Germany wanted to get Ukraine back in 1940
How did the Western pacification policy of Hitler lead to the birth of the monster? What lessons follow from this? Volumes have been written on this topic. But so far, many questions remain unanswered.
At the end of the First World War, French Marshal F. Foch uttered truly prophetic words: "This is not peace, this is a truce for 20 years." He was right. Already in the early 30s, signs of an impending new war appeared. The economic crisis shook the capitalist world. Japan seized Manchuria from China, fascist Italy attacked Abyssinia. The Third Reich was preparing for the establishment of world domination. Sooner or later, the object of its expansion was to be the Soviet Union, which the future Fuhrer of the German state did not hide at the dawn of his political career.
"There was an assumption about the possibility of an unexpectedly rapid disintegration of the Russian Armed Forces"
The danger of the coming war was also realized in the USSR. During the last decade before the Nazi invasion, the country was preparing for defense, and in the international arena it was trying to create a system of collective security. It is a pity that by June 22, 1941, far from everything had been done.
In Germany, with the advent of the Nazis to power, an active - first propaganda, and then practical preparation for a revanchist war in Europe began. Hitler in "Mein Kampf" declared the Slavic states in the east of Europe, primarily the Soviet Union and the "Versailles" winners - Great Britain and France, enemies of Germany.
In Moscow, anti-Soviet tirades from Berlin were seen as a direct threat. Improving the country's defense capability during these years has become the most important task.
In 1935, the one hundred thousandth Reichswehr, the armed forces of the Weimar Republic, gave way to the five hundred thousandth Wehrmacht - the army of revenge. This was a flagrant violation of the Versailles Peace Treaty. But Britain and France were silent.
Preparations for war were carried out under the guise of "ripe and natural" demands for "equality of Germany in armaments", limited by the Treaty of Versailles, and most importantly - under the slogan of fighting Bolshevism. Since the summer of 1933, "freedom to arm" has become the main goal of Berlin's foreign policy. For this it was necessary to throw off the "chains of Versailles". Using the policy of "appeasement" on the part of the West, seeking to confront Germany with the USSR, Hitler seized Austria, Czechoslovakia, Klaipeda and, attacking Poland, unleashed World War II.
It has split the imperialist world into two camps. On the one hand, the Third Reich and its allies in the Anti-Comintern Pact (Japan, Italy), on the other, the countries of the Anglo-French coalition. Few remember this, but the USSR, bound to Germany by the Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, remained neutral in this global battle.
By the middle of the summer of 1940, only two giants remained on the European continent - the Third Reich with the countries it occupied and the Soviet Union, which had prudently moved its borders to the west by 200–250 kilometers. But even then their relations worsened, and after the capture of Greece and Yugoslavia by Germany in the spring of 1941, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland joined the tripartite pact, it became clear that a war between Nazi Germany and the USSR was inevitable. The Reich moved eastward like a bulldozer, reeling the countries that had fallen before it on its tracks.
Where was Hitler in a hurry
After the defeat of the Anglo-French coalition on the continent, the German leadership faced the issue of landing on the British Isles. But the preparation of such an operation ("Sea Lion") from the very first days showed that it would hardly be possible to carry it out. The Germans did not have supremacy at sea and in the air, and without this, the landing of troops was impossible. And the leadership of Nazi Germany makes a decision - first of all, to seize natural resources and the territory of the USSR, then to defeat England and the United States.
On July 3, 1940, the Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces, General F. Halder, noted that among the operational issues that the General Staff had to deal with, the "eastern problem" came to the fore. On July 19, Hitler addressed London with a "final appeal for prudence." However, the Churchill government rejected the proposal for a compromise peace. And Hitler decided to take the risk - to undertake an eastern campaign in a state of war with England.
The success of the lightning campaigns in Western Europe encouraged the Fuhrer and his closest associates. According to their logic, with the defeat of France and the establishment of German domination in Western and Northern Europe, Great Britain would hardly have posed a serious threat to the Reich, moreover, it did not have a common front with Germany.
Of course, London hoped that in the event of a mortal threat, the United States and the Soviet Union would side with it. But Hitler believed that the rapid defeat of the USSR would deprive Britain of all hope of an ally in Europe and force it to surrender. At a meeting of the military-political leadership of Germany on July 21, 1940, the Fuhrer, when analyzing the current strategic situation, noted that one of the most important reasons that Great Britain is still continuing the war is the hope for Russia. Therefore, it is extremely important, Hitler believed, to start the war in the east as early as possible, and therefore to end it as quickly as possible. "For the defeat of Russia, - noted in the staff magazine of the Wehrmacht, - the problem of time is of particular importance."
On July 22, Halder wrote down in his diary the instructions given by Hitler at the meeting: “The Russian problem will be solved by an offensive. You should think over the plan for the upcoming operation:
a) deployment will last four to six weeks;
b) smash the Russian ground army, or at least occupy such territory that it would be possible to secure Berlin and the Silesian industrial region from Russian air raids. Such an advance into the interior of Russia is desirable so that our aviation could destroy its most important centers;
c) political goals: the Ukrainian state, the federation of the Baltic states, Belarus, Finland, the Baltic states - a thorn in the body;
d) 80-100 divisions are needed. Russia has 50–75 good divisions. If we attack Russia this fall, England will get relief (aviation). America will supply England and Russia."
At a meeting of the leadership of the German armed forces on July 31, it was decided to undertake a five-month campaign of the Wehrmacht in the spring of next year with the aim of destroying the Soviet Union. As for Operation Sea Lion, at the meeting a proposal was made to use it as the most important factor in disguising the prepared attack on the Soviet Union.
According to the German leadership, the defeat of Russia should have forced Britain to end its resistance. At the same time, they were counting on the strengthening of Japan in East Asia, a sharp increase in its resources at the expense of the Soviet Far East and Siberia with an increase in the immediate threat to the United States. As a result, the United States will be forced to abandon support for Britain.
The defeat of Russia opened the way for the Wehrmacht to the Middle East, Central Asia, and India. Progress through the Caucasus to Iran and beyond was considered as an option.
The fate of the USSR, according to Hitler, was decided by the division of the territory: the north of the European part of Russia was supposed to be given to Finland, the Baltic states were included in the Reich with the preservation of local self-government, the future of Belarus, Ukraine and the Don was in doubt, the idea of creating " free from communism republics ", and Galicia (Western Ukraine) was subject to annexation to the" general-governorship "of Poland occupied by the Germans. For Great Russia, it was envisaged to establish a regime of the most severe terror. The Caucasus was transferred to Turkey on the condition that Germany would use its resources.
For propaganda purposes, steps were taken to give future aggression the appearance of "just retribution" or, moreover, a necessary defense. The Soviet Union was accused of double dealing with Germany, which, according to Hitler, was expressed in inciting England to continue resistance and refuse peace negotiations. On July 21, he attacked Stalin, who, he said, "is flirting with England in order to force her to continue the war, thus shackle Germany in order to have time to seize what he wants to capture, but will not be able to, if peace comes." In Halder's notes, Hitler's thoughts were expressed more frankly: “If Russia is defeated … then Germany will dominate Europe. In accordance with this reasoning, Russia should be liquidated."
Directive No. 21
The military-political concept formulated in this way formed the basis for the direct planning of the eastern campaign of the Wehrmacht. The leading role here was played by the headquarters of the ground forces, for it was this branch of the armed forces that was entrusted with the implementation of the main tasks. In parallel, work was underway on the campaign plan at the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht.
Several options have been developed. One of them formulated the following idea of an offensive: “With a direct attack on Moscow, smash and destroy the forces of the Russian northern group … the line Rostov - Gorky - Arkhangelsk . The offensive on Leningrad was viewed as a task for a special group of troops covering the northern flank of the main operation.
This version continued to be refined and refined. The most advantageous direction of the main attack was considered to be the area north of the Pinsk swamps, which provided the best conditions for reaching Moscow and Leningrad. It was supposed to be applied by the forces of two army groups in cooperation with the troops advancing from Finland. The main task of the central group was to defeat the Red Army in the Minsk region with the further development of the offensive against Moscow. It also envisaged the possibility of turning part of the forces to the north in order to cut off Soviet troops in the Baltic.
The southern flank (one third of the total number of forces) struck from Poland to the east and southeast. Part of the forces of this army group was intended for a raid from Romania to the north, in order to cut off the Soviet troops' escape routes from Western Ukraine to the Dnieper. The ultimate goal of the campaign was to designate access to the line Arkhangelsk - Gorky - Volga (up to Stalingrad) - Don (up to Rostov).
Further work on the fundamental document was concentrated in the headquarters of the operational leadership of the Wehrmacht. On December 17, the plan was reported to Hitler, who made his comments. They were drawn up in a separate document certified by his signature. The importance of encircling the Red Army groupings in the Baltic and Ukraine by turning the advancing troops to the north and south, respectively, after breaking through on both sides of the Pripyat swamps, the need for the priority seizure of the Baltic Sea (for the unimpeded delivery of iron ore from Sweden) was emphasized. The decision of the question of an attack on Moscow was made dependent on the success of the first stage of the campaign. An assumption was made about the possibility of an unexpectedly rapid disintegration of the Russian Armed Forces and the implementation, in this case, of the option of simultaneously turning part of the forces of Army Group Center to the north and conducting a non-stop offensive against Moscow. All the problems of the war in Europe were supposed to be solved in 1941 in order to forestall the entry into the war of the United States, which, according to Hitler, was possible after 1942.
On December 18, after making adjustments to the prepared draft, Hitler signed a directive of the Supreme High Command No. 21, which received the code name "Variant Barbarossa". It became the main guiding document of the war plan against the USSR. Like Hitler's decision of July 31, 1940, the directive envisioned a lightning campaign with the destruction of the enemy even before the war against England was over. The ultimate goal of the campaign was defined as the creation of a protective barrier against Asian Russia along the Volga-Arkhangelsk line.
1941 is the most difficult year of the Great Patriotic War. And by the number of losses, and by the number of captured Red Army soldiers, and by the territory occupied by the enemy. How was the invasion prepared? Why was it unexpected?
Romania and Finland were named as supposed allies in Directive No. 21, although Hitler had a low opinion of the combat capabilities of the armed forces of these countries. Their task was mainly to support and support the actions of German troops in the north and south. The independent actions of the main Finnish forces in Karelia (on the Leningrad direction) were defined as an offensive to the west or on both sides of Lake Ladoga, depending on the success of the advance of Army Group North.
In May 1941, Hitler agreed to involve Hungary in the war against the USSR. On February 3, he approved the directive of the main command of the Wehrmacht ground forces on the strategic deployment of troops for Operation Barbarossa. In connection with the hostilities in the Balkans, it was decided to postpone the start of the eastern campaign from May to a later date. The final date for the attack on the USSR - June 22 - Hitler called April 30.
Factory of aggression
In September 1940, a new program for the production of weapons and ammunition was adopted, with the aim of equipping the troops intended for the eastern campaign. The highest priority was the production of armored vehicles. If for the entire 1940th 1643 tanks were produced, then only in the first half of 1941 - 1621.
"Army commanders have been instructed to ensure that combat experience gained in the western campaign is not overestimated."
The production of wheeled and half-tracked armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers grew. Much attention was paid to providing the Wehrmacht with artillery and small arms. The supply of ammunition for all types of weapons was significantly increased. More than 30 divisions were deployed from the west and from Central Germany to Poland and East Prussia to prepare the Eastern theater of military operations in July - October 1940.
Practical preparation for the attack on the USSR began in the summer of 1940. In comparison with the Anglo-French coalition, the Soviet Union, in the opinion of the Wehrmacht command, was a stronger enemy. Therefore, it decided by the spring of 1941 to have 180 combat divisions of the ground forces and another 20 in reserve. The need for priority formation of new tank and motorized formations was emphasized. The total number of the Wehrmacht reached 7.3 million by June 1941. The active army consisted of 208 divisions and six brigades.
Great attention was paid to qualitative improvement, increasing combat skills, equipping with new military equipment, retraining command personnel, and improving the organizational and staff structure of troops. Of the large amount of captured weapons accumulated in Germany as a result of previous campaigns, it was decided to use only Czech tanks and anti-tank guns of some conquered countries for an attack on the Soviet Union.
By the beginning of the aggression against the USSR, the Third Reich had at its disposal the economic resources of almost all of Europe. By June 1941, its capabilities for metal production, power generation, coal mining were approximately 2–2, 5 times greater than that of the Soviet Union. The military products of the Czechoslovakian enterprises "Skoda" alone could supply about 40-45 divisions with many types of weapons. In addition, in the occupied countries, Germany seized huge reserves of strategic raw materials, equipment, and most importantly, the entire arsenal.
In the period from August 1940 to January 1941, 25 new mobile formations were formed, which included tank, motorized and light divisions and brigades. They were intended to create tank wedges designed to ensure the rapid advance of German troops into the depths of Soviet territory. Ten tank, eight motorized, four light infantry divisions and two tank brigades were formed. As a result, by June 1941, the total number of tank formations in the Wehrmacht increased compared to May 1940 from 10 to 22, and motorized (including SS troops) - from 9 to 18. In addition to mobile, by January 1941, 18 new infantry and three mountain rifle divisions. Four light divisions included only two infantry regiments instead of three, taking into account the fact that on Soviet territory they would have to operate in difficult terrain. PTO had tracked traction, artillery divisions were equipped with light mountain guns.
To ensure the high combat effectiveness of the newly formed formations, the command included in their composition units and subunits from divisions that already had solid combat experience. Usually these were entire regiments or battalions. Completion and partial reorganization of the formations took place. All of them were transferred to wartime states. The replenishment of personnel took place primarily at the expense of those mobilized born in 1919 and 1920, who were trained in the reserve army.
Tanks and personnel
In the fall of 1940, the process of reorganizing the ground forces acquired an all-encompassing character. In November, 51 divisions were simultaneously undergoing reorganization, that is, more than a third of the active army in Germany. Particular importance was attached to the creation of large motorized formations, including tank, motorized, and a number of infantry divisions. To control them in the eastern campaign in November-December 1940, the headquarters of four tank groups were organized. They were intended to break into enemy defenses and rush to the main objectives of the operation. Unlike field armies, they were not assigned the task of capturing and holding territory. The increase in the mobility of tank groups was facilitated by the absence of cumbersome rear convoys. The material and technical support was assigned to the field armies, in the zone of which they were to operate.
By 1941, in tank formations intended for an attack on the USSR, the number of medium tanks increased by 2, 7 times - from 627 to 1700. They accounted for 44 percent of the total number of vehicles allocated for the eastern campaign. Moreover, the T-III tanks were overwhelmingly equipped with 50-mm cannons. If we add to them another 250 assault guns, which, according to tactical and technical data, corresponded to medium tanks, then the share of the latter increased to 50 percent compared to 24.5 percent in the French campaign.
From the end of 1940, 50-mm guns and heavy 28-mm anti-tank guns began to enter service with anti-tank units and subunits. The infantry division's anti-tank fighter battalion became motorized. Compared to 1940, the number of anti-tank guns (excluding trophy ones) increased by 20 percent, and the number of anti-tank weapons - more than 20 times. In addition, Czech anti-tank guns of 37 and 47 mm caliber were in service. Some of them were mounted on self-propelled carriages. With all these means, the German military leadership hoped to completely neutralize the actions of Soviet tanks.
In aviation, the emphasis was on achieving qualitative and quantitative superiority. Much attention was paid to planning strikes against Soviet airfields, for which the capabilities of air reconnaissance were expanded. In training pilots, primary attention was paid to improving the training of crews, acquiring experience and skills in organizing navigation support for flights. At the beginning of 1941, the air corps in the west were instructed to reduce operations against England to such an extent as to fully restore their combat capability by the start of Operation Barbarossa.
Numerous command and staff exercises were held. They prepared very carefully. The task was to develop the officers' operational thinking. They were required to skillfully conduct reconnaissance, take care of organizing interaction between the branches of the armed forces, neighbors and with aviation, quickly respond to changes in the combat situation, rationally use the available forces and means, prepare in advance for the fight against enemy tanks and aircraft.
The terms of individual training of privates were increased: in the reserve army - at least eight weeks, in active units - at least three months. The army commanders were instructed to ensure that the combat experience gained in the Western campaign was not overestimated, the troops were set up to "fight with all their might against an equal enemy." The Department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces for the Study of Foreign Armies of the East prepared a review "From the experience of the Russian-Finnish war." It summarized the tactics of Soviet troops in the offensive and defense, concrete examples of their actions were comprehensively assessed. In October 1940, a review was sent to the lower headquarters, right down to the division.
Hitler's miscalculation
By the beginning of the attack on the USSR, the Wehrmacht leadership was able to fully provide the troops with qualified command personnel and create the necessary reserve of officers: for each of the three army groups, it consisted of 300 people. The most literate were sent to formations intended for action in the main directions. So, in tank, motorized and mountain rifle divisions, career military personnel accounted for 50 percent of the entire officer corps, in infantry divisions that were re-equipped in late 1940 - early 1941, 35, in the rest - ten (90 percent were reservists).
All training was carried out in accordance with the concept of lightning war. And this determined not only the strengths, but also the weaknesses of the German armed forces. German troops were aiming for a mobile, fleeting campaign and were ill-prepared for prolonged combat operations.
Since the summer of 1940, the Wehrmacht command began to pay exclusive attention to the equipment of the future theater of military operations. The entire territory of East Prussia, Poland, and a little later Romania, Hungary and Slovakia began to intensively prepare for the strategic deployment of ground forces and air forces. To concentrate a huge number of personnel and military equipment in areas bordering the USSR, to create the conditions necessary for successful hostilities, a developed railway and highway infrastructure, a large number of airfields, an extensive communications network, premises and sites for the deployment of material and technical means were required. sanitary, veterinary and repair services, training grounds, barracks, an established air defense system, and so on.
From the beginning of 1941, airfields were intensively built and expanded on the territory of East Germany, Romania and northern Norway. Near the border with the USSR, work was carried out only at night. By June 22, the main preparatory measures for the redeployment of the Air Force to the east were completed.
The Wehrmacht command deployed a grouping unprecedented in the history of war on the western borders - from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. The troops prepared for the invasion included three army groups ("North", "Center", "South"), a separate German ("Norway"), Finnish and two Romanian armies, and a Hungarian corps group. In the first strategic echelon, 80 percent of all forces were concentrated - 153 divisions and 19 brigades (of which German - 125 and 2, respectively). This provided a more powerful initial strike. They were armed with over 4,000 tanks and assault guns, about 4,400 combat aircraft, almost 39,000 guns and mortars. The total strength, together with the German Air Force and Navy allocated for the war against the USSR, was approximately 4.4 million.
The strategic reserve of the main command of the Wehrmacht was 28 divisions (including two tank divisions) and brigades. By July 4, 14 divisions were to be placed at the disposal of the command of the army groups. The rest of the connections were supposed to be used later, depending on the situation at the front. In the reserve of the main command of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht, there were about 500 thousand personnel, 8 thousand guns and mortars, 350 tanks.
On June 14, at a meeting with Hitler, the last details were clarified: the beginning of the offensive was postponed from 3 hours 30 minutes to 3 hours exactly (Central European time). Comprehensively prepared for aggression against the USSR, being in full combat readiness, German army groups were just waiting for a command to be thrown into the depths of Soviet soil.
