- Hitler explained the war with the USSR by the fact that he was supposedly ahead of Stalin. You can also hear this version in Russia. What do you think?
- There is still no confirmation of this. But no one knows what Stalin really wanted.
Bernd Bonwetsch, German historian
The sleep of reason gives birth to monsters. In fact, having failed to respond in time to the challenge of the time, Soviet researchers of World War II and the Great Patriotic War "slept through" the revival of the old monstrous Nazi myth about the readiness of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 to strike a preemptive strike against Germany. Moreover, the almost complete absence of serious studies of Soviet pre-war planning and the reasons for the defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941, coupled with their closeness, allowed the old myth to gain wide popularity in a short time.
An attempt to combat it by refuting its individual elements, since “a fundamentally correct idea is sometimes supported by not very reliable, and sometimes just erroneous considerations”, did not bring success. Indeed, “it is not enough to criticize the arguments of an opponent in a dispute. This will only show that his position is ill-founded and shaky. To reveal its erroneousness, it is necessary to convincingly substantiate the opposite position."
Poor study of the events of the summer of 1941 provoked a heated discussion about the plans of the Soviet military and political leadership on the eve of World War II and their role in the catastrophic defeat of the Red Army in the summer of 1941. Three options were proposed for the development of events: the Red Army was preparing for defense, a preemptive attack on Germany or the defeat of the Wehrmacht on the territory of the USSR. The discussion is now at an impasse. The materials available to researchers did not give an unambiguous answer; moreover, all three parties confirm the truth of their version of Soviet planning with the same documents.
In this work, an attempt will be made to get out of the current stalemate through a detailed study and rethinking of the documents of Soviet pre-war planning introduced into scientific circulation. The novelty of the work lies in a close examination of the Soviet pre-war planning, showing the development, revealing its mechanism. Particular attention is paid to explaining the reasons for the military failures of the Red Army in the border battle in the summer of 1941. For the first time, a plan for the defeat of the Wehrmacht troops on the territory of the Soviet Union is shown in detail and reasoned, with reference to specific documents.
The last plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army in case of war before the outbreak of World War II was developed during the Czechoslovak crisis on March 24, 1938, after the USSR government announced that the Soviet Union was ready to provide assistance to Czechoslovakia in the event of German aggression. The plan provided for the opposition of two military blocs: on the one hand, France, Czechoslovakia and the USSR, on the other, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia. It was assumed that Italy would take part in hostilities exclusively with its navy, Lithuania would be occupied by Germany and Poland in the first days of the war, and Romania and Turkey, under certain circumstances, could oppose the USSR.
It was assumed that Germany would put up 14 divisions against France, Germany and Poland would put 33 divisions against Czechoslovakia, and against the USSR Germany, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Finland would concentrate 144 divisions and 16 cavalry brigades, to which the USSR would oppose 139 divisions and 26 tank brigades. According to the plan of the command of the Red Army, the smaller number of Soviet troops was to be compensated for by their better mechanization.
In total, two options for the actions of the Red Army in case of war were developed. The first envisaged the deployment of the main forces of Germany, Latvia and Poland north of the Pripyat bogs, the second - the deployment of the main forces of Germany and Poland south of the Pripyat bogs. In both cases, it was envisaged to defeat the enemy by a frontal strike by Soviet troops against the largest enemy grouping. In the first version, from 70 to 82 Soviet divisions and 11 tank brigades (12 divisions of the RGK were supposed to crush Estonian and Latvian troops in the event of Estonia and Latvia entering the war) north of the Pripyat swamps should have smashed the German-Polish-Latvian grouping of forces of 88 divisions and 3 cavalry brigades on a wide front from Sventsyan to Baranavichy with the provision of the main attack on both banks of the Neman with strikes from Polotsk and Slutsk. 38 Soviet divisions and 9 tank brigades were to defeat 40 Polish divisions and 13 cavalry brigades south of the Pripyat swamps on a narrow front from Rovno to Brod (diagram 1).
In the second version, from 80 to 86 divisions and from 13 to 15 tank brigades of the Soviet grouping (6 divisions and 3 tank brigades of the northern Soviet grouping, in the event of neutrality of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, were to strengthen the Soviet grouping south of the Pripyat swamps) were to defeat the German-Polish a grouping of 86 divisions and 13 cavalry brigades on a wide front from Rivne to Ternopil, providing the main attack on Lublin with strikes on Kovel and Lvov, and 37 Soviet divisions and 7 tank brigades were to oppose 62 German-Polish divisions and 3 cavalry brigades on a narrow front from Oshmyany to Novogrudok (diagram 2). The influence of the change in the size of the grouping on the tasks assigned to it draws on itself: an increase in a grouping increases, and a decrease decreases both the width of the front and the depth of the strike.
The Munich agreement of England and France with Germany and Italy made it impossible for the USSR to provide military assistance to Czechoslovakia. After the Munich guarantees of the new borders of Czechoslovakia, the military assistance of the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia led to war at least with England, France, Germany and Italy, and at most with all of Europe. At the same time, the subsequent cooling of Germany's relations with Britain and France predetermined its rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Having concluded the Moscow non-aggression pact in 1939 and secretly dividing part of Europe into spheres of influence, Germany and the USSR began to redistribute borders in Europe in accordance with their agreements: Germany attacked Poland, occupied Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and part of France, in while the Soviet Union regained Bessarabia, Western Belarus and Ukraine, annexed Northern Bukovina and moved its border away from Leningrad. In the Far East, the Soviet Union, having defeated the Japanese provocateurs on the Khalkhin-Gol River, for a long time discouraged Tokyo from waging a large-scale war with the USSR.
During the hostilities in Poland, Finland, Romania and Mongolia, the Soviet Union gained invaluable combat experience: on the Khalkhin-Gol River - to encircle and defeat the enemy, on the Karelian Isthmus - to break through heavily fortified areas, in Western Belarus and Ukraine, as well as Bessarabia - maneuvering operations and the use of mechanized corps, and in Bessarabia - the use of airborne troops. The knowledge tested and worked out in the course of real military operations was used in August 1940 when developing a new strategic deployment plan, taking into account the increase in the size of the Red Army and the new borders of the USSR.
As in the previous plan, Germany remained the main enemy. There is nothing surprising or reprehensible in the development of a plan for waging a war with Germany, friendly for 1940, the USSR. The USSR, as well as any other country, did not have permanent friends, but there was a constant need to ensure the security of its borders, especially with such a fickle "friend" as Hitler's Germany. That is why, when in the summer of 1940 I. Stalin, having decided to deepen the friendship of the USSR with Germany for the sake of dividing the Balkans into spheres of influence and placing the Black Sea straits at the disposal of the USSR, so as not to repeat the unenviable fate of England and France, for which friendship with Germany turned into open enmity, and giving Soviet diplomats freedom of action in relation to Germany, at the same time demanded that his military provide security guarantees to the USSR against any surprises from Germany.
It was assumed that against the Soviet 179 divisions and 14 tank brigades on the border with the USSR, Germany, Finland, Hungary and Romania would put up 233 divisions. The concentration of the main grouping of Germany in the east was expected to be north of the Pripyat bogs in order to deliver from East Prussia either a strike on Riga and Polotsk, or a concentric strike from Suwalki and Brest to Minsk. In the area of Liepaja and Tallinn, amphibious assaults were expected: one for striking the flank of Soviet troops in the Baltic, the other for a joint concentric strike on Leningrad with Finnish troops. South of the Pripyat swamps, a strike of 50 German divisions was expected to bypass and rear the Lvov grouping of Soviet troops, and from the Botosani area - a strike by Romanian troops on Zhmerinka.
To counter Germany, the main grouping of the Red Army in the west of 107 divisions and 7 tank brigades was concentrated north of the Pripyat swamps, 62 divisions and 4 tank brigades - south of the Pripyat swamps, and 11 divisions and 3 tank brigades - on the border with Finland. It was planned to deliver a frontal strike against the fortifications of East Prussia by forces of the troops of the North-Western Front and a strike by part of the troops of the Western Front, bypassing these fortifications. For the defeat of the Lublin group of German troops, a concentric strike by the troops of the Western and Southwestern Fronts was envisaged. It was planned to firmly cover the border of the USSR with Hungary and Romania. The reserve of the High Command was supposed to be placed behind possible attacks of the German army in order to deliver an effective counterattack against the German troops that had broken through into the depths of the territory of the USSR (Diagram 3).
However, since I. Stalin expected the leading powers to struggle for influence in the Balkans, he was not satisfied with the proposed plan, and the leadership of the Red Army was instructed to develop a plan with the concentration of the main forces of the Red Army south of the Pripyat bogs. Already on September 18, 1940, a new strategic deployment plan was submitted for approval, in which the option with the deployment of the main forces of the Red Army north of the Pripyat swamps was supplemented by the option with the deployment of the main forces of the Red Army south of the Pripyat swamps.
It was planned that the South-Western Front, with the forces of 94 divisions and 7 tank brigades, brought together in 6 armies, together with part of the forces of the Western Front, with a concentric blow from the Bialystok and Lvov ledges, would smash the enemy's Lublin grouping and advance deep into Poland to Kielce and Krakow. The Northwestern and part of the forces of the Western fronts were tasked with delivering an auxiliary strike in the general direction to Allenstein. The plan made a proposal to deepen the strike of the southern grouping of Soviet troops to Breslau, but the size of the Red Army grouping on the border with Germany in 162 divisions and 13 tank brigades was not designed for this (Figure 4).
Together with the strategic deployment plan, on September 18, 1940, the Soviet political leadership was presented with a plan for the defeat of the Finnish armed forces by the Red Army. Since military operations were planned to be conducted with a friendly position of Germany, it was proposed to concentrate against 18 Finnish divisions of 63 Soviet divisions and 3 tank brigades: 11 rifle divisions of the Leningrad Military District, 2 - PribOVO, 5 - OrVO, 8 - MVO, 7 - KhVO, 4 - Ural Military District, 2 - SKVO, 6 - PrivVO, 1 - ArchVO, 2 tank and 1 motorized divisions, 3 tank brigades, as well as 14 rifle divisions RGK from ZOVO and KOVO. It was planned to create two fronts - North and North-West. 15 divisions of the Northern Front, leaving in the Petsamo-Naussi and Kemi area to the Norwegian and Swedish border, were to suppress international aid to Finland, while 32 divisions and 3 tank brigades of the North-Western Front, as well as 2 divisions of the RGK, with two concentric strikes and with landing forces, he was supposed to defeat the main forces of the Finnish army and reach Tampere and Helsinki, as well as occupy the Aland Islands (diagram 5).
In a radio speech on October 1, W. Churchill said: “Given security considerations, Russia cannot be interested in Germany settling on the shores of the Black Sea or in occupying the Balkan countries and conquering the Slavic peoples of Southeastern Europe. This would be contrary to the historically formed vital interests of Russia. Already on October 5, 1940, the final plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army in the West was proposed for consideration, and on October 14, the final plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army in the West was approved, with the concentration of the main forces of the Red Army south of the Pripyat swamps as the main option. The composition of the Southwestern Front, in order to ensure a guaranteed strike on Breslau, was increased to 126 divisions (including 23 divisions of the RGK) and 20 tank brigades, for which it was necessary to plan an increase in the Red Army from 226 divisions and 25 tank brigades to 268 divisions and 43 tank brigades (diagram 6). Two circumstances are noteworthy. First, since the increase was planned to be carried out after the outbreak of hostilities for a whole year, there is no need to talk about planning a preemptive strike by the Red Army against Germany at this stage. We can only talk about delivering a counterattack against the invading aggressor on the territory of the USSR.
Secondly, since the plan provided for the development of additional plans for the conduct of hostilities with Finland, Romania and Turkey, it was prepared, undoubtedly, in the hope of deepening relations with Germany, a joint division of the Balkans into spheres of influence, the annexation of Finland and Southern Bukovina to the USSR and the Black Sea straits. On the basis of this plan, in October 1940, a new plan for the mobilization deployment of the Red Army was adopted, proposing an increase in its composition to 292 divisions and 43 brigades.
The increased number of the Red Army made it possible to concentrate 134 divisions and 20 tank brigades in the Southwestern Front and bring the blow of Soviet units from the Lvov salient to the coast of the Baltic Sea in order to encircle and subsequently destroy almost the entire Wehrmacht grouping in the East. After the adoption of the plan for the concentration of the Red Army and the mob-plan, the KOVO headquarters were instructed to develop a plan of action for the district troops in accordance with the October plan for the concentration of the Red Army, and the LenVO headquarters was instructed to develop a plan for Operation NW. 20 "(" revenge in the North-West "), which was based on the plan of September 18, 1940, taking into account the planned increase in the composition of the Red Army.
However, all these truly grandiose plans were not destined to come true. In the Leningrad Military District, an instruction from the Red Army command to develop a plan for the final defeat of Finland “S-Z. 20 "has not received development. In contrast to the Leningrad Military District, in KOVO, the action plan of the troops of the Southwestern Front according to the deployment plan for 1940 was developed already in December 1940. The plan provided for the concentration of 7 armies, 99 divisions and 19 tank brigades in the Southwestern Front. The defeat of the enemy was supposed to be carried out in three stages - mobilization, the defeat of the main forces of the enemy and his pursuit in the direction of Breslau to the Opel-Kreisburg-Petrkov area by the forces of the 5th, 19th, 6th, 26th and 12th armies of the South -Western and part of the forces of the Western Fronts, as well as the defeat of parts of the Romanian army with a concentric strike of the 18th and 9th armies on Iasi and the exit of parts of the 9th army to the Bulgarian border (diagram 7). In full accordance with the October strategic deployment plan and the KOVO plan in January 1941, in connection with the assignment to the North Caucasus and the subsequent planned transfer to the western border, Timoshenko told I. Konev: “We are counting on you. You will represent the strike group if it is necessary to strike."
After a meeting of the top commanding staff of the Red Army in December 1940, two military-strategic games on maps in January 1941 and the approval of the KOVO commander G. Zhukov in February 1941, M. Kirponos was appointed the Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to command KOVO. Upon his arrival in KOVO, the developed cover plan was presented to the new commander of the district, who at the beginning of February 1941 ordered the KOVO commanders to develop army plans to cover the border by March 15, 1941. In mid-March 1941, these plans were ready, and, according to I. Baghramyan, head of the operational department of the KOVO headquarters, "no major alterations were required."
The General Staff of the Red Army monitored the development of the plan by the KOVO headquarters and “shortly after the beginning of the occupation of Yugoslavia by the Nazis … gave instructions to make a number of significant amendments to the plan for covering the state border. The district command was ordered to significantly strengthen the troops moved to the border. Four mechanized corps, four rifle divisions and a number of formations and units of special forces were additionally pulled up here. … The military council of the district, after carefully studying the new cover plan, without delay approved it. However, in early May 1941, the plan was rejected, and the KOVO command was ordered to develop a new plan for covering the border. To understand the reason for the refusal of the leadership of the Red Army from the KOVO plan, which became the pinnacle of the development of the plans for the strategic deployment of the Red Army on August 19, September 18 and October 14, 1940, it is necessary to return to November 1940.
With the failure in November 1940 of the negotiations between V. Molotov and I. von Ribbentrop and A. Hitler, as well as the beginning of a diplomatic war between Germany and the USSR for Bulgaria, the question of defeating Germany from a theoretical plane turned into a practical one. Obviously, in this situation, the political and military leadership of the USSR decided, without giving up the initiative to the enemy, to defeat his armed forces, forestalling their mobilization and delivering a preemptive strike against Germany. In this situation, the agenda raised the question of increasing the composition of the Red Army to deliver a guaranteed and all-destructive preemptive strike by the KOVO grouping from the border of southern Poland to the Baltic coast, and the preemptive strike required an increase in the composition of the Red Army in the pre-war period. Thus, the October 1940 strategic deployment plan, and after it the mobplan, the KOVO plan and the plans for the defeat of Finland, Romania and Turkey, were suddenly canceled and consigned to oblivion.
In December 1940, a meeting of the top commanding staff of the Red Army was held, at which new forms and methods of the combat employment of troops were considered, taking into account the combat use of the armed forces of Germany, England and France in 1939-40. In early January 1941, two military-strategic games on maps were held in order to determine the most effective option for a preventive strike by the Red Army against Germany - north or south of the Pripyat swamps to the Baltic Sea, bypassing the fortifications of East Prussia from the Bialystok and Lvov ledges, respectively. The fact that both games began with offensive actions of the “eastern” (USSR), while their actions to practice repelling the aggression of the “western” were limited to a short and extremely vague preamble. In the first game, the strike of the "eastern" ones, led by Pavlov, was inflicted bypassing the fortifications of East Prussia, however, the "western" ones, inflicting a short counterattack at the base of the "eastern" offensive, questioned its effectiveness (Scheme 8). In the analysis of the game, the decision of D. Pavlov, who played for the "eastern", was recognized as correct, but with the proviso that for the success of such a deep blow it is necessary to involve more forces and means.
In the second game, the "eastern" (USSR), having struck south of the Pripyat bogs, quickly defeated the "southern" (Romania), "Southwestern" (Hungary) and began a rapid advance deep into the territory of the "western" (Germany). It was this deployment option that was approved as the main one (Figure 9). Thus, for the second time, the southern option of concentrating the Red Army to the West triumphed over the northern option. According to the results of the games, G. Zhukov, who was in charge of the "eastern" troops in the second operational game on maps, was appointed the new chief of the General Staff of the Red Army to develop and deliver a preventive strike by the Red Army against Germany.
The fact that the strike should have been precisely preventive is clearly indicated by I. Stalin's appointment of the date for the start of the implementation of G. Zhukov's March plan for June 12, 1941 - as M. Meltyukhov quite rightly noted, I. Stalin could have appointed the date of the USSR attack on Germany, and the date of the German attack on the USSR is not. In February 1941, a new mobilization plan was adopted, providing for the transfer of the Red Army in pre-war time to the staff of 314 divisions (22 divisions deployed from 43 tank brigades were added to the previous 292 divisions). In addition, apparently, everything was ready for the formation of several dozen more divisions with the beginning of hostilities.
On March 11, 1941, after the introduction of German troops into Bulgaria, and British troops into Greece, the Soviet Union adopted a new plan for the strategic deployment of the Red Army, providing for the concentration of 144 divisions as part of the troops of the Southwestern Front, and as part of the Northwestern and Western fronts 82 divisions. This plan involved Germany's strikes in the Baltic states - on Riga and Daugavpils, Belarus - on Volkovysk and Baranovichi with concentric strikes from Suwalki and Brest, and Ukraine - on Kiev and Zhmerinka, in order to encircle and defeat the Lvov group of Soviet troops (diagram 10).
The complete March 1941 plan of the year has not yet been published anywhere, however, it probably assumed a preemptive strike by the troops of the Southwestern Front against Germany to the Baltic coast, with the aim of encircling and defeating the entire group of German troops in the East at once. The main difference between the March 1941 plan and the September and October 1940 plans is the increase in the Southwestern Front grouping and the depth of the strike on Germany up to the Baltic coast, its mobilization and concentration in the pre-war period, the assumption of a decrease in the depth of Germany's strike against the USSR in Belarus - not to Minsk, but to Baranovichi, and also, apparently, a strong connection to the actions of the Anglo-Greek-Yugoslav-Turkish troops against Germany's Balkan allies - Bulgaria, Italian Albania, Romania and Hungary.
The beginning of the development in March 1941 by the USSR and Britain of plans for the introduction of troops into Iran suggests the existence of some kind of treaty or agreement between them - England refuses to completely defeat the Italians in North Africa and sends its troops from there to Greece to strike at Germany's Balkan allies and thus ensuring the unimpeded defeat of the German group in the East by the Red Army, in exchange for protecting India from a strike by the troops of the German Afrika Korps, Italy and France from North Africa and the Middle East through Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq to Iran and further to India (Scheme 11). One thing is certain - by creating the Balkan Front, U. Churchill, in fact, sought to "evoke a serious and favorable reaction in Soviet Russia."
The rapid defeat of Yugoslavia and Greece by Germany cooled Stalin's resolve to attack Germany. The March 1941 plan was canceled. I. Stalin apparently renounced his friendship with W. Churchill and began to restore his relations with A. Hitler. Indicative in this respect is I. Stalin's categorical refusal of G. Zhukov's proposal to be the first to attack Germany in accordance with the plans of May 15 and June 13, 1941.
The plan proposed to I. Stalin by G. Zhukov on May 15, 1941, envisaged a preventive strike against Germany and Romania by the forces of 8 armies and 146 divisions of the Southwestern Front and part of the forces of the Western Front, with access at the first stage to the Ostrolenka-Olomouc line, at the second - to the coast of the Baltic Sea in order to encircle the East Prussian grouping of the Wehrmacht in the East. The reserve of the Main Command of the Red Army behind the Western and Southwestern Fronts was to deliver a counterattack on enemy units that had broken through to Vilnius and Minsk, as well as to Kiev and Zhmerinka. Two armies of the RGK, stationed in the area of Sychevka, Vyazma, Yelnya and Bryansk at junction railway stations, were to, if necessary, reinforce the troops of either the Western or the Southwestern fronts.
It was planned to fend off the German offensive by letting German shock groups go to Minsk and Kiev: separated by the Pripyat swamps, they posed absolutely no threat to the Red Army, at the same time they guaranteed the safety of the offensive of the troops of the Southwestern Front from the counterstrike of German troops. At the same time, reliable cover of the USSR's border with Germany in the East Prussia region prevented the breakthrough of the Germans into the Baltic States and the encirclement of the Western Front troops in the Baranovichi area (Scheme 12). The plan of June 13, 1941, slightly differing from the May plan in individual details, exactly repeated this scheme (Scheme 13).
On June 13, 1941, the TASS message published in the Soviet press on June 14, 1941 about the absence of tension between Germany and the Soviet Union was transmitted to the German government through diplomatic channels. In order to understand the motivation of I. Stalin, who finally and irrevocably refused to deliver a preemptive strike against Germany, let us return in December 1940 to a meeting of the highest command personnel of the Red Army.
Thus, we found out that after the establishment of a new state border, the General Staff of the Red Army developed a new plan for the deployment of the armed forces of the Red Army. The initial strike of 94 divisions and 7 tank brigades from the Lvov salient to Krakow (40% of 226 spacecraft divisions) was deepened by 126 divisions and 20 tank brigades first to Breslau (47% of 268 divisions), and then 134 divisions and 20 tank brigades to the Baltic coast (46% of 292 divisions). Since the expansion of cooperation with Germany was envisaged, the planning was of the “just in case” nature. The priority was the question of dividing the spheres of influence in the Balkans and the liberation of Finland, the rest of Bukovina and the Straits.
The situation changed dramatically after the failure of V. Molotov's negotiations with the German political leadership in November 1940. The liberation campaign was canceled. On the agenda was the issue of a preemptive strike against Germany. The number of the Red Army was promptly increased to the required state by the summer of 1941, the planning was worked out, but the plan for a preventive attack on Germany was not adopted for implementation.
Scheme 1. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the deployment plan of March 24, 1938 (Northern version). Compiled from a note by K. E. Voroshilov about the most probable opponents of the USSR // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 2 / Appendix No. 11 // www.militera.lib.ru
Scheme 2. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the deployment plan of March 24, 1938 (Southern option). Compiled from a note by K. E. Voroshilov about the most likely opponents of the USSR // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 2 / Appendix No. 11 // www.militera.lib.ru
Scheme 3. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the deployment plan of August 19, 1940. Stalin and V. M. Molotov on the basics of the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the USSR in the West and in the East for 1940 and 1941 // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 95 // www.militera.lib.ru
Scheme 4. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the deployment plan of September 18, 1940. Compiled according to a note by the USSR Ministry of Defense and the NGSh KA in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov on the basics of deploying the armed forces Soviet Union in the West and in the East for 1940 and 1941 // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 117 // www.militera.lib.ru
Scheme 5. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army against Finland in accordance with the deployment plan of September 18, 1940 Compiled according to a note by the USSR NO and the NGSh KA to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to I. V. Stalin and V. M. Union in case of war with Finland // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 118 // www.militera.lib.ru
Scheme 6. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the deployment plan of October 5, 1940 Compiled according to a note by the USSR NO and the NGSh KA in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to IV Stalin and VM Molotov on the fundamentals of the deployment of the armed forces Soviet Union in the West and in the East for 1941 // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 // www.militera.lib.ru
Scheme 7. Actions of the troops of the Southwestern Front according to the deployment plan for 1940. Compiled from a note by NSh KOVO. December 1940 // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 224 // www.militera.lib.ru
Scheme 8. Initial situation and decisions of the parties on the first strategic game, held at the General Staff of the Red Army in January 1941. Copied from: M. V. Zakharov On the Eve of the Great Trials / General Staff in the Pre-War Years. - M., 2005. S. 366-367.
Scheme 9. Initial situation and decisions of the parties on the second strategic game, held at the General Staff of the Red Army in January 1941. Copied from: Zakharov M. V. On the Eve of the Great Trials / General Staff in the Pre-War Years. - M., 2005. S. 370-371.
Scheme 10. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the strategic deployment plan of March 11, 1941. Reconstruction of the author. Compiled on the basis of a note by the USSR NO and the NGSh KA // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 315 // www.militera.lib.ru
Scheme 11. Joint actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army and Great Britain in accordance with the strategic deployment plan of March 11, 1941. Reconstruction of the author. Compiled according to a note of the USSR NO and the NGSh KA // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 1 / Document No. 315 // www.militera.lib.ru; Shtemenko S. M. General Staff during the war. In 2 books. Book. 1/2 ed., Rev. and add. - M., 1975. - S. 20-21; Encyclopedia of World War II. Battles in the south: May 1940-June 1941 / Per. from English - M., 2007.-- S. 70-71.
Scheme 12. Actions of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations in accordance with the deployment plan of May 15, 1941 Compiled according to a note by the USSR NO and the NGSh KA to the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR I. V. Stalin with considerations on the plan for the strategic deployment of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in case of war with Germany and its allies // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 2 / Document No. 473 // www.militera.lib.ru
Scheme 13. Grouping of the Armed Forces of the Red Army in the European theater of operations according to the deployment plan of June 13, 1941. Compiled from a certificate on the deployment of the USSR Armed Forces in case of war in the West // 1941. Collection of documents. In 2 books. Book. 2 / Document No. 550 // www.militera.lib.ru
