The US military leadership conducts briefings with the leadership of the armed forces on the analysis of the state of combat readiness of the strategic offensive forces (SNA) and the development of measures to eliminate deficiencies.
It should be emphasized that the materials of the briefings are developed based on the results of strategic exercises, inspections of the combat readiness of the space wings of ICBMs (analogous to the missile army of the Strategic Missile Forces) and aviation wings. At the same time, the Pentagon leadership declares the high efficiency of inspections like NORI (Nuclear Operational Readiness Inspections) and nuclear safety inspections like NSI (Nuclear Surety Inspections).
The main purpose of inspections of the NORI type is the integrated control and assessment of the combat readiness of the wings for practicing the tasks of hitting strategic targets at the stage of an armed conflict with the use of nuclear weapons (NW) according to two main indicators: the formation of forces (Force Generation) and their use (Employment). The formation of forces includes the actions of command and control bodies and troops on warning signals; submission of reports on the state of the SNS and making them ready for combat use; organization of operational management; material and technical support; protection and defense, cover of SNS facilities from air and ground enemy strikes. The indicator "use of troops" includes: assessment of the situation and prompt response to emerging threats; performing combat missions to deliver nuclear strikes (conditionally); submission of reports on the performance of combat missions; the use of the main, back-up and reserve systems of combat command and control of troops and nuclear weapons; implementation of measures by types of comprehensive support; elimination of the consequences and restoration of the combat capability of troops.
Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James is upset about the results of the ICBM wing checks.
NSI-type inspections are aimed at monitoring and evaluating the actions of management personnel in the management of forces and assets in various conditions of the situation and the fulfillment of nuclear safety requirements. In the course of these inspections, the completeness and quality of the assigned tasks are checked and assessed according to ten indicators: actions in the event of incidents with nuclear weapons (NW); completeness and quality of technical operations; checking the activities of technical services; monitoring the state of maintenance facilities, transportation of nuclear warheads and rules for handling them; safety of nuclear warheads; the safety of their storage; organization of logistic support; fulfillment of the requirements for the selection and verification of the moral and psychological qualities of personnel admitted to work with nuclear warheads; the state of logistics; fulfillment of the requirements of guidelines for all types of work and exercises with nuclear warheads.
As for the naval strategic nuclear forces, they are subject to TRE (Tactical Readiness Inspection) inspections with each of the Ohio-class SSBN crews after the completion of combat patrols. However, the results of inspections carried out at NSNF are not published in open foreign sources.
In addition, the state and prospects for the development of strategic offensive forces are being studied by an independent commission of the US Department of Defense, created in March 2014, the results of its work are also of a closed nature.
DEGRADATION OF THE SNS COMBAT READY CONTINUES
According to the Pentagon, the SNA's state of alert ensures nuclear deterrence of potential adversaries of the United States and its allies. Based on the results of strategic exercises, the proven wings showed the ability to perform combat missions to defeat strategic targets of a potential enemy (conditionally).
At the same time, an analysis of open information materials shows that, based on the results of inspections in missile and aviation wings, a significant number of shortcomings and poorly resolved systemic issues have been revealed.
Thus, the 341st wing of the Minuteman III ICBM (AvB Malmstrom) was rated "unsatisfactory" based on the results of an NSI type check by the Air Force's Global Strikes Command (GSC) Commission. The personnel showed low knowledge and practical skills in working with nuclear warheads. Additional time was provided to eliminate the shortcomings, followed by rechecking.
Emblem of the 341st wing of the Minuteman III ICBM.
At the briefings, special attention was paid to the analysis of the unsatisfactory organization of training and combat duty by the duty forces. It is noted that instead of systematic training of personnel, formal tests are practiced. At the same time, numerous facts of fraud were revealed, dozens of officers who were noticed cheating and cheating answers during the tests for professional aptitude were removed from combat duty, most of the missile officers were sent for recertification. It turned out that many officers from the maintenance and repair groups, who were allowed to carry out combat duty and maintain nuclear warheads, do not even know the procedure for working with them. In the preparation of combat crews of launch control points (PUP) of ICBMs Minuteman III, there is a narrow specialization, insufficient operational-tactical outlook, commitment to work according to instructions, general issues of military art are poorly mastered. As in previous years, the facts of drug use by officers at the launch control points of Minuteman III ICBMs, their distribution and sale were revealed. Some of them took up combat duty after using drugs, ostensibly to prevent stress.
It was also noted at the briefings that the guidance documents of the aviation wings did not sufficiently regulate the actions of personnel in the preparation of B-52N strategic bombers with nuclear ALCMs for combat use. The directives and instructions coming to the wings from 20 VA, KSU, USC and the Ministry of the Air Force often contradicted each other. In their content, more attention was paid to the order of solving non-nuclear tasks to the detriment of nuclear ones. In this regard, plans for training and methodological gatherings, training programs and topics for training with flight crews, specialists of maintenance and repair groups were directed to prepare for the performance of non-nuclear tasks. And as a result - poor knowledge and insufficient practical skills in solving the problems of nuclear support for the use of ICBMs and long-range nuclear ALCMs.
The allocation of material, technical and financial resources for maintaining combat readiness, the supply of modern samples of general-purpose equipment, the solution of social problems of the military squadrons of the nuclear component of the Air Force was carried out on a leftover basis. The facts of the formal attitude of the chiefs of 20 VA, KSU, OSK and the Ministry of the Air Force to the problems of combat duty and its all-round support have been revealed in the missile wings. When considering career prospects, priority was given to personnel performing tasks in military conflicts, which caused discontent among missile officers. The temporary and current shortage of key specialists also negatively affects the moral and psychological state of the wing personnel; no measures were taken to replenish it. In some units and subdivisions of maintenance and repair of aircraft wings, such a shortage was from 50 to 200 people. This led to a violation of the combat duty schedules and created significant physical and psychological stress on the personnel of combat crews and flight crews. Guidance documents regulating the manning standards and levels of maximum shortage for the main specialties in the wings of ICBMs and aviation wings have not been developed. The materials of the inspections also noted that in a number of missile maintenance units there were only a few key specialists, which did not meet the requirements of nuclear safety. Maintenance work on missiles was often stopped due to the lack of qualified personnel, as prerequisites were created for an emergency situation with nuclear missiles. When monitoring practical actions, some aircraft wings exceeded the established standards for bringing the aircraft fleet to the highest degree of combat readiness.
Minuteman III ICBM Launch Control Shift Officers, 91st Wing, Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota.
Many commanders and chiefs announced problems in the technical support of the combat and daily activities of the troops: various equipment, road transport, transport and handling units used when working with missiles and nuclear warheads, have worked out the terms of operation, need to modernize the nuclear warhead storage.
In the materials of the inspections, it was emphasized that the main reason for the shortcomings in combat readiness was the imperfection of the operational and administrative management of the SNS. Thus, the forces and means assigned to combat duty in peacetime are under the operational subordination of the USC command. Within the framework of the administrative control, the missile and aviation wings are part of the 20 VA, KGU and the Ministry of the Air Force and carry out the relevant directives of the senior commanders. When transferring from peacetime to wartime, the remaining forces and means are transferred to the operational subordination of the USC, the quality of preparation of which for combat duty does not always satisfy the USC command. A strict system of selection and training of personnel on duty, testing of their moral and psychological qualities has not been introduced. The system for monitoring the state of alert does not provide knowledge of the real state of affairs in the alert forces. The missile wings do not comply with the requirements of the AFGSCI 13-5301 instructions, developed by the Air Force Global Strikes Command, which regulate the preparation and combat duty by combat crews of Minuteman III ICBM launch control posts.
The lack of targeted assistance and insufficient funding of the SNA from the US military-political leadership were confirmed as general shortcomings in combat readiness. This led to the emergence of systemic problems in ensuring sustainable command and control of troops and nuclear weapons; deterioration of infrastructure facilities; low manning of subunits to carry out combat duty; his lack of professional training; deterioration of military discipline and the moral and psychological state of people. During the inspections, it was revealed that commanders substitute for subordinates in solving secondary tasks, depriving them of independence and initiative. There is an excessive number of checks by the wing command, 20 VA, KGU and OSK and superficial training of the controllers themselves.
Nuclear bombs of the B-61 type are being upgraded.
At the briefings, special attention was paid to the analysis of problems in the state of the nuclear weapons complex (NWC): this is the need to confirm the safety and extend the service life of nuclear warheads in the conditions of the US observance of a moratorium on nuclear tests; the doubtfulness of the identity of the results of three-dimensional computer modeling of thermonuclear reactions in comparison with real nuclear tests of nuclear warheads; limited opportunities to carry out a full cycle of nuclear warheads, since the manufacture of their key components (plutonium assemblies) can be carried out in a piece mode on the basis of the Los Alamos laboratory of the US Department of Energy; systematic failure to meet deadlines and frequent adjustments to large production and scientific and technical projects; physical deterioration and obsolescence of facilities and parts of the equipment of the NWC infrastructure; the presentation of new, more stringent requirements for security, secrecy and environmental protection, in the absence of additional resources; an increase in the number of specialists of retirement age and difficulties in training new qualified personnel; loss of experience in conducting full-scale tests of nuclear warheads at the Nevada nuclear test site, etc. Thus, the state of the nuclear weapons complex is fully consistent with the assessment stated in the US nuclear strategy (2010) as "declining".
This is not a complete list of shortcomings, but in reality, failures in the combat readiness of the US SNA.
The authors of the article analyzed the organization of certain issues of combat duty based on a photograph published on the website of the US Air Force.
The results of the analysis indicate serious shortcomings in the organization of combat duty, equipment of the launch control point, low discipline and responsibility of the personnel of the launch combat crew and formal checks by officials and various commissions.
This conclusion is confirmed by the following arguments of the authors who have significant experience of combat duty in the Strategic Nuclear Forces of the RF Armed Forces.
1. The backs of the seats of the launch combat crew commander and his deputy are folded back, which indicates the desire of personnel to rest (sleep) at combat posts or that the seats are malfunctioning. It is no coincidence that the right armrest of the commander's seat is worn out. During the briefings, it was emphasized how, during the checks, sleeping numbers of the combat crew were found, whose heads were bent over the keyboard of the launch panels.
It can be assumed that with the personnel of combat crews, the launch of systemic trainings, which would keep people in suspense, is not carried out. The seats are not equipped with seat belts designed to prevent injury to personnel in the event of a possible sharp movement of the PUP structure in the event of an enemy inflicting nuclear missile strikes at the control point (the structure is suspended on powerful hydraulic shock absorbers).
It is strange that the launch crew is on alert without personal protective equipment (gas masks), which must be at the combat post and attached to the headrests of the seats. Obviously, the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction by the enemy (and by terrorists) is not taken into account in the US SNC, and training of personnel in defense against weapons of mass destruction is not practiced. Moreover, the equipment of filtration and ventilation systems at the PUP has long expired and needs to be replaced.
2. Obviously, the US SNA does not pay due attention to ensuring the accurate functioning of the uniform time system. It can be seen that the PUP has only one set of wall clocks from the last century. There is no reserve, and the readings of the wall clock and the wristwatch of the deputy commander of the combat crew differ, which is unacceptable. Perhaps the US SNA does not know that all available clocks (including personal ones) at control points should show a single time. In addition, there is no clock that records the time in the Strategic Aerospace Directions, at least in one (Northern SVKN).
3. The deputy commander of the combat crew is on alert in violation of the uniform, since the collar of a red T-shirt of an unidentified sample is visible. Do direct bosses, inspectors and members of numerous commissions really fail to notice this?
4. It can be assumed that the photograph of the girl glued to the case of the lower lock of the safe has a positive effect on the morale and psychological state of the officers of the combat crew. Meanwhile, the placement of locks does not contribute to the prompt opening of the safe and retrieval of the contents. In addition, there is a threat of the lock falling on the remote control keypad, damaging it or issuing unauthorized commands and reports. It should be emphasized that the locks at the missile launch control points must be internal.
5. It should also be noted the negligence in the work of the combat crew commander with documents. So, the limit bar of the shelf with documents is folded back, or the locking mechanism is faulty. Meanwhile, combat, operational, technical and other secret documentation should be kept in safes in order to prevent their seizure. In addition, it is prohibited to visually familiarize with the names of the documents of officials admitted to the launch control point. There is a foreign object on the shelf of the deputy commander of the combat crew.
6. The premises of the launch control point need repairs, and the structure needs additional sealing. This is evidenced by a broken regiment and traces of moisture to the left of the crew commander.
The bed set behind a dirty curtain to the right of the deputy commander of the launch crew does not contribute to an increase in responsibility, discipline of combat duty and readiness for immediate execution of combat missions.
7. There are no antistatic floor coverings at the launch control station, since the structure is a reinforced concrete monocoque cylindrical structure. Therefore, the legs of the combat crew numbers are placed on the stiffeners of the structure elements.
8. The design flaw of the launch control point is the absence of separate tabletops for each number of the combat crew for working with documents and keeping a combat alert log. In this regard, there are no priority documents (at hand) required at the time of receipt of combat orders (signals): these are special duties, action algorithms, a list of reports, schedules, standards, etc.
BRIEFINGS: CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The results of the analysis allow us to draw the following conclusions about measures to eliminate deficiencies and failures in combat readiness, which were considered at the briefings.
So, in order to ensure the prestige of service in the strategic offensive forces, it was decided to raise the posts of KGU commander to a four-star general and assistant chief of staff of the Air Force for strategic deterrence and nuclear integration to lieutenant general by one step. It provides for an increase in the monetary allowance of servicemen serving in the SNC, as well as the payment of various bonuses. In addition, in order to stimulate personnel, a medal "For participation in nuclear deterrence operations" was established.
The issue of increasing the number of specialists involved in the Navy and Air Force for solving problems related to the preparation and use of nuclear missile weapons by 2,500 and 1,100, respectively, will be positively resolved. Due to the redistribution of Air Force funds, an additional $ 145 million has been allocated this year for recruiting KSU troops, training personnel and increasing the efficiency of recruiting and training specialists, eliminating deficiencies in the state of weapons and military equipment, etc.
Strategic bomber B-52N.
As for the US nuclear arsenal, by the end of the 2030s. it is planned to have in service three universal nuclear chargers (NZU) for warheads of strategic land-based and sea-based missiles and two NZUs for aviation ammunition: the B61-12 guided air bomb and the W80-4 ALCM warhead. This concept, called "three plus two", does not provide for the development of fundamentally new nuclear weapons. The release of nuclear warheads is planned to be carried out by modernizing part of the existing ammunition using nuclear units from previously worked out structures. Changes will be made only to non-nuclear components in order to unify them, as well as to improve the safety of nuclear warheads in emergency situations and to protect them from unauthorized actions.
Particular attention is paid to the development, based on the existing modifications (B61-3, -4, -7 and -10), a unified B61-12 guided strategic aerial bomb with a service life extended by 30 years. The start of serial production of this type of bombs is scheduled for 2020. They will be carried by NATO and US Air Force tactical aircraft, as well as strategic bombers. A program is being developed to modernize the W80-1 nuclear warhead into a W80-4 modification for a promising air-launched cruise missile in order to equip a promising strategic bomber. It is also envisaged to modernize the storage of nuclear weapons, primarily located at the Barksdale Aviation Base. In general, the US military leadership intends to optimize the size and range of the country's nuclear arsenal until 2040 in order to minimize the cost of maintaining it.
At the briefings, it was emphasized that plans for modernization and the creation of new types of strategic offensive weapons are not considered in the SNA, since there are no serious problems in their implementation.
Measures are being taken to tighten the system for monitoring the state of combat readiness of the SNS in terms of planning, preparing and conducting inspections, including sudden ones. The tasks and functions of the Department of Cost Estimates and Program Analysis of the US Defense Ministry have been clarified, which will check the elimination of shortcomings in the strategic offensive forces, analyze the results of the measures taken, the correct use of the allocated resources, their impact on increasing the combat readiness of the SNS and solving the tasks of nuclear deterrence in general. It is planned to present a monthly report to the First Deputy Secretary of Defense R. Work.
In this regard, a special group for assessing the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence was formed for R. Work, consisting of representatives of the US Defense Ministry, the USC and the Air Force KGU, which will analyze the materials received, and quarterly prepare conclusions and proposals for a report to the US Secretary of Defense.
Thus, the results of inspections and the work of various commissions, the state of combat readiness of the strategic offensive forces are of serious concern to the military-political leadership of the United States. This is confirmed by an unsatisfactory assessment for the state of combat readiness of the entire 341st wing of the Minuteman III ICBM.
