The January 1945 offensive of the troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts, launched on the Vistula, went down in history as the Vistula-Oder strategic offensive operation. One of the brightest, bloody and dramatic pages of this operation was the elimination of the group of German troops surrounded in the fortress city of Poznan.
Tank "gas chamber"
The German command tried to use the city and the strong engineering fortress "Citadel" in order to restrain the actions of our troops and delay their advance in the Berlin direction. Adapting the fortress to the tactics of modern warfare, the Germans dug anti-tank ditches in tank-hazardous areas around the city, created field firing positions with the expectation of shooting through roads and approaches to anti-tank ditches. The enemy set up staggered firing points along the roads. They were equipped with anti-tank guns and heavy machine guns. All field structures were connected by a common fire system with the forts of the fortress located around the city.
The fort was an underground structure that almost did not protrude above the terrain level. Each fort was surrounded by a ditch 10 meters wide and up to 3 meters deep with brick walls, in which there were loopholes for frontal and flanking shelling. The forts had an overlap of up to one meter and were covered with an earthen embankment up to 4 meters thick. Inside the forts there were hostels for garrisons from platoon to battalion, vaulted porches (underground corridors) with a number of pockets for placing ammunition, food and other property. All forts had artesian wells and appliances for heating and lighting.
In total, there were 18 forts along the ring bypass of the city, and they alternated: large and small. According to German plans and maps, all forts were numbered and named and were used by the enemy, in addition to their main purpose, as production workshops, warehouses, and barracks1.
In addition to the forts, the buildings and streets of the city were also prepared for possible battles. For example, the commander of the 1st Guards Tank Army, General M. E. Katukov noted: "Poznan was a typical tank" gas chamber. "On its narrow streets, well prepared for defense, the Germans would have knocked out all our cars."
German military specialists not only adopted the experience of building long-term defensive structures of the Finnish Mannerheim Line, the French Maginot Line, but also made their own changes in accordance with the new conditions of combat. The Soviet troops, and in particular, the Soviet artillery faced the difficult task of destroying the fortress city of Poznan and its garrison as soon as possible.
The liquidation of the encircled grouping was entrusted to the 29th Guards and 91st Rifle Corps, which were reinforced by units of the 29th Artillery Breakthrough Division, 5th Rocket Artillery Division, 41st Cannon Artillery and 11th Mortar Brigades and other artillery formations. In total, the troops involved in the assault included about 1400 guns, mortars and rocket artillery combat vehicles, including over 1200 units of caliber from 76 mm and above.
Given the powerful defensive structures of the German garrison, artillery played a decisive role in the assault on the fortress. The artillery of the reserve of the main command (RGK) was divided into two powerful groups: northern and southern.
The assault on Poznan was difficult and was accompanied by serious losses among the attackers. Even the commander of the artillery of the 1st Belorussian Front, General V. I. Kazakov noted in his memoirs that "these were long, stubborn and exhausting battles, where each building had to be taken with battle" 3.
Fort by fort, house by house
The assault on the city by Soviet troops began on January 26, 1945, but this day did not bring success to the advancing. The next day, V. I. Chuikov began storming the forts in front of the Citadel. Artillery with 3-5 minute fire strikes suppressed manpower and fire weapons in the forts until the infantrymen passed between them and blocked them. Such a construction of artillery support for the attack required high accuracy in the preparation of the initial data and the correction of the shooting itself. Unfortunately, sometimes these calculations were not entirely correct, and the infantrymen suffered from their own artillery.
Initially, attempts to capture the forts failed, although the attacking infantry was given support weapons and tanks. One such unfortunate example is written in the memoirs of V. I. Chuikov "The End of the Third Reich". The battle for Fort Bonin was led by an assault group, which included an incomplete rifle company, a company of 82-mm mortars, a company of sappers, a squad of smoke chemists, two T-34 tanks and a battery of 152-mm guns. After artillery processing of the fort, the assault group, under the cover of a smoke screen, burst into the central entrance. She managed to take possession of the two central gates and one of the casemates that covered the approach to these gates. The enemy, having opened strong rifle and machine-gun fire from other casemates and also using faust cartridges and grenades, repulsed the attack. After analyzing the actions of the attackers, Chuikov understood their mistakes: “It turned out that the fort was stormed only from the side of the main entrance, without pinning down the enemy from other directions. This allowed him to concentrate all his forces and all the fire in one place. forts, the caliber of 152 mm guns is clearly insufficient "4.
All these reasons were taken into account in the subsequent attack. It began after the processing of the fort with heavy guns that fired concrete-piercing shells. The assault group approached the enemy from three directions. Artillery during the assault did not cease fire on embrasures and surviving firing points. After a short struggle, the enemy capitulated. This organization of artillery actions during the capture of blocked forts reliably ensured the unhindered advance of our infantry. As a result, on January 27, 1945, all three forts were captured. Fighting broke out in the city's districts, which were heavy and bloody for both sides.
Day after day, slowly and persistently, the units of the army of V. I. Chuikov cleaned house after house. The battles were heavy and bloody. Usually the day began with a short artillery preparation, which lasted no more than 15 minutes. During the artillery barrage, all the artillery fired. From closed positions, fire was fired at the depth of the enemy's defense, and then the actions of the assault groups began, which supported the guns that fired direct fire. As a rule, the assault group consisted of an infantry battalion, reinforced with 3-7 guns of caliber from 76 to 122 mm.
Storming the Citadel
By mid-February, Soviet troops captured the city of Poznan, with the exception of the Citadel fortress. It was an irregular pentagon and was located in the northeastern part of the city. The walls and ceilings were up to 2 meters. In every corner there were fortress structures - redoubts and ravelins. Inside the fortress there were a number of underground rooms and galleries, one-story and two-story buildings for warehouses and shelters.
Along the perimeter "Citadel" was surrounded by a moat and an earthen rampart. The walls of the moat, 5 - 8 meters high, were lined with bricks and proved to be insurmountable for the tanks. From the numerous loopholes and embrasures arranged in the walls of buildings, towers, redoubts and ravelins, all the faces of the ditch and the approaches to it were shot through by both frontal and flanking fire. In the Citadel itself, about 12 thousand German soldiers and officers were hiding, led by two commandants - ex-commandant General Mattern and General Connel.
The main attack on the fortress was delivered by two rifle divisions from the south. To ensure the capture of the fortress, four cannon and howitzer brigades, three artillery and mortar battalions, one of them of special power, were supplied. In an area less than a kilometer wide, 236 guns and mortars of caliber up to 203 and 280 mm, inclusive, were concentrated. 49 guns were allocated for direct fire, including five 152-mm howitzers-guns and twenty-two 203-mm howitzers.
An exceptional role in the battles for Poznan was played by the artillery of the large and special power of the RGK. The 122nd high-power artillery brigade, the 184th high-power howitzer artillery brigade and the 34th separate artillery division of the RGK special power took part in the storming of the fortress and in street battles. These units, having made a march on their own, during February 5-10, 1945, arrived in Poznan and were placed at the disposal of the commander of the 8th Guards Army5.
The destruction of the most important objects of the fortress began on February 9 with the approach of artillery of great and special power. The artillery of the Red Army of large and special power usually consisted of 152-mm Br-2 cannons and 203-mm B-4 howitzers. The shells of these weapons made it possible to penetrate concrete floors 1 meter thick. In addition to them, there were 280-mm mortars Br-5 model 1939 in service. The armor-piercing shell of this mortar weighed 246 kg and could penetrate a concrete wall up to 2 meters thick. The effectiveness of these guns in the battles for Poznan was very high.
On February 18, a powerful artillery strike was made against the Citadel. 1400 guns and missile launchers "Katyusha" ironed the German defense for four hours. After that, Soviet assault groups broke into the destroyed buildings of the fortress. If the enemy continued to resist in any place, then 203-mm howitzers were urgently pulled up to him. They began to strike with direct fire at the fortified positions of the enemy, until they achieved their complete destruction.
The intensity of the struggle and the bitterness were incredible. The Soviet artillerymen were more than once rescued by their ingenuity and good interaction with other branches of the armed forces. This is evidenced by the following characteristic episode, described in the memoirs of V. I. Kazakov. On February 20, 1945, assault groups of the 74th Guards Division, covered by well-aimed artillery fire, captured a section of the rampart between fortifications No. 1 and No. 2. On the eve of the artillerymen made a breach in the fortress wall, through which a unit of Soviet infantrymen burst into the fortification No. 2. However there the storming men had a hard time, as the Germans began to fire accurate fire on them. It became clear that the Soviet infantry could not advance further without the help of artillery. The commander of the 86th separate anti-tank battalion, Major Repin, was ordered to quickly transfer guns to support the infantry. The artillerymen managed to roll one 76-millimeter and one 45-millimeter cannon across the assault bridge, but it was impossible to overcome the distance between the bridge and the fortress wall due to heavy enemy fire. Here the soldiers' ingenuity and initiative came to the aid of the gunners. Let us give the floor to V. I. Kazakov: "The gunners fixed one end of the rope to the frame of the 45-mm cannon and, grabbing the other end of the rope, crawled under fire to the wall. Taking cover behind it, they began to drag the cannon, and when they pulled it up to the wall, opened fire on the firing points, It is now possible to roll out the 76-mm gun through the gap inside the courtyard and open fire at the entrance to the fortification No. 2 "6. The flamethrower Serbaladze took advantage of these resourceful actions of the gunners. He crawled to the entrance to the fortification and from his knapsack flamethrower launched two streams of fire, one after the other. As a result, a fire started, then ammunition detonated inside the fortification. Thus, fortification No. 2 was eliminated.
Another example of the soldier's ingenuity was the creation of the so-called assault groups of the RS, which fired single direct-fire missiles directly from the capping. The M-31 shells were capped and fixed on the windowsill or in the break in the wall where the firing position was chosen. The M-31 projectile pierced a brick wall 80 cm thick and exploded inside the building. To mount the M-20 and M-13 guiding projectiles, tripods from captured German machine guns were used.
Assessing the effect of using this weapon in the battles for Poznan, V. I. Kazakov noted: "True, only 38 such shells were fired, but with their help it was possible to expel the Nazis from 11 buildings." Subsequently, the creation of such groups was widely practiced and fully justified itself in the battles for Berlin.
As a result, overcoming the desperate resistance of the German garrison with great difficulty, Soviet troops captured the Citadel by February 23, 1945 and completely liberated Poznan. Despite the almost hopeless situation, the German garrison resisted to the last and could not resist only after the massive use of artillery of great and special power by the Soviet troops. Moscow celebrated the day of the Red Army and the capture of Poznan with a salute in the form of 20 salvoes from 224 guns.
In total, artillery suppressed enemy fire resources in 18 forts on the outer bypass of the city, 3 of which received destruction of the rear walls. 26 armored caps and concreted firing points on these forts were destroyed. High-power artillery fire destroyed the forts "Radziwilla", "Grolman", a bastion south of Khvalishevo and a fort in quarter N 796, which were overground fortresses. The central southern fort of the Poznan fortress was completely destroyed by artillery fire, its ravelins, redoubts and other structures were significantly damaged. Medium-caliber artillery fire suppressed enemy fire weapons in five pillboxes and completely destroyed about 100 pillboxes.
What did the projectile consumption tell us about?
Of particular interest to historians is the analysis of the consumption of ammunition during the assault on Poznan. From January 24 to February 23, 1945, it amounted to 315 682 shells8 weighing more than 5000 tons. To transport such a quantity of ammunition, more than 400 wagons were required, or about 4,800 GAZ-AA vehicles. This figure did not include 3230 M-31 rockets used in battles. The consumption of mines was 161,302 mines, that is, the consumption per weapon is about 280 min. Of the 669 barrels in the Poznan operation, 154,380 shots were fired. Thus, there were 280 shots per barrel. The artillery of the 29th Guards Rifle Corps with reinforcements on the western bank of the Warta River used up 214,583 shells and mines, and the artillery of the 91st Rifle Corps on the eastern bank was half as much - 101,099 shells and mines. From open firing positions, artillery fired 113 530 shells with direct fire, i.e. about 70% of the total consumption of shots. Direct fire was fired from 45mm and 76mm guns. On direct fire, 203-mm B-4 howitzers were massively used, using up 1900 shots from open firing positions, or half the consumption of high-power ammunition. In the battles for Poznan, especially on the streets of the city, Soviet troops used up 21,500 special rounds (armor-piercing, incendiary, sub-caliber, armor-piercing). In the battles surrounding Poznan (January 24-27, 1945), artillery and mortars of all calibers consumed 34,350 shells and mines, including rockets. Street battles from 28 January to 17 February required over 223,000 rounds, and battles to capture the fortress - about 58,000 shells and mines.
In the course of the battles for Poznan, the tactics of field and rocket artillery operations in urban conditions as part of assault groups, the actions of large and special artillery against long-term enemy defensive structures, as well as other methods of fighting in urban conditions, were worked out. The capture of Poznan was a dress rehearsal for the storming of Berlin.
