The Great Byron once remarked: "A thousand years is hardly enough to create a state, one hour is enough for it to crumble to dust." For the USSR, such an hour came on December 8, 1991.
Then, in Belovezhskie Viskuli, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Chairman of the Supreme Council of Belarus Stanislav Shushkevich, ignoring the opinion of millions of Soviet people who spoke out in March 1991 for the preservation of the Soviet state, declared that “the Union of SSR, as a subject of international political law and geopolitical reality ceased to exist”and signed the Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Over the 26 years that have passed since this event, many memoirs of its participants have appeared in the press, as well as the opinions of various witnesses, historians, experts. But nevertheless, a number of rather important circumstances of the Belovezhskaya collusion are still in the shadows. This concerns, first of all, the events that made the fateful meeting in Viskuli inevitable.
"Reformer" Gorbachev
The chain of events that determined the movement of the Union to the Viskuli began back in May 1983, when the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev suddenly wished to visit Canada to get acquainted with the methods of farming Canadians. There he was expected to meet with Alexander Yakovlev, the former ideologist of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and then the USSR ambassador to Canada and concurrently an American "agent of influence."
In the evenings on the shady lawns of Ottawa, far from prying ears, the former Soviet ideologist instilled in Gorbachev that "the dogmatic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism is so unsanitary that any creative and even classical thoughts die in it." In his book, which bore the iconic title "The Whirlpool of Memory", Yakovlev recalled: "… it was in conversations with me back in Canada, when I was an ambassador, that the idea of perestroika was first born."
Then came March 1985, when Gorbachev, a talkative and firm believer in his exclusive destiny, was elected General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. This is how the six-year road to Bialowieza began for the USSR.
Former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov noted that “Gorbachev was corrupted by world fame, by foreigners. He sincerely believed that he is the messiah, that he saves the world. His head was spinning …”.
For this reason, the narcissistic Gorbachev started perestroika, which turned into a "catastrophe" for the USSR.
Let me remind you that the failure of Gorbachev's "catastrophe" became clear by 1989. And in 1990, this failure began to manifest itself in the form of declarations of independence by the union republics. On March 11, 1990, Lithuania announced its withdrawal from the USSR with an ultimatum. Incidentally, this was not a surprise for Gorbachev. Indeed, even at a meeting with US President Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik (October 1986), he agreed with the proposal for the withdrawal of the Baltic republics from the USSR. Gorbachev gave his final consent to the withdrawal of the Balts from the Union during a meeting with another US President George W. Bush in Malta (December 2-3, 1989). The Baltic separatists knew this.
It does not hurt to recall that in 2009, in an interview with Andrei Baranov, a reporter for the Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper (15.06.2009), Gorbachev said that, starting perestroika, he knew: "the Baltic republics will seek independence." In 1990, due to the crisis in the Union's economy caused by Gorbachev's ill-considered reforms, other union republics began to declare their secession from the USSR.
On June 12, 1990, Russia declared its state sovereignty. On June 20, Uzbekistan adopted the Declaration of Independence, on June 23 - Moldova, on July 16 - Ukraine, on July 27 - Belarus. Then a cascade of proclamation of sovereignty within the RSFSR began. Things went so far that on October 26, 1990, the Irkutsk Region declared its sovereignty.
At the same time, Gorbachev pretended that nothing special was happening. The first alarm bell sounded for him at the IV Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (December 17-27, 1990). Before the start of the Congress, People's Deputy Sazhi Umalatova proposed to be the first to put on the agenda the issue of mistrust in the President of the USSR, saying: "It is not necessary to change the course, but the course and the head of state."
I remember this speech by Umalatova (I was present at the Congress as a guest). Most of the deputies in the hall listened to Umalatova with some fear. After all, everything that was true, but about which they preferred to remain silent, suddenly sounded from the rostrum of the Kremlin Palace of Congresses. The situation was saved by Anatoly Lukyanov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and a loyal associate of Gorbachev. He did not allow anyone to speak on Umalatova's proposal, and put it to a roll-call vote.
426 were in favor, 1288 were against, 183 abstained. This was natural, since by that time only the chairman of the KGB of the USSR, Vladimir Kryuchkov, had information about Gorbachev's treacherous policies. But he chose not to support Umalatova's proposal, although he knew that on February 23, 1990, a meeting of representatives of the central apparatus of the KGB of the USSR sent a letter to Gorbachev that delay in taking urgent measures to stabilize the situation in the USSR threatened to disaster. Therefore, Kryuchkov, as the head of the KGB, was simply obliged to ask the president why he ignored the letter from the Chekists.
Kryuchkov also knew that in January 1990, US Secretary of State J. Baker stated: “The circumstances are such that Gorbachev will not survive … The danger for him is not that he will be thrown out with the help of a palace coup, but that Street . But Kryuchkov preferred to be silent …
The next "bell" for Gorbachev sounded at the April 1991 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, at which I, as a member of the CPSU Central Committee, was present. After the report of the new USSR Council of Ministers Valentin Pavlov, the speakers began to harshly criticize Gorbachev. He could not stand it and announced his resignation. However, the Gorbachevites, having announced a break, organized a collection of signatures in support of the secretary general. After the break, the Plenum voted not to consider Gorbachev's statement. So the political Pinocchio remained in power.
Let me remind you that in March 1991, at the request of US President George W. Bush, ex-US President Richard Nixon arrived in the USSR for an inspection. His conclusion, sent to the White House, sounded disappointing: "The Soviet Union is tired of Gorbachev."
This was an accurate diagnosis. Gorbachev knew about this diagnosis and began to feverishly prepare for resignation.
On May 15, 2001, the former chief of staff of the President of the USSR Valery Boldin told about this in an interview with the Kommersant-Vlast newspaper. He said that Gorbachev was already in 1990: “I felt out of the game … He was crushed. I tried to put a good face on a bad game. I realized this after I, the chief of staff of the president, began to receive unthinkable bills for the products delivered for him … mainly delicacies and alcohol - sometimes in boxes. Procured for future use. For a rainy day. Then he called me and asked me to start arranging his personal affairs …”.
Well, by August 1991 the chair under Gorbachev had turned into a red-hot frying pan. He learned that in September 1991 it was planned to convene the Congress of the CPSU, which was supposed to dismiss Gorbachev from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee, and then at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR to deprive him of the presidency and prosecute for the totality of the crimes he committed.
Gorbachev could not accept this. It was impossible to allow the holding of congresses and, above all, the CPSU. There was no official reason to put the party outside the law. A large-scale provocation was needed, which would put an end to the CPSU, the KGB and the people's deputies of the USSR. It was with this goal in mind that Gorbachev, with the support of Kryuchkov, organized the so-called August 1991 putsch. At that time, many in the Soviet Union were expecting something like this.
On February 11, 1991, the Moscow Chekists invited me to a meeting. They were extremely interested in the bloody provocation at the Vilnius TV tower, which was organized on the night of January 13, 1991 by the President of the USSR Gorbachev and the head of the separatist Supreme Soviet of Lithuania Landsbergis. This provocation, which resulted in the death of 14 people, allowed Lithuania to eliminate the remnants of the Kremlin's control and prepare the appropriate structures for the interception of power.
At that time, I was a member of the Central Committee of the PSSS, 2nd secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party / CPSU and a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania. Therefore, I knew some of the secret machinations of Gorbachev and Landsbergis. To the question of the Chekists: "What should be expected in the future?" I replied: "Provocations of the Union scale, which will hit the authority of the CPSU, the KGB and the army!"
Mikhail Poltoranin later confirmed my assumptions about the provocation that Gorbachev was preparing with the GKChP. In an interview with "Komsomolskaya Pravda" (2011-18-08), he said that the State Emergency Committee was the greatest provocation of the President of the USSR.
In this interview, Poltoranin also said that Yeltsin and Kryuchkov provided active assistance to Gorbachev in the situation with the organization of the so-called August putsch. In addition, Poltoranin noted that on the eve of the "putsch" Yeltsin often spoke with Gorbachev.
The preliminary conspiracy of our "heroes" is evidenced by their behavior after the "putsch". It is no coincidence that then Gorbachev resignedly allowed Yeltsin to issue a number of decrees that went beyond the constitutional powers of the President of the RSFSR and aimed at improper appropriation of Union power.
There is no doubt that during this period Gorbachev already set himself the task of pushing the USSR towards disintegration, which would ensure a secure future for it. And by December 1991, according to Gorbachev, the time was ripe to put a final point in the history of the USSR. Here I will interrupt and move on to an analysis of another chain of events, which also led the USSR to the Belovezhskaya agreement.
Yeltsin. For the sake of power …
This chain of events is associated with Boris Yeltsin. To begin with, I will give a description that his former close associate Mikhail Poltoranin gave him in an interview with the Fontanka.ru newspaper (2011-08-12). When asked what role Yeltsin played in the preparation of the Belovezhskaya Agreement, Poltoranin replied:
“Yeltsin played a decisive role. He did not feel sorry for anything.
It was all the same to him: whether to lead a democratic state, a fascist state, whatever - just to be in power. If only to be controlled by no one. He got along with Gorbachev, who, in general, also did not care about everything, and they only "painted" the struggle among themselves.
But in reality, there was no struggle! They literally negotiated at night."
And then Poltoranin said: “Yeltsin spent almost 4 hours with Gorbachev before his trip to Belarus. And Gaidar, Shakhrai, Burbulis were waiting for him. The team has gathered, and Yeltsin is still receiving the last instructions from Gorbachev in front of Belovezhskaya Pushcha. Then he jumps out: “I have to go, meet with Kravchuk!”. Mikhail Sergeevich said: "You talk to him there."
On March 17, 1992, Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk in an interview with Moscow journalist K. Volina said that Yeltsin flew to Viskuli with the consent and on behalf of Gorbachev, who was interested in Kravchuk's answers to three questions. I will quote these questions as they are presented in the book. Kravchuk “Our goal - a free Ukraine: speeches, interviews, press-conferences, briefings” (“Our goal is a free Ukraine: speeches, interviews, press conferences, briefings”). Kravchuk, L. M. Kiev: Globus Publishers, 1993.
Yeltsin told Kravchuk: “I want you to know that these three questions are not mine, they are Gorbachev’s, yesterday I spoke to him, and I am asking them on his behalf. First: do you agree with the draft agreement? Second: should it be changed or corrected? Third: can you sign it? After I said "no" to all three questions, he asked me: "What is the way out?" According to Kravchuk, Yeltsin replied that in this case he would not sign a new union treaty either.
That's how Kravchuk, who was in 1950a member of Bandera's hundreds of "brave youths", then introduced into the Komsomol and party organs of the Ukrainian SSR, dealt a fatal blow to the USSR.
To confirm this episode of Kravchuk's biography, I suggest that readers refer to the book by Yuri Taraskin "War after the war. Memoirs of a counterintelligence officer "(Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole Publishing House, 2006). He was an employee of "SMERSH", for several years acting "undercover" in the leadership of the OUN-UPA (banned in the Russian Federation).
But back to B. Yeltsin. In Sverdlovsk, the civil engineer Yeltsin, who "by conviction" joined the CPSU, was known for being ready "to break into a cake, but to fulfill any task of the party." Becoming the first secretary of the regional committee, Yeltsin immediately carried out the long-standing decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU to demolish the Ipatiev house (the place of the execution of the royal family in 1918). Yeltsin's predecessors on the regional committee did not do this.
In June 1985, Yeltsin, the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk regional committee of the CPSU, became secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Gorbachev and Ligachev, then the "second" in the CPSU, liked his toughness and decisiveness, and Yeltsin was "sent" to Moscow to "restore order" after the conservative Grishin.
Yeltsin without hesitation dismissed the 22 first secretaries of the Moscow district committees of the CPSU, drove others to suicide, some to heart attacks. Apparently, there was a reason, but the replacement of many of the removed secretaries Yeltsin carried out on the principle of "sewed on soap." Boris Nikolayevich's conceit, no less than that of Mikhail Sergeevich, soon let him down. At the October 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Yeltsin allowed himself to criticize the activities of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee. He also expressed concern about the excessive "glorification of some members of the Politburo towards the Secretary General."
Yeltsin's speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU was chaotic and not impressive. But, as Gorbachev put it, he "cast a shadow on the activities of the Politburo and the Secretariat and on the situation in them," and for this the CPSU was punished. I felt this from my own experience, when in 1981, for the most vague criticism of the Vilnius Civil Committee and the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party to ensure the growth of labor productivity, I was immediately sent to a two-year study at the Vilnius Higher School of Artists to “raise the Marxist-Leninist level”. Moreover, he was sent to a group of instructors of rural district party committees, although he had a higher technical education and was the secretary of the Republic of Kazakhstan for overseeing the economy in the large Lenin Republic of the Communist Party of Lithuania in Vilnius.
Boris Nikolaevich was relieved of his post as first secretary of the Moscow State Committee of the CPSU and was appointed first deputy chairman of the USSR State Construction Committee. However, Soviet citizens, as always, preferred not to tell why Yeltsin was dismissed from office.
The secrecy of the speech of the first secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU at the October Plenum was taken advantage of by his supporter, the editor of the newspaper Moskovskaya Pravda, Mikhail Poltoranin. He prepared a version of Yeltsin's speech, which had nothing to do with what he said at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
In this speech, the talented journalist put everything that he himself would like to say at this Plenum.
This was the revelation that the Soviet people had long awaited, during the period of the so-called stagnation. Yeltsin's speech, spread by Poltoranin on a copier, spread throughout the Union with the speed of a forest fire. Soon, in the eyes of Soviet people, Boris Nikolayevich became a public defender, unjustly punished by the Kremlin partocrats. It is not surprising that in March 1989 Yeltsin was elected People's Deputy of the USSR. At the I Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR (May - June 1989), thanks to Deputy A. Kazannik, who ceded his mandate, he became a member of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and, as the chairman of one of the committees of the Supreme Soviet, became a member of the Presidium of the USSR Armed Forces.
During this period, American Sovietologists became interested in Yeltsin. In the Soviet "historical closet" they found an old tricky idea and decided to revive it with the help of a disgraced Russian politician. In the USSR, the absence of the Communist Party of Russia was simply explained. In a monolithic Union, it was impossible to create a second equivalent political center. This threatened to split both the CPSU and the Union. With the advent of the charismatic figure of Yeltsin, the Americans had the opportunity to implement plans to create such a center in the USSR.
In September 1989, a certain organization, supposedly dealing with AIDS problems, invited the USSR People's Deputy Yeltsin to give lectures in the USA. More than strange: the former builder Yeltsin and AIDS … But neither Gorbachev nor the State Security Committee was alarmed by this. In the United States, Yeltsin spent nine days, during which he allegedly gave several lectures, receiving $ 25,000 for each.
It is difficult to say what these lectures were, since the Soviet guest was constantly, to put it mildly, in a "tired" state all the days of the visit. But he remembered well the recommendations that American experts suggested to him. They were simple and very attractive - to proclaim the sovereignty of Russia, introduce the institution of the presidency there and become president.
The same M. Poltoranin told about this in an interview with "Komsomolskaya Pravda" (09.06.2011) under the title "Who brought Yeltsin to power?" He said: “Yeltsin brought the idea of the presidency from America back in 1989. In the United States, a lot of work was done with our politicians. And Yeltsin was strongly influenced."
I would like to emphasize that the CIA, which closely patronized Yeltsin during his visit to the United States, reported to the new American President George W. Bush that Yeltsin would give the States more, faster and more reliable than Gorbachev.
That is why Bush initially relied on Boris Nikolaevich, and not on Mikhail Sergeevich.
In May 1990, Yeltsin began to implement American recommendations. Moreover, the impression was that Gorbachev did everything to facilitate the return of Yeltsin to power. On May 29, 1990, in the absence of real opposition from Gorbachev's team to Yeltsin's team, Boris Nikolaevich was elected Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Council. Gorbachev met the day of the election of the head of the Russian parliament and his future political gravedigger on an airplane over the Atlantic, once again heading to the United States.
On June 12, 1990, at the first Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, Yeltsin's team managed to include in the agenda the issue "On the sovereignty of the RSFSR, a new union treaty and democracy in the RSFSR." The congress was asked to adopt the Declaration of Sovereignty of Russia, which provides for the priority of Russian laws over allied ones. Gorbachev attended the Congress. After reading the draft Declaration, he said that he did not see anything terrible in it for the Union, so the allied authorities would not react to it. For the President of the USSR, a lawyer by profession and the guarantor of the integrity of the USSR, the Declaration should be assessed as a criminal violation of the Constitution of the USSR. But…
In August 1990, while in Ufa, Yeltsin suggested that the Supreme Soviet and the government of Bashkiria take as much power as "they can swallow." This wish largely determined the true parade of sovereignties within the RSFSR. Things came to the point of declaring sovereignty by the Russian regions.
Well, and then everything developed, as if on a knurled one. Indeed, if we take as truth the speech of Vladimir Kryuchkov, Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, delivered by him on June 17, 1991 at a closed meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, then 2,200 enemy agents of influence were operating in the country. Moreover, it is known that a surname list of these agents was attached to the text of Kryuchkov's speech. Judging by the scale of the deficit that these agents managed to create in the country, they acted extremely effectively.
But Kryuchkov at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet limited himself to general words. Apparently, his position was again determined by the fact that he and his department were themselves involved in creating situations in the country that caused serious damage to the state security of the USSR.
Viskuli is the ultimate …
A few words about what happened in the Belarusian Viskuli during the preparation and signing of the Belovezhskaya Agreement. First of all, about the idea of a meeting of the three heads of the union republics in Viskuli. There are many versions about this. Let me suggest one more. There is no doubt that the main topic of the meeting in Viskuli, far from Moscow, was the desire of the republican leaders to discuss an agreement on the creation of the Union of Sovereign States (UIT) without the annoying dictatorship of the talker Gorbachev.
It should be borne in mind that Moscow, as a meeting place, immediately disappeared. Not only Kravchuk would not have flown there, but, apparently, Shushkevich too. Yeltsin, who had strained relations with Kravchuk, would have refused to fly to Kiev. Only Belarus remained. Shushkevich was persuaded to organize a meeting, promising to discuss at it issues of oil and gas transportation through the territory of the republic, which promised her considerable funds. By the way, Kravchuk was also vitally interested in discussing with Russia the supply and transportation of oil and gas to Ukraine. Moreover, he passionately wanted to hunt in Belovezhskaya Pushcha.
As for Yeltsin, he flew to Belarus, as it was said, with the consent of Gorbachev, and his team consisting of G. Burbulis, E. Gaidar, A. Kozyrev and S. Shakhrai was carrying with them the drafts for the preparation of the text of the Belovezhsky agreement, which abolished the USSR.
In this regard, it can be assumed that Gorbachev and Yeltsin, during their 4-hour meeting on the eve of departure, worked out two options for the outcome of the meeting in Viskuli.
First. Kravchuk will agree to sign a new union treaty on certain conditions. However, this version was unlikely, since on December 1, 1991, a referendum on the independence of the republic was held in Ukraine, during which 90.3% of voters supported this independence. And, although the bulletin only raised the question of support for the Act of Independence of Ukraine, adopted on August 24, 1991, and did not talk about the independence of Ukraine as part of the USSR or outside, which is extremely important in legal terms, Kravchuk and his team presented the results of the referendum as unanimous desire of Ukrainian citizens to be outside the Union.
Second. This most likely option was that under any conditions Yeltsin set out to him, Kravchuk would refuse to sign a new union treaty, and then it would be possible to denounce the 1922 treaty on the creation of the USSR. Instead of the Union, it was proposed to create a new state association - the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in which Gorbachev could claim a leading role.
However, no one believed Gorbachev's promises anymore. Therefore, it was decided to hold a meeting in Belarus, in a rather isolated place, but where it was possible to fly by plane. It is also desirable near the Polish border, so that in case of hostile actions by Gorbachev, you can go to Poland on foot.
Shushkevich remembered the Viskuli farm in Belovezhskaya Pushcha, where in 1957, by order of Nikita Khrushchev, a hunting government residence was built, in which there were several wooden cottages. The Polish border is 8 km away. The military airfield in Zasimovichi, capable of receiving jet aircraft, is about 50 km away. The dacha was equipped with government communications. An ideal meeting place for VIPs.
On Saturday, December 7, 1991, distinguished guests and their accompanying persons gathered in Viskuli. President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev did not make it to Belarus. He preferred to land in Moscow and wait for the outcome of the situation there. Based on the information known to date, it can be argued that neither Kravchuk nor Shushkevich planned to adopt the Belovezhskaya Agreement at the meeting.
Kravchuk came to hunt and to discuss the issues of oil and gas supplies, so he immediately went to the Pushcha to hunt. On, as the staff of the dacha recalls, his guards scared away wild boars and bison. Freezing on the watchtower, Leonid Makarovich returned to his warm room, feeling sleepy.
As for Shushkevich, he did not prepare the residence at all for the development and adoption of such a serious document as the Belovezhskaya Agreement. There was not enough space for the advisers, experts and guards accompanying the heads of state. The residence not only lacked premises for serious work, but there was not even a typewriter and other office equipment. A plane was sent to Moscow for a fax. Something had to be borrowed from the administration of the reserve "Belovezhskaya Pushcha", including a typist for printing the document.
But by 16 o'clock. On December 8, 1991, the document was ready, and under the sight of television and cameras Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich signed the Agreement on the termination of the existence of the USSR and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Yeltsin immediately rushed to call President George W. Bush and report that the task he received in the United States in 1989 had been successfully completed. The head of Russia, one of the leading states of the world, had to humiliate himself so much! Unfortunately, Boris Nikolayevich, when he was the president of Russia, remained an errand for the Americans.
Fictitiousness of the Belovezhskaya agreement
Bush and Gorbachev were immediately informed about the signing of the Belovezhskaya Agreement and Yeltsin's phone call. But the train is said to have already left. Yeltsin phoned Bush and hinted to Gorbachev that he no longer considered him a partner.
The President of the USSR had the opportunity to bring to justice the participants in the shameful Belovezhskaya conspiracy. For almost a day, Soviet special forces, in full combat readiness, were waiting for a flight to Belarus to arrest the conspirators.
The flight to the Zasimovichi airbase is less than an hour. But the order from the president of the USSR was never followed, although the laws of the USSR and the results of the March 1991 All-Union referendum on the preservation of the Union, which confirmed the desire of 77.85% of the population to live in a single country, allowed Gorbachev to take the most severe measures against the Belovezhskaya conspirators.
I will repeat myself. The termination of the existence of the Union was beneficial to Gorbachev, whose ideology in life, as the head of his personal guard Vladimir Medvedev aptly noted, was the ideology of self-survival. As a result, Gorbachev was left to be content with a list of personal material claims against Yeltsin, which became his “compensation” for his non-conflict resignation from the presidency of the USSR. They seemed exorbitant to Yeltsin, but Gorbachev's patrons from the United States recommended that the President of the Russian Federation recognize them as acceptable.
Over the past years, much has been said about the fictitiousness of the Belovezhskaya Agreement. Let me just remind you of the main thing. On December 11, 1991, the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee adopted a Statement in which it recognized the Belovezhskaya Agreement as contradicting the USSR Law "On the procedure for resolving issues related to the secession of the union republic from the USSR." The statement emphasized that, according to this Law, some republics are not entitled to resolve issues related to the rights and interests of other republics, and the authorities of the USSR can cease to exist only "after a constitutional decision on the fate of the USSR."
To this I will add the assessments from the Decree of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of March 15, 1996 No. 157-II GD "On the legal force for the Russian Federation - Russia of the results of the USSR referendum on March 17, 1991 on the issue of preserving the USSR." The Resolution stated that “the officials of the RSFSR, who prepared, signed and ratified the decision on the termination of the existence of the USSR, grossly violated the will of the peoples of Russia to preserve the USSR, expressed in the USSR referendum on March 17, 1991, as well as the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic ".
It was also emphasized that “The Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States of December 8, 1991, signed by the President of the RSFSR B. N. Yeltsin and State Secretary of the RSFSR G. E. Burbulis and not approved by the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR - the highest body of state power of the RSFSR, did not have and does not have legal force in the part related to the termination of the existence of the USSR."
This is the official legal assessment of the Bialowieza Agreement and its signatories today. But this will not return the lost country.
