In 2012, after 30 years of secrecy in the UK, documents from the 1980s concerning the war between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) were made public. The new batch of declassified documents from the British government sheds light, in particular, on the Foreign Office's strategy during this war and reveals some of the usually well-disguised springs of London's policy. In particular, as the documents show, British analysts closely monitored the Soviet and foreign media both in London and at the British Embassy in Moscow, tracking the slightest nuances of the materials then published and trying to work out a line that would make it possible to achieve unconditional US support and neutralize the influence of the USSR. on the course of the conflict.
In addition, a large portion of declassified documents from that period was published in 2015 by the US National Archives and Records Administration. These documents also reveal some interesting points regarding the relationship within the US government under Reagan, in particular between the various elements of his power bloc. Documents from the US archives unambiguously show that the Reagan administration from the very beginning, without much hesitation, sided with the Thatcher government and provided all the assistance it needed.
LORD CARRINGTON: Pulling the bagpipe for as long as possible …
After the sudden capture of the Falkland Islands by Argentine troops on April 2, the British government broke off diplomatic relations with Argentina and secretly dispatched destroyers and frigates under the command of Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, under the command of Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, from Gibraltar to Ascension Island, who were "at the right time" participating in the Springtrain 1982 ocean exercise. The nuclear submarine "Spartan" was sent ahead of them. According to some reports, another, but already a missile submarine of the British was sent to positions in the South Atlantic, where it was ready to launch a missile strike on Buenos Aires.
If anything, a March 31 TASS report accused Britain of escalating tensions by sending a nuclear submarine into the region. The CIA report on April 1 also stated that on March 30, one or two British nuclear submarines were sent to the South Atlantic. In the same report, by the way, it was reported that Argentina "is obviously planning an invasion of the disputed islands tomorrow, if its growing pressure on the diplomatic line fails." How much does this coincide with Thatcher's 1993 memoir, in which she argued that “no one could have predicted the Argentine takeover of the Falklands in more than a few hours”?
Was it really so? Moreover, in a letter from Thatcher to Reagan published in the USA on March 31, she wrote: “You know about alarming intelligence reports from both your and our sources that the Argentine Navy may be ready to invade the Falklands within the next 48 hours … there are only 75 marines and one ice reconnaissance ship."
The CIA report on April 1 stated: "Britain is aware of a possible invasion and could send additional forces to the Falklands - there is a runway to receive large transport planes, but refueling is required."
Some researchers believe that London made full use of the well-developed strategy of “luring” the then ruling junta of “hot” Argentine generals in Argentina. In a review by the US Embassy in Argentina dated May 16, 1979, sent to the US State Department, it was said that eventually Argentina would restore its political sovereignty over the Malvinas, most likely subject to firm guarantees of the preservation of the islanders' ancestral property, their way of life and in the presence of bilateral agreements with Great Britain on the joint economic and scientific development of this territory. The coming to power of a new Conservative government in England may slow down such a course of events, but it is clear that the continuing decline and depopulation of the islands requires them to adapt to new conditions, while this is still possible. “However, the impatience of the Argentines and their revanchist sentiments can upset the delicate and gradual approach to solving this problem. This will cause toughening of British public opinion regarding the transfer of the islands to Argentine control and further deterioration of British-Argentine relations."
According to the observations of British diplomats, which they shared with their American counterparts at the May 1980 talks in Washington, the Argentine side was increasingly impatient with the status of the islands. But the most "terrible" thing was that Argentina was "flooded" with Russians and Cubans, while Moscow was developing cooperation with the Argentines in the field of nuclear energy! As one of the Foreign Office analysts wrote, "any relationship with the USSR should in itself be alarming."
A series of negotiations that took place in 1980-1981, in which British diplomats used the instruction of British Foreign Secretary Peter Carrington to "pull the bagpipes as long as possible", did not lead to any result, but caused more and more irritation among the Argentine leadership.
Regular negotiations took place on February 26-27, 1982 in New York. At them, the Argentine side proposed to create a mechanism for a permanent bilateral commission, which would meet monthly and work on rapprochement of the positions of the parties, that is, according to the Argentines, on how to transfer the Malvinas Islands to Argentina's sovereignty easier and faster. The British side categorically rejected this approach. On March 1, 1982, the Argentine side issued a one-sided communiqué, which ended with the words: "In case the issue is not resolved as soon as possible, Argentina reserves the right to end this mechanism and choose the course of action that best suits its interests."
Commentary on 24 March 1982 by US Ambassador to Argentina Harry Schlodeman: “There is a cynical point of view, especially among politicians, that the Argentine government has pulled this old dispute into the limelight in order to divert the attention of the Argentine people from economic problems. I'm not sure about that. Talks with the British seem to have naturally stalled, given the time it took and the British inability to negotiate sovereignty. In any case, the Argentine government finds itself in such an internal political situation in which it has to do something if the proposal to create a permanent commission is not accepted."
How they looked into the water! But Schlodemann, whether intentionally or not, only noted the diplomatic side of the crisis that Argentina was going through. In fact, by the beginning of 1982, the military junta, led by General Leopoldo Galtieri, was on the eve of economic collapse: industrial production ceased, external debt exceeded the budget many times, external borrowing stopped, inflation was 300% per year. The dictator hoped to raise the prestige of his military regime with the help of a small victorious war. He also believed that the American Reagan administration would side with Argentina, which helped the United States in the fight against the Sandinista leadership of Nicaragua. True, on April 1, Secretary of State Alexander Haig sent instructions to Ambassador Schlodemann to convey to Galtieri that any military action "would destroy the promising relations between the United States and Argentina."
On the evening of April 1, Reagan called Galtieri and, in a 40-minute conversation, tried to convince him not to invade the islands. He warned Galtieri that the invasion would seriously damage relations between the two countries and offered his mediation, including the visit of Vice President George W. Bush to Buenos Aires. Galtieri replied that Argentina had waited 149 years, did not intend to wait any longer, and rejected the offer of mediation, saying that "the events themselves have already outstripped this offer." He went on to say that Argentina will use all its resources to restore its sovereignty over the islands and is free to use force when it thinks the moment is right.
It is interesting to note that Reagan had a peculiar idea of the history of the Falklands. Judging by the entry in his diary dated April 2, talking with Galtieri, he was convinced that the islands belonged to Great Britain "somewhere since 1540" (!).
And this is not to mention the Monroe Doctrine, which, being voiced by President James Monroe in 1823, should have opposed the British takeover of the Malvinas Islands back in 1833!
On the morning of April 1, 500 Argentine Marines were on their way. On April 2, 1982, Argentine troops under the command of General Mario Menendez, carrying out Operation Sovereignty, landed in the Falklands. A company of British Marines stationed in Port Stanley ended resistance on the orders of the British Governor Rex Hunt. The new governor, now in the Malvinas, was General Menendos. On April 7, a very solemn ceremony of his inauguration took place.
From a military point of view, Galtieri hoped that his air force would dominate the archipelago, and Britain at that time did not have combat-ready aircraft carriers. The command of the Argentine Navy informed its American partners (Admiral Thomas Hayward) that the Argentine action was undertaken with the aim of "countering the obvious Soviet threat in the region, taking into account about 60 Soviet trawlers in the Malvinas Islands", but this was received by the Americans with undisguised sarcasm.
From a psychological point of view, British strategists accurately calculated that world public opinion, which had previously supported Argentina's claims to the islands and condemned Great Britain, which “clung to the remnants of its past colonial greatness,” would immediately side with the “islanders - staunch adherents of British citizenship”, which the Argentine junta wants to subdue by military force.
It should be noted that the entire group of British forces and equipment that participated in the exercises in the Gibraltar area and sent to the Falklands, as the CIA analysts concluded, was capable of attacking the Argentine Navy immediately upon arrival, pushing them out of the suspension zone, then blocking the islands and waiting for the main forces.
The tactics of delaying negotiations and the strategy of "enticement" have borne fruit.
Was there a threat of Soviet intervention
At the same time, British intelligence was tasked with strengthening surveillance of the actions of the USSR. So, on April 2, from the American military attaché in Buenos Aires, information was received about the presence of Soviet submarines 50 miles from the Falkland Islands, while allegedly they were under Soviet fishing trawlers. The American attaché also said that three Argentine submarines have gone to sea.
The day before, on April 1, the CIA sent out an information telegram that the Argentine Navy had information on April 1 about two Soviet submarines in the South Atlantic in the area between the Malvinas Islands and the South Georgia Islands.
In the future, such "alarming" messages periodically continued to come to London. On April 14, a stockbroker, who, he said, was associated with the Argentines at the embassy in Paris, reported that four Soviet submarines were in the Falklands region and that the Russians had allegedly told the Argentines that these submarines would go to their aid in case of need.
In fact, the game was obviously played on a much larger scale. In 2012, the British Guardian, which published excerpts from declassified documents, and Radio Liberty reported that the possible intervention of the Soviet Union in the conflict was almost a nightmare for Washington. However, this is not the case. The CIA's April 2, 1982, Falklands Assessment Brief stated that "the Soviets will try to exploit the crisis and provide political support to Argentina, but will not engage in direct military intervention." On April 9, the US intelligence community document Falkland Islands Crisis stated: "It is unlikely that the Soviets will be directly involved in this dispute, although they may secretly provide Argentines with information regarding British military movements."
Finally, the April 15 report of the British Joint Intelligence Center also stated: "We do not think that the USSR will be directly involved in military operations in the conflict zone."
The position of the Soviet leadership at that time became immediately crystal clear when the Soviet representative in the UN Security Council, Oleg Troyanovsky, unexpectedly abstained from voting for the resolution proposed by Great Britain.
Nor did the Russians imagine any "nightmare" for President Reagan, who was building his policy towards the USSR, as it became known recently, on the basis of Tom Clancy's spy novels. On April 7, 1982, at a National Security Council planning group meeting, in response to the words of the deputy director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Bobby Inman, that we do not know for sure if the Soviets are ready to intervene in the conflict, Reagan stated: completely illegal invasion, then I think we could just sink the whole island with a pair of B-52s!"
Of course, the actions of the USSR from the very beginning of the conflict became the object of close attention from the outside, including the Foreign Office. On April 5, London demanded from the British Embassy in Moscow to assess:
- Moscow's general attitude to the conflict, - actions of the USSR in the event of hostilities between Great Britain and Argentina, - the actions of the USSR in the event of economic sanctions against Argentina.
On the same day, signed by Embassy Counselor Alan Brook-Turner, a reply was sent that if Argentina could not receive full support from the Third World countries, in the event of hostilities, it would most likely lose, and the Russians would probably tacitly agree with any action by Great Britain on the return of the Falklands. On April 6, Foreign Office analysts concluded that "it can be argued that the Russians will avoid military involvement in the conflict."
On April 8, during a meeting with Haig, Thatcher bluntly stated that “we are now rejecting the victorious march of socialism … and have reached the point where there can be no compromises. The Soviets are afraid of US intervention in the conflict because they themselves are overwhelmed by their own problems, and it would be surprising if they also decided to intervene. Haig agreed: yes, the USSR increasingly began to put itself at a disadvantage.
WASHINGTON'S SLEEPING POSITION
As a result of a short fighting, only mountains of weapons remained from the Argentines in the Falklands. Photo from www.iwm.org.uk
On the other hand, the British apparently immediately saw through the American attempts with the help of the "Soviet threat" (including the mythical "Soviet submarines hiding under fishing trawlers") to soften the Thatcher government's response to Argentina's seizure of the Falklands. British analysts believed that surveillance and intelligence gathering by Soviet satellites, naval reconnaissance aircraft and surface ships, including Soviet fishing vessels in the Falklands, would increase as the British task force moved south. At the same time, in response to the fears of US Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, expressed in a conversation with British Ambassador Neville Henderson on April 15 in Washington that the Russians may actually be involved in hostilities, London expressed a firm conviction: “We have no evidence to support of this, and we do not believe that the USSR will risk being directly involved in military operations in the conflict zone. " And they added: "It is not clear whether Eagleburger's remarks were based on real concerns or were intended to soften the UK's stance on Argentina."
Apparently, London was also alarmed by Haig's statements in an interview with Thatcher on April 13 that he was not afraid that the United States would fully intervene in the conflict, but that he foresees Soviet military intervention if Great Britain takes a military action in the Falklands.
London was well aware of the hesitation of the US administration and its desire, if not to neutralize, then at least soften the severity of the Anglo-Argentine conflict. They immediately analyzed the ties between the USSR and Argentina in all areas and noted their rapid development: agreements on the supply of grain and meat, the creation of joint fishing companies in the Falklands region, the supply of enriched uranium for the Argentine nuclear program. It was especially noted that the USSR received from Argentina a third of its grain imports and took 75% of Argentine grain exports. London believed that this was very important for the USSR, which, as expected, had to import about 45 million tons of grain in 1982 to compensate for a poor harvest for the third year in a row. Argentine supplies helped the USSR to overcome the US grain embargo announced by President Carter in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. In addition, they destroyed a widely publicized campaign in the West to discredit the Soviet economy, which "cannot feed itself."
On April 12, Henderson was interviewed by the American company CBS. The American audience was impressed, but especially shocked by the British ambassador's announcement that Russian "Bears" (Tu-95 aircraft) with a range of 8,000 miles are based in Cuba and Angola and are monitoring the North and South Atlantic.
As a result, according to public opinion polls in the United States, 50% of Americans in the event of an armed conflict were in favor of supporting the UK, 5% for supporting Argentina and 30% for neutrality.
But in general, Washington didn’t need much persuasion. Judging by the published documents, analysts from the US NSS came to a firm conclusion on April 1: "Britain is right, and it is a more important and close ally for us." On April 3, the British Embassy asked for US assistance in persuading representatives of Zaire and Japan to vote in the UN Security Council for the British draft resolution, and received assurances from the State Department that "the United States will do everything possible to help the adoption of the UK resolution." The British resolution demanded an "immediate cessation of hostilities" and "an immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces" from the islands and called on the governments of Argentina and Great Britain to "seek a diplomatic solution to existing differences." This resolution No. 502 was adopted on April 3. Panama was the only one against. The USSR abstained because, as some researchers believe, "the KGB promised a good thrashing for London from Buenos Aires." The Panama Draft Resolution was not put to the vote.
The process of developing a decision to support London is described in a very colorful way in the memoirs of James Rentschler, a staff member of the NSS.
On the morning of April 7, 1982, the NSC Planning Team was assembled for a meeting at the White House. Reagan appeared at the meeting dressed in a sporty blazer and a blue open-necked shirt - after the meeting, he intended to immediately go to Barbados to visit an old Hollywood friend, actress Claudette Colbert, with whom he was going to spend the Easter holidays.
The main question is: does the United States need to intervene and why, when and how?
CIA (Admiral Inman): The UK has declared a 200-mile exclusion zone, and Argentina has pulled its ships out of this zone. The British continue to board ships, they are extremely serious and are mobilizing everything they have in the Navy.
MO (Weinberger): The British plan to deploy their submarines, inflict maximum damage, and then proceed with the landing. Argentina is concentrating its forces on the coast, but the balance of power is in favor of the British.
On April 6, ABC TV reported that an SR-71 US reconnaissance aircraft had flown over the Falklands (Malvinas) before and after the Argentine invasion to collect information that was later passed on to the British.
Vice President Bush: "How accurate is this ABC report that the US is allegedly supplying the UK with detailed photographs of Argentine troops and ships from our reconnaissance aircraft?"
Weinberger: Absolutely not true! A typical example of Soviet disinformation. In fact, the Soviets have moved their satellites and may be supplying the Argentines with information on the movements of the British fleet."
After that, the planning team members began to discuss the problems of airfields in the South Atlantic, technical problems of runway lengths, carrying capacities, refueling radii, etc., while Reagan sat and looked at the door, while his face clearly read: “When will I get out of here?"
Secretary of State Haig: “Thatcher is extremely belligerent, because she understands that if the situation worsens, then her government will fall. She is very much disturbed by the memories of the Suez crisis, she does not want to allow again the shame that Great Britain experienced then. On the other hand, Argentina is getting more and more nervous and maybe looking for a way out."
After that, a dispute arose between Gene Kirkpatrick, the US representative to the UN, and Admiral Inman about who is more important for the United States: Great Britain or Argentina and whether the Rio Treaty (Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty) should be observed.
Reagan: “I propose the following solution. It would be better for us on the issue with Latin America if we maintain friendship with both sides in this crisis, but it is more important for us that the UK does not lose."
After that, according to Rentschler, Reagan and his assistants rushed to the helicopter, which was supposed to take him to Barbados. "He could not postpone the beginning of his Caribbean idyll even for a minute!" Haig barely managed to mutter in an undertone in the President's ear: “Don't worry, Mr. President, we can handle this task. I'll take Dick Walters with me, he'll talk to the generals of the junta in Spanish military jargon and beat the crap out of them."
But the main words in all this pre-Easter bustle were pronounced by Admiral Inman: “We have no other alternative but to support our British allies to the very end. I'm not talking now about kinship ties, language, culture, union and traditions, which are also important. I want to recall the extreme importance of our common interests in strategic terms, the depth and breadth of our cooperation in the field of intelligence, across the entire spectrum of threats during the Cold War, where we had close cooperation with Great Britain. And I want to remind you of the problems that we have with Argentina in terms of nuclear nonproliferation. If we let the Argentines get away with it when they use conventional weapons, who can guarantee that in 10-15 years they will not try to do the same with nuclear weapons?"
On April 9, the United States Intelligence Community concluded that "a clear British victory would have avoided negative consequences for US-British relations."
On April 13, at the request of the British Embassy, Eagleburger gave the go-ahead for the transfer to the British of information on the quantity and quality of weapons and military equipment, in particular, electronic warfare equipment supplied by the United States to Argentina. After that, there was information in the press that the United States could intercept all Argentine military messages, which led to a change in the Argentine military code. Admiral Inman announced this at a meeting of the National Security Service on April 30, expressing at the same time his hope for "a speedy restoration of our ability in this area, although the damage from these leaks in the press was significant."
On April 28, the British government declared the 200-mile zone around the islands completely closed from 11:00 on April 30. On April 29, Thatcher, in her message to Reagan, pathetically wrote: “One of the stages in attempts to resolve this crisis is over. It seems to me important that when we enter the next stage, the United States and Great Britain should be unequivocally on the same side, firmly defending the values on which the Western way of life is based."
On April 30, Haig made a press statement in which he indicated that since on April 29 Argentina rejected US proposals to resolve the dispute, the US President imposed sanctions against Argentina: freezing all military supplies, denying Argentina the right to military purchases, freezing all loans and guarantees …
Officially, the Anglo-Argentine conflict ended on June 20, 1982, when British forces landed in the South Sandwich Islands. The victory was seen as further evidence of the power of Great Britain as a naval power. Patriotism in the metropolis went off scale - the Thatcher government received the very ratings that General Galtieri hoped for. The fact that the Argentine regime was an authoritarian, semi-fascist regime, in the eyes of many Englishmen, gave the Tory military action the flavor of a "liberation mission", the struggle of democracy against the dictatorship. In London, with a huge crowd of people, a "Victory Parade" was held! In Buenos Aires, Galtieri retired.
The answer to the question about possible Soviet intervention during the conflict is still kept in closed collections of Russian archives. It is only known for certain that Soviet Tu-95 long-range naval reconnaissance aircraft were monitoring the British task force. In addition, the Soviet satellites Kosmos-1345 and Kosmos-1346, launched on March 31, 1982, just on the eve of the Falklands War, allowed the command of the Soviet Navy to track the operational and tactical situation in the South Atlantic, accurately calculate the actions of the British fleet, and even determine with an accuracy of several hours the time and place of the landing in the Falklands of the British landing.
