In the image of a spy that has developed in the mass consciousness, one of the most important places is occupied by disguise. The most common stereotype tells us that a scout should wear an unremarkable coat and an equally average hat. However, fashion is changing and intelligence is being forced to follow it. This in no way contradicts another opinion widespread among the "uninitiated" - scouts use makeup. Thanks to the mass of books and films, this version has not been questioned by the general public for a long time. In turn, the employees of the special services do not share it. According to the former head of the press service of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Russia B. Labusov, all this does not make sense. A scout must work under cover and the disappearance of one person (a diplomat or a businessman - agents are often disguised as them) in one place and the sudden appearance of another person in another place will surely raise questions from the enemy's counterintelligence. On the other hand, for counterintelligence officers tracking an enemy spy, disguise or make-up will be useful in some circumstances, for example, in situations when the "ward" begins to guess about the presence of surveillance.
One way or another, the domestic special services used little disguise and change in appearance. At least in those transactions about which there is open information. The entire State Security Committee had only a few people involved in this area. All of them were part of the 7th Directorate. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformations that followed, specialists in changing appearance became employees of the Operational Search Directorate of the FSB. According to various estimates, the total number of makeup specialists in the FSB hovers around three to four dozen. Such a small number of employees can be explained by the same dislike of the domestic special services for makeup and their habit of using simpler means.
These simpler means were most often cars or clothing. The fact is that not in all cases the enemy's "outdoor" can fully recognize the person she is following. Therefore, agents of the same height, physique and with similar, for example, hairstyles can cause a lot of problems for counterintelligence officers. The main thing is to exchange "camouflage means" without anyone noticing. In addition, several times domestic intelligence officers used dummies to distract surveillance. It was almost always a Sherlock Holmes-style "operation" where the mannequin was positioned so that it could be seen from the outside window. Outside observation recorded the presence of the "scout" in a certain place, and he himself was in another and did everything that he needed. A similar technique was used with cars: a car with a dummy of an embassy employee left in one direction and led the surveillance, and the employee himself went where he needed. This particular method of countering counterintelligence was used by many countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States. However, this method is not a panacea. If counterintelligence agents realize that they are being led by the nose, they can simply increase the number of observers. Of course, this takes away strength, but it increases the reliability of the "ward" guidance.
Despite some dislike for them, the special services still used makeup and other ways to change the face. It is worth making a small comment about the reasons for this dislike. The same theatrical make-up is of little use for agents for the reason that at short distances the make-up person looks rather ridiculous and, as a result, attracts attention. Thus, if shadowing is carried out on makeup, the entire "cover" can be spoiled by the specific reaction of ordinary passers-by. Another, more promising, but still not universal way of changing facial features is the use of masks. According to intelligence officer Y. Baranovsky, back in the early 70s, a technology for the production of latex masks was created in one of the domestic research institutes, which had a good resemblance to a real human face. This "Fantomas method" also did not give guarantees, however, it made it possible to noticeably change facial features. According to a number of sources, over time, it was possible to start the production of such masks that did not give out a person at a distance of a couple of meters. However, early versions of latex camouflage products could be used with sufficient effect. To do this, it was required to impair visibility - to be behind a dirty window glass or to sit in a car with closed windows. In most cases, this was enough for the surveillance to be unable to figure out who exactly was in front of her.
An interesting fact is that the attitude to makeup among the special services of different countries is slightly different. Soviet, and then Russian intelligence officers dislike this method of changing appearance. Americans, in turn, do not consider it a panacea either, but when the opportunity arises, they do not neglect it. The CIA, like the KGB and FSB, has a special department that deals with such matters. Its history, as far as is known, makeup in the CIA dates back to the mid-sixties. Then a certain Tony Mendes was recruited into the Office. In 65, he was an unknown artist, and in the future he was destined to become a living legend of American intelligence. After passing all the necessary checks, Mendes ended up in the department that was engaged in the preparation of documents, money, etc. His duties included the production of false papers and certificates, which were intended for agents thrown through the "Iron Curtain". Along the way, with the forgery of documents, Mendes, who understood the make-up business, gradually promoted another idea of disguise. Until a certain time, the management looked at his proposals solely as another project. Nevertheless, Mendes continued to insist on his own and eventually proposed an experiment. In its course, in just a couple of hours, the artist made two Caucasians out of an Asian and an African. The management, to put it mildly, was surprised. It was even more surprised when these two "Caucasians" completely calmly left the territory of the CIA department, where they were making up, and then got there again. The guards did not raise any questions about the appearance and documents of the two "test subjects".
After a successful experiment, Mendes got a promotion and a ton of work. Since the late 60s and early 70s cannot be considered a quiet time in the political and intelligence aspects, Mendes had to work a lot. The bulk of the tasks for his department, which received the nickname "Magic Kingdom", concerned the import and export of agents from the USSR. Mendes taught his skills to several of his employees and they traveled to different countries from time to time and did make-up there. At the beginning of 1974, the Magic Kingdom received a particularly important and large assignment. Several people had to be taken out of Moscow at once. Using their own make-up and documents of their manufacture, several make-up artists arrived in the capital of the Soviet Union. Among the specialists in camouflage was T. Mendes. The removal of embassy staff, agents and make-up artists went smoothly in the end, but Mendes himself had to get very nervous. CIA colleagues told him that his name, special signs and information about the nature of his activities first fell into the hands of counterintelligence in North Vietnam, and from there they went to the KGB and, as a result, to all Soviet embassies around the world. Fortunately for Mendes, everything worked out and he quietly went home to the States.
Simple dressing up is much more popular in the field of changing the appearance. It's simple and effective enough. At least, ordinary passers-by, seeing a disguised scout, react calmly and do not betray him, as is the case with theatrical make-up. Most often, dressing up was used to divert surveillance to a third person: the scout and the assistant changed their clothes, as a result of which the "outdoor" went far from the one who was followed from the very beginning. But this requires finding a suitable place for exchange and there is not always such an opportunity. Another way of dressing up is that the "ward" of outdoor surveillance goes somewhere and does not go out. Rather, it comes out, but in different clothes. Under some circumstances, this technique works quite well. However, it is not a universal remedy for all occasions. For example, dressing did not help the American agent Martha Peterson. Arriving at one of the Moscow cinemas by car, she went into the hall and for some time pretended to be watching a movie. As if helping Soviet counterintelligence officers, she was dressed in a conspicuous white dress with large flowers. About 10-15 minutes after the start of the session, Peterson quickly put on a jacket and trousers over her dress, just as quickly changed her hair and left the hall, so to speak, a completely different person. After riding the bus, subway and trolleybus, the CIA officer went to the place where she was supposed to make a "bookmark" for the agent, known by the code name "Trigon". True, Peterson did not manage to leave the place of the "bookmark". The State Security officers saw through the trick of the American woman in time and calmly led her to the very place of the assignment. It should be noted that in the retelling of Yu. Semenov ("TASS is authorized to declare …"), this story looks less exciting and interesting.
Yet various camouflage techniques are the exception rather than the rule. Changing clothes cannot change a person's figure or plasticity, makeup requires a long preparation, as well as appropriate weather and other conditions, and so on. The really popular and most widespread method of changing the "personality parameters" in intelligence and counterintelligence is the preparation of documents for the agent. A properly made service ID or passport of another country can not only ensure the completion of the task, but also reduce the likelihood of failure. At the same time, in some circumstances, it is necessary to resort to other means besides documents. The development of various technologies in the very near future may make it possible to increase the effectiveness of makeup or special masks. But, unfortunately, the general public will learn about this in thirty years, not earlier.
