There is a widespread opinion that the repressions of 1937 weakened the army, there were no experienced officers (Volkogonov D. A. Triumph and tragedy / Political portrait of I. V. Stalin. In 2 books. M.: Publishing house APN, 1989, Book 1 Part 1. P.11-12), but discipline has always been at its best in our army. But is it really so?
To begin with, let's go to 1936, when all the repressed commanders and marshals were still at their posts and we will get acquainted with the state of affairs based on the materials of the archive of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and a number of other interesting archives.
So, judging by the comments of the head of the Red Army Combat Training Directorate, 2nd Rank Army Commander A. Sedyakin, many units that participated in the 1936 maneuvers showed an extremely low level of training of the participating troops. The infantry went to the attack not in rare chains, but in "crowds from squads." The soldiers instinctively clung to each other, which meant they were poorly trained. Laying, running, self-entrenching, and throwing grenades were not practiced.
S. Budyonny himself admitted the disgusting training of the troops, declaring that "the company is not good, the platoon is not good, the squad is not good", "the coordination of the interaction of the combat arms is lame … the intelligence organization is lame … the soldiers do not know their duties in battle" - you read in the documents of that time …
One of the reasons was the extremely low level of elementary culture among the Red Army soldiers. For example, in 1929, 81.6% of the cadets (in the infantry - 90.8%), admitted to military schools of the ground forces, had either primary education or none at all. In January 1932, 79.1% of cadets of military schools had primary education, and in 1936 - 68.5%.
Commander S. Bogomyagkov noted back in 1935 that “tactically competent commanders are 99 percent people with good general development and broad outlook. There are few exceptions. But how many then had such a horizon?
The school could not teach them much. And if so, then the rank and file - they were also unable to teach in an amicable way. The audit documents paint a monotonously dismal picture of the inept training of the rank and file. Classes were constantly disrupted due to their stupid organization. A lot of Red Army men were distracted by various household jobs. In a number of units, the structure of a rifle was studied without … the rifle itself, and a telephone - without a telephone. Orders for parts of the same Uborevich or Yakir are full of examples of simplifying the rules of shooting in exercises, and all this because otherwise they would simply not have hit the target.
And, of course, the army, first of all, begins with discipline, the appearance of soldiers and commanders, the respect that they know how to instill with all their appearance, military bearing, knowledge. In October 1936, the division commander K. Podlas wrote about this: “The younger ones are familiar with the older ones, loosely, they put their feet aside…. Sitting down, they take orders, bicker … Lots of torn uniforms, dirty, unshaven, etc. Every now and then the documents of the inspectors report that the uniforms of the cadets had not been erased all summer, that they did not know what to do when the senior commander appeared, and these were the people who were prescribed by the charter to train soldiers in the future. It was not so in the Russian tsarist army. One of the old tsarist officers recalled that when a senior officer gave the order to the cadets to line up, one should look not at their faces, but only at the tips of the bayonets. Just try to move - you can see everything.
The junior commanders of the Red Army who were released from such Soviet schools also looked unsightly. Loose, often unshaven and in torn tunics, they, in principle, could not be demanding. It was quite possible to cover such a person with obscenities, to call him a "bastard". The platoon commander or the sergeant major could be criticized by a Komsomol soldier at a Komsomol meeting. What kind of military discipline could there be? And what to do if this was the very atmosphere of the then "proletarian state". The soldier was seen not so much as a soldier, but as a "comrade of such and such" …. (Andrey Smirnov. Great maneuvers // Rodina. 2000, №4. P.86-93)
Even a cursory acquaintance with the materials of our military archives shows that the roots of the 1941 catastrophe do not go back to 1937, but to … 1917! Moreover, this statement is easily provable. For example, there is data on the state of military discipline immediately before the war. In a number of the Red Army, emergencies took on rampant proportions:
If in the IV quarter of 1940 there were 3669 accidents, then in the first quarter of 1941 there were already 4649, that is, there was an increase of 26.6%. As a result of the accidents that took place in the army, 10,048 people were out of action, with 2,921 killed and 7,127 wounded. In the first quarter of 1941, 3244 people were out of action, of which 945 were killed and 2290 were wounded. The average number of killed and wounded was at the level of 27-28 people per day, and in the first quarter of 1941 there were already 36 people (TsAMO - Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, f. 32, op. 11309, d. 26, l. 245-246.). It is clear that this indicates an increase in the intensity of combat training. But here is what conclusion was made on the basis of these data and checks by the commission on the transfer of affairs of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense by Marshal of the Soviet Union K. E. Voroshilov to Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Timoshenko: “military discipline is not up to the mark and does not ensure the exact implementation of the combat missions (Ibid., 15.l.8.)
Already during the war, in order to strengthen military discipline for officers, seminars, meetings, lectures, reports and conversations were organized on the following topics: "On the one-man command in the Red Army", "Commander - educator and leader of his subordinates", etc. For example, in units 1st Guards. tank army, a lecture was read for officers: "On the role of an officer in strengthening military discipline", a two-day training camp was held for tank commanders, commanders of tank companies and battalions, where issues of discipline education among soldiers were considered (TsAMO, f. 299, op. 3063, d. 31, l.19). In the 41st Guards. at a meeting of the command and political staff of the 16th Army, the issue "On the introduction of one-man command and immediate tasks to strengthen discipline" was discussed (TsAMO, f. 208, op. 5415, d. 4, l. 85). Of course, it's very cool that it was like this, if not for one "but": all this happened in the army, where discipline is the basis of the foundations!
Note that the period from 1934 to 1939, the salaries of the command staff of the Red Army increased sharply. For example, KE Voroshilov at the 18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) reported that the monthly earnings of commanders - from platoon to corps - had increased by about 2.5 - 3.5 times. But the greatest “care” was shown for the top-level commanders. And the most important thing is that the salary has increased, but there are still problems with discipline!
And here's another thing that is significant: almost simultaneously with the increase in the salary of the red commanders, the cases of their divorces from their proletarian wives have noticeably increased. And here there was not only their desire to marry younger and more beautiful, but also, preferably, former representatives of the nobility. That is, people tried to at least so join the "high and pure". But what was to be done by those for whom there is even a special designation "non-commissioned officer clique"? Until 1937, they had little chance of reaching noticeable heights in the same army, but massive purges cleared the way for them to rise. It is obvious that these very people, who were rapidly climbing over the corpses, could not be the moral ideal of the “new society”. But they were making their way upstairs …
With the beginning of the war, discipline problems worsened even more and, of course, they were solved, both in 1941 and in 1944 (TsAMO, f. 32, op. 11318, d. 63, l. 24). But they often decided this way - by means of assault and … unauthorized executions! So, in the directive of the head of the political department of the Western Front No. 00205 of 1941-29-07there were cases of “unjustified shootings of soldiers and commanders” (TsAMO, f.221, op.1362, l.4.d.87). This can be "attributed" to the special circumstances of the outbreak of the war. However, in January 1944 alone, on the 2nd Ukrainian Front, there were over 100 cases of assault and executions without trial or investigation (Ibid.: 240, op. 2772, d.18, l.180, 277, 380, 400) !
Well, what the lack of discipline could lead to at the front and, accordingly, the panic that arises in such a situation shows the example of the 34th Army of the Western Front in the period from August 10 to 26, 1941. As of August 10, it consisted of: a total of 54,912 personnel, 4,434 commanding personnel at all levels, 83 tanks, 376 artillery pieces, and 43,220 rifles and machine guns. After a panicky retreat on August 26, it remained: 22043 personnel (40.1% of the initial number), commanding staff 2059 (46.4%), tanks - 9 units (10.8%), guns - 92 (25.0%), rifles and machine guns - 11975 (27.7%) (TsAMO, f.32, op.11309, d.51, l.38.) Again, they tried to fight the panic by shooting. So, in October 1941, 20 people were shot in the 30th army on the Western Front, and in the 43rd - 30 (TsAMO, f.32, op.11389, d.50, l.126.). But it helped badly. For example, despite the executions of alarmists directly on the battlefield, the 97th Rifle Division (Southwestern Front) withdrew from the battlefield three times in a row from 6 to 8 August, and lost up to 80% of its personnel and a large number of weapons and military equipment (TsAMO, f.221, op.1362, d.34, l.195). That is, this measure did not work!
One of the worst cases of military discipline violation is desertion. And here it is by year: 1941 - 30782 people, 1942 - 111994, 1943 - 82733, 1944 - 32723, 1945 - 6872. Total: 265104 people (Archive of the Main Military Prosecutor's Office (State Military Prosecutor's Office) - 1941-1945: d.253, fol. 76; d.258, l.1, 5; d.265, l.24). And most of all, the deserters in 1945 are surprising. What kind of person you had to be to decide on such a thing this year ?! Of course, people died in 1945, but still, only the last idiot could have done such a thing at that time! We also had members, and there were quite a few of them: in 1941 - 8105, in 1942 - 25265, in 1943 - 16631, in 1944 - 6959, in 1945 - 1696. Total: 68656 (Archive of the Main Exhibition Hall: d.253, d.76, l.1, 5; d.265, l.24). After all, 265 thousand is 33% of the total number of servicemen convicted during the war years, from 1941 to 1945 (Archive of the Supreme Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. Op. 1. P. 316, n. 86 p., Sheets 3, 48.) … It is easy to calculate that 803,031 people were convicted for various crimes during the war years! And this is very important, because the corpus delicti is still on the “secret list”, that is, it is impossible to find out what exactly, who sat down for what article. It can be argued that a book published in Germany about one and a half million German women raped by our soldiers is a lie! Because this kind of crime in the Red Army was suppressed and punished very severely. And it is clear that although there were rapists among the 803301 convicts, of course, but even this number does not even reach half of the declared one and a half million! Because there was theft, and looting and, say, also self-harm, and the most banal "scuffle" on the basis of drunkenness and hostile relations that arose between the soldiers (or even between the commanders - I personally am sure that this happened!).
So the study of archival materials is not only a tool for learning the truth in relation to our history, as well as the role of the same discipline during the Second World War, but also an important means of repelling the modern slanderers of Russia!
