The last years of the existence of the Soviet Union are a real kaleidoscope of details, which, with their negative essence, do not cease to amaze even today. The change in the political, economic and social state of the huge country, which had been building for several decades, was happening at an unprecedented speed. It would seem that even the Ecumenical evil genius cannot destroy in such a short time what was built on a more than stable basis. However, as it turned out, what the Ecumenical evil genius cannot do, only a few people who have made their way into power can well do.
By the end of 1988 - beginning of 1989, crisis cracks appeared in the Soviet Union literally in every plane of state and public life. The economic situation became more and more deplorable, and not one of the then and modern economic experts is inclined to say that a huge economic funnel in the vastness of the USSR arose naturally.
By 1986, an economic model was formed in the Soviet Union, which was based primarily not on the development of domestic production, but on the use of income from the sale of raw materials abroad. The industrial post-war boom, which was observed for quite a long time, was replaced by a shift in the direction of the commodity sector, which attracts with its profitability. The Soviet economy began to systematically shift to the channel of raw materials, starting from the 70s, when oil prices began to rise all over the world. If the price of a barrel of oil in the early 70s fluctuated around $ 2, which is little understood today, then after the aggravation of the situation in the Middle East and the imposition of an embargo on oil supplies against the states that supported the Israelis in the Arab-Israeli conflict, oil prices began slowly. but surely crawl up. Although here the word "slow" is hardly even appropriate.
The Soviet Union, as a state that was actively involved in the exploration of oil fields and the production of "black gold", fully felt what economic preferences could be derived from the price growth of oil. It was foolish not to take advantage of the fact that the growing economies of the world needed energy resources, which were more and more expensive. By 1980, oil prices had jumped more than 40 times compared to 1972 and, according to official figures, amounted to an unthinkable, at that time, 82 dollars per barrel. This price of a barrel of oil allowed the Soviet state to move to such a financial model of development, when it is oil revenues that determine in the greatest volume the filling of the state budget.
However, no growth can continue indefinitely, and the first sign of a slump in oil prices flew across the world economy in 1982. In just 4 subsequent years, prices for "black gold" fell more than three times and began to balance around $ 20-25 per barrel. Of course, these values could be considered quite acceptable, but not for the economy, which in just some 8-10 years managed to get used to dependence on raw materials.
Mikhail Gorbachev, who headed the country in March 1985, decided to use the situation in that vein to try to get rid of the economy's dependence on raw materials. With the support of the well-known at that time Soviet economists L. I. Abalkin, A. G. Granberg, P. G. Bunich, T. I. Zaslavskaya begins the famous stage of economic restructuring, which was supposed to bring the USSR out of export dependence on the sale of hydrocarbons and transfer the Union's economy to the development channel on the basis of industrial growth and reforms to create a private sector.
Outwardly, such a message as a reorientation of the economy looked quite promising and promised serious advantages. But only the implementation of the outlined ideas was carried out by such methods that were no longer the usual Soviet ones, but had not yet become classical liberal.
The state was faced with a situation where the ongoing reform simply could not be controlled. The old methods of control did not work already, the new methods did not work yet. The Soviet economic model found itself in a semi-position, when oil prices fell, new sources of income were required, but although these sources appeared, only their resources went anywhere, but not for the development of the financial system.
Gorbachev himself, who initiated a sharp reorientation of the economic model, apparently did not himself understand how to implement everything that economic experts offer him. As a result, the situation turned into such a form when almost every subsequent decision of the authorities was based on the denial of the decisions of the previous ones. A situation of economic uncertainty arose that the state could no longer cope with. Mikhail Gorbachev's declarations that he was loyal to socialist ideals, but at the same time was disposed towards the development of a market economy in the USSR, caused bewilderment, because none of the outlined courses were unambiguously embodied. The authorities, without completing one thing, feverishly took for another undertaking, giving rise to the uncertainty of the all-Union scale.
Only during the years when Mikhail Gorbachev was at the highest state post of the Soviet Union, the external debt increased by 5, 2 times. Foreign states, through the banking sector, were quite willing to lend the USSR at, let's say, enchanting interest rates, which today, by their very appearance, would testify to "draconian" lending. Since 1985, in order to keep the economic situation under control and follow the course of the reforms being undertaken, the state apparatus has gone to the realization of the gold reserve, which by 1991 decreased from almost 2,500 tons to 240 tons (more than 10 times). Roughly speaking, they tried to plug the new holes that appeared with gold. But the ratio of the number of economic holes and the volume of gold reserves was not in favor of the latter.
Against this background, the country is struck by a severe crisis associated with the inability to provide the population with goods and services. However, here the same economic experts say that this crisis was clearly artificial. In 1989-1990, when quite powerful inflation began to manifest itself, manufacturers often tried to "hold back" finished products themselves, which ultimately simply rotted in warehouses. At the same time, store shelves were rapidly emptying. Even the introduced rationing system for the distribution of essential goods did not save a huge country. But the reasons that the manufactured products did not reach the consumer lie not only in the growing inflation. In this regard, there are considerations that product manufacturers have been waiting from day to day for the publication of a decree on price liberalization and private entrepreneurship. Realizing that it is possible to break a much larger bank from the sale of manufactured goods, many enterprises worked, as they say, in a warehouse, or simply waited for better times with stopped machines. It is banal: I wanted to sell at a higher price … Equality and the spirit of collectivism disappeared into the air - somehow, too quickly, the producers remembered that the consumer is an object for making a profit …
It turns out that the stories that in the Soviet Union of the late 80s - early 90s there was no raw material base for stable production are ordinary fairy tales with which certain forces are trying to justify the actions of the then leadership.
As a result, the Soviet people became a real hostage of the unfolding struggle for power between the union center and the regional "princelings", a hostage of a large industrial agreement, which today would be called a collusion of monopolists. In this regard, the first undercover and then quite open struggle between Gorbachev and Yeltsin looks especially negative, each of whom tried to achieve the best preferences for himself. And if Gorbachev already understood that the reforms he had started had failed and it was simply pointless to try to resist, then Boris Yeltsin decided to seize the moment and announce that he would definitely turn the country in the right direction, setting it on the path of strategically important reforms.
The domestic economy at that moment appeared to be the real victim of people who were trying to get political or financial points for themselves. Liberalization of prices finally buried the country's attractiveness for any investment projects on its territory, since it was much more profitable for all manufacturers to sell their goods abroad and receive real money for it than to trade for so-called "wooden" ones. This state of affairs, when each person who had the opportunity to steer the new Russian economy, tried to bring notes of personal interest to him in the course of the financial system, led to the fact that the impoverishment of the Russian people reached its apogee.
Yegor Gaidar, Stanislav Shatalin, Grigory Yavlinsky promised to bring the country out of the total economic crisis. The last two were the authors of the sensational "500 Days" program, which was designed to speed up economic recovery. Large-scale privatization became the basis of this program. Shatalin and Yavlinsky offered the country amazing things: to privatize all the fixed assets of the huge state in 3 months. At the same time, today even a person far enough from the economy can declare that it is simply unthinkable to arrange privatization according to the "blitz-krieg" method in a country where inflation rates exceeded 2000% by the end of the year. Any privatization should be carried out subject to the stability of the state currency market, or relying on a different indicator of the assessment of material values. According to the privatization program, which, we recall, was supposed to be completed just 3 months after its start, the ruble was designated as the basis, which fell at the same rate as Felix Baumgartner during the jump from the stratosphere.
And how it was possible to rely on the national currency, which lost most of its value at the end of the day, is completely unclear. However, as we all know, privatization has begun. Yes, it didn’t end in three months, but its most intense leap came precisely at the time of unbridled hyperinflation, when entire industrial associations were being bought up for nothing. Those who got access to both the state budget and foreign loans, literally in batches bought up enterprises at 1% of their real value, and today they are giving interviews about how they managed to make their fortune "honestly".
Blitzkrieg-style privatization was carried out within the framework of the so-called shock therapy, which, according to economic definition, includes, in addition to the aforementioned price liberalization, the denationalization of unprofitable enterprises. It should be emphasized that they are unprofitable. As it turned out, literally in 2-3 years the overwhelming majority of the country's enterprises were among the unprofitable - a question no less important than the one that affects the reliance of privatization mechanisms on the endlessly falling ruble.
So, in the first year of the announced denationalization, 24 thousand “unprofitable” enterprises and more than 160 thousand collective farms (agricultural farms) were privatized. The population, which did not have the means to feed themselves, for obvious reasons could not fully participate in the privatization process. Only a few became owners of shares in enterprises. The voucher round of privatization led to the fact that persons with funds appeared as wholesale buyers of the famous privatization checks, and the purchase was often carried out at a cost that was ten times lower than the indicated value of the privatization check itself. It should be recalled here that Anatoly Chubais, one of the ideologues of voucher privatization, promised at one time that the cost of one privatization check received by Russian citizens in a year of privatization would be equal to the cost of a new Volga car …
The cost of the redeemed metallurgical, coal mining and oil and gas enterprises was striking in its unexpected modesty. After a large-scale study by the specialists of the Accounts Chamber, it turned out that in total during the era of the 90s, about 130 thousand enterprises were privatized. At the same time, the income from such total privatization amounted to 65 billion rubles in the prices of the pre-default month of 1998. This is about $ 10 billion. Only 10 billion dollars in a whole decade! For comparison: today British Petroleum is selling 50% of TNK-BP shares for $ 17 billion + 13% of Rosneft shares.
It turns out that a one-time deal in terms of its parameters significantly exceeds a ten-year income nationwide … If we say that the state budget income from the privatization of the 90s is ridiculous, and the privatization itself is frankly predatory, then this is absolutely nothing.
It turns out that the political system of that time itself formed all the conditions for a narrow circle of people to be able to share all the main national resources and gain access to dictating conditions to the state authorities themselves. If so, then this is anything but a market economy. Shock therapy remained a shock for the Russian people, but for the ideologists of privatization and economically liberalization mechanisms, it appeared not just comfortable, but real manna from heaven. It is surprising that today the same individuals continue to rest on their laurels for their more than dubious financial transactions.
As the classic said, with such happiness and freedom …
