The defeat of the Crimean Front and its subsequent liquidation on May 8-19, 1942, became one of the links in the chain of military disasters in 1942. The scenario of the action during the operation of the 11th Wehrmacht Army under the command of Colonel-General Erich von Manstein against the Crimean Front was similar to other German operations of this period. The German troops, having received reinforcements and accumulating forces and resources, launched a counteroffensive against the Soviet forces that had reached a positional deadlock and suffered significant losses.
On October 18, 1941, the 11th German army began an operation to capture the Crimea. By November 16, the entire peninsula, except for the base of the Black Sea Fleet - Sevastopol, was captured. In December-January 1941-1942, as a result of the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, the Red Army returned the Kerch Peninsula and advanced 100-110 km in 8 days. But already on January 18, the Wehrmacht recaptured Feodosia. In February-April 1942, the Crimean Front made three attempts to turn the tide of events on the peninsula in its favor, but as a result could not achieve significant success and suffered heavy losses.
Erich von Manstein.
Plans of the German command
As in other sectors of the Soviet-German front, hostilities on the Crimean peninsula by the spring of 1942 entered the phase of trench warfare. The Wehrmacht made the first attempts to launch a decisive counteroffensive in March 1942. The 11th Army received reinforcements - the 28th Jaeger and 22nd Panzer Divisions. In addition, the Romanian corps received the 4th Mountain Rifle Division. The task of routing Soviet forces in Crimea was first given to the command of the 11th Army on February 12 in the "Order on the conduct of hostilities on the Eastern Front at the end of the winter period" of the main command of the ground forces of the Third Reich. German troops were to capture Sevastopol and the Kerch Peninsula. The German command wanted to free up large forces of the 11th Army for further operations.
With the end of the thaw period, the German armed forces began to move on to the implementation of this plan. The main governing document for the German three army groups was Directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942. The main targets of the 1942 campaign were the Caucasus and Leningrad. The 11th German Army, which got bogged down in positional battles on an isolated sector of the Soviet-German front, was tasked with "clearing the Kerch Peninsula from the enemy in the Crimea and capturing Sevastopol."
In April 1942, at a meeting with Adolf Hitler, Georg von Sonderstern and Manstein presented a plan for the operation of Soviet forces on the Kerch Peninsula. The forces of the Crimean Front were quite densely built on the Parpach Isthmus (at the so-called Ak-Monai positions). But the density of the formation of troops was not the same. The flank of the Crimean Front adjacent to the Black Sea was weaker, and the breakthrough of its positions allowed the Germans to go to the rear with a stronger grouping from the 47th and 51st armies. The task of breaking through the Soviet positions of the 44th Soviet Army was entrusted to the reinforced XXX Army Corps (AK) of Lieutenant General Maximilian Fretter-Pico as part of the 28th Jaeger, 50th Infantry, 132nd Infantry, 170th Infantry, 22 1st Panzer Divisions. In addition, the German command was going to use the flank of the Crimean front open by the sea and land a landing in the rear of the attacked Soviet troops as part of a reinforced battalion of the 426th regiment. XXXXII AK as part of the 46th Infantry Division under the command of General of the Infantry Franz Mattenklott and the VII Romanian Corps as part of the 10th Infantry, 19th Infantry Divisions, 8th Cavalry Brigade were to conduct a diversionary offensive against the strong right wing of the Crimean Front. The operation was covered from the air by the VIII Luftwaffe Air Corps under the command of Baron Wolfram von Richthofen. The operation was codenamed "Bustard Hunt" (German: Trappenjagd).
The 11th Army was inferior to the Crimean Front (KF): in personnel by 1, 6: 1 times (250 thousand soldiers of the Red Army against 150 thousand Germans), in guns and mortars by 1, 4: 1 (3577 at the KF and 2472 for the Germans), 1, 9: 1 in tanks and self-propelled gun mounts (347 for the KF and 180 for the Germans). Only in aviation was the parity: 1: 1, 175 fighters and 225 bombers from the KF, the Germans - 400 units. The most powerful instrument in Manstein's hands was von Richthofen's VIII Luftwaffe Air Corps, the most powerful unit of the German Air Force. Richtofen had vast combat experience - back in the First World War he won eight aerial victories and was awarded the Iron Cross of the 1st degree, fought in Spain (chief of staff and then commander of the Condor legion), a participant in the Polish, French campaigns, the Cretan operation, participated in Operation Barbarossa and Typhoon (offensive on Moscow). In addition, the German commander had a fresh 22nd Panzer Division under the command of Major General Wilhelm von Apel. The division was formed at the end of 1941 on the territory of the occupied part of France, and it was "full-blooded". The tank division was armed with Czech PzKpfw 38 (t) light tanks. By the beginning of the offensive, the division was reinforced with a 3 tank battalion (52 tanks), in addition, in April, the unit received 15-20 T-3 and T-4. The division had 4 motorized infantry battalions, two of them were equipped with the "Ganomag" armored personnel carrier and an anti-tank battalion (it also had self-propelled guns).
Manstein had the tools to hack into the Crimean front defenses and build on the success of the Air Corps and 22nd Panzer Division. A tank division could, after breaking through the front, quickly move forward and destroy Soviet reserves, rear services, and intercept communications. The breakthrough development troops were reinforced with the Grodek motorized brigade, made up of motorized formations that participated in the offensive operation of the units. Command of the Crimean Front - Commander of the KF Lieutenant General Dmitry Timofeevich Kozlov, members of the Military Council (Divisional Commissar F. A. Z. Mehlis), had only tank units for direct support of the infantry (tank brigades and battalions) and did not create means of counteracting the deep penetration of the Germans - army mobile groups consisting of tank, anti-tank, mechanized, cavalry formations. We must also take into account the fact that the front line was completely open for aerial reconnaissance, it was an open steppe. The Germans easily opened the positions of the Soviet troops.
The plans of the Soviet command, the forces of the Crimean Front
The Soviet command, despite the fact that the tasks of the winter offensive were not fulfilled, did not want to lose the initiative, and did not lose hope of changing the situation in their favor. On April 21, 1942, the High Command of the North Caucasian direction was formed, headed by Marshal Semyon Budyonny. The Crimean Front, the Sevastopol Defense Region, the North Caucasian Military District, the Black Sea Fleet and the Azov Flotilla were subordinated to Budyonny.
The Crimean front occupied defensive positions on the rather narrow Ak-Monaysk isthmus 18-20 km wide. The front consisted of three armies: 44th under the command of Lieutenant General Stepan Ivanovich Chernyak, 47th Major General Konstantin Stepanovich Kolganov, 51st Army of Lieutenant General Vladimir Nikolaevich Lvov. In total, by the beginning of May, the KF headquarters had 16 rifle and 1 cavalry divisions, 3 rifle, 4 tank, 1 naval brigades, 4 separate tank battalions, 9 artillery regiments of the RGK and other formations. The front in February - April 1942 suffered serious losses, was largely drained of blood, exhausted, did not have fresh and powerful shock formations. As a result, the KF, although it had a numerical advantage in men, tanks, guns and mortars, was inferior in quality.
The asymmetric structure of the KF troops even more equalized the capabilities of the Soviet and German command. The positions of the KF were divided into two sections, unevenly filled with troops. The southern section from Koi-Aisan to the Black Sea coast with a length of about 8 km represented the Soviet defensive positions prepared back in January 1942. They were defended by the 276th Rifle, 63rd Mountain Rifle Divisions of the 44th Army (A). In the second echelon and the reserve were the 396th, 404th, 157th rifle divisions, the 13th motorized rifle regiment, the 56th tank brigade (on May 8 - 7 KV, 20 T-26, 20 T-60), 39th tank brigade (2 KV, 1 T-34, 18 T-60), 126th separate tank battalion (51 T-26), 124th separate tank battalion (20 T-26). The northern section from Koi-Aisan to Kiet (about 16 km) curved to the west, overhanging Feodosia, which, according to the plans of the Soviet command, was the first target of the offensive. In this ledge and in close proximity to it, the main forces of the 51st and 47th armies of the KF were assembled, reinforced by troops subordinate to the front headquarters. In the first echelon were the 271st, 320th rifle divisions, 77th mountain rifle divisions, 47th A, 400th, 398th, 302nd rifle divisions 51A, 55th tank brigade (10 KV, 20 T-26, 16 T-60), 40th tank brigade (11 KV, 6 T-34, 25 T-60). In the second echelon and reserve: 224th, 236th rifle divisions, 47th A, 138th, 390th rifle divisions, 51st A, 229th separate tank battalion (11 KB) and other units.
As a result of the front, Dmitry Kozlov gathered the main forces of the KF on his right flank, but they got bogged down in positional battles and lost their mobility. In addition, the Germans were able to take advantage of the pause between the previous and the upcoming new Soviet offensive. The directive of the Supreme Command Headquarters No. 170357 to the command of the KF about the transition to the defense was too late, there was no longer time to regroup the forces, dismantle the strike group on the right flank in favor of strengthening the positions of the left flank. The German command, having assembled the strike group on its right flank opposite the positions of the 44th A, did not hesitate.
According to the original plan of the command of Army Group South, Operation Bustard Hunt was to begin on 5 May. But due to the delay in the transfer of aviation, the start of the offensive operation was postponed to May 8. It cannot be said that the German strike was a complete surprise for the command of the KF. Shortly before the start of the German offensive, a Croatian pilot flew over to the Soviet side and reported on the upcoming strike. By the end of May 7, an order was issued for the front troops, which announced that the German offensive was expected on May 8-15, 1942. But there was no time for the right reaction.
Battle
May 7. The VIII Luftwaffe Air Corps was to return to the Kharkov region soon to take part in the operation to eliminate the Barvenkovsky ledge. Therefore, the air strikes began a day before the transition to the offensive of the 11th German army. Throughout the day, the German Air Force attacked headquarters and communications centers. I must say that the actions of the German aviation during this operation were very successful, for example, during a raid on the headquarters of the 51st Army on May 9, Lieutenant General, Army Commander Vladimir Lvov died. The Soviet command posts were reconnoitered in advance and suffered heavy losses. The command and control of the troops was partially disrupted.
May 8. At 4.45, aviation and artillery training began. At 7.00, units of the 28th Jaeger, 132nd Infantry Divisions of 30 AK on the right German flank went on the offensive. The main blow fell on the orders of the 63rd Mountain Rifle Division and partially the 276th Rifle Division of the 44th A. In addition, the Germans landed troops up to a battalion in the rear of the 63rd Georgian Mountain Rifle Division, causing panic. By the end of the day, the German units broke through the defenses at a front 5 km away and to a depth of 8 km.
At 20.00 the front commander, Kozlov ordered a flank counterattack on the enemy units that had broken through. The forces of the 51st A in the morning of May 9 were due from the line of Parpach - g. Shuruk-Oba to strike in the direction of the Peschanaya gully. The strike group included 4 rifle divisions, 2 tank brigades and 2 separate tank battalions: 302nd, 138th and 390th rifle divisions from 51st A, 236th rifle division from 47th A, 83rd naval rifle brigade, 40th and 55th tank brigades, 229th and 124th separate tank battalions. They received the task of restoring the position of the front and developing the offensive, cutting off the German units that had broken through into the depths of the Kerch Peninsula. The 44th Army was supposed to hold back the onslaught of the Germans at this time. On the first day of the battle, no one thought about retreating to the rear defensive lines. There were no orders for their occupation. Moreover, the 72nd Cavalry Division and the 54th Motorized Rifle Regiment, which were subordinate to the front headquarters and located at the Turkish Wall, were ordered to move into the 44th A zone to strengthen its defense.
9th May. The German command brought the 22nd Panzer Division into the breakthrough, but the rains that began greatly slowed down its advance. Only by the 10th Panzer Division was able to break through into the depths of the KF defense and turn to the north, reaching the communications of the 47th and 51st Soviet armies. The Panzer Division was followed by the 28th Jaeger Division and the 132nd Infantry Division. Grodek's motorized rifle brigade was also thrown into the breakthrough - it reached the Turkish Wall on May 10 and crossed it.
May 10. On the night of May 10, during negotiations between the front commander Kozlov and Stalin, it was decided to withdraw the army to the Turkish (in other sources Tatarsky) shaft and organize a new line of defense. But the 51st Army was no longer able to carry out this order. As a result of the air strike on the headquarters, the commander of the Lvov was killed and his deputy K. Baranov was wounded. The army frantically tried to avoid disaster. Parts of the 47th and 51st armies on May 9 went into the planned counterattack, there was a fierce oncoming battle. Soviet tank brigades and separate tank battalions, rifle units fought against the formations of the 22nd Panzer Division and the 28th Jaeger Division. The intensity of the fighting is evidenced by the fact that if on May 9 there were 46 tanks in the 55th Tank Brigade, then after the battle on May 10 there was only one left. Soviet tank infantry support units could not hold back the onslaught of German forces.
May 11-12. On the afternoon of May 11, units of the 22nd Panzer Division reached the Sea of Azov, cutting off significant forces of the 47th and 51st armies from the retreat route to the Turkish Wall. Several Soviet divisions were surrounded in a narrow coastal strip. On the evening of the 11th, the Soviet high command still hoped to restore the situation on the peninsula by creating a defensive line on the Turkish shaft. Stalin and Vasilevsky ordered Budyonny to personally organize the defense of the troops of the KF, to restore order in the Military Council of the front and for this to leave for Kerch. The left-flank divisions of the 51st Soviet Army spent another day on unsuccessful attempts to prevent the encirclement of other troops, lost time and lost the race to the rear line of defense.
The Germans did not waste time and did everything to prevent the Soviet troops from retreating to a new line of defense. By the end of the 10th, the advanced units of the 30th AK reached the Turkish shaft. On May 12, the Germans landed troops in the rear of the 44th Army. This allowed them to begin a successful struggle for the Turkish Wall before the reserve 156th Infantry Division approached the shaft.
May 13 and subsequent days. On May 13, the Germans broke through the defenses in the center of the Turkish Wall. On the night of the 14th, the Supreme Command Headquarters admitted defeat on the Kerch Peninsula. At 3.40 Budyonny, with the consent of the Headquarters, ordered the start of the withdrawal of the KF troops to the Taman Peninsula. Vasilevsky orders to put the 2nd and 3rd airborne corps and the airborne brigade at the disposal of Budyonny. Apparently, it was supposed to organize a defense on the approaches to Kerch and stop the German offensive in order to withdraw the troops of the defeated KF by landing. Moreover, they were not going to hand over Kerch - this meant to bury all the results of the Kerch-Feodosia landing operation. May 15 at 1.10 A. M. Vasilevsky orders: "Not to surrender Kerch, to organize a defense like Sevastopol."
The advanced German units, apparently it was Grodek's motorized brigade, reached the outskirts of Kerch on May 14. The city was defended by units of the 72nd cavalry division. Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis, a representative of the Headquarters on the Crimean Front, announced this at 18.10: “The battles are taking place on the outskirts of Kerch, from the north the city is bypassed by the enemy … We have disgraced the country and must be damned. We will fight to the last. Enemy aviation decided the outcome of the battle."
But the measures to turn Kerch into a fortress city, to withdraw most of the forces from the peninsula were late. First, the Germans cut off a significant part of the KF troops by turning the 22nd Panzer Division's formations to the north. True, they wanted to send her to Kharkov on May 15, but the stubborn resistance of Soviet troops on the peninsula delayed her sending. Parts of the 28th Jaeger and 132nd Infantry Divisions turned northeast after breaking through the Turkish Wall and also reached the Sea of Azov. Thus, a barrier was built for the Soviet troops who were retreating from the Turkish Wall. On May 16, the 170th German Infantry Division, which was introduced into the breakthrough, reached Kerch. But the battle for the city continued until May 20. The Red Army soldiers fought in the area of Mount Mithridat, the railway station, the plant named after I. Voikova. After the defenders had exhausted all possibilities for resistance in the city, they retreated to the Adzhimushkay quarries. About 13 thousand people retreated in them - formations of the 83rd Marine Brigade, the 95th Border Detachment, several hundred cadets of the Yaroslavl Aviation School, the Voronezh School of Radio Specialists and soldiers from other units, townspeople. In the Central quarries, the defense was led by Colonel P. M. N. Karpekhin. The Germans, through continuous attacks, were able to drive the Red Army soldiers deep into the quarries. But they could not take them, all the assaults failed. Despite the acute shortage of water, food, medicine, ammunition, weapons, the fighters held the defense for 170 days. There was no water in the quarries. It had to be mined outside, according to the recollections of the surviving soldiers, "for a bucket of water they paid with a bucket of blood." The last defenders of "Kerch Brest", completely exhausted, were captured on October 30, 1942. In total, 48 people fell into the hands of the Germans. The rest, about 13 thousand people, died.
The evacuation from the peninsula lasted from 15 to 20 May. By order of Vice Admiral Oktyabrsky, all possible ships and vessels were brought to the Kerch region. In total, up to 140 thousand people were evacuated. Commissioner Lev Mekhlis was one of the last to evacuate, on the evening of May 19. In the last days of the disaster, as a man of undoubted personal courage, he rushed along the front line, it seemed that he was looking for death, trying to organize a defense, to stop the retreating units. On the night of May 20, the last formations, covering the retreat of comrades, plunged into the ships under enemy fire.
Outcomes
- By the Directive of the Headquarters, the Crimean Front and the North Caucasian direction were eliminated. The remnants of the KF troops were sent to form a new North Caucasian Front. Marshal Budyonny was appointed its commander.
- The front has lost more than 160 thousand people. Most of the aircraft, armored vehicles, guns, vehicles, tractors and other military equipment were lost. Soviet troops suffered a heavy defeat, the results of previous actions in this direction were lost. The situation on the southern flank of the Soviet-German front became seriously complicated. The Germans were able to threaten to invade the North Caucasus through the Kerch Strait and the Taman Peninsula. The position of the Soviet troops in Sevastopol sharply worsened, the German command was able to concentrate more forces against the fortified city.
- On June 4, 1942, the Headquarters issued directive No. 155452 "On the reasons for the defeat of the Crimean Front in the Kerch operation."The main reason was the mistakes of the command of the KF. Front commander Lieutenant-General DT Kozlov was demoted to major general and removed from his post as front commander. The commander of the 44th Army, Lieutenant General SI Chernyak, was removed from the post of army commander, demoted to colonel and sent to the troops in order to "check on another, less complicated job." The commander of the 47th Army, Major General KS Kolganov, was removed from the post of army commander and demoted to colonel. Mekhlis was removed from the posts of Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, he was demoted in rank two steps - to the corps commissar. Member of the Military Council of the KF divisional commissar F. A. Shamanin was demoted to the rank of brigade commissar. The chief of staff of the KF, Major General P. P. The commander of the KF Air Force, Major General E. M. Nikolaenko, was removed from his post and demoted to colonel.
- The disaster of the Crimean Front is a classic example of the weakness of the defensive strategy, even in the conditions of a small, quite convenient for defense (the Germans could not carry out wide outflanking maneuvers) of the front and a smaller number of manpower, tanks and guns from the enemy. The German command found a weak spot and ripped open the Soviet defense, the presence of mobile, shock formations (22 Panzer Division and Grodek's motorized brigade) made it possible to develop the first success, encircle the Soviet infantry, destroy the rear, individual formations, cut communications. Air superiority played an important role. The command of the KF did not manage to reorganize the front troops into more correct defensive formations (without bias in favor of the right flank), to create mobile shock groups that could stop the German offensive and even turn the tide in their favor by striking the flanks of the German grouping that had broken through. Could not prepare in advance a new line of defense, to divert forces and means to it. German generals during this period of the war were still outplaying the Soviet generals.
Adzhimushkay_stones - entrance to the museum.
