Ask a Russian what he can say about the Kalashnikov assault rifle, the immediate answer will be the words "reliable", "reliable" and "unpretentious" in one sequence or another. The second answer, after a little thought, is "simple and easy to use." And third, if the citizen is a little well-read, "cheap to manufacture."
OBJECTIVE REALITY
All that has been said is absolutely true. But not all. The listed qualities of the weapon are limited to the phase of firing the shot - that is, the moment the bullet leaves the barrel. But for a weapon, this characteristic is not enough, since the bullet fired must still hit the target. And in this phase, the Kalashnikov assault rifle, as they say, has problems.
There are two key ones. First, a bullet fired from a Kalashnikov assault rifle has a relatively weak striking (penetrating) effect. Secondly, the Kalashnikov assault rifle has poor accuracy, it is practically impossible to shoot in bursts of aim (the barrel "leads" diagonally to the right upwards, the muzzle compensator does not save), therefore, the limit of aimed automatic fire does not exceed 200-300 m.
The first of the shortcomings is due to the low-power (low-impulse) service cartridge 7, 62x39 mm. For comparison - a NATO service cartridge of a similar caliber has a sleeve length of 51 mm and, accordingly, trite contains more gunpowder.
A little clarification is needed here. In general, our cartridge theoretically refers to the so-called intermediate, and the specified NATO cartridge - to rifle. The classic Soviet rifle cartridge is considered to be the cartridge 7, 62x54 mm, with which the NATO one should be compared. But in life, unfortunately, for most of the second half of the twentieth century, a Soviet soldier with an AK was opposed by an enemy soldier armed with automatic rifles M14, FN FAL and G3 with a cartridge 7, 62x51 mm, so that just such a comparison seems appropriate.
So, a weak cartridge 7, 62x39 mm, and even a relatively short barrel determine a low muzzle energy of the AK of about 2000 J, while the main western counterparts in the same caliber - the FN FAL and M14 assault rifles - have an energy of 3000-3400 J. open terrain, the last armed soldiers can be the first to start mowing down the fighters equipped with the legendary Kalashnikov without much risk for themselves. By the way, even after the transition to intermediate cartridges of a smaller caliber, 5, 45 mm for us and 5, 56 mm for them, the latter has a sleeve 15% longer - 45 mm. Plus a longer barrel - 500 mm for the M16 versus 415 mm for the AK-74, and please: the muzzle energy of the first is 1748 J, the second is 1317 J.
Moreover, in the shortened version of the M16 (automatic carbine M4) with a barrel length of 368 mm due to the more powerful cartridge, the muzzle energy is still higher - 1510 J. In our shortened version of the AK-74U with a barrel of 205 mm (cut, cut !) The muzzle energy is 918 J. But the value of the high muzzle energy of small arms in modern combat has greatly increased. Our real enemy - terrorist groups - do not enter into open combat and operate from cover, and the "potential" enemy (sadly, NATO is still considered to be it) has long ago equipped his infantry with body armor. The fact that small-caliber weapons are losing relevance is confirmed by the active development by Western firms of promising models of automatic rifles in caliber 6, 5-6, 8 mm.
The second drawback is due to the low rate of fire (600 rounds per minute) and not the best geometry of the weapon - the axis of the AK barrel bore is located above the shoulder rest of the butt. As a result of recoil when fired, a moment of forces is created that lifts the barrel up, and even spirals to the right - in the direction of rotation of the bullet in the barrel. The low rate of fire resonates with the natural muscular reaction of the shooter - the recoil from the next shot falls into the most relaxed shoulder, which started but did not complete its reaction to the previous shot. Figuratively speaking, the machine gun "dances" in the hands during automatic firing.
However, we are not talking about assessing the individual advantages and disadvantages of the machine. You do not need to have great perspicacity to understand that all the pros and cons of the AK are somehow interconnected. I will clarify my idea. There is a phrase among designers that the creation of any technical object is the result of a compromise between mutually exclusive requirements. This means that the constructor initially finds itself in a situation of choice, when it determines what to sacrifice and what to give preference to.
In fact, the constructive basis of automatic weapons was created at the end of the 19th - beginning of the 20th centuries (Mannlicher, Schmidt-Rubin, Mauser, Crick, Steck, Simonov), and all further creativity consisted in improving some of the characteristics of weapons due, of course, others. The Kalashnikov assault rifle is no exception. The essence of the constructive solution of the AK is to improve the qualities of the weapon, manifested before the moment of the shot, attributed mainly to operational, by reducing the qualities that appear after the shot and attributed to combat.
Judge for yourself. One and a half times less powerful cartridge means less dynamic loads on the structural elements of the weapon when firing. Hence the reliability. The low rate of fire is the result of the use of the AK barrel locking scheme with a bolt rotation, which is more inertial in relation to the skewed bolt scheme used by foreign counterparts (due to the greater amount of movement made by the bolt when locking). But such a scheme is objectively more hermetic, which, of course, increases the reliability and reliability of the AK. In addition, the lower the rate of fire, the less wear and tear on the moving parts of the weapon - and this is again reliability, reliability, and at the same time the durability of the AK.
As for the ease and simplicity of the AK in handling, it is, upon close examination, a very ungrateful thing. The fact is that the process of operating a weapon is only 1-2% of the actual shooting. And the remaining interest is the safety and care for him to prepare for battle. And in this regard, ease and ease of use turn into a vicious property to disassemble and assemble weapons and take care of them with a minimum of additional tools, or even without the latter. But, whatever one may say, it is always a technology of a coarser, cumbersome and massive execution with blind rigid joints. The bottom line is that AK is relatively heavy, but it perfectly resists pollution, you can throw it under the wheel, roll in a puddle, hit against a wall, and anyone can use it. Here we can add that the rough and massive design of the weapon allows to increase its durability even under the most disgusting storage conditions. Well, the low cost of AK in production, which allows it to be stamped in the millions, is perfectly combined with the noted ease and ease of use.
However, it's time to ask the question: why exactly did Mikhail Timofeevich make him this way, what was his motivation? And here I will note that we have a strange story of the creation of weapons. The emphasis is solely on the genius of the designer. They say he stroked his bright head and gave out on the mountain an unsurpassed masterpiece of design thought.
This is not true. Any weapons are made in strict accordance with the tactical and technical assignment (TTZ), which is developed and approved by the customer - the Ministry of Defense, the military. In the process of creating weapons, the designer is obliged to fulfill only all the tactical and technical requirements laid down in the TTZ. So the Kalashnikov assault rifle was not just designed this way - it was set for development that way. Therefore, it is more correct to formulate the above question as follows: why are such requirements imposed on the created sample? Such a formulation of the question does not at all deny the talent of the designer - it depends on him how well the presented requirements, sometimes quite contradictory, will be combined in the created sample. But the dominant role here is still played by the TTZ.
I'll try to answer. To do this, we need to make a small digression, after which we will return to the AK.
THE THIRD PROBLEM OF RUSSIA, OR THE IDEOLOGY OF DOMESTIC WEAPONS
In addition to two well-known troubles, Russia has one more that is directly related to military affairs. Such, after an abundance of fools and disgusting roads, has become a huge number of its population, called in a military fashion a mobilization resource, and the population in its mass is not very literate.
The state, the size of one-sixth of the entire land mass, formed during the reign of Catherine II, has since then had an almost unlimited mobilization resource, that is, in the event of a war, it could deploy an army of any size. And this constituted and still forms the basis of all domestic military development, including strategy, tactics, characteristics of weapons, the structure of the military-industrial complex, and even the way of thinking of the military leadership.
Until the beginning of the twentieth century, specifically before the advent of machine guns and rapid-fire guns, the success of the battle was determined by the elementary numerical superiority in the decisive sector, since tactically the battle was reduced to duels. One armed fighter confronted another, and with a similar weapon. It is clear that in such conditions a large army had all the advantages. Russia actively used this advantage for two centuries, and gradually the conviction prevailed in high military minds that a mobilization resource could compensate for everything else. Remember the unforgettable remark of Field Marshal Apraksin? “Take care of the horses. The women still give birth to peasants, but they have paid for the horses in gold."
Russia has always counted on the opportunity to compensate for any possible organizational and technological lag in the military field by forced exploitation of human potential. That is, the military strategy of Russia, and then the USSR, was directly based on an seemingly endless mobilization resource. Well, tactics, of course, boiled down to ensuring such conditions for the conduct of combat in which the military numerical superiority plays a decisive role. This is essentially a tactic of open close combat, and the closer to the enemy, the better.
Now to arms. A huge army requires a huge amount of weapons. The production of a huge amount of weapons and ammunition for them requires an appropriate scale of production, devouring huge resources. Well, where can you get away from cheap-to-manufacture and technologically simple, if not primitive, weapons? And the cheaper, the more profitable - in which case it will not be a pity to lose, because close combat involves significant losses of both manpower and, accordingly, weapons. And the army should be taught at least to a minimum how to handle weapons, and training, for obvious economic reasons, should be limited to a very definite period.
But if the mobilized contingent is huge, and even illiterate, it is necessary to reduce and simplify the learning process as much as possible. And this is possible if we are dealing with a weapon that is as easy to use as possible. In addition, the produced weapons must also be properly stored, and huge warehouses for a huge amount of weapons also cost money, which the state is always in short supply. So the simplicity of the weapon is not the last thing here. And the frugal attitude to weapons on the part of an illiterate contingent has certain limits. With such a military strategy, the durability of weapons is very relevant - the process of accumulating them for a huge army, even with a huge production, is still very long. And here durability allows you to save a lot on retraining the army - do not have to fight with gray hair with the same weapon that they took in their hands at the dawn of youth, and the enemy's combat advantage can again be compensated for by an additional military conscription.
The conclusion is obvious. In a country that builds its military doctrine on the inexhaustibility of the mobilization resource, there will be no alternative in demand for a cheap-to-manufacture, easy-to-use, durable, reliable and unpretentious weapon in operation, even if it is inferior to the enemy's weapons in terms of combat properties.
Now let's continue our story about AK.
CHILD OF MILITARY DOCTRINE
So, what is the basis of the tactical and technical requirements for the Kalashnikov assault rifle? And there lies, in fact, the requirement to quickly arm 10-15 million people - something like this can be estimated the infantry mobilization of the USSR. The technical challenge for the arms industry in this regard is to produce an appropriate amount of extremely simple, cheap and reliable AK. It doesn't matter that the enemy will mow down the attacking chains where the AK is powerless - those who will reach and engage in close combat should still be enough to achieve the necessary advantage. And if the enemy suddenly wins, we have a guerrilla war in reserve, the tactics of which are raids, ambushes, etc. - again perfectly matches close combat. How right was Mikhail Kalashnikov when he called his automatic rifle a people's one! This weapon is more likely not for a professional army, but for a mass people's militia.
I will speak out about the enthusiastic assurances that the AK has no analogues. It really has no analogues, because there is simply nothing to compare it with! In the international classification of small arms, there is no concept of “machine gun” at all. There is, for example, a "light automatic rifle" or "automatic carbine" (more precisely - a "short automatic rifle" - short automatic rifle), whose characteristics are close to the AK.
Now about the "most widespread in the world." Indeed, the most common. But this rather speaks of the gigantic production of AK and the unheard-of generosity with which the USSR distributed it to the right and left to the prolific “fighters against world imperialism”. Even desperate supporters of the AK admit this sad fact, speaking of the insane extravagance with which our leadership handed out weapons and technical documentation to the right and left. The abundance of supplies produced is amazing - entire geographic regions were literally oversaturated with the beloved Soviet small arms.
The inconceivable number of produced AK and its unshakable label "the best in the world" have exhausted objective attempts to further develop Soviet small arms. The modernization of the AK in 1959 (AKM) only slightly reduced its weight by replacing some of the wooden parts with plastic ones. The transition to caliber 5, 45 mm (AK-74) did not improve any characteristics at all - not even the number of cartridges in the magazine. Needless to say, the design of the machine remains unchanged. An interesting detail: according to a recent contract with Venezuela, which we like to be so proud of, the Latin Americans purchased a modernized AK-74 version 103, that is, in a more powerful 7.62 mm caliber. In fact, this is a copy of the aforementioned AKM.
I cannot ignore such a masterpiece as the Nikonov AN-94 assault rifle, designed at one time to finally replace the AK. Its main advantage was proclaimed the rate of fire of 1800 rounds per minute in the mode of accumulated recoil impulse. But this applies only to the first two shots of the burst, and then - the same AK. It is clear that due to the constructive bells and whistles in terms of the rate of fire, the cost of the machine turned out to be too large, and in the presence of whole mountains of already stamped AK (17 million!), The AN-94 did not receive wide distribution.
A similar fate, and for the same reason, awaits, apparently, and the latest version of the Kalashnikov assault rifle - AK-12. There is little open information about it, but, according to published data, its distinctive feature is the ability to shoot with both the right and left hand, it is more ergonomic than its predecessors, it has a modern sight and a better barrel. There are no fundamental design changes - "we have retained the unique characteristics of Kalashnikov's brainchild: simplicity of design, highest reliability, operational strength, low cost." Although it can be seen from the presented images that the butt of the weapon is finally brought out practically along the axis of the barrel, the sight is accordingly raised. But in principle, this is the same unforgettable classic Kalashnikov, with which even journalists agree, calling the AK-12 a bluff and a risky advertising ploy.
It is a pity, but it seems that our gunsmiths once themselves "created an idol for themselves" and for half a century of prayers lost their qualifications, and they still try to mask their impotence with hurray-patriotic slogans that set the teeth on edge. As proof, I quote the general designer of TsNIITochmash for wearable weapons and combat equipment of servicemen Vladimir Lepin: “Our AK-74M assault rifle in terms of its operational characteristics (and just that, mind you - SV) is superior to the M-16 rifle. This includes (here it is! - SV) checking the operation of the weapon without cleaning and lubricating for five days, throwing from a height of 1, 2 meters, dust resistance, "sprinkling", etc. " It sounds, of course, impressive, but where did the main characteristic of small arms go - the ability to effectively hit the enemy in battle?
So the conclusion. The Kalashnikov assault rifle was developed solely on the basis of the doctrine of the inexhaustibility of the power's mobilization human resource. This weapon is super reliable, easy to use and extremely cheap to manufacture, but at the same time lags behind foreign counterparts in terms of combat characteristics. Such weapons are more likely not suitable for experienced professionals, but for a hastily trained mass of conscripts who are thrown into close combat in the hope of realizing a numerical superiority. All these aspects of the doctrine were embodied in his brainchild by Mikhail Kalashnikov, and, probably, in the best way.
Well, about the AK, it seems, everything. However, let me remind you that I wanted to say not about the advantages and disadvantages of the AK, but about the fact that its creation only reflected the essence of the military doctrine of the USSR, and before that of tsarist Russia - the realization of numerical superiority over the enemy.
Let's remember our other legend - the Makarov pistol.
DEAR "PAPASHA" MAKAROV AND OTHERS
So, PM (Makarov pistol of the 1952 model) is an invariable attribute of all domestic films about Soviet officers, policemen and employees of various special services.
PM, as they say, is "a crude and simple weapon, which, however, works flawlessly even in the worst conditions." In general, the PM design ideology is fully consistent with the aforementioned AK. Low-power cartridge 9x18 mm, one and a half times weaker than the standard foreign 9x19 mm Parabellum (it holds 0.33 grams of gunpowder versus 0.25 grams for the PM cartridge). Such a cartridge was invented to simplify the design of the pistol as much as possible, solely with the aim of increasing its reliability, ease of production and ease of use.
Indeed, it turned out nowhere easier - disassembled PM consists of only three parts (frame, bolt, return spring) plus a store. On the downside, everything is the same: in addition to a short firing range (a combination of a weak cartridge and a short barrel), the pistol is quite massive. The PM automatics, operating on the principle of a free breechblock, does not have recoil dampers required for pistols of this caliber. As a result, even with a relatively weak cartridge, the PM has a solid and sharp recoil, which quickly "clogs" the hand during intense shooting. The pistol is "clumsy" due to the large thickness of the handle - and this is with a single-row arrangement of cartridges in the store. Also, due to the use of a multifunctional mainspring, the PM has a rather tight descent, as a result of which it is difficult to maintain the aiming line in the vertical plane when fired. Let's add here a completely microscopic rear sight and a front sight in order to finally doubt the "highest" fighting qualities of the PM (I will add that the top of these "charms" is the statutory wearing of a holster with a pistol on the right side, from where it is impossible to pull it out without protruding the elbow properly; left bok, presumably, nostalgically awaits the return of the saber).
Summary. PM is easy to use, has high reliability, small size and weight for a given caliber. However, the reduction in size cost the pistol its fighting qualities. The shortened barrel, in combination with a relatively low-power cartridge, led to low accuracy and accuracy of fire, even at short ranges.
In the 90s, there was an attempt to increase the power of the PM cartridge by increasing the energy of the powder charge. The muzzle velocity of the bullet soared up to 420 m / s. An increase by a quarter of the gas pressure in the barrel and the forces acting on the structural elements of the Makarov pistol necessitated the creation of its modernized version - PMM. At the same time, the number of cartridges in the store was increased to 12 by their staggered arrangement. It is clear that they did not think too much about how to shoot from the PMM - the increased recoil with an unchanged design and automatic equipment with a free shutter is quite capable of knocking the weapon out of hand. So, I think, it is unrealistic to make an aiming series of shots from the PMM with the required rate of fire of 30–35 rounds per minute. In addition, as experts delicately note, the resource of a weapon using a fairly powerful ammunition has significantly decreased compared to the base model. True, the PMM could shoot old low-power cartridges, but then the question is, why all the fuss? In general, the game was clearly not worth the candle, and, despite the start of mass production, this pistol did not replace its “daddy” PM in the army.
AK and PM as the brainchild of the doctrine of the inexhaustibility of the mobilization resource are by no means an exception, but a manifestation of a general rule - the stake is placed precisely on extremely simple, unpretentious and cheap weapons. All our celebrities - "three-line", PPSh, PPS, TT - are openly focused on mass production, reliable, unpretentious, easy to use and do not require special care and attention. But in terms of combat qualities, they do not surpass, and are often inferior to similar weapons of the enemy.
Who is to blame and what should we do
History has no subjunctive mood, so I will not look for the guilty.
What needs to be done is technically clear: following modern realities, increase the power of the service cartridge of promising small arms, as well as its caliber.
But technology alone is not enough, it is time to change the very principles of military development. It is possible to correct the officially published military doctrine, although the signature of the president has not yet dried under it, namely, among the many potential enemies, single out the most dangerous ones that will actually have to be fought (as it seems, these are terrorist groups). Recognize that professionals are needed to defend the country, not conscripts with a year's experience (at least from the understanding that effective use of modern weapons cannot be taught in a year) and, on this basis, set a logical goal in the long term to abandon the draft. Formulate clear goals and principles for the development of weapons, including small arms, such as the predominant conduct of combat at a distance, the improvement of all types of combat support (primarily intelligence and information), etc.
And it would also be nice to calm down the jingoistic streams in print and electronic media, wholesale and retail glorifying our "best in the world", "unsurpassed" and "unparalleled" ships, planes and tanks, which invariably "plunge into shock", "Make a splash" and "admiration" at all kinds of salons and exhibitions. Hurray-patriotism works like blinkers that prevent you from seeing the obvious things, and soberly assessing the dignity and shortcomings of domestic weapons for subsequent work on their improvement: these "best in the world" consist of at least a quarter of imported components, especially in radio electronics. Without all this, it’s not something to design - to set objective tactical and technical requirements for a promising weapon will be a problem.
