On September 6, 1955, in the White Sea, from the Soviet diesel submarine B-67 (project 611V), the world's first test launch of the R-11FM ballistic missile, carried out under the leadership of Sergei Pavlovich Korolev, took place. The submarine was commanded by Captain 1st Rank F. I. Kozlov. Thus, 60 years ago, a new type of weapon was born - submarine ballistic missiles.
In fairness, it should be noted that the forefather of this weapon is Wernher von Braun, who proposed in the fall of 1944 to place his V-2 missiles in floating containers towed by a submarine, which were supposed to serve as a launcher. But by the will of fate and the heroism of our soldiers, Soviet and American rocket engineers had to implement this project in the conditions of the fiercest competition of the Cold War.
Underwater cosmodrome
In the beginning, success favored the Americans. In the summer of 1956, the Navy initiated and generously sponsored the NOBSKA research project. The goal was to create promising models of missile and torpedo weapons for surface and submarine ships of the fleet. One of the programs involved the creation of a missile submarine based on existing diesel and nuclear ones. According to the project, four 80-ton liquid-fuel (liquid oxygen + kerosene) MRBMs "Jupiter C" were placed in transport and launch containers in a horizontal position outside the strong hull of the boat. Before launch, the missiles had to be upright and refueled. Both nuclear weapons developers in the United States took part in the project on a competitive basis - LANL (Los Alamos National Laboratory) and the freshly baked LLNL (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory), which had no practical experience, headed by Edward Teller. The storage of liquid oxygen in separate tanks on the submarine and the need to pump it from the onboard stock to the rocket tanks immediately before launch was initially considered a dead-end direction, and the project was rejected at the sketch stage. In the fall of 1956, at a meeting in the Ministry of Defense with the presence of all the designers, Frank E. Boswell, head of the naval ammunition testing station, raised the question of the possibility of developing solid-propellant ballistic missiles five to ten times lighter than the Jupiter C, with a flight range from 1000 to 1500 miles. He immediately asked the developers of nuclear weapons: "Can you create a compact device weighing 1000 pounds and with a capacity of 1 megaton in five years?" Los Alamos representatives immediately refused. Edward Teller writes in his memoirs: "I got up and said: we in Livermore can make it in five years, and it will give 1 megaton." When I returned to Livermore and told my guys about the work ahead, their hair stood on end."
The companies Lockheed (now Lockheed Martin) and Aerojet took over the work on the rocket. The program was named Polaris, and on September 24, 1958, the first (unsuccessful) test launch of the Polaris A-1X missile from a ground-based launcher took place. The next four were also emergency. And only on April 20, 1959, the next launch was successful. At that time, the fleet was reworking one of its projects of the Scorpion SSN-589 PLATS into the world's first SSBN George Washington (SSBN-598) with a surface displacement of 6019 tons, and an underwater one - 6880 tons. To do this, a 40-meter section was built into the central part of the boat behind the fence of retractable devices (deckhouse), in which 16 vertical launch shafts were placed. The circular probable deviation of the rocket when firing at a maximum range of 2200 kilometers was 1800 meters. The missile was equipped with an Mk-1 monoblock warhead that separates in flight, equipped with a W-47 thermonuclear charger. In the end, Teller and his team managed to create a revolutionary thermonuclear device for its time: the W47 was very compact (460 mm in diameter and 1200 mm in length) and weighed 330 kilograms (in the Y1 model) or 332 kilograms (Y2). Y1 had an energy release of 600 kilotons, Y2 was twice as powerful. These very high, even by modern criteria, indicators were achieved by a three-stage design (fission-fusion-fission). But the W47 had serious reliability issues. In 1966, 75 percent of the 300 most powerful Y2 warheads were considered defective and could not be used.
Greetings from Miass
On our side of the Iron Curtain, Soviet designers took a different path. In 1955, at the suggestion of S. P. Korolev, Viktor Petrovich Makeev was appointed chief designer of SKB-385. Since 1977, he is the head of the enterprise and the general designer of the Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau (now the State Regional Center named after Academician V. P. Makeev, Miass). Under his leadership, the Mechanical Engineering Design Bureau became the country's leading research and development organization, solving the problems of developing, manufacturing and testing sea missile systems. For three decades, three generations of SLBMs have been created here: R-21 - the first missile with an underwater launch, R-27 - the first small-sized rocket with factory refueling, R-29 - the first sea intercontinental, R-29R - the first sea intercontinental with a multiple warhead …
SLBMs were built on the basis of liquid-propellant rocket engines using high-boiling fuel, which makes it possible to achieve a greater coefficient of energy-mass perfection in comparison with solid-propellant engines.
In June 1971, a decision was made by the military-industrial complex under the USSR Council of Ministers to develop a solid-propellant SLBM with an intercontinental flight range. Contrary to the prevailing and firmly rooted ideas in historiography, the assertion that the Typhoon system in the USSR was created as a response to the American Trident is incorrect. The actual chronology of events suggests otherwise. According to the decision of the military-industrial complex, the D-19 Typhoon complex was created by the Engineering Bureau. The project was supervised directly by the general designer of the mechanical engineering design bureau V. P. Makeev. The chief designer of the D-19 complex and the R-39 missile is A. P. Grebnev (laureate of the USSR Lenin Prize), the leading designer is V. D. Kalabukhov (laureate of the USSR State Prize). It was planned to create a rocket with three variants of warheads: a monoblock, with a MIRV with 3-5 medium-power units and with a MIRV with 8-10 low-power units. The development of the conceptual design of the complex was completed in July 1972. Several variants of missiles with different dimensions and with differences in layout were considered.
A decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of September 16, 1973 set the development of the Variant ROC - the D-19 complex with the 3M65 / R-39 Sturgeon missile. At the same time, the development of solid-propellant missiles 3M65 for SSBNs of project 941 was started. Earlier, on February 22, 1973, a resolution was issued on the development of a technical proposal for the RT-23 ICBM complex with the 15Zh44 missile with the unification of the engines of the first stages of the 15Zh44 and 3M65 missiles at Yuzhnoye Design Bureau. In December 1974, the development of a preliminary design for a rocket weighing 75 tons was completed. In June 1975, an addition to the draft design was adopted, leaving only one type of warheads - 10 MIRVs with a capacity of 100 kilotons. The length of the launch pad increased from 15 to 16.5 meters, the launch weight of the rocket increased to 90 tons. The August 1975 decree of the USSR Council of Ministers fixed the final layout of the rocket and combat equipment: 10 low-power MIRVs with a range of 10 thousand kilometers. In December 1976 and February 1981, additional decrees were issued, stipulating changes in the type of fuel from class 1.1 to class 1.3 at the second and third stages, which led to a decrease in the missile's range of action to 8300 kilometers. Ballistic missiles use solid fuels of two classes - 1.1 and 1.3. The energy content of fuel type 1.1 is higher than 1.3. The former also has better processing properties, increased mechanical strength, resistance to cracking and grain formation. Thus, it is less susceptible to accidental ignition. At the same time, it is more susceptible to detonation and is close in sensitivity to a conventional explosive. Since the safety requirements in the terms of reference for ICBMs are much stricter than those for SLBMs, class 1.3 fuel is used in the first, and class 1.1, in the second. Reproaches from Western and some of our experts in the technological backwardness of the USSR in the field of solid propellant rocket technology are absolutely unfair. The Soviet SLBM R-39 is one and a half times heavier than the D-5 precisely because it was carried out using ICBM technology with overestimated safety requirements, completely redundant in this case.
Slippery weight
The third generation of nuclear missile weapons on submarines required the creation of special thermonuclear charges with improved weight and size characteristics. The most difficult thing turned out to be the creation of a small-sized warhead. For the designers of the All-Russian Research Institute of Instrumentation, the formulation of this problem began with the report of the Deputy Minister of Medium Machine Building for the Nuclear Weapons Complex A. D. Zakharenkov in April 1974 about the characteristics of the Trident warhead - Mk-4RV / W-76. The American warhead was a sharp cone with a height of 1.3 meters and a base diameter of 40 centimeters. The warhead weighs about 91 kilograms. The location of the special automatics of the warhead was unusual: it was located both in front of the charge (in the nose of the unit - a radio sensor, protection and cocking stages, inertia), and behind the charge. It was necessary to create something similar in the USSR. Soon, the Mechanical Engineering Bureau issued a preliminary report confirming the information about the American warhead. It indicated that a material based on carbon filaments was used for its hull, and an approximate estimate of the distribution of weight between the hull, nuclear warhead and special automatics was given. In the American warhead, according to the authors of the report, the corps accounted for 0.25–0.3 warhead weights. For special automatics - no more than 0, 09, everything else was a nuclear charge. Sometimes, false information or deliberate misinformation on the part of a rival stimulates the engineers of the competing parties to create more sophisticated or even ingenious designs. This is exactly what has been the case for almost 20 years - the overestimated technical characteristics served as an example to follow for Soviet developers. In reality, it turned out that the American warhead weighs almost twice as much.
Since 1969, the All-Russian Research Institute of Instrumentation has been working on the creation of small-sized thermonuclear charges, but without reference to a specific ammunition. By May 1974, several charges of two types were tested. The results were disappointing: the warhead turned out to be 40 percent heavier than its foreign counterpart. It was required to select materials for the case and to work out new devices for special automatics. VNII instrument-making attracted to the work of the Scientific Research Institute of Communications of the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. In the commonwealth, an extremely light special automatic was created, not exceeding 10 percent of the weight of the warhead. By 1975, it was possible to almost double the energy release. The new missile systems were supposed to install multiple warheads with the number of warheads from seven to ten. In 1975, the All-Russian Research Institute of Experimental Physics KB-11 (Sarov) was involved in this work.
As a result of the work carried out in the 70s and 90s, including those on ammunition of small and medium power class, an unprecedented qualitative increase in the main characteristics that determine combat effectiveness was achieved. The specific energy of nuclear warheads has been increased several times. Products of the 2000s - 100-kilogram small class 3G32 and 200-kilogram medium power class 3G37 for R-29R, R-29RMU and R-30 missiles were developed taking into account modern requirements for increased safety at all stages of the life cycle, reliability, security. For the first time in an automation system, an inertial adaptive firing system is used. In combination with the sensors and devices used, it provides increased safety and security in abnormal operating conditions and in case of unauthorized actions. Also, a number of tasks are being solved to increase the level of counteraction to the anti-missile defense system. Modern Russian warheads significantly surpass American models in terms of power density, safety and other parameters.
Rocket Race Salt
The key positions that determine the quality of strategic missile weapons and are recorded in the protocol to the SALT-2 Treaty naturally became the starting and throwing weight.
Clause 7 of Article 2 of the Treaty: “The launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM is the dead weight of a fully loaded missile at the time of launch. The throw weight of an ICBM or SLBM is the total weight of: a) its warhead or warheads; b) any autonomous dispensing units or other appropriate devices for aiming a single warhead or for separating or for disengaging and aiming two or more warheads; c) its means of penetrating defenses, including structures for their separation. The term “other appropriate devices”, as used in the definition of the throw weight of an ICBM or SLBM in the second agreed declaration to paragraph 7 of Article 2 of the Treaty, means any device for disengaging and targeting two or more warheads, or for targeting a single warhead, which could provide additional warheads with additional speed no more than 1000 meters per second”. This is the only documented and legally recorded and fairly accurate definition of the throw weight of a strategic ballistic missile. It is not entirely correct to compare it with the payload of the launch vehicle used in civilian industries to launch artificial satellites. There is a "dead weight", and the composition of the throwing weight of the combat missile includes its own propulsion system (DP), capable of partially performing the function of the last stage. For ICBMs and SLBMs, an additional delta at a speed of 1000 meters per second gives a significant increase in range. For example, an increase in the warhead speed from 6550 to 7480 meters per second at the end of the active section leads to an increase in the launch range from 7000 to 12000 kilometers. Theoretically, the disengagement zone of warheads of any ICBM or SLBM equipped with MIRV can represent a trapezoidal area (inverted trapezoid) with a height of 5000 kilometers and bases: lower from the launch point - up to 1000 kilometers, upper - up to 2000. But in fact, it is an order of magnitude less in most missiles and is strongly limited by the engine thrust of the dispensing unit and the fuel supply.
Only on July 31, 1991, the real figures of the launch masses and payload (throw weight) of American and Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs were officially published. Preparations for START-1 have come to an end. It was only during the work on the treaty that the Americans were able to assess how accurate were the data on Soviet missiles provided by the intelligence and analytical services in the 70s and 80s. For the most part, this information turned out to be erroneous or, in some cases, inaccurate.
It turned out that the situation with American numbers in the environment of "absolute freedom of speech" is not better, as one might expect, but much worse. The data in numerous Western military and other media in reality turned out to be far from the truth. The Soviet side, the experts who carried out the calculations, in the preparation of documents both on the SALT-2 Treaty and on START-1, relied precisely on the published materials on American missiles. Incorrect parameters, which appeared back in the 70s, migrated from independent sources to the pages of the official tabloids of the US Department of Defense and archive files of manufacturers. The figures provided by the American side during the mutual data exchange immediately after the conclusion of the treaty and in 2009 do not give the real throw weight of the American missiles, but only the total weight of their warheads. This applies to almost all ICBMs and SLBMs. The exception is the MX ICBM. Its throw weight in official documents is indicated exactly, up to a kilogram - 3950. It is for this reason that, using the example of an MX ICBM, we will take a closer look at its design - what the rocket consists of and which warhead elements are included in the throw weight.
Rocket from the inside
The rocket has four stages. The first three are solid propellant, the fourth is equipped with a rocket engine. The maximum rocket speed at the end of the active section at the moment of shutdown (cutoff of thrust) of the 3rd stage engine is 7205 meters per second. Theoretically, at this moment, the first warhead can separate (range - 9600 km), the 4th stage is launched. At the end of its operation, the warhead has a speed of 7550 meters per second, the last warhead is detached. The range is 12,800 kilometers. The additional speed reported by the 4th stage is not more than 350 meters per second. According to the terms of the SALT-2 Treaty, the missile is formally considered a three-stage one. DU RS-34 seems to be not a stage, but an element of the warhead design.
The throw weight includes the Mk-21 warhead breeding unit, its platform, the RS-34 rocket engine, and the fuel supply - only 1300 kilograms. Plus 10 Mk-21RV / W-87 warheads of 265 kilograms each. Instead of part of the warheads, complexes of means of overcoming missile defense can be loaded. The throw weight does not include passive elements: a head fairing (about 350 kg), a transition compartment between the warhead and the last stage, as well as some parts of the control system that are not involved in the operation of the breeding unit. The total is 3950 kilograms. The combined weight of all ten warheads is 67 percent of the throw weight. For Soviet ICBMs SS-18 (R-36M2) and SS-19 (UR-100 N), this figure is 51, 5 and 74, 7 percent, respectively. There were no questions about the MX ICBM then, and there are no now - the missile undoubtedly belongs to the light class.
In all official documents published over the past 20 years, the numbers of 1500 kilograms (in some sources - 1350) for the Trident-1 and 2800 kilograms for the Trident-2 are indicated as the throw weight of American SLBMs. This is only the total weight of the warheads - eight Mk-4RV / W-76s, 165 kilograms each, or the same Mk-5RV / W-88, 330 kilograms each.
The Americans deliberately took advantage of the situation, supporting the still distorted or even false ideas of the Russian side about the capabilities of their strategic forces.
"Tridents" - violators
On September 14, 1971, the US Secretary of Defense approved the decision of the Naval Coordination Council to begin R&D under the ULMS (Extended Range Ballistic Missile Submarine) program. The development of two projects was envisaged: "Trident-1" and "Trident-2". Formally, Lockheed received an order for the Trident-2 D-5 from the Navy in 1983, but in fact, work began simultaneously with the Trident-1 C-4 (UGM-96A) in December 1971. SLBMs "Trident-1" and "Trident-2" belonged to different classes of missiles, respectively, C (caliber 75 inches) and D (85 inches), and were intended to arm two types of SSBNs. The first - for the existing boats "Lafayette", the second - for promising at that time "Ohio". Contrary to popular belief, both missiles belong to the same generation of SLBMs. "Trident-2" is made using the same technologies as "Trident-1". However, due to the increased size (diameter - by 15%, length - by 30%), the starting weight has doubled. As a result, it was possible to increase the launch range from 4,000 to 6,000 nautical miles, and the throw weight from 5,000 to 10,000 pounds. The Trident-2 rocket is a three-stage solid-propellant rocket. The head part, which is two inches smaller than the diameter of the first two stages (2057 mm instead of 2108), includes the Hercules X-853 engine, which occupies the central part of the compartment and is made in the form of a cylindrical monoblock (3480x860 mm), and a platform with warheads located around it. The breeding unit does not have its own remote control; its functions are performed by the third stage engine. Thanks to these design features of the missile, the length of the Trident-2 warhead disengagement zone can reach 6400 kilometers. The third stage, loaded with fuel, and the platform of the breeding unit without warheads weighs 2,200 kilograms. For the Trident-2 rocket, there are four options for loading the warhead.
The first is "heavy warhead": 8 Mk-5RV / W-88, throw weight - 4920 kilograms, maximum range - 7880 kilometers.
The second is "light warhead": 8 Mk-4RV / W-76, throw weight - 3520 kilograms, maximum range - 11 100 kilometers.
Modern loading options according to STV-1/3 restrictions:
the first - 4 Mk-5RV / W-88, weight - 3560 kilograms;
the second - 4 Mk-4RV / W-76, weight - 2860 kilograms.
Today we can say with confidence that the missile was created in the period between the SALT-2 (1979) and START-1 (1991) Treaties, knowingly in violation of the first: than that of the largest, respectively, in terms of throw weight, of the light ICBMs”(Article 9, point“e”). The largest of the light ICBMs was the SS-19 (UR-100N UTTH), whose throw weight was 4350 kilograms. A solid reserve for this parameter of the Trident-2 missiles provides the Americans with ample opportunities for "reentry potential" in the presence of a sufficiently large stock of warheads.
Ohio - on pins and needles
The US Navy today has 14 Ohio-class SSBNs. Some of them are based in the Pacific Ocean at the Bangor naval base (17th squadron) - eight SSBNs. The other is in the Atlantic at the Kings Bay naval base (20th squadron), six SSBNs.
The main provisions of the new policy for the development of the US nuclear strategic forces for the near future are recorded in the Nuclear Posture Review Report 2010 released by the Pentagon. In accordance with these plans, it is planned to begin a gradual reduction in the number of deployed missile carriers from 14 to 12 in the second half of the 2020s.
It will be carried out "naturally" after the expiration of the service life. The withdrawal from the Navy of the first Ohio-class SSBN is scheduled for 2027. Submarines of this type should be replaced by a new generation of missile carriers, currently under the abbreviation SSBN (X). In total, it is planned to build 12 boats of a new type.
R&D is in full swing, it is expected to begin replacing existing missile carriers in the late 2020s. The new submarine with a standard displacement will be 2,000 tons heavier than the Ohio and will be equipped with 16 SLBM launchers instead of 24. The estimated cost of the entire program is $ 98-103 billion (of which research and development will cost $ 10-15 billion). On average, one submarine will cost $ 8, 2–8, 6 billion. The commissioning of the first SSBN (X) is scheduled for 2031. With each subsequent one, it is planned to withdraw one Ohio-class SSBN from the Navy. The commissioning of the last boat of the new type is scheduled for 2040. During their first decade of service life, these SSBNs will be armed with D5LE Trident II SLBMs.
