Part 1. "Elton"
On Sunday, April 9, at 10.00, the commander of the hydrographic vessel "Elton" took over as the battalion duty officer. In the second half of the day, an understanding came: something had happened at sea. By the evening, we set the task of picking up a vessel with a hydrological cable at least 2,000 meters long on board and capable of reaching full autonomy tomorrow.
Almost all ships with oceanographic equipment were at the base. These, first of all, included oceanographic research vessels (ois) of project 850 and hydrographic vessels of project 862. These were vessels of sufficiently large displacement and unlimited seaworthiness, and oceanographic research was their main purpose. Adequate equipment was guaranteed on these ships. There was only one problem: the actual readiness to go to full autonomy. Everything was explained simply. These vessels went out to sea for 60-90 days no more than 2 times a year, each time performing the prescribed pre-voyage measures in accordance with the annual plan of oceanographic research. The rest of the time the vessel was at the berth, the crew was taking vacations and the accumulated time off. It was very problematic to prepare the ois for an unscheduled launch to the sea with full autonomy in less than a day.
There were also universal hydrographic vessels (gisu) of projects 860 and 861. Their versatility consisted in the ability to perform both oceanographic research and pilot work (delivery of supplies to lighthouses, maintenance of coastal lights and floating warning signs). But the readiness of these ships was very high. Most of the crew was always on board. Going out to sea was planned with a weekly plan, or even happened suddenly. Of the minority of the crew who did not live on board, many did not go ashore to have a good rest before going to sea again. It was also much easier to replenish the stocks of these ships, since their displacement was one and a half to two times less. At the same time, seaworthiness was also unlimited. Doubt was caused only by the state of the oceanographic equipment, since it was used relatively rarely on these ships.
Somewhere in the sea there was a hydrographic vessel 861 of the Kolguev project, but it was re-equipped to search for submarines and is currently performing combat missions. The command obviously knew better how to dispose of them.
After some deliberation, the Elton commander on duty at the battalion came to the conclusion that there are only two options: the Boris Davydov ois and the Elton gisu itself.
On the Elton's hydrological winch, the cable was exactly more than two kilometers. As recently as last year, the vessel carried out hydrological work in the Greenland Sea for 60 days. The battalion duty officer did not believe in the possibility of preparing the officer for the exit, but the commander of the Davydov was on board, who suddenly announced his readiness to carry out any order from the command. The command, apparently, also had doubts about the readiness of the Boris Davydov rocket, and the task of preparing the ship for going to sea was assigned to the commander of the Elton, taking him off duty on Monday morning two hours before the shift.
The exit was scheduled for 15.00. By lunchtime, the crew was on board. Those who were absent were notified and arrived on time. Fuel and water supplies were replenished to full norms from neighboring ships by 14.00. The issue of baking bread was also resolved. In the division, it was customary to freeze bread for future use in huge quantities, but it was no longer possible to get bread. The experience of the Elton commander in the Black Sea Fleet came in handy, where bread was baked in the sea, receiving flour for the entire campaign. The expeditionary staff of the Hydrographic Service of the Northern Fleet arrived on board. The goals of the campaign were still not entirely clear.
Finally, at 17.00, the “go-ahead” was received to go out to sea with a call to Sayda Bay, and the ship departed from the pier in Mishukovo. At 19.45 Elton moored in Yagelnaya Bay. By midnight, RChBZ specialists arrived on board with instruments. It became clear that they would do the bulk of the work. Then it became known for certain about the death of the Soviet nuclear submarine K-278 "Komsomolets". The point of death of the nuclear submarine was designated by "K-3", the commander of "Elton" was told the approximate coordinates. At 7 am on April 11, "Elton" departed from the pier with the task of going to the Greenland Sea.
At point "K-3" "Elton" arrived on April 12, at 22.00, and immediately began sampling air, water at different horizons and soil sampling. The results of radiation measurements were immediately transmitted to the headquarters of the fleet. In parallel, a visual observation of the water surface was established. A Norwegian Coast Guard ship was already in the area. He was contacted on VHF and passed on an offer to stay away. He soon departed southward.
A day later, on April 13, our destroyer approached the K-3 point. "Elton" became close to him for voice communication. The last instructions from the command and the updated coordinates were transmitted from the destroyer. In the very first days, Orion-class aircraft of the US Navy's base patrol aircraft began to fly around the vessel, and a Norwegian helicopter once flew in. On April 15, Elton replenished its fuel and water supplies from the Dubna tanker. It was stormy almost all the time. The excitement then subsided to five points, then intensified to seven.
On April 22, the R / V V. Berezkin "Hydrometeorological Service of the USSR and brightened up the loneliness of" Elton "for almost a week. Storming close to each other, the ships exchanged navigational information. Determining the coordinates of the vessel in the area was not very good. In the best case, the Cicada SNS managed to get one observation at 4 o'clock. From time to time I had to take up the sextant.
The specialists of the GS of the Northern Fleet, who were on board, tried to "hang" on such rare observations the depth measurements in the area, which was very poorly combined with storm tacks and maneuvering to fulfill the main task - monitoring the radiation situation. The task to perform the sounding was set in connection with the expected arrival of the carrier vessel of the deep-sea vehicle. The commander of "Elton" together with the chief officer (both of them were hydrographic officers) went the other way. From the very beginning of being in the area, each SNS observation was plotted on a pre-prepared tablet in the Mercator projection at a scale of 1: 25000. The measure was forced, since there were simply no maps for this area, larger than a scale of 1: 500000. All maneuvers of the vessel for a month of sailing on such a map could easily be covered with a 1-kopeck coin. At each observation, the commander ordered the depth to be recorded using the echo sounder. In the end, the entire plate was covered with depths, which made it possible to draw contours. The seconded hydrographers did everything right, but on three sheets of thin tracing paper with rare accidentally successful measurement tacks, which they managed to hook on at least two observations. It was almost impossible to use this for navigation purposes. Therefore, when in mid-May the Perseus gisu of the Baltic Fleet with a deep-sea vehicle on board arrived at the point, the Elton commander handed over to the Perseus his map, which he himself had been maneuvering for about a month. I must say that the commander of the "Perseus" appreciated the work of the navigators of the "Elton" and expressed his gratitude as best he could.
Immediately after meeting with "Perseus" "Elton" received an order to follow to the base and at 04.00 on May 16, everything was moored in the same Yagelnaya bay. The specialists of the RKhBZ, who were carrying out the monitoring, got off the board. The excess of the natural background radiation environment was never revealed. Before lunchtime, we managed to replenish food and water supplies. It was 1989. There was simply no water in Mishukovo then, and there were problems with obtaining food. After lunch, "Elton" left the Yagelnaya Bay and two and a half hours later moored in Mishukovo at the 4th berth with the 2nd hull to the same type "Kolguev". The crews of both ships were impressed by the recent tragic events in which they somehow had to take part, and of course, a lively exchange of information immediately began.
So what did the sailors of "Kolguev" actually see? Let's look at the events of April 1989 through the eyes of the commander of "Kolguev".
Part 2. "Kolguev"
On April 7, at 10:00 am, the commander of the hydrographic vessel "Kolguev", as usual, was on the bridge and habitually peered at the monotonous picture of the Greenland Sea right along the course. Recently, in accordance with the plan of the trek, he gave the command to lie down on a course of 180º. The vessel rocked smoothly at a 6-knot speed. The excitement was no more than 4 points, which could be considered a calm.
The only midshipman in the crew climbed onto the bridge, and this could only mean one thing: another telegram had been received from the command. This time, the headquarters of the fleet warned that the maneuvering area of the Soviet submarine K-278 was located at the course of "Kolguev". Search equipment "Kolguev" could detect the "trace" of the boat, so the commander was warned. The area was located on the border of the Greenland and Norwegian Seas.
At 11.15 on the screen of the radar "Don" there was a mark almost directly on the course. According to calculations, the move had no purpose. Soon it was possible to see it visually - it was a submarine on the surface. The commander decided to get as close as possible to identify the boat. If it was "someone else's", it was necessary to prepare a report. It could have been "one of our own", since this was already the area mentioned in the telegram. In any case, it is strange why the boat is on the surface. With conversations on VHF, I also did not want to light up ahead of time.
Shortly before noon, we got close to the submarine. In a distance, a voice connection was established near the cable. The boat was Soviet, and the submariners clearly had some problems. A part of the crew was on the upper deck, but there seemed to be no signs of an accident. The commander of "Kolguev" asked through a megaphone if help was needed. The response of the submarine commander was negative, "Kolguev" was asked to follow its own course. Well, okay, you never know what the submariners decided to do on the high seas …
"Kolguev" entered the Norwegian Sea and continued to move away from the surfaced nuclear-powered ship to the south with the same 6-knot course. However, soon on VHF negotiations began to be tapped - the boat interacted with the aviation of the fleet. It was difficult to understand anything specific, perhaps these were teachings. There was no reason to change course yet. It all started at about 4.30 pm. From what was heard on the VHF, it was already clear that there was an accident on the boat, and alarming notes were growing in the negotiations. The commander of "Kolguev" ordered to go back and select the towed devices. A minute later the midshipman with a telegram went up to the bridge. The text contained an order to follow the emergency boat at the maximum possible speed, the telegram was signed more than an hour ago … A few minutes later the same order was duplicated through the command and control channels (wow, they remembered!).
In 5 hours, the 6-knot vessel managed to move about 30 miles from the boat. This means that this distance can be covered with the maximum possible stroke in about 2 hours. By 17.00, towed devices were chosen and soon entered the full speed mode, and after a few minutes they brought the speed to 225 per minute, which corresponded to the most full speed and 16 knots.232 revolutions per minute were not given even on the measuring line, only during sea trials after repairs - this was the maximum possible move, and the mechanics gradually entered this mode. The vessel was rapidly approaching the accident site at a speed of 17 knots.
I arrived at the meeting point with the nuclear submarine "Kolguev" at about 19:00. The boat was no longer on the surface of the ocean. The rescue operation was launched by the “Khlobystov” who arrived in time. He arrived almost an hour early and managed to save many submariners. "Kolguev" was destined to raise only four dead sailors from the water. The bodies were handed over to the Khlobystov and for another day they tacked the area, lifting everything that could be related to the disaster on board from the surface of the water …
Epilogue
All of us were very worried about what happened to the Komsomolets nuclear submarine. The press, one after another, began to publish articles describing the chronology of events and attempts to understand the reasons for such grave consequences. Mention was made of the lack of preparation of the crew for rescue operations, and the lack of the necessary rescue equipment in the fleet in appropriate readiness, and the lack of interaction with the Norwegian Navy. But it was never mentioned anywhere that the hydrographic vessel "Kolguev" was at the side of the damaged nuclear submarine "Komsomolets" almost immediately after the submarine surfaced to the surface and could take on board the submariners who were not involved in the fight for survivability. "Kolguev" could have simply been on the side of the damaged nuclear submarine or nearby in the area of the accident, but did not receive such an order …
Many years have passed since then. Rescue training of the crews of ships and vessels of the Navy has reached a qualitatively new level. Not fast enough, but modern rescue equipment is still being delivered to the Navy. Specially designated naval forces are kept in readiness for rescue operations. Even with the Norwegian Navy, joint exercises are held from time to time.
And yet, along with purely technical reasons and the overwhelming forces of nature, the notorious human factor continues to play its sinister role.
Eternal memory to the sailors who died in the ocean!
