As we said in the first part, the army of conquerors, which successfully landed at the Rock of Gibraltar, captured several cities and repulsed an attempt to counterstrike the border Visigothic contingent. But then, at the moment of finding the forces of Tariq ibn Ziyad at Salt Lake (Largo de la Sanda), scouts disguised as merchants arrived at his headquarters, who reported that news of the invasion had finally reached King Rodrigo, who was besieging Pamplona. and he, with a huge army of supposedly 40, 70 or even 100 thousand people, is moving south.
It should be noted right away that the Visigoth state, even at the peak of its prosperity, simply could not collect tens and hundreds of thousands of warriors indicated in medieval sources, and even more so, King Rodrigo had limited resources. Due to the civil war, his state was in crisis, and constant hostilities and sharply increased separatism greatly reduced the mobilization capabilities of the ruler of Spain.
Apparently, in reality, his army was so small that he not only threw the siege of Pamplona, without leaving even a blocking contingent there, but went to conclude agreements of peace and alliance literally at once with all his opponents from among the Visigoth and Roman-Iberian aristocrats …
And, at first glance, he managed to assemble a fairly large and seemingly combat-ready army. According to estimates of modern researchers, he was able to recruit about 15-20 thousand people against the army of jihadists, or maybe even 30-33 thousand, which is relatively close to the lowest medieval estimates of his forces at 40 thousand people.
However, his army was a miniature reflection of Westgottenland, with exactly the same problems and disadvantages. And the main one was that in his army of real professional equestrian warriors, according to modern estimates, there were only, at best, 2-3 thousand people, and the rest were mostly barely armed militias.
This was due to the fact that Roderick's army reflected the specifics of the class structure of early feudal society in Spain. And in this society, only aristocrats with their equestrian squads could be professional soldiers (among whom, as it turned out later, a very significant number were persons who were in sharp opposition to the king and plotted treason).
Small contingents (estimated at several thousand people) of relatively combat-ready heavy and medium infantry in the Christian army were soldiers who were in the royal service and recruited from the garrisons of the cities where they ensured law and order and supported the rule of the king. Basically, by their origin, they were also Germans - Visigoths from poor strata, Suebs, Vandals, etc., who lived in the Iberian Peninsula since the time of the Great Nations Migration.
In addition, from the border troops, from forces like the local mounted police, and even from an analogue of the postal service, relatively combat-ready small contingents of light and medium cavalry were formed. But that was all, and the remaining units, and this is a large part of the Christian army, were represented by poorly combat-ready infantry recruited from the Ibero-Romans. And even if they had any desire to fight for the power of the "Germans", there was no real opportunity to do it successfully in a field battle (since the Visigoths deprived the Ibero-Romans of the opportunity for military service and the right to bear arms).
The army of Tariq ibn Ziyad was indeed numerically smaller than the Christian army, but far from 8 or 10 or even 20 times, as Muslim authors write even today, but about 1.5-2 times. At the same time, she consisted mostly of well-armed, battle-hardened and extremely fanatical fighters.
In addition to the 7,000 people with whom Tariq landed at Gibraltar, Musa ibn Nusayr sent him, according to some sources, 5,000, according to other sources - 12,000 warriors from the Berbers (there were about 80% of them) and Arabs (there were about 20%).
In general, it should be said that what really happened was not so much the Arab conquest as the Berber conquest of Spain. The Berbers were a nomadic people who lived on the northern outskirts of the then newly formed Sahara. The Arab invaders defeated them in a difficult struggle, but, assessing their fighting qualities, they presented a choice - either the Berbers remain forever "defeated", "dhimmi", or they convert to Islam, join the army of the victors and provide their warriors for a campaign in Spain. The combination of strength and cunning, seasoned with gross flattery, allowed the Arabian conquerors to recruit (due to the promises of great victories and the unthinkable riches awaiting them) many warriors from the newly converted fanatics, who became the basis of the army of Tariq.
In addition, the jihadist army included a small contingent of professional soldiers under the command of Count Julian (don Juan of the late Hispanic and Ilyan of the Arab chronicles), as one of the main initiators of the invasion.
And also among the allies of the Islamists who invaded Spain, one can note a very unusual contingent, consisting of Spanish and North African Jews, as well as Berbers who converted to Judaism and even a few Judaized Germans from the Vandal tribe still preserved in the West Maghreb.
The exact number of this contingent, which is very unusual for a jihad army, is unknown, but it was headed by a separate "amir" Kaula al-Yahudi (whose last name definitely speaks of Jewish origin). The main idea of the soldiers of this unit was revenge on the Visigoths, these "early medieval Spanish Germans" for the persecution that some of the kings of Westgottenland rained down on the Jews.
Some authors note their valor in battle and at the same time unyielding cruelty after the battle and during the repressions that they unleashed in the captured cities on the Visigothic aristocracy and the Christian priesthood, who were considered the main culprits of the persecution.
In the course of the further Muslim conquest of Spain, this contingent, under the command of Kaula al-Yahudi, will occupy cities such as Seville and Cordoba, and will move further north along the Mediterranean coast of the country, even reaching Catalonia. However, later, in 718, after the conquest of all of Spain, this commander will quarrel with the Islamic authorities, raise an armed mutiny, his unit will be defeated, he himself will be executed, and the surviving soldiers from Jews and Ger will hide in Jewish communities on the Mediterranean coast.
Unfortunately, the exact course of the battle, due to the paucity of surviving historical descriptions, can only be reconstructed in general terms. The battle took place on a flat plain and, apparently, the relief did not affect the course of the battle in any way (except that the Muslims had chosen the area they needed in advance and met the Visigoths at a position convenient for Tariq's army).
Tariq was desperately playing for time, probably waiting for reinforcements to march. He even tried to start negotiations, but Roderick was adamant, demanding the condition of peace from the jihadists immediate evacuation and compensation for all losses from their invasion.
Apparently, the Arab-Berber army formed a classic battle formation, spread both along the front and in depth, from several lines. This allowed the commander to freely build up the force of the blow in the right place and freely operate the reserves. The Visigoths, apparently, formed in one continuous line: in the center in a deep formation - the infantry, on the flanks - the cavalry.
The Visigoth army probably outnumbered the Tariq army in length, but due to the dismemberment of the battle formation, its battle line was almost equal to the Christian army.
Both leaders took their places in the depths of the central positions of their battle lines: the leader of the Islamists was surrounded by his 300 "Ansars", and the leader of the Christians rode out in a chariot (probably according to the custom of the Roman emperors; in addition, it is very convenient to observe the battlefield from the chariot).
All sources point to the very fierce nature of the battle. After a fairly long skirmish and a series of fights (probably lasting for several days), both sides "met with great fuss." The battle went on for a long time. The Muslims increased the force of their blows, and the battle formations of untrained Christian infantry in the center turned into a huge, hard-to-control crowd.
The situation on the flanks was even worse for the Visigoth king. If on one wing the Christian squads quite successfully repelled the jihadist cavalry, then on the other wing the heavy cavalry contingents commanded by the opposition aristocrats at first simply did not obey the order to attack, and then completely left the battlefield. As can be understood from one description, it seems that the horsemen under the command of the traitorous counts not only deserted, but even attacked their fellows from the side of their flank.
As you can see, Tariq was not just playing for time before the battle - he was probably able to secretly negotiate treason with the former opponents of the king, and even bribed them. This, in parallel with the inept tactics and poor training of most of the Visigothic army, predetermined the defeat of the Christians.
After the betrayal of the cavalry of one of the flanks, either the freed Muslim cavalry attacked the other wing, turning it to flight, or there the Christian cavalry was crushed by a contingent from the jihadist equestrian reserve.
At the same time, the king, seeing the defeat of his army, according to Christian annals, decided to take part in the decisive attack and rushed forward, disappearing forever in the crowd of fighting. According to Muslim descriptions, Tariq himself, seeing Rodrigo in a chariot, either struck at the head of his guards at him directly through the fighting infantry in the center, or, more likely, bypassing the front of one of the flanks, striking the king's squad from the side.
Be that as it may, the last reserve of the Visigoths, the king's warriors, was crushed. He put up relatively weak resistance to the jihadists (and some of them, apparently, also betrayed the king and fled). And, perhaps most importantly, according to a number of sources, during this attack, the ruler of Spain was one of the first chariot, and the king was able to escape, gather a new army and died only in September 713 in the battle of Seguel).
But be that as it may, the dagger attack of Tariq's heavily armed equestrian "Ansars" decided the course of the battle. After that, either seeing the death of their king, or seeing his flight and simply already tired of the battle, a huge mass of Spanish Christians, squeezed from three sides, rushed to flee from the planned encirclement along the "golden bridge" skillfully provided by the jihadists, covering the battlefield near Jerez de la Frontier.
The losses of the Visigoth troops were catastrophic. Thousands, if not tens of thousands of Christians died in the course of the encirclement and in the pursuit of those fleeing. The human losses of the contingents of southern and central Spain were very high - the jihadists were actively pursuing and did not take prisoners, rightly believing that of the former warriors they were bad slaves, and in the cities left without defenders they would still recruit enough captives for themselves.
And, most importantly, this battle decided the fate of Spain because most of the already very few professional warriors in this kingdom, both recruited from the garrisons of cities and from among the Gothic aristocracy, died in it. In addition, another part of the ruling class treacherously went over to the side of the conquerors, further depriving the people of the opportunity to resist the Islamists. This, in combination with a number of other factors, opened the country for further conquest.
However, the losses among the troops "firmly embarked on the path of ghazavat" were heavy: judging by Muslim sources, about 25% of the participants in the battle were killed, and in reality, perhaps much more. This is evidenced by the fact that after the battle, the army of Tariq ibn Ziyad was so weakened that it did not pursue a strategic pursuit and further conquest of the country, but limited itself to capturing the surrounding areas. The march to Toledo was postponed until next year, when in 712 Musa ibn Nusayr himself, at the head of a new large army, landed in Spain.
P. S. The ruler of Ceuta and his daughter, who greatly contributed to the jihadist invasion of Spain, did not live happily ever after. Count Julian, who was probably of Rumian origin (i.e. Byzantine) and never converted to Islam, although he was close to the court of Musa ibn-Nusayr, was surrounded by the contempt of the Islamic aristocracy both as a non-Muslim and as a traitor. As a result, when he once again tried to somehow protect the agreed sovereignty of Ceuta before the governor of Africa, he was executed without further ado, and his possession was included in the caliphate.
His daughter, both because of her dubious "fame" and because of her rejection of the lifestyle prepared for women by radical Islamists, was also not accepted among the upper class of conquerors. After the execution of her father, she became not even a wife, but simply a concubine of one of the emirs, who made her a "harem slave" and took her to his castle El Pedroche, located in the province of Cordoba, where she either went mad or committed suicide. realizing the dire consequences of their actions.
According to local legends, her ghost appeared in this castle for several centuries, until in 1492 the Muslims were completely expelled from the territory of Spain during the Reconquista …
Basic sources and literature
Álvarez Palenzuela, Vicente Ángel. Historia de Espana de la Media. Barcelona: "Diagonal", 2008
Collins, Roger. La Espana visigoda: 474-711. Barcelona: "Critica", 2005
Collins, Roger. España en la Alta Edad Media 400-1000. // Early Medieval Spain. Unity and diversity, 400-1000. Barcelona: "Crítica", 1986
García Moreno, Luis A. Las invasiones y la época visigoda. Reinos y condados cristianos. // En Juan José Sayas; Luis A. García Moreno. Romanismo y Germanismo. El despertar de los pueblos hispánicos (siglos IV-X). Vol. II de la Historia de España, dirigida por Manuel Tuñón de Lara. Barcelona, 1982
LORING, M. Isabel; PÉREZ, Dionisio; FUENTES, Pablo. La Hispania tardorromana y visigoda. Siglos V-VIII. Madrid: "Síntesis", 2007
Patricia E. Grieve. The Eve of Spain: Myths of Origins in the History of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish Conflict Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009
Ripoll López, Gisela. La Hispania visigoda: del rey Ataúlfo a Don Rodrigo. Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1995.
