Independence from Russia leads to the loss of statehood
An analysis of the current state of the armed forces of the post-Soviet countries (excluding Russia) allows us to conclude that their prospects are not very bright. Some may disappear along with their armies.
At the moment, the best situation is in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Thanks to the export of natural resources, these countries have enough money to acquire modern weapons in more or less required quantities, and they are purchased from Russia, Israel and the West. Astana and Baku have their own defense industry complexes, albeit low-powered, but successfully developing, as well as, which is very important, a sufficient body of personnel to master modern weapons (both production and operation). The April "micro war" in Karabakh confirmed that the technical capabilities of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces have significantly increased. True, the current drop in oil and gas prices could deal a serious blow to the plans for military construction.
Remnants of the former power
Ukraine and Belarus have highly developed defense-industrial complexes, a lot of equipment, and a sufficient number of qualified personnel. However, their military prospects are significantly worse than those of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, since the economic situation in both Slavic countries is close to catastrophic, which makes it impossible to renew their large, but still heavily worn out Soviet arsenals.
At the same time, the situation in Ukraine (for more details - "Independence Loop"), the situation is much worse, since the Kiev authorities purposefully finish off the country with total theft. Because of this, it is extremely difficult to talk about its prospects in general and the army in particular. The Belarusian situation is not so dramatic, but the combination of socialist experiments in the economy with a “multi-vector foreign policy” (according to the official formulation of Minsk) can lead to very sad consequences for this country too.
Armenia is a kind of Caucasian Israel. The country has no resources, is in an extremely unfavorable geopolitical situation, but pays great attention to military development. For reasons primarily of an economic nature, Russia is unable to fully become for Armenia what the United States is for Israel. However, no matter what some citizens of the fraternal republic may think about this, their country has no alternative to the Russian Federation as the main geopolitical ally, and this is very clearly demonstrated by the example of neighboring Georgia. In Tbilisi, immediately after the collapse of the USSR, they bet "on a different horse" and now they can no longer abandon the previous, recklessly pro-Western policy, although it was this policy that led to the loss of 20 percent of the state territory without hope of returning, without bringing the slightest economic prosperity. The prospects for military development in Georgia are also not encouraging. The country has big problems with resources, equipment, personnel, and the defense industry.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which have significant revenues from the export of hydrocarbons, could be in the same category with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, but they are hindered by corruption, the absence of their own defense industry and, most importantly, an acute shortage of qualified military personnel. Therefore, it is extremely difficult for them to build armies that are serious at least in terms of the scale of their region.
It is pointless to discuss the prospects for the military development of the Baltic countries, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Their armies will at best remain at their current level of negligible size.
Kosovo rule
Many of the former Soviet republics still hope that their "elder brothers" - Russia or the West - will be engaged in the construction of their Armed Forces. Experience shows that these are all illusions. The "older brothers" are ready to sell the newest equipment to the "younger" exclusively for the full price, for which the overwhelming majority of post-Soviet countries simply do not have the funds, and many have no personnel to master it. Armament of the Cold War times, the “elders”, perhaps, would have given it away for free or very cheaply, but the “junior” ones already have it, while the BMP-1 or Mi-24V resource (as well as the M113 or F-16A) is deliberately worked out regardless of the current ownership of the sample and from whom it is transferred. For these reasons, in particular, it makes no sense to talk about Western military assistance to Ukraine. Kiev has no money for modern technology, but there is more than enough good from the 70s and 80s there.
In addition to the "legal" countries, in the post-Soviet space there are two partially recognized (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) and two unrecognized (Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh) states, as well as the contested territory (Crimea). Of all these conflicts, only the Transnistrian one has some prospects for a peaceful resolution: through both the creation of a confederal state and the voluntary refusal of Chisinau from Tiraspol. The probability of realizing both of these options is small, but still non-zero. It is absolutely impossible to settle the rest of the conflicts peacefully, since the positions of the parties are irreconcilable and mutually exclusive. Even the theoretical perspective of resolving these conflicts in accordance with international law disappeared after the Kosovo precedent. True, its creators, that is, the NATO countries, demand that this be recognized as a "unique case", although there is nothing exceptionally special in it. The uniqueness of the Kosovo case can only be formalized by inscribing the well-known phrase Quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi (“What is allowed to Jupiter - not allowed to a bull”) into international law, but this is still hardly feasible. Much more appropriate would be a paraphrased quote from the Russian classics: "If there is Kosovo, then everything is allowed." Thus, the named conflicts will be resolved by military means, someone's unconditional surrender, or they will be frozen for an indefinite period (conflicts with the disputed territories under the British crown - Gibraltar and the Falklands - have been hanging for centuries). For Crimea and the former Georgian autonomies, the last option is most likely; Nagorno-Karabakh, as the events of early April showed, will sooner or later be guaranteed another war. However, even despite the huge investments in the Azerbaijani Armed Forces and the obvious growth of their potential, the NKR is too tough for them.
Chairs from older brothers
As for the relations of the post-Soviet countries with Russia, we will have to recall the history of the collapse of the USSR. All other republics sought not abstract independence, but concrete - from Russia. Moreover, only in the Baltics and, to a much lesser extent, in Moldova and Transcaucasia, this desire was divided by the peoples of the republics, in other cases there was a pure uprising of the elites, the desire of the first secretaries of the CPSU republican committees to become presidents. Accordingly, in all post-Soviet countries, the ideological concepts were based on the idea of independence from Russia. In Ukraine, it came to clinical Russophobia (this is not a figure of speech, but a statement of fact), but in other countries this idea to a certain extent influenced the consciousness of the population. The mood of at least 90 percent of Crimeans can be called hypertrophied pro-Russian, this region will remain the most loyal to Moscow for decades simply because its residents, unlike all other our citizens, have something to compare with. Nevertheless, even their mentality is already in a certain way different from the Russian one - 22 years of life in Ukraine affected. With Belarusians and Kazakhs, we literally and figuratively speak the same language, however, from communication with them, you very quickly understand that these are residents of other countries. With the rest of the former compatriots, we mentally parted even more.
The events of the past eight years have clearly shown that an alliance with Russia guarantees the country protection in the event of any problems, and with NATO - the lack of such protection, military defeat and, possibly, territorial losses. However, these obvious facts conflict with the usual idea of independence from Russia. Therefore, even the leaders of the CSTO member states tend to sit on two or even three chairs (since the "Chinese" one has also appeared). In this regard, there is no need to harbor any special illusions about integration in the post-Soviet space. Its prospects are very limited; there is no reason to count on a change in the situation in the foreseeable future.
However, it is precisely in the military field that integration can be most successful, since the growth of the potential of the RF Armed Forces, combined with the readiness to use it, cannot be ignored. If a country needs real security, it can only rely on Russia, and not on the NATO bubble. However, in the best case scenario, our military allies will be only five CSTO members, two of which will certainly remain pure “security consumers”. With the rest of the states of the former USSR, in the coming decades, either a "cold peace" or a "cold war" will begin. Nobody dares to "hot" - the instinct of self-preservation will work.
