Napoleon strove to defeat the Russian armies from the very beginning of the campaign. But Barclay and Bagration, even combining their forces, avoided a decisive battle, continuing to retreat into the interior of the country. And therefore, after Smolensk, the French emperor, most likely, contrary to his original plans, undertakes a campaign against Moscow. His expectation that the Russians would fight a decisive battle at its walls was fully justified. And yet, according to eyewitnesses, on the eve of this battle, Napoleon was very afraid of a possible withdrawal of the enemy and for this reason acted very carefully.
It should also be noted that no matter how the French emperor tried to defeat the Russian army, it was in the capture of Moscow that he saw the successful completion of the campaign.
Kutuzov took command in a very unfavorable strategic situation, in which, until the arrival of reserves and other troops, the best decision, apparently, was to preserve the army. At the same time, in the battle for the ancient capital, the balance of forces, according to the information of the Russian headquarters, was too unprofitable [1]. But the refusal to defend her was contrary to the tsar's demand and would hardly have found understanding in the army and the people.
After the arrival of the new commander-in-chief, the retreat continued for another five days, but this, most likely, was caused to a greater extent not so much by the search for a better position as by the desire to attach all possible reinforcements to the army.
On August 22, the Russian army settled at Borodino. At the same time, the main forces of the French remained in Gzhatsk, and their vanguard also did not show significant activity for the second day.
Although Kutuzov examined and approved the position, many were not sure that the battle would be fought here. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that Bagration was not too worried about the dangers that threatened his army that day. No less hurt by the appointment of Kutuzov, Barclay, according to his recollections, examined the location of his troops and ordered "to cover the right flank … to build several fortifications and spotted" [2].
In fact, this wing has received even more attention. On the 22nd, the construction of a whole system of numerous fortifications began there. And then an order was given to the 2nd Army, according to which all of its entrenching tools were transferred to the main apartment, and in fact - to the 1st Army [3]. Obviously, neither Bagration nor Barclay could give such an order on their own.
In the disposition for August 24 there is a special instruction that the jaegers of the 1st army "come in part to occupy the forests, located on the right flank" [4]. There are no such indications, for example, about the protection of the Utitsky forest.
And Platov, according to his report [5], on the eve of the battle “sent a detachment of Cossacks of Balabin II to the right fifteen miles away”, although a detachment of Vlasov III was already monitoring the enemy north of the main position.
But what were the grounds for such concern for the right flank?
Of course, if the defense was too unreliable, the enemy could cross the Kolochu in its lower reaches, with all the ensuing consequences.
The path to Mozhaisk along the left bank of the Moskva River was perhaps more convenient for the enemy than, for example, the Old Smolensk Road, but, on the other hand, the French could practically not use it to carry out a roundabout maneuver covertly and suddenly. In addition, to reach the rear of the Russian army, they would have to cross the Moskva River twice, and even near Mozhaisk.
Finally, the right wing was still much better protected by the terrain than the left.
Since no retreat order was issued on the morning of the 23rd, according to one version, Bagration, already alarmed by this development of events, communicated his opinion about the position of the 2nd Army to the commander-in-chief, after which a new reconnaissance took place.
During the inspection of the position, Kutuzov, according to Barclay, rejected his proposal to build a strong redoubt at the Kurgan height, but ordered the construction of the Semyonov fortifications [6].
As a result, these fortifications, on which the left flank rested on the day of the general battle, began to be erected with a delay of a day or even a little more.
And this is a mistake, first of all, of the Quartermaster General, to whom M. S. Vistitsky 2nd was appointed on August 20. But, according to many historians, his duties were actually performed by KF Toll. And it was he who played the main role in the selection of the position and the deployment of troops on it.
It should also be noted that if the French troops stopped in Gzhatsk not for two days, but for only one, they could reach the Russian left flank, when engineering work on it had not yet begun.
Since there was little time left for the construction of serious fortifications near Semenovsky, it was necessary to win it. This was the true meaning of the stubborn defense of the Shevardino position.
Just the same, most likely, wishing to protect Kutuzov and himself from criticism, he pointed out that the Shevardinsky redoubt was built “in order to better reveal the true direction of the enemy forces, and if possible, the main intention of Napoleon” [7].
But they began to build this redoubt just in front of the Semenovskie flushes and almost simultaneously with them.
And on the 24th it was only possible to "discover" that the troops of Murat and Davout, marching in the vanguard of the main column, together with the Poniatovsky corps (which was supposed to support them), were trying to seize the Shevardino position. But this became quite clear after 3-4 hours of the battle, and it lasted until nightfall, and at least half of the troops of the 2nd Army took part in it.
This battle, of course, did not completely predetermine the further actions of the enemy. The next day, the Russian command again needed to closely monitor the movements of Napoleon's troops and try to unravel his true intentions. And in the same "Description of the battle …" Tolya, Kutuzov comes to the conclusion that "Napoleon had the intention to attack the left wing of the Russian army with his main forces" only "in the evening" of the 25th, when "on the enemy's right wing, large movement”[8].
Attack on Raevsky's battery. Artists F. Roubaud and K. Becker. 1913 Oil on canvas
But where was the left flank on the morning of 24 August?
From Kutuzov's letter to the tsar a day later, it can be understood that the commander-in-chief decided to "bend" him "to the previously fortified elevations" (ie to flushes) only after the attack of the "main forces" of the enemy [9]. Barclay thought the same, believing that Semenovsky was preparing a kind of reserve position for the troops of the 2nd Army.
But in fact, Gorchakov's detachment was essentially a rearguard. And even in the disposition for August 24 there is a certain hint that the 27th division, "located on the left flank," most likely did not adhere to the 7th corps, although it was part of the "cor-de-battal" [10] … But later it was supposed to be located on the eastern side of the Semenovsky ravine, as shown in the "Position plan …" [11].
During the reconnaissance on August 23, Bagration also drew Kutuzov's attention to the danger of bypassing the left wing along the Old Smolensk road. The commander-in-chief, however, agreed with the opinion of Bennigsen, who proposed using non-combatant troops (i.e., militias) to protect this road. However, it is quite obvious that these troops could block the path of only a very insignificant detachment of the enemy.
The adjustments made during the reconnaissance did not affect the center and the right wing in any way. And in the future, Kutuzov rejected all proposals to place the entire army (or, at least, "cor-de-battal") south of the village. Gorki, which can be explained both by the increased attention to the northern flank, and, apparently, to a greater extent by the desire, in any development of events, to keep in their hands the main route of retreat - the New Smolensk road.
Of course, on 23 August one could only guess about the intentions of the French emperor. But in his letter to the tsar, written on the same day, Kutuzov informs about his firm intention to leave the chosen position if the enemy tries to bypass it [12].
Probably, at first, Napoleon took the Shevardinsky redoubt for an advanced fortification and ordered to seize it without delay in order to quickly reach the main Russian position. On the other hand, this redoubt simply interfered with the advance of the French troops to Borodino, threatening the main communication from the flank, and also blocked the path to the most advantageous direction of the frontal attack.
However, some French marshals believed that on the 24th their troops had already attacked the main position of the enemy, and, therefore, the Russians would either try to regain the lost redoubt, or retreat even further to the east. This opinion, of course, could not but disturb Napoleon [13].
After all, if the first assumption was justified, then the next day they would have to defend, not attack.
It was quite difficult to develop a good plan for the general engagement on August 25 also due to the Shevardino battle that had lasted until nightfall. In addition, it was necessary to bring up "artillery reserves and all other slightly lagging units", i.e. two army corps and a significant part of the cavalry, which was not at the roll call in Gzhatsk.
Finally, further attacks by the Russian left wing were too predictable, and, quite possibly, Napoleon wanted to think carefully about everything.
On August 25, Kutuzov conducted another reconnaissance [14]. Bennigsen proposed to build there a closed fortification of the bastion type with 36 guns near the Kurgan Heights. But Kutuzov preferred Tolya's opinion, and a little later they began to build a lunette with 18 guns there. Thus, the delay with its construction was more than three days. Although a certain amount of work had been done earlier, Raevsky believed that during the day there was only a simple open battery at this height. In this case, the "cor-de-battal" before the start of the battle began to pass directly through the Kurgan Heights.
According to Barclay's report, Tuchkov's 3rd corps was transferred "on the 24th in the evening" to the left flank by order of Kutuzov. Later, he recalled that he found out about this by accident, and Tol ordered the corps to follow him [15].
But many historians believe that all this happened a day later.
Konovnitsyn in his report, unfortunately, definitely indicates only the time when the rangers of his division were "detached" on the left flank. And it remains unclear where at that moment were her other shelves [16].
In his memoirs [17] Bennigsen writes that on the 25th he went to the extreme left flank to place Tuchkov's corps there. And in a report to Kutuzov, he says that Vistitsky also took part in this. Ultimately, Tuchkov's corps was placed directly in the village. The duck and near it, i.e. almost exactly in accordance with the "Position plan …".
But still, what was the purpose of this redeployment?
Toll, as is known, explained its necessity by the threat of an enemy offensive along the Old Smolensk road. And, according to his "Description of the battle …", when "big movements" were noticed on the right flank of the French army on the evening of August 25, Kutuzov "immediately" sent the 3rd corps "to cover" the Old Road, reinforcing it with Morkov's militias [18].
However, on the "Plan of the position …" Tuchkov's troops "are located secretly." In addition, their image on these crocs is more consistent with a covert placement, rather than defensive.
Therefore, according to another version, Tuchkov had to "act on the flank" of the enemy, attacking Bagration's flush, from a hidden position in the area of the village. Duck.
According to A. A. Shcherbinin, Kutuzov assigned the entry into battle of the 3rd corps and militia divisions in fact a key decisive role in the battle, and Bennigsen brought his plan “to nothing” [19]. But at present, many historians consider both of these statements to be either delusion or fiction.
In addition to Shcherbinin, E. Württemberg, E. F. Saint-Prix, and also Vistitsky, whose memoirs are perhaps the most eloquent, were very well aware of this plan: “Bagration sent several times to Lieutenant General Tuchkov 1st, so that he from village Utitsy hit the rear and the flank of the enemy …”[20].
Researchers have long found that the location for the "ambush" was rather poorly chosen. Surroundings of the village. The duck did not provide visual stealth for a large detachment well. The Old Smolensk road passed through the indicated village, which, undoubtedly, was of great tactical importance, and the enemy could try to use it in his plans. In addition, the 3rd corps and, accordingly, the line of jaegers in front of it were located too close to the positions of the French army, which, of course, could cause concern for its command.
However, on the "Position plan …" the location of the "ambush" detachment could be shown approximately. But even if it was supposed to place the 3rd corps to the south or east, Tuchkov, and in these variants, might need all of his troops to protect the Old Road, if a sufficiently large enemy detachment were advancing along it.
Nevertheless, many believed that Tuchkov could easily fulfill his task, reproaching him for passivity, indecision, overestimating the forces of the enemy who attacked him, and even that he "did not know how to hold on." But these reproaches cannot be considered objective.
An important consequence of the movement of the 3rd corps to the Old Smolensk road was that its defense became, of course, much more reliable. But there were still significant flaws. Tuchkov's corps had little artillery, and no fortifications were built for it.
As indicated in the "Report …" [21], in the space "from the 3rd corps to the left wing of the 2nd army" "for better communication" were placed 4 regiments of rangers.
The Utitsky forest was not completely and completely impassable, which allowed the French to use quite large forces there on August 26. And in the fight against these enemy troops, undoubtedly, a very large role was played by the units of Baggovut's corps that arrived from the right flank. Thus, located "for better communication" between the 3rd corps and the 2nd army, Shakhovsky's jaegers could urgently need significant reinforcements. Moreover, as it turned out later, they were also needed by Bagration, and then Tuchkov.
It is important to note that the regular troops directed to the Old Smolensk road were not taken from the right flank, but from the main reserve, the number of which was significantly reduced after that.
After the Shevardinsky battle, the 2nd Army suffered significant losses, but no reinforcements were received, and therefore Bagration was forced to reduce his reserve, pushing Vorontsov's division into the first line. True, earlier the total number of guns in his army was brought to 186, and battery ones - to 90.
But in the event that the left wing of Bagration is attacked by the main forces of the enemy, Kutuzov, according to FN Glinka, planned to strengthen it with Miloradovich's troops the day before.
On August 25, Napoleon was also preparing for the decisive battle, having spent two or three lengthy reconnaissance that day.
He rejected Davout's offer to bypass the enemy's left wing with the forces of the 1st and 5th corps at night. Indeed, a large detachment would have to travel a considerable distance in the dark through the forest in unfamiliar terrain. In such conditions, he could get lost, be discovered by the enemy, etc., which could have a variety of consequences, including Kutuzov's refusal to fight.
There was a certain risk in the significant division of Napoleon's main forces that arose under such a plan. In addition, the detachment sent to bypass still needed to go out into open space in order to line up in battle formations. Otherwise, all this mass of troops would have remained in the forest.
In general, Davout's plan promised a lot, but the likelihood of failure, which could have a big impact on the outcome of the battle, was not so small.
When such a maneuver was made during the day, of course, the effect of surprise was lost. And in an offensive through the forest, it was possible to use practically one infantry in loose formation. And in these "forest" battles even a large unit could "get bogged down". And yet there is an opinion that Napoleon should have sent more forces not to the Semyonov fortifications, but to the south, since the French managed to achieve good results there, and with the use of artillery and even cavalry.
In the French commander's own plan, the main role was assigned to a frontal attack on the enemy's left flank from Kurgan Heights to the Utitsky forest.
And bypassing the Old Smolensk road, only a relatively small Polish corps was sent, which was to march not at night, but at dawn.
It should be noted that this decision could have nothing to do with Tuchkov's troops.
First of all, Napoleon could simply think of providing a flank for the main forces. Indeed, the Old Smolensk Road did not run so far from the route of Davout's divisions, and was not such an extreme flank for the French. And if the enemy's barrier on this road turned out to be weak, Poniatovsky could have made a detour.
In total, Napoleon intended to concentrate more than 90% of the "Great Army" (including the Polish corps) against the Russian left wing. By the beginning of the battle, he had placed almost as many guns on the right bank of the Kolochi as Kutuzov had in the center, on the left flank and in the main reserve. But most of the rest of the artillery was subsequently used to support the offensive of the Beauharnais troops to Kurgan Heights. At the same time, Miloradovich's guns were separated by too great a distance even from the enemy's forward posts.
The French emperor took a number of measures in order to create a false idea among the enemy about the actual location and further actions of his troops [22]. On August 25, on the left bank of the Koloch, there was a significant part of the army, including the entire guard, which left their bivouacs near the village. Valuevo only at nightfall.
It is only logical that Napoleon was showing the enemy the strength of his left wing. At the beginning of the battle, the Russian command could see that there were quite large forces relying on the fortifications erected west of the village of Borodino. But 4 divisions of Beauharnais with the Italian guard also had to cross Kolocha at the Aleksinsky ford already during the battle. The viceroy's engineers built the bridges for this maneuver at the last moment - on the night of 26 August.
That same night, the French built three large artillery positions against the left wing and center of the Russian army. As a result, at dawn on August 26, 102 French guns opened fire on the Semyonovsky fortifications. Moreover, contrary to popular belief, the cores immediately flew to the target. It is generally accepted that the Russians had 52 guns installed on and near these fortifications. Currently, this figure seems to be overestimated to many historians. Another 18 guns were located a little further - beyond the Semenovsky ravine. Shulman's battery also, apparently, could not respond to the artillery of General d'Antoire de Vrencourt with equal fire.
Napoleon also, in order not to disturb the enemy, deliberately left the village of Borodino in his hands. And Ponyatovsky, probably, did not even move closer to the Old Smolensk road.
Of course, it is very difficult to draw a definite conclusion about the extent to which these military "tricks" influenced the decisions of Kutuzov. However, the fact that the Russian commander-in-chief did not remove a single soldier and not a single weapon from the right flank was undoubtedly beneficial to Napoleon.
The correctness of the calculations of the generals is usually found out in the course of the battle. Judging by the text of the "Description of the Battle …", the Russian army was, at least, quite well prepared for the fact that the main forces of the enemy would rush to its left wing. Only at the cost of huge losses and only by noon did the French finally manage to seize the Semyonov fortifications. Moreover, before Bagration was wounded, this wing acted so successfully that it even had a "surface above the enemy" [23].
The authors of a very interesting study "Nine by Twelve …" [24] convincingly prove that such a presentation of events is a distortion of the facts, the beginning of which was laid by Karl Tol, first in the "Report …", and then in the "Description of the battle …" [25]. Numerous documents indicate that Bagration was actually wounded at about 9 am, and all three flushes completely passed into the hands of the enemy no later than 10 hours. By changing the chronology of events and some literary techniques, Toll tried to hide the true drama of this episode of the battle.
Perhaps, only the first attacks of French troops on the positions of Vorontsov's division did not inspire great fears. But already at about 7 o'clock in the morning, Bagration, seeing that the forces of the 2nd Army were clearly insufficient, turned to Kutuzov and Barclay with a request to send reinforcements to him. According to Lavrov's report, even before that, "the entire Guards Infantry Division, appointed by the Colonel for the Quartermaster Unit of Tolya … took a position behind the right flank of the 2nd Army to reinforce it" [26]. After some time, Bagration received in his immediate command the second and combined grenadier brigade of this division, as well as 3 regiments of guards cuirassiers with part of the artillery from the main reserve. Despite the fact that the time of the direct entry of the guardsmen into battle was different, with the exception of the cuirassiers of Shevich, almost from the very beginning of the battle they were all under the fierce fire of enemy artillery. This fact is especially noted by Lavrov in his report.
Barclay has repeatedly expressed his surprise and disagreement at such an early use of the Guards Corps in battle. Bagration, apparently, adhered to the same opinion and was in no hurry to throw the guards regiments into battle. First, he attracted his private reserves, as well as troops from neighboring areas of the position, to the fight for the flushes.
The departure of a part of the 7th corps, Konovnitsyn's division and Sievers' cavalry to the Semyonov fortifications, of course, weakened the center and the extreme left flank of the Russian army. But even before the movement of these troops, Raevsky and Tuchkov were far from all right.
Judging by the report and "Notes …" by Ermolov [27], the defenders of Kurgan Heights suffered heavy losses from the fire of French batteries and, most likely, lacked artillery charges. The fortification built there was weak, and because of its tightness, the main part of the infantry cover was outside, where it was exterminated by the enemy's grapeshot. Moran's infantry took advantage of this situation, seizing this important point during the first assault.
The troops of the 3rd corps were significantly inferior to the Poles in artillery, and without the 3rd division, in manpower. In addition, Tuchkov was almost immediately forced to leave a too disadvantageous position near the village. Duck and retreat 1.5 km to the east.
The actions of Napoleon's flank groups at the initial stage of the battle were generally very effective. Although the French did not succeed in firmly taking possession of the Shulman battery and the Utitsky kurgan, the Russians needed solid reserves and enormous efforts to prevent this from happening.
In the fight for Semyonovskie flushes, the following fact attracts attention. The troops of the 2nd Infantry Corps, which were supposed to reinforce Bagration's army in the event of a serious threat to the left flank, did not directly participate in this struggle. This was because the 2nd Corps approached the left wing, when the battle for the flushes was in its final stages, and the fate of these fortifications had actually already been decided. At the same time, a very dangerous situation developed for the Russians in the center of their position and in the Utitsky forest. For this reason, Barclay placed the 4th division south of Kurgan Heights, and Baggovut led the 17th division to the far left flank of the army. It was later joined by the 2nd Brigade of the 4th Division.
In order to reach the positions of the 2nd Army, not to mention the Old Smolensk road, Baggovut took a lot of time. Therefore, it was risky to delay this maneuver. Judging by the text of the "Dispatches …", Kutuzov gave the order to transfer the 2nd and 4th corps to the left wing and center at about noon, and after Bagration was wounded. But in reality, Baggovut's corps left the right flank much earlier. And in the "Description of the battle …" the commander-in-chief gives the order to Baggovut soon after 7 (ie about 8) in the morning. Most likely, the commander of the 2nd corps received two orders: the first from Barclay, and the second later, when his troops were on their way, from Kutuzov.
The starting position of the 4th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Corps was, in our opinion, quite justified, since before the start of the battle the entire Beauharnais group, with the exception of Moran's division, was located on the left bank of the Kolocha. But Osterman-Tolstoy's infantry also left the right flank long before noon and, apparently, already from 10 am was in the center of the position.
There are two opposite opinions about the main idea of Napoleon's tactical plan - the use of an "oblique" battle formation (oriented against the most vulnerable part of the enemy's overly "stretched" position) and the subsequent frontal offensive of the main forces.
Some believe that this decision was in principle correct, since by 9 o'clock the French had almost achieved victory, and only some unfortunate circumstances and mistakes of their commanders prevented them from developing their success. And after that, Kutuzov managed to pull up almost all of his reserves, including troops from the right flank.
According to others, the outcome of this battle was quite natural, and the main reason for its "deplorable" results for the French was that Napoleon decided to attack a well-fortified enemy position from the front, and did not use the maneuver usually used in such cases.
But, firstly, the Russians did not build any "bastions" on the Borodino field. Their defense relied only on ordinary field fortifications, which, according to eyewitnesses, had significant shortcomings.
Secondly, all the main strongholds on the left wing and in the center were eventually captured by the French. At the same time, the Russians fought for them with a huge effort and also suffered very serious losses (probably even more significant). Nevertheless, having already lost all these fortifications, Kutuzov's troops were not disorganized and did not retreat, but, on the contrary, maintained order of battle and continued to defend themselves in a new position.
Napoleon's plan was, in our opinion, not so erroneous, and a less staunch enemy under the same conditions could suffer a complete defeat.
But under Borodino, this plan did not bring the expected result to the French commander, first of all, because the Russian soldiers showed unparalleled heroism and resilience in this battle, and their commanders led their troops skillfully and energetically.
Largely for the same reason, the successes of the "Great Army" were not so significant at the initial stage of the battle, i. E. until 9 o'clock in the morning.
Cavalry battle in the rye. 1912 g.
Raid of Uvarov and Platov's cavalry
In contrast to the rather skeptical assessments of K. Clausewitz, according to many Russian historians, the cavalry raid of Uvarov and Platov played a very significant or even decisive role in the battle.
However, only these two generals in the Russian army were not awarded for their participation in the Battle of Borodino. The fact that Kutuzov had certain claims against them is also evidenced by the memoirs of AB Golitsyn and the report of the commander-in-chief to the tsar on November 22 with the words “the Cossacks … on this day, so to speak, did not act” [28].
In addition, according to the "Notes" of A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Platov was "dead drunk on both days." NN Muravyov-Karsky also mentioned this in his notes. Moreover, according to this eyewitness of the events, because of the "bad orders and drunken state" of the Cossack chieftain, his troops "did nothing", and "Uvarov, who took over the command after him, did nothing" [29]. That is, in other words, the actions of the Cossacks and cavalry on the left bank of the Kolocha not only did not play a significant role, but did not bring almost any benefit at all.
But what results did Kutuzov expect from this maneuver? And what was its ultimate goal?
According to the memoirs of Clausewitz, the idea of a cavalry strike on the northern flank of the enemy arose at Platov, who, early in the morning, did not find significant French forces on the left bank of the Kolocha [30].
There is an opinion that, on the basis of this information, the Russian command could already conclude that in reality Napoleon had much fewer troops than previously thought. But such a conclusion at ten o'clock in the morning could be erroneous.
Prince E. of Hesse-Philippstalsky, who arrived from Platov, first presented the plan of the Cossack chieftain to Colonel Tol. And he, quite possibly, not only got carried away with this plan, but also saw in it a way to completely change the nature of the battle and, perhaps, even win it. Other military leaders also believed in the great prospects of this plan. So, for example, Barclay believed that if "this attack were carried out with greater firmness … then the consequences of it would be brilliant" [31].
Uvarov understood his task as follows: "… to attack the enemy's left flank in order to at least somewhat delay his forces, which were so eager to attack our second army" [32].
According to one version, a surprise attack by the Russian cavalry was supposed to divert a significant part of the French troops to the left bank of the Kolocha, after which Kutuzov planned to turn the tide of the battle. And it was for this purpose that he sent the 4th Infantry and 2nd Cavalry Corps to the center of the position [33].
A strong counterattack, of course, could significantly change the situation in the battle. But could the cavalry raid of Uvarov and Platov create soon after noon (later the insignificance of their forces would have been revealed) sufficiently favorable conditions for a counteroffensive?
Earlier, among domestic historians, it was believed that Napoleon, having learned about the appearance of the Cossacks in the rear of the 4th corps, immediately sent from 20 to 28 thousand people to his left flank. However, it has now been established that all these reinforcements actually amounted to about 5 thousand people, and, thus, did not even outnumber all the Russian troops that took part in the raid [34]. Moreover, Beauharnais restored order on the northern wing practically on his own.
Such a result, of course, is no longer so impressive, and many blame Uvarov and Platov for the failure to achieve more. But let's look at this episode of the battle from the side of the enemy.
Napoleon was undoubtedly alarmed by reports from the left flank, since by that time there were no more than 10 thousand people left to defend him. It is also clear that the further advance of the enemy troops in the southern direction could create a threat to the artillery of General d'Antoire de Vrencourt, and later on to the main route of retreat (although from the village of Shevardino to the New Smolensk road in a straight line approximately 1.5 km). And it was, of course, dangerous to delay in taking the necessary measures.
But d'Antoire assessed the situation very correctly and asked Beauharnais to send exactly the cavalry, and its approach would not take much time. He sent him two regiments of Grusha, two guards regiments of Trier and, just in case, all the infantry of the Italian guard. Napoleon sent Colbert's brigade to cover the rear. [35] If a greater danger arose, a little more cavalry would apparently have been sent to the northern wing, which, of course, would not have changed anything in principle.
On the other hand, the demoralizing effect of this Russian counterattack could not have been as strong as in the climax of the battle.
And the general situation in the confrontation between the sides that had developed by the beginning of the active operations of Uvarov's corps and, above all, the French guard remaining in reserve, to a large extent allowed Napoleon to avoid too hasty and reckless decisions. And it is unlikely that under such circumstances, the French commander who had great tactical experience, without waiting for more accurate information about what is happening on the left bank of the Kolocha, would immediately send a large number of troops there.
It is also important to note that the capabilities of Uvarov and Platov were naturally limited by the forces at their disposal. In addition, the terrain and the lack of a unified command prevented them from achieving greater success.
Obviously, a much stronger effect from this counterattack could have been achieved at the moment when the enemy would have squandered his offensive potential by throwing his last reserves into battle. But Kutuzov, apparently, could no longer wait for this moment, since at ten o'clock a very alarming situation developed on the left flank.
According to another version, the Russian cavalry raid was only a diversion (sabotage) with the ultimate goal of relieving the enemy's pressure on the left flank and center as much as possible. And the corps of Osterman-Tolstoy and Korf moved to the left along the front to strengthen the defense, since new enemy attacks were to be expected in the area of the Raevsky battery.
But if the counter-offensive plan was not thwarted, what then caused Kutuzov's discontent with the actions of Uvarov and Platov?
And according to this version, the commander-in-chief in the same way could have complaints against these generals, and expect that the enemy will send many more troops to repel the Cossacks and regular cavalry.
In the end, this maneuver undoubtedly had quite beneficial consequences for the Russians, since at a very tense moment of the battle, the activity of their adversary significantly decreased, and this pause lasted about two hours.
Gorki - the command post of the Russian Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov
Final battle
After the final capture of Kurgan Heights by the French, both sides were already significantly drained of blood and tired.
By that time, Kutuzov did not have such a powerful reserve behind the lines of the main battle formation, which was indicated in the disposition on August 24: 18 guard battalions, 20 grenadier battalions, 11 infantry battalions and 40 cuirassier squadrons. And the enemy was still strong enough, and he retained his main reserve. Therefore, the risk in the counteroffensive was definitely not small.
And yet, according to eyewitnesses, Kutuzov gave verbal orders about his intention to attack the enemy the next day, and in accordance with this plan, a disposition was drawn up. But officially, he sent Dokhturov an order with the following content:
"I see from all the enemy movements that he weakened no less than we did in this battle, and therefore, having already tied up with him, I decided tonight to arrange the whole army in order, to supply artillery with new charges and tomorrow to resume the battle with the enemy …"
Barclay received exactly the same order. He has a very interesting ending, which is rarely quoted: "… For any retreat in the present disorder will entail the loss of all artillery" [36].
Perhaps Kutuzov actually thought so at that moment. But this decision, of course, can only be considered as preliminary.
Late in the evening, he gathered a council “to decide whether to hold the battlefield the next morning, or retreat, and, meanwhile, ordered Tol to survey the position of the left flank … Arriving on the left flank, Karl Fedorovich learned that the old Moscow road leads the scaffolding, more direct postal, to the communications of the army. From there only the mentioned shots were heard. This circumstance was decisive”[37]. Ermolov also believed that "the position of Baggovut's corps, hitherto unnoticed in the darkness of the night, and which the enemy could disrupt communication with other troops, forced to retreat" [38].
Probably, when it became known about the large losses, Kutuzov wanted to convince the generals that there was a threat of a detour.
A. B. Golitsyn quite frankly wrote about this: “At night, I drove around with Tol the position in which our tired soldiers slept like a dead sleep, and he reported that it was impossible to think of going forward, and even less to defend from 45 tons those places that were occupied by 96 tons., especially when Napoleon's entire Guards Corps did not participate in the battle. Kutuzov knew all this, but he was waiting for this report and, having listened to it, ordered him to retreat without delay …”[39].
But something else is also obvious. On the 27th, no reinforcements would have approached the Russians, and the enemy could have received them. And, undoubtedly, in such a situation it was better to retreat and move to connect with the reserves than to stay put.
As for the convincing tactical victory of the Russians in the counteroffensive on the 26th or the next day, it would have been clearly Pyrrhic, if at all possible. And Kutuzov never aspired to such victories at all, not to mention how dangerous the loss of most of the army was in the strategic situation that had developed by that time.
Towards the end of the battle, Napoleon did not hide his annoyance well. But Berthier and others did not advise him to bring the guard into action because "in this state of affairs, the success achieved at this price would be a failure, and failure would be such a loss that would eliminate the victory of the battle." They also "drew the attention of the emperor to the fact that one should not risk the only corps that still remains intact and should be reserved for other cases" [40].
In other words, the French marshals believed at that moment that even if victory was achieved, its price would be too high. It turns out that they also did not want a Pyrrhic victory, and even 600 miles from France. They, too, knew how to think strategically and think “not about the glories of only battles won,” but about the fate of the entire campaign.
But these arguments of the marshals would not have been so compelling if Napoleon had not seen with his own eyes that the Russians were not retreating, were maintaining order of battle and were firmly in their new position.
Many believe that the refusal of full-scale use of the guard was a serious mistake of Napoleon. However, already in the above words of A. Colencourt, a participant in the events, as you can see, “failure” after the entry into battle of the main reserve of the “Great Army” is not ruled out. And the French commander himself, according to Jomini, later did not consider his decision to be erroneous, since "the enemy still showed quite firmness."
Main tactical results
1) In the "clash of the giants", none of the opposing sides was able to win a convincing victory.
2) According to estimates of modern Russian historians, the French lost 35-40 thousand people on August 24-26. In the Russian army, from 40 to 50 thousand people were out of action [See. see our article "The number and losses of armies at Borodino"].
3) Despite the enormous exhaustion, both armies as a whole have not lost their combat effectiveness. As for the reserves saved by the commanders, Napoleon, as you know, did not use the Guards divisions of Curial and Walther (except for Colbert's brigade) in the battle at all. The Roge division, although it was pushed forward by the end of the day, remained behind the lines of other troops and did not enter into combat contact with the enemy.
A fairly large part of the Russian army also did not take an active part in the battle. But, firstly, from the regular infantry and cavalry, only units at the Main Apartment and 4 regiments of jaegers located on the right flank did not fight the enemy.
Secondly, the main part of the troops of the main reserve, according to the disposition of August 24, entered the battle or was moved to the 1st line at the beginning of the battle. At the final stage of the battle, the cuirassiers of Shevich and the Life Guards were also quite active. Finnish regiment. And formally only the Life Guards remained in reserve. Preobrazhensky and Semenovsky regiments. But after the fall of the Kurgan battery, they actually defended the space between the 4th corps and the left flank, repelling the attack of the enemy cavalry there.
4) Late in the evening, Napoleon, wanting to put his weary troops in order, took them to their starting positions. Attaching great importance to this fact, many Russian historians shared the opinion of Kutuzov: "… and it ended up that the enemy did not win a single step of the ground anywhere …" [41]. This does not fully correspond to the truth, at least in relation to the village of Borodino, which remained in the hands of the French, not to mention a significant change by the end of the day in the position of the left flank and center of the Russian army.
Of undoubted interest for the researcher are also facts concerning the nature of the battle and the successes achieved by the opponents at its various stages.
Napoleon held the initiative almost throughout the day. The offensive of the French troops, which began with the very first shots, gradually gained strength, constantly creating a threat for Kutuzov's army to break through the defense or bypass the flank. The Russians managed to repel all enemy attacks, but at the same time no similar threats were created on their part. An exception is the cavalry raid of Uvarov and Platov, which made Napoleon nervous. However, neither at this nor at any other moment of the battle did Kutuzov find it possible or useful to intercept the tactical initiative. Therefore, the counterattack of the Russian cavalry caused only a pause, without changing the nature of the battle as a whole.
Even as the battle subsided, the French were still trying to make some last supernatural effort to break the resistance of their opponent.
In the course of the battle, the Russians, having lost a number of key strongholds of their position, were forced to concede a significant part of the "battle site" throughout the entire space from New to Old Smolensk road. Napoleon ordered to leave the occupied territory when the battle had actually ended. The French troops withdrew to their original positions in full battle formation, without being attacked and actively pursued by the enemy.
On the advantages of the parties
This topic is quite extensive, and here we are limited to only a brief opinion on the main aspects.
Borodino's position was, of course, not ideal for the Russians. Along with its advantages, it also had obvious disadvantages. However, the stop of the French in Gzhatsk gave their enemy at least two days for the optimal disposition of troops and engineering preparation of the position.
In the area where the main struggle unfolded (between Kolocha, the Stonets stream and the Utitsky forest), the area did not give any special benefits to either side.
As for the balance of forces, the French had a fairly solid superiority in the regular troops. True, in the infantry and cavalry (that is, without special troops), it was, according to our calculations, somewhat less [See. see our article "The number and losses of armies at Borodino"].
On the other hand, the Russians had an advantage in artillery pieces. Moreover, according to their total caliber, it was even more significant (according to some estimates, about 30%).
Although the Cossacks were usually not taken into account in battles, they were a well-armed and trained army, capable of performing some of the functions of light regular cavalry. And Kutuzov could use the militias to solve auxiliary problems.
In terms of quality, the French army was undoubtedly very strong - with it Napoleon conquered almost all of Europe.
According to many foreign historians, this army had a great advantage in its more progressive internal organization, in which, for example, even a simple soldier had very good career opportunities. Thanks to this, the commanders who were out of action could easily be replaced, etc. In addition, the French outnumbered their enemy tactically and had more veterans and experienced soldiers in their ranks.
But on the whole, the motivation of the participants in the campaign of the "Great Army" to Russia was exactly the same as that of other conquerors. And, of course, the cult of Napoleon's personality played a huge role.
Historians rightly point out that there were a significant number of inexperienced recruits in the Russian army. Indeed, just a few days before the army approached Borodino, more than 15 thousand recruits from Miloradovich joined it.
But there were, undoubtedly, veterans of previous campaigns in the troops. Indeed, from 1804 to 1812 Russia was at war continuously - with Iran, France, Turkey and Sweden. And in this war, the armies of Barclay and Bagration reflected the invasion of huge enemy forces for the third month already.
Even J. Pele-Clozo mentioned the staunchness and bravery of the Russian soldiers, about their "determination to die rather than yield," and also called their army one of the first two in the world. True, he believed that the Russian military leaders had "little art", with which we, of course, cannot agree.
The fighting spirit of Kutuzov's army was undoubtedly greatly enhanced by the fact that its soldiers and officers fought for their homeland under the walls of the ancient capital.
Ultimately, the "moral resilience" of the Russian troops in this battle turned out to be very high.
Separately, we note that the French army had very serious supply problems, which affected not only the condition of the soldiers, but also the horses. The Russians, on the other hand, did not experience such difficulties with provisions and fodder.
