Our southern neighbor Georgia has long been firmly in the camp of Russia's opponents. Recently, a motorized infantry company of the Georgian Armed Forces was included in the NATO Rapid Reaction Force. Anti-Russian sentiments are strong in the country, especially among young people. A NATO training center operates on the territory of Georgia on a permanent basis. Since last year, joint military exercises of NATO and Georgian troops have become periodic. The latter with the arrogant name Noble Partner 2016 started as early as May 11 of this year. President Giorgi Margvelashvili has said from a high rostrum more than once that "Russia occupies a fifth of Georgia and Tbilisi will never accept this." During the opening of the Noble Partner 2016 military exercises, he announced Georgia's aspirations to NATO. The North Atlantic Organization is slowly but surely assimilating a new Caucasian theater of military operations. And there is no longer any doubt that in the event of a war against Russia, NATO will undoubtedly attempt to invade the Caucasus. And this time the Russian army will not have to fight against the Georgian soldiers, who have already shown what they are on the battlefield, the enemy will be more serious. If we talk about organizing the defense of the high-mountainous part of the Main Caucasian Ridge (GKH), then first of all it is worth paying attention to the Transcaucasian Highway, the Military Ossetian and Georgian Military Highways. No less dangerous direction is the Military-Sukhum road with gentle Klukhor and Marukh passes.
The section of the Georgian-Russian border that runs along the Main Caucasian Ridge (GKH) from Mount Gvandra to the top of Geze-Tau (about 140 km long) should also not be ignored. Here you will have to defend your positions at absolute altitudes of 3000–3500 m and higher - this is the highlands. I propose to consider some of the features of the organization of defense in this segment.
PROBABLE OPPONENT
The best adapted for war in the mountains are fighters born and raised in the mountains. The irony of the situation is that during the defense of the Caucasus in 1942-1943, the Red Army was deployed by the front to the north, and now the probable enemy is threatening Russia from the south. In those years, the inhabitants of the mountainous regions of Georgia adjoining the GKH from the south - the Svans - provided invaluable assistance to the mountain troops of the Red Army and the NKVD. Many highlanders fought against the Alpine rangers of Germany and its allies (in fact, the troops of Western and Central Europe, but at that time united under the auspices of the Third Reich). Now the Svans will fight against Russia. There are many excellent hunters among them, by the way, they have almost exterminated all the game on their side and often come to Russian territory to get a mountain goat or something else. The Balkars have long been saying in earnest that wild animals in the Caucasus do not cross the Russian-Georgian border in a southern direction under any circumstances. It should be borne in mind that the Svans know the mountains like the back of their hand, they can perfectly shoot, move, triple ambushes, attack and defend themselves in the mountains. They are undisciplined, but they can successfully participate in sabotage and reconnaissance raids as part of small groups. In Soviet times, there were many excellent climbers among the Svans. For example, the name of Svan Mikhail Khergiani, one of the strongest climbers of the Union, was widely known in the USSR and Europe at one time.
But, frankly speaking, Georgia is not able to put serious forces on the battlefield. The main part of the NATO mountain infantry will be: the German 23rd mountain rifle brigade, the French alpine huntsmen (five reinforced battalions: 6, 7, 11, 13, 27th), the 159th mountain infantry regiment, legionnaires; units of the US 10th Mountain Division and possibly the 86th Brigade, Italian Alpini (two brigades and three separate regiments) and Bersalieri (six regiments). The possibility of the appearance of the Austrian 6th mountain-ranger brigade in the Caucasus theater of operations within the framework of NATO's Partnership for Peace program cannot be completely ruled out.
The Western countries have one serious problem, which concerns the possibility of significantly replenishing the mountain infantry forces through mobilization. In short, NATO does not have such an opportunity, all that the command of the North Atlantic organization can count on are reservists. For example, strong climbers from Western countries (and there are much more of them there than in Russia), a priori not connected with the army, are unlikely to be recruited for military operations due to their pacifist worldview.
Of the former USSR allies in the Warsaw Pact, the 21st Polish brigade of the Podhalian riflemen and two Romanian mountain brigades - the 2nd and the 61st - can take part in the hostilities in the Caucasus. The rest of the NATO member countries do not have any significant mountain infantry forces in their armies. But based on past experience, it can be assumed that they will provide small military contingents at the disposal of the joint command of the North Atlantic organization. It cannot be ruled out that the army contingents of the ANZUS bloc countries (Australia, New Zealand, and the USA) will be attracted to the solution of military tasks in the Caucasus. In addition, it is possible that units of troops of non-NATO countries can participate in hostilities within the framework of the same Partnership for Peace program, such as Ukraine, Moldova, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and others. By the way, in Soviet times, Ukrainian mountaineering clubs (in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk) were among the strongest in the Union.
RUSSIAN MOUNTAIN ARROWS
What kind of special troops designed to wage war in the mountains does Russia have? The Southern Military District of the Russian armed forces has two mountain rifle brigades. One brigade (33rd), stationed in the Botlikh region of Dagestan, about 40 km from the Russian-Georgian border. This is the eastern Caucasus. This brigade includes separate mountain rifle battalions of the 838th and 839th, a separate reconnaissance battalion of the 1198th, a division of self-propelled howitzers, an anti-aircraft battery, a communications battalion, an engineer-engineer company, an electronic warfare company, a logistics company, a repair company, a medical company, an RChBZ platoon and a commandant's platoon.
Another mountain brigade (34th), also of battalion composition, is stationed in the village of Storozhevaya-2 in Karachay-Cherkessia, about 60 km from the state border. True, this time on the other side is not hostile Georgia, but friendly Abkhazia. The structure of the 34th brigade is identical to the 33rd.
It must be admitted frankly that these forces are clearly not enough in the event of possible military actions, which are discussed in the article. Unlike NATO, the Russian mobilization system makes it possible to significantly replenish troops with reservists in a short time. But here we are talking about mountain specifics. Therefore, it is worth creating in addition to the already existing real brigades (which, undoubtedly, have tasks according to the "M" plan) skadded mountain units or formations in the required quantity and quality and place them in Staropolye and in the Kuban.
In Russia, there is someone to form mountain rifle units for conducting combat operations in high mountains. The mass enthusiasm of young people for mountaineering and mountain tourism contributes to this. The question is whether the military registration and enlistment offices take into account the hobby of potential conscripts and reservists, which is so useful for the country's defense. In Soviet times, when mountaineering and mountain tourism were more widespread than now, the military registration and enlistment offices did not keep such records, and in the Soviet armed forces, in fact, there was no mountain infantry at all. We are not talking about formally declared as mountain military units and formations.
LET'S LOOK INTO THE CHARTER
Once again I want to return to the issue of the discrepancy between the recommendations that are spelled out in the Combat Regulations “on the preparation and conduct of combined arms combat” (BU) with the realities that the troops will encounter in the mountains. This time we are talking about defensive fighting.
Let's see what is written in article 198, part 2 of the BU: "The main efforts are focused on the defense of tank-hazardous areas, mountain passes, road junctions, dominant heights and important objects." Everything seems to be true, but this is only at first glance, and if you think about it, then this very general recommendation is, in fact, a dummy. And it is worth mentioning that tank-hazardous directions in high mountains are mainly roads, sometimes it is the bottom of flat-bottomed valleys or gorges or gentle slopes free of large stones, very rarely - these are plateaus with a flat surface, which must be driven up the serpentines and then also move down. That's probably all. But this "all" applies only to low mountains and some part of the middle mountains. In the highlands, there are no tank-hazardous directions at all.
When it comes to dominant heights, clarification is needed. If we mean the tops of the mountains, then the recommendation contains a mistake: the fact is that the valleys are not visible from the tops at all, with very rare exceptions. To observe the bottom of the valley, you cannot go above the lower shoulder of the ridge slope, as soon as you go beyond the bend, only the slope of the opposite ridge will be in the field of view. The higher you go, the less you see what happens in the gorge. Remote parts of the valley can be viewed from some points. Obviously, it makes no sense to defend the heights in the mountains, as is done on the plain. The point is not to indiscriminately position your positions as high as possible, but to be higher than the enemy, while not losing sight of him and staying from him at a distance that will allow you to effectively use all available fire weapons.
I propose to look at article 199: “Roads, exits from gorges, tunnels, mountain valleys, gorges, convenient river crossings and canyon crossings, as well as directions that can be used by the enemy for bypass.
Firstly, the concept of “exits from the gorges” is confusing. It turns out that the heights are deliberately given to the enemy, and the lowlands must be defended, since the gorges (valleys) are always located "outlets" downward. There is confusion in the article between the terms "valley" and "gorge". I want to clarify one detail for the reader: gorges and valleys are, in fact, one and the same, and you should not include these terms in one chain of enumerations. It is believed that the former are much narrower and somewhat shorter than the latter. Example: The Tunkinskaya valley is over 160 km long and 30 km at its widest point, while the Baksan gorge is about 96 km long and at its widest point it is just over 1 km. But in the special literature, these two terms do not have any difference, when it comes to valleys, gorges are often meant. Secondly, the “canyon crossings” are embarrassing, the impression is that the author of the article did not see anything but plain ravines, and believes that the canyons are so small that it is a trifle to build a crossing through them. It is difficult to comment on these "transitions", since they are clearly from the realm of fiction, which has nothing to do with reality.
Further in the same article it is written: "… organizing the defense in a narrow valley (gorge), place fire weapons on the adjacent slopes of the mountains so that cross-fire is provided in the valley (gorge)." The word "lumbago" means that the gorge must be shot through to its entire length. Let's take as an example the very small Adyl-su gorge in the Elbrus region. It is about 12 km long, has many bends and a significant difference in height; it is unlikely that it will be possible to “shoot through” it along its entire length using the entire arsenal of a motorized rifle battalion. Covering a section of it with dense fire over the entire width of the gorge is not a problem, but we are talking about "shooting".
I return to the article again: “The heights forming the entrance to the valley are most strongly fortified. The approaches to the dominant heights are covered with fire from artillery and grenade launchers and anti-tank weapons. In this case, artillery is widely used for direct fire."
If we mean the main valley, which starts from the foothills and goes all the way to the main ridge, then the heights at its entrance can be very low and insignificant, so much so that at their tops only a machine-gun nest can be equipped, one position without spare ones, or you can lay down there. for a sniper or NP. Why cover the approaches to such a peak is also unclear. If we are talking about one of the side valleys near the main ridge, then there is no point in defending such a peak, because, as a rule, the valley is not visible from it at all. In this case, it is better to prepare positions on the lowest shoulder, on the side of the mountain. At the same time, we are not talking about the placement of cannon artillery there (especially MLRS). Let's try to imagine how you can prepare a position for a cannon on a slope with a steepness of 30-35 degrees to fire direct fire towards the foot of the mountain (otherwise how to understand the requirement of the charter).
Article 201 says: "A bypassing enemy is destroyed by artillery fire and other means, as well as by decisive actions of subunits of the second echelon (reserve) or an armored group of a battalion (company)." The trouble is that it is not always possible to drag artillery upstairs, especially armored vehicles, even in mid-mountainous conditions, and there is no question of doing something like that in the highlands. There, everything that the mountain infantry can have, it is able to carry, at best use pack animals.
Let's look at one more point, and that's it. So, the charter says: "It is advisable to carry out counterattacks from top to bottom along the ridges, valleys, roads with extensive use of detours and envelopes." This is another empty recommendation. First, if you move along the ridges and valleys, taking into account their great length, then this combat action does not fit into the term "attack", then we should talk about a counteroffensive. Secondly, the ridges, if we are talking about middle and high mountains, are crowned with rocky ridges, and in winter - snow blows and cornices. The very topography of the ridges is often such that you can't really turn around on it. Sometimes you will have to attack not even in a column one at a time, but simply one at a time, and in some places the fighters will have to crawl through difficult areas in which they physically cannot fire at the enemy. Along the valleys, the enemy will have to counterattack head-on. Therefore, if we are talking about a counterattack, we must first of all pay attention to the slopes of the ridges, wide corridors, folds in the mountainous terrain, allowing covert maneuvers to take advantageous positions, from where you can counterattack, and it is better to hit the enemy with destructive fire from top to bottom., from medium distances.
DEFENSE OF PASSES
A soldier of the 34th brigade demonstrates skills that are useless in real combat. Photo from the official website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
In order not to be unfounded, I propose to consider the option of organizing defense on a specific example. Let's take not the entire high-mountainous area of the GKH from the Gvandra peak to the Geze-tau peak, but only its center. Let's restrict ourselves to the regimental-level defense area (RO), from the summit of Chiper-Azau-bashi (3862 m) to the peak of Cheget-tau (4109) - along the front (about 40 km long) and to the Elbrus village in depth, inclusive (about 16, 5 km without taking into account the height difference). This RO closes the exit to the Baksan Gorge with its developed infrastructure and operational directions to Nalchik and Minvody. The essence of the organization of defense is that a small part of the forces take positions along the GKH line, and leave the main forces for maneuver, which is the main component of active defense. Reserves must be placed so that it is possible to transfer troops ahead of the enemy to especially dangerous areas during hostilities.
On the right flank of this RO, the main attention will have to be paid to the Donguz-Orun pass, through which a pack route goes from the Baksan gorge to the Inguri valley in Svaneti. This pass is located at an altitude of 3180 m above sea level. The slope leading to it from the Baksan Gorge is gentle, but impassable for vehicles. The rise here of light artillery, ammunition, material means will have to be carried out on pack animals or, as they say, manually. It is possible to use helicopters, of course, without landing them. The slopes on the Georgian side, leading to the pass from the Nakra river valley, are steep, wide and open. The length of the climb is 3.5 km, on which the infantry has nowhere to hide. There is work here for mortars, heavy machine guns, and long-range sniper rifles. In addition, in the upper part of this ascent, a rather narrow couloir leads to the pass, which it is enough to block with one machine gun. A battery of light mortars can be placed on the northern slope of the pass, near the ridge. Snipers can position themselves in the rocks just below the pass from the southern side, on the pass itself, along the adjacent ridges of the Nakra-tau and Donguz-Orun-bashi peaks. In addition, on the pass, you can place up to a platoon of shooters. The position is strong, but reliable anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense and means to combat precision weapons are needed.
The company reserve will be located near the Donguz-Orun-kel lake and partially in the Northern shelter. MANPADS calculations will occupy positions on the ridges closer to the peaks of Nakra-Tau and Donguz-Orun-Bashi. On the neighboring passes Chiper (3400 m), Chiper-Azau (3263 m) and on the cofferdam (3700 m) between the peaks of Nakra-tau and Donguz-Orun-Bashi, it is necessary to set up barriers, one maneuvering group should be placed on the Big Azau glacier.
When preparing positions, it is imperative to provide for the laying of land mines for the collapse of rockfalls, ice falls and avalanches on the enemy's battle formations in an explosive manner. These weapons are sometimes more effective than machine guns, rifles and artillery.
The battalion reserve, intended for the rotation of personnel occupying positions in the highlands, must be located near the Cheget hotel. The senior commander can deploy heavy cannon and rocket artillery and air defense forces in the area of the Cheget, Terskol, Itkol hotels, in the Narzan glade and deeper down the valley. In this case, fire and technical means must be dispersed. Electronic warfare systems and air defense systems can be deployed on the southern slope of Elbrus, the roads here lead to the Mir station (3500 m) and to the ice base (3800 m), with the help of snow groomers the equipment can be lifted to the jumper between the peaks of Elbrus (5300 m). For visual communication with the neighbor on the right, place an NP on the Hotu-tau pass.
In the center of the forward position of the RO, the "hottest" place will undoubtedly be the Becho pass (3375 m). In this section, the second echelon and support facilities will be located below the pass in the Yusengi River valley, since this valley is impassable for equipment, the transfer can be carried out by horse-drawn vehicles and transport helicopters. The approach to the Becho pass from the Georgian side is easier than from the Baksan gorge, but the terrain is impassable for vehicles, the enemy will have to attack on foot. The road from Svaneti comes close to the foot of the pass, the enemy has the opportunity to deploy artillery on the approaches to it.
The left flank of our RO will cover the Adyl-su valley and the lateral valleys extending from it towards the GKH. Here, the main efforts will be directed to the defense of the Dzhan-Tugan (3483 m) and Kashkatash (3730 m) passes. In addition, at least four barriers will have to be set up to cover the passes: Ushbinsky (4100 m), Chalaat (4200 m), Dvoynoy (3950 m), Bashkara (3754 m). In the valley of the Adyl-su river, heavy self-propelled artillery and equipment can reach the Dzhan-Tugan alpine camp, which is 5-6 km from the GKH (excluding the elevation difference). Reserve groups can be accommodated at German overnight stays, in the Shkhelda's Smile glade, next to the Dzhan-Tugan a / l, at the Yellow Stones bivouac (lateral moraine of the Kashkatash glacier), in the Green Hotel glade (near the Bashkarinsky glacier). For visual communication with a neighbor on the left, the NP can be placed on the top of Viatau (3742 m). The headquarters, reserve and rear of the regiment are best located in the forest at the confluence of the Baksan and Adyl-su rivers, not far from the village of Elbrus.
In the course of hostilities, due to the proximity of the battle formations of the opposing sides, enemy aircraft will not be able to strike along the front line of defense. But it is still necessary to prepare shelters in the positions. When organizing a circular defense of strong points located on the watershed line of the Main Ridge, the main attention should be paid to the ridges and long shelves passing below them.
IMPORTANT KITS
There are several rules to follow while in the highlands. On snowfields or closed glaciers, sunglasses interfere with aimed fire from small arms (especially for snipers), but they should never be removed: after an hour of combat with unprotected eyes in bright sun, the fighter will receive sunburn of his eyes, and after a whole day - at best, short-term loss of vision. It is necessary to protect all exposed areas of the skin from the sun's rays, especially the face, otherwise severe sunburn cannot be avoided. In low clouds, you should also not take off your tinted glasses, as this will burn your eyes.
In the highlands, in positions and during movement on the terrain, it is always necessary to provide insurance (self-insurance), even for latrines.
During a long stay in a high-mountainous zone (for the Caucasus, this is an absolute height of 3000–3500 m and above), the human body loses a lot of moisture, which must be constantly replenished, if this is not done, then the blood will thicken strongly and there is a danger of "earning" thrombophlebitis and, as a consequence - heart attack or stroke. In battle, a situation may arise when the fighter does not have water at hand. If there is snow or ice sucking, the larynx and tongue become inflamed and swollen. When drinking melt water, firstly, thirst is not quenched, and secondly, vital minerals are flushed out of the body, even if the water is heated. Cold water can provoke inflammation in the larynx and is harmful to teeth. To avoid trouble, it is necessary to supply the fighters fighting in the highlands with aspirin tablets for blood thinning (which must be consumed constantly, in between drinks) and special complexes "aqua-salt" to enrich drinking water with minerals. In case of emergency, each fighter should have a flexible plastic tube 20-25 cm long, from 5 to 7 mm in diameter, which is necessary so that there is no contact of cold water with his teeth while drinking from the stream (in this case, you need to drink in small sips, warming water in the mouth).
If a unit defends positions located in a high-altitude zone, a snow cave is the best structure for personnel to rest. It does not disturb the wind and precipitation, more reliable protection in case of thunderstorms and storms, snow is a good heat insulator. When constructing snow caves, it is very important to ensure the outflow of carbon dioxide that a person exhales (carbon dioxide is heavy, therefore it accumulates at the bottom, the outflow niche should go below the level of the cave floor), if the outflow is not ensured, everyone in the cave may die.
If it is not possible to get up on a bivouac (to warm up food) during a march in high altitude conditions in winter, chocolate must be in the dry ration to maintain vitality. Other products freeze in the cold to the state of bottle ice and are not suitable for eating, and even frozen chocolate dissolves easily in the mouth. A jar of water must be carried under such conditions under a down jacket, closer to the body, in a backpack the water will surely freeze.
In the event of acute symptoms of mountain sickness (hypoxia), the victim should be given alcohol inhalation, this will support him for a while. Ideally, of course, a portable oxygen breathing apparatus is needed; if it is not there, the patient must be immediately lowered down, and he must not walk on his own, he must be carried. Otherwise, altitude sickness can develop into pulmonary edema, cerebral edema, or heart attack.
During an attack (counterattack) when skiing down a slope with a deep cover of freshly fallen snow (from 1, 5 m or more), so as not to cut the slope (this happens when the traverse of the slope) and not cause an avalanche, all fighters must move strictly downward in small, smooth arcs (godil). It is quite difficult to fire on the move (with sufficient skills it is possible, but aiming will not work), it is undesirable to stop for shooting (since the skier sinks deeply into the snow when stopping, he has no vision, and then it is very difficult to start moving). It's easier to get close to the enemy and destroy him with point-blank fire. In this case, it is difficult for the enemy to conduct aimed fire at the rapidly approaching battle formations of the attackers.
If the enemy decides to subject the attackers to mortar shelling, firstly, due to the rapid movement of skiers, it is difficult to target him, and secondly, mortar fire can cause an avalanche, but even if the enemy decides to do this, the effect of mortar fire will be negligible (unless that the avalanche will come down) - deep snow will extinguish the blast wave and will not let the fragments of the mine drowned in it scatter.
It is difficult to carry out an attack on skis if the deep snow is covered with a thin crust that cannot support the weight of a person. In this case, the skiers need great preparation so as not to lose their balance during the descent.
USEFUL KNOWLEDGE
Observation posts or gunner positions that are distant from the base should also be provided with shelters in case of a thunderstorm. For example, on the slopes of Elbrus at altitudes above 4500 m during a storm, the temperature can drop to -20 (sometimes lower) degrees Celsius, but it will snow. A fighter in an open space will be covered with a crust of ice in the blink of an eye, he will have to fight this phenomenon, and then there will be no time for the enemy.
During a storm, lightning strikes the slope densely (like a machine-gun burst) and randomly, static electricity simply fills the entire space around, in the dark all objects protruding upward glow and beep. In combination with a strong wind, dense, hard, and even wet snow and other delights, a storm in the highlands is an absolute hell. A soldier must be prepared to perform a combat mission in such an environment.
For lifting heavy loads to high-altitude positions, such as mortars, ammunition for them, building materials for the construction of shelters and fortifications, etc., you can use pack animals. Where they are powerless, the soldiers will have to haul cargo themselves, but not by the method used in 1942–1943 and in Afghanistan. Polyspast is a universal system that will help soldiers to raise mortars and other weights to a height without losing a lot of strength. And for this it is necessary that the fighters knit the chain hoist "on the machine."
Ammunition storage areas, especially artillery shells and grenades, should be securely protected from lightning in case of a thunderstorm.
Mountain troopers must be able to work reliably with a lack of safety material. In the absence of zhumarov, shunts or clamping blocks (devices for moving up the rope), one must be able to use special knots in combination with carabiners: a prusik, a UIAA knot, a guard loop, etc. If there is no trigger device, a carabiner can also be dispensed with. By the way, not all eminent climbers in Russia know what a “carbine brake” is and how to knit it. There are popular knots: figure eight and a simple conductor, which are better replaced with a bowline for the simple reason that the latter does not tighten tightly under load and, if urgently needed, can always be dissolved. There are many such "small tricks", you need to know them, because they can save lives.
