninthly, only after the encirclement of the troops of the Western Front was the Lvov ledge abandoned, which suddenly became unnecessary, and the organization of the struggle on the territory occupied by the enemy began.
Tenthly, I. Stalin reacted extremely sharply and negatively to the catastrophe of the Western Front: he shouted at the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army G. K. Zhukov, withdrew from the leadership of the country for some time, and subsequently shot almost the entire leadership of the Western Front. Nothing like this has ever happened again. It is understandable, because I. Stalin was infuriated not by the defeat of the front, near Kiev and Vyazma in 1941, the Red Army suffered defeats and worse, but the failure of the strategic plan to defeat the enemy and liberate all of Europe from him. Eleventh - the Lepel counterstrike exactly repeats the plan of the defeat of the Wehrmacht troops, which had broken through in the Smolensk direction, planned by the Soviet command. As well as the creation in July 1941 of the front of reserve armies on the Ostashkov-Pochep line: Staraya Russa, Ostashkov, Bely, Istomino, Yelnya, Bryansk. Twelfth, the plan of the Soviet command envisaged a short-term occupation of Soviet territory and therefore did not provide for a deployed partisan movement, which began to be created only in July with the realization of the failure of the plan to quickly defeat the enemy and the start of a long war. Moreover, with the conduct of hostilities on Soviet territory.
Thus, before the war in the Soviet Union, a plan was developed to defeat the Wehrmacht in the event of a German attack on the USSR, and its implementation began. Unfortunately, both the plan and its implementation had a number of shortcomings. The plan did not take into account the possibility of Germany entering into battle from the very first hours of its main armed forces and therefore provided for long periods of mobilization of the Red Army. If the lack of proper cover by anti-tank brigades and mechanized corps of the Brest-Minsk and Vladimir-Volynsky-Kiev directions was planned, the Kaunas-Daugavpils and Alytus-Vilnius-Minsk directions remained open by mistake. It's just that the leadership of the General Staff of the Red Army could not foresee the Wehrmacht's attack on Kaunas, bypassing the positions of the 10th anti-tank brigade and the 3rd mechanized corps from East Prussia, as well as through Vilnius through Alytus. Fatal for the fate of the Western Front was the decision of the General Staff of the Red Army to transfer the anti-tank defense from the Vilnius-Minsk direction to the Lida-Baranovichi and Grodno-Volkovysk directions. Striking a blow at Minsk through Vilnius, the enemy, firstly, bypassed three anti-tank brigades at once, and secondly, a counterattack by I. V. Boldin in the direction of Grodno, even in principle, could not reach the Wehrmacht strike group, rushing through Alytus to Vilnius and further to Minsk, and at least somehow influence the fate of the Western Front.
In terms of deployment, it should be noted that the border is well covered in the zone of the Southwestern Front. As for the border cover in the zone of the North-Western and Western Fronts, it should be considered unsatisfactory. On the Alytu direction, on the way of the 3rd German tank group, there was one 128th rifle division, while the 23rd, 126th and 188th rifle divisions by June 22, 1941 were just moving towards the border. In addition, not trusting the three national Baltic rifle corps, the command of the North-Western Front was afraid to send them to organize a second echelon of troops on the border, deciding to use the 65th rifle corps for this purpose, the connections of which, however, due to the lack of railway transport, in time they were never delivered to the border.
In the zone of cover of the border by the troops of the Western Front, the abandonment of the 6th and 42nd rifle divisions in the barracks of the Brest fortress should be recognized as erroneous - at the beginning of the war they were locked in the fortress and could not fulfill the task assigned to them to prevent the enemy from bypassing the fortifications of the Brest fortress. According to L. M. Sandalova “the main drawback of the district and army plans was their unreality. A significant part of the troops envisaged for performing cover missions did not yet exist. … The most negative impact on the organization of the defense of the 4th Army was the inclusion of half of the cover area No. 3 in its zone. "However, “before the outbreak of the war, the RP-3 was never created. … Directorate of the 13th Army did not arrive in the Belsk region. … All this had grave consequences, since on the very first day of the war, neither the 49th and 113th divisions, nor the 13th mechanized corps received any missions from anyone, fought uncontrolled by anyone, and retreated to the north under enemy blows -east, in the band of the 10th army. " The command of the 13th Army was used to strengthen the defense of the Lida direction, however, since parts of the German 3rd Panzer Group were breaking through to Minsk through Alytus and Vilnius, this decision could not prevent the catastrophe of the Western Front.
Let us dwell on the ratio of V. D. Sokolovsky with the Iranian question. In March 1941, the General Staff of the Red Army, under the guise of command and staff exercises in the Transcaucasian and Central Asian military districts, began to develop a plan for the introduction of Soviet troops into northern Iran. As we remember, in England in March 1941, the development of a plan for the introduction of British troops into southern Iran also began. In April 1941, the development of the exercises was approved by N. F. Vatutin and in May 1941 were held in the ZakVO, and in June 1941 - in SAVO. The study by the staff of the General Staff of the border only with Iran from Kizyl-Artek to Serakhs indicates the development of the introduction of Soviet troops into Iran - it is indicative that the border with Afghanistan, and this, by the way, is the shortest path to India, did not interest anyone in the Soviet General Staff.
In the March 1941 plan of the year, only 13 divisions were allocated to the border with Iran - it was required, firstly, to assemble a grouping of 144 divisions as part of the Southwestern Front, and secondly, to collect the required number of troops on the border with Japan. The vagueness of relations between the USSR and Japan demanded a constant build-up of Soviet troops as part of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts - 30 divisions in the plan of August 19, 1940, 34 divisions in the plan of September 18, 1940, 36 divisions in the plan of October 14, 1940, and 40 divisions in plan of March 11, 1941.
In April 1941, the Soviet Union concluded a non-aggression pact with Japan, which was immediately used to increase troops on the border with Iran at the expense of the troops of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts. In particular, if in the plan of March 11, 1941, the Transcaucasian, Central Asian and North Caucasian military districts numbered 13 divisions, then in the plan of May 15, 1941 there were already 15 divisions, and in the plan of June 13, 1941, the real concentration of the Red Army in May – June 1941 - 30 divisions. All this testifies to the readiness of the USSR and England to send their troops to Iran in June 1941.
Thus, we established that at the beginning of 1941, the development of two plans for the deployment of units of the Red Army began in parallel. First, the plan of N. F. Vatutin, however, after the defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece by Germany, V. D. Sokolovsky.
N. F.'s plan Vatutin envisaged the creation of a grouping of more than 140 divisions within the Southwestern Front for a preemptive strike against Germany, while V. D. Sokolovsky - the defeat of the shock units of the Wehrmacht on the Western Dvina - Dnieper line, where a powerful group of armies of the High Command Reserve was created. The new plan, possessing a number of unique qualities, at the same time contained a number of serious mistakes, which did not allow it to be fully realized and doomed to long oblivion.
Scheme 1. Actions of the troops of the Western Front in accordance with the April directive of the USSR NO and the NGSh KA to the commander of the ZOVO troops in 1941. Compiled according to the directive of the USSR NO and the NGSh KA to the commander of the ZOVO troops. April 1941 // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 2 / Document No. 224 // www.militera.lib.ru
Scheme 2. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the May plans to cover the border of the border military districts in 1941 and the task set in June 1941 for a group of reserve armies. Reconstruction by the author. Compiled from: Note on covering the state border on the territory of the Leningrad Military District // Military History Journal. - No. 2. - 1996. - S.3-7; Directive of the USSR NO and the NGSH to the commander of the Baltic Special Military District of May 14, 1941 // Military History Journal. - No. 6. - 1996. - P. 5–8; The plan to cover the territory of the Baltic Special Military District for the period of mobilization, concentration and deployment of the district troops from May 14, 1941 to June 2, 1941 // Military History Journal. - No. 6. - 1996. - P. 9–15; Directive of the USSR NO and the NGSH to the commander of the Western Special Military District of May 14, 1941 // Military History Journal. - No. 3. - 1996. - P. 5–7; Note on the plan of action of troops in cover on the territory of the Western Special Military District // Military History Journal. - No. 3. - 1996. - P. 7–17; A note on the defense plan for the period of mobilization, concentration and deployment of KOVO troops for 1941 // Military History Journal. - No. 4. - 1996. - P. 3–17; Note on the action plan of the troops of the Odessa military district in the cover of the state border of June 20, 1941 // Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal. - No. 5. - 1996. - P. 3–17; a note by the USSR NO and the NGSh KA to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I. V. Stalin with considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies on May 15, 1941 // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 2 / Document No. 473 // www.militera.lib.ru; Gorkov Yu. A. State Defense Committee decides (1941-1945). Figures, documents. - M., 2002. - S. 13; Zakharov M. V. On the Eve of the Great Trials / General Staff in the Pre-War Years. - M., 2005. - S. 402–406; Zakharov M. V. General Staff in the pre-war years / General Staff in the pre-war years. - M., 2005. - S. 210-212; Command and control personnel of the Red Army in 1940-1941 The structure and personnel of the central apparatus of the USSR NKO, military districts and combined arms armies. Documents and materials. - M.; SPb., 2005. - P. 10; A. I. Evseev Maneuvering strategic reserves in the first period of the Great Patriotic War // Military History Journal. - No. 3. - 1986. - P. 9–20; Petrov B. N. On the strategic deployment of the Red Army on the eve of the war // Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal. - No. 12. - 1991. - P. 10–17; Kunitskiy P. T. Restoration of the broken strategic defense front in 1941 // Military History Journal. - No. 7. - 1988. - P. 52-60; Makar I. P. From the experience of planning the strategic deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in the event of a war with Germany and direct preparation for repelling aggression // Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal. - No. 6. - 2006. - P. 3; Afanasyev N. M. The Roads of Trials and Victories: The Combat Path of the 31st Army. - M.: Military Publishing, 1986. - S. 272 p.; Glants D. M. Soviet military miracle 1941-1943. Revival of the Red Army. - M., 2008. - S. 248–249; Kirsanov N. A. At the call of the Motherland (Volunteer formations of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War). - M., 1971. - S. 17-18, 23-27; Kolesnik A. D. Militia formations of the Russian Federation during the Great Patriotic War. - M., 1988. - P. 14-18, 21-24; Military encyclopedic dictionary. - Moscow: Military Publishing, 1984. - S. 503–504; The combat composition of the Soviet Army. (June – December 1941). Part 1. // www.militera.lib.ru
