Great Britain and the United States, being allies and having common interests, participated in most of the key events of the 20th century. They fought together in the First and Second World Wars, jointly confronted the communist "threat", and since the signing of the Washington Treaty on April 4, 1949, which laid down the foundations for the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, they have been military allies with a special relationship.
The term "special relationship" originates from a speech by Winston Churchill (who was then no longer British Prime Minister) in March 1946 at a meeting in Fulton, Missouri. - Soviet Union: "The iron curtain has descended across the entire continent"). It characterizes the relations in the military, cultural, diplomatic and economic spheres that have historically developed between the two English-speaking states.
By 1982, "special relationships" had evolved more than ever. They were especially strengthened in the face of a common enemy - the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, which was expressed in the development of programs of military cooperation and interaction in the field of intelligence.
Both countries bore primary responsibility for the defense of the Alliance in terms of both conventional and nuclear weapons; they were jointly engaged in the collection and processing of intelligence (on the basis of an agreement on electronic intelligence activities between Great Britain and the United States), had an officer exchange program and, among other areas of interaction, shared a satellite resource. The UK was arguably the US’s biggest European ally (in the supposed war zone in the event of World War III), while the US viewed Britain as a kind of guardian of the Western world.
On April 2, 1982, Argentina again occupied the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands, occupied by the British back in 1833. So the conflict went into an open phase.
According to Argentine estimates, in the conflict over the Malvinas Islands, US reconnaissance satellites played a key role in favor of their traditional ally, the British.
Of course, the United States provided the British not only with military assistance, but it deserves a more detailed consideration. It was military assistance that played a decisive role in the military events that took place in the South Atlantic in April – June 1982.
"BIG BROTHER" FOLLOWS EVERYTHING
First of all, it is worth noting that the conviction that American satellites are monitoring the conflict zone was present at all levels of the command of the Land Forces, Navy and Air Force of Argentina, however, the Navy felt their presence more than others, therefore it is believed that the work satellites fettered the freedom of action of Argentine ships at sea.
Admiral Anaya - Chief of the General Staff of the Argentine Navy - in his official report on the results of the war, wrote that the Americans conducted satellite observations in the South Atlantic, adding that this information came to him from various American admirals. Especially Admiral Anaya noted that starting from April 3, "the enemy had at his disposal the data received from the satellite on all movements of ground forces."
His Deputy Vice Admiral Juan José Lombardo, the theater commander of the South Atlantic region (and the commander of naval operations) pointed out in 1983 that “NATO was well aware of the situation at sea … ships were at sea, although they could not determine what kind of ships … I'm sure they had this information. " He also stated that "in Norfolk (the largest naval base in the world owned by the US Navy) there is a world map on which all naval targets are marked, and that satellites are continuously tracking operational data."
Rear Admiral Gulter Ayara, the fleet commander, was also confident that the enemy knew about their positions. According to him, this information was confirmed on May 3: "The Commander-in-Chief gathered us in his office and reported that the enemy absolutely has current information from satellites about the location of our ships."
Thus, every naval officer at his level was convinced that the American satellites were working in the interests of the Royal Navy.
Later, this conviction that the situation in the South Atlantic is permanently monitored by American satellites was reported to the country's political leadership and public opinion: when the cruiser Belgrano was sunk on May 2, 1982 by the British nuclear submarine Conqueror, it became obvious that it became possible thanks to the data from American satellites. 368 Argentines became victims of the torpedo attack. Moreover, the cruiser was outside the combat zone established by the British, so Argentina accused Britain of an act of aggression.
This was confirmed by the report of the official Argentine news agency TELAM, and the confrontation of the US Ambassador in Buenos Aires Harry Schlodeman with the command of the Argentine army, which had "accurate evidence" that "American satellites transmitted intelligence information that helped the British to determine the meta position of Belgrano and sink it. " This was also confirmed by the President of Argentina Galtieri to the President of Peru in the framework of the negotiations that took place at the time.
The military-political leadership, the media (which, of course, were subject to psychological struggle) were confident that nothing had gone from under the surveillance of the spy satellites that were over the South Atlantic. Evidence of this, obviously, was the sinking of the cruiser.
However, as of 1982, this was not entirely the case.
THE DARK EYE IN ORBIT
In the eyes of the layman, "spy" satellites were large telescopes that observe the Earth's surface, capable of transmitting absolutely clear high-resolution images to any corner of the globe, regardless of weather conditions.
Even if reconnaissance satellites were of great strategic value, their operational and tactical capabilities (over 30 years) were limited, especially during an air-sea conflict such as the Malvinas conflict.
In April 1982, the United States had three satellites of this type: one KH-8 (Project Gambit 3) and two KH-11 (Kennan or Crystal). The KH-8 was shut down on 23 May and was replaced by the KH-9 ("Hexagon"), which was launched on 11 May. The KH-8 and its replacement KH-9 had high-resolution cameras, but the film was delivered by parachute from orbit from an altitude of 160 km.
It is interesting to note that almost 65 km of films from KH-9 were delivered to Earth in four different capsules, that is, the satellite could take a large number of images, but there were only four ways to deliver them to Earth.
As for the oldest KH-8, we are talking about mission 4352. On March 20, 1982, it became problematic for him to deliver the first two capsules with film to Earth - they remained in outer space. On May 23, the satellite was able to send the last capsule, which contained images taken at high and low altitudes, but, for unknown reasons, 50% of the images were unreadable.
The KH-11 can be considered the first modern satellite to store images in digital format. But in 1982, the quality of his images was slightly inferior to KH-11 and KH-8 or KH-9, so the latter were also in orbit.
By the beginning of hostilities, the orbits of these satellites did not pass over the territory of the Malvinas Islands or Argentina. To expand the coverage area, the orbit of one of them, possibly KH-11-mission No. 4, was temporarily changed according to the statements of the US Secretary of Defense Kaspar Weinberger. It turns out that the KH-9 could also shoot images in the conflict zone.
According to the calculations, KH-11, which followed its course from south to north, 45 minutes after working in the South Atlantic had the opportunity to transmit images directly to the Manvis Hill ground station, Yorkshire, UK. The station was under the control of the US National Security Agency and could directly coordinate the operation of satellites in higher orbits to establish continuous communication.
In early April 1982, US Secretary of the Navy John F. Lehman, Jr. stated that he "regularly studied top secret images of the Malvinas Islands recently obtained during the flight through Argentina and recorded the slightest defense preparations." “Our satellites and other sources allowed us to take a privileged position, while Britain was building up its forces to march south,” he said.
For their part, the British stated that in April they had American images of South Georgia only, and not of the Malvinas Islands and continental bases. In any case, this information was vital to the British actions in South Georgia.
Without a doubt, as one American admiral later stated, the big problem with satellite imagery was that "it provided strategic data, not tactical." To perform operational tasks, these images had to be transmitted to Earth, processed, analyzed and assembled.
In other words, the satellite filmed bases, airfields, military positions, infrastructure, etc., but these images could not contribute to the conduct of hostilities in the air-naval theater of operations, especially since the satellite could take information at sea only when it passed directly over this location. The situation was the same with the ground situation.
Another problem cited by the aforementioned admiral was that "satellite imagery was irregular and dependent on weather conditions", which was important in the increased cloudiness over the Malvinas Islands.
CIA EXPERTS COME INTO WORK
In the United States, satellite imagery has been analyzed by the National Center for Imaging, a photographic analysis organization based in Washington DC under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
In 2010, the images taken in 1982 were declassified, and since 2015 they have been publicly available in the CIA database in Maryland.
From an analysis of almost 400 sheets of reports for the period from April to May 1982, it turns out that the activity of US satellites was mainly (as a preventive measure) directed against the USSR, China and the Middle East. From this it is clear why the main targets were static civilian and military targets.
As for the conflict over the Malvinas Islands, only 12 objects were filmed there, mainly airfields and ports, from which it can be concluded that the effectiveness of satellite observation was limited, which may have been due to the difficulty of processing photographs due to constant strong cloud cover.
Of course, this does not mean that during April-May 1981, only 12 objects were processed, since the British could do their own analysis of the situation, especially based on images from the KH-11 sent directly to the UK. Without a doubt, there is now data that can be used to determine the performance of this spacecraft.
A copy of the declassified original of the CIA report of May 5, 1982, which was at the disposal of the British command.
Illustration courtesy of the author
It is also worth noting that the images were not sent directly to British combat units. For example, the Royal Marines of Great Britain did not receive any images during the entire operation. Perhaps, in the units of the ground forces on the islands, the situation was the same.
The images could have been more useful when planning Operation Raisin Pudding (a special forces landing in the vicinity of the Rio Grande, an Argentinean island in Tierra del Fuego), but then only a small number of 1: 50,000 images were used, which covered both the Argentine and Chilean parts islands.
In support of the above, it is worth quoting Captain 1st Rank Nestor Dominguez, who is arguably Argentine's top military satellites expert, who reassures that "there was a tremendous amount of evidence that spetsnaz could not receive intelligence from imaging satellites."
Thus, we can conclude that this type of satellites did not play a significant role in the conflict over the Malvinas Islands, although it helped to collect the necessary data. However, other US military reconnaissance satellites provided appropriate assistance to the British during the conflict over the Malvinas Islands.
First of all, we can mention the system of satellites "White Cloud" ("White Cloud") or NOSS (National Oceanic Satellite System), which are in service with the US Navy, and the ELINT electronic reconnaissance system. Typically, such systems include three satellites that are capable of detecting electronic signals within a 3200 km radius, serving as the primary reconnaissance tool of the US Navy. It is worth adding that, according to some reports, the KN-9 and KH-11 satellites were also used, using groups of small satellites with electronic reconnaissance equipment ("ferrets") with similar capabilities, but only when they were directed to a ground target.
One of the satellites of the ELINT system played a notable role during the conflict when, on the evening of May 1, it detected a radio signal from an Argentine destroyer Type 42.
This information, promptly transmitted to the flagship of the British Navy "Hermes" (HMS Hermes), allowed the British to understand that the Argentine aircraft carrier, which was apparently accompanied by the destroyers of the Argentine Navy "Hercules" (ARA Hercules) and Santisima Trinidad (ARA Santisima Trinidad)), is nearby, take precautions and clarify its position to retreat to a safe distance in order to escape from the impact of an aircraft wing on board the aircraft carrier. The actions of the British thwarted the planned attack of the Argentines on that day, and subsequently there was no such opportunity for a second attack.
On the other hand, among the radio reconnaissance satellites (COMINT) stands out the satellite known under the code name "Vortex" (the third in a series), the main task of which was to intercept communications from the strategic communications system of the Soviet armed forces.
The National Reconanissance Office of the United States admitted that the satellite, launched in October 1981, was used to support the British. At that time, the satellite was used to intercept communications over Central America, but for several hours a day, the antenna was redirected to the South Atlantic to intercept military communications from the Argentines, over which the British were given control.
In addition, it is important to note that the Argentinean military communications were intercepted on a regular basis (both by these satellites and by other means). And worst of all, this information was also decoded by the enemy's armed forces. The intelligence chief of the British Armed Forces noted after the war in his conversation with an American colleague that "90% of information we received through radio and radio technical intelligence", adding that "radio intelligence (COMINT) … has established itself as an invaluable tool (of information mining. - "NVO") ".
Thus, radio and radio intelligence satellites (SIGINT - a system that includes ELINT radio intelligence and COMINT radio intelligence) played an important role in the conflict around Malvin.
In conclusion, we note that, in general, the American satellites over the South Atlantic had a definite, albeit limited, benefit in the British military operations. At the same time, it was the SIGINT electronic intelligence satellites that made the greatest contribution to helping the British, carrying out work from space. Moreover, it should be added that visual reconnaissance could be carried out by shooting in rare cases and exclusively stationary objects.
This analysis is an assessment of American aid to the British, which they needed in the absence of their own operational capabilities. This must be borne in mind for a correct assessment of the parties involved in the conflict over the Malvinas Islands. The British fought in this war not themselves, but relying on the powerful support of the United States.
Argentina
Report by the National Center for Photographic Processing (CIA)
May 5, 1982 on the passage of an American satellite over Argentine military installations
Confidential copy authorized for distribution 2010/06/11:
CIA - RDP82T00709R000101520001-8
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(c) NATIONAL CENTER FOR PHOTO PROCESSING
Page 1 of 2 Supplement to Z-10686/82
Copy of NPIC / PEG (05/82)
4 DIAGRAMS
MILITARY FORCES, ARGENTINA
1. SIGNIFICANCE: IN THE BUENOS AIRES AREA A POSSIBLE REDUCTION OF AIR FORCE COMBAT ACTIVITY IS OBSERVED.
2. NOTE: 11 IMAGES OF ARGENTINA MILITARY OBJECTS (pass), INCLUDING KURUZA KUATIA, RECONQUISTA, AER. GENE. URKISA, AER. MARIANO MORENO, BUENOS AIRES, AER. TANDIL, AER. MAR DEL PLATA, BAHIA BLANCA, COMMANDANTE ESPORA, PORT OF BELGRANO. IN AERIAL REGIONS. MARIANO MORENO, COMMANDANTE ESPORA, KURUZU KUATIA, PORT BELGRANO HIGH CLOUDS; BUENOS AIRES, RECONQUISTA, AER. MAR DEL PLATA - PARTIAL CLOUD. AERIAL REGIONS. GENE. URKIS AND AER. TANDIL - CLEAR.
A REDUCTION OF COMBAT ACTIVITY IS OBSERVED AT THE AERODROME GEN. URKISA. USUALLY HERE FROM 5 TO 9 CANBERRA BOMBERS, NONE NOW IS OBSERVED. OBSERVED TWO AUXILIARY AIRCRAFT "GUARANI-II" AND ONE C-47. AERODROME GEN. URKISA, ON WHICH THE ONLY ARGENTINA BOMBER ESCADRILLA IS BASED, IS 250 NM NORTHWESTERN BUENOS AIRES (SCHEME 2 OF 4).
IN THE REGION OF RECONKISTA AERODROME IT IS CLEAR AND NO COMBAT ACTIVITY OBSERVED (pass). STEERING WAY, LOCATION OF IA-58 "PUCHARA" AND HANGARA IN THE NORTH-WEST PART OF THE AERODROME COVERED BY CLOUD. NO AIRPLANE OBSERVED IN THE MAINTENANCE AREA IN THE SOUTH-EAST OF THE AERODROME. 2 OF 14 IA-58 "PUCHARA" OBSERVED AT THE AERODROME (pass) WERE IN THE SERVICE AREA. USUALLY AERODROME ARE 16 IA-58 "PUCHARA". RECONQUISTA AERODROME, LOCATED 2 NAVY MILE FROM RECONQUISTA, IS THE BASE OF THE ARGENTINA AIR FORCE IA-58 PUCHARA STAFF ESCADRILLE (NOT ON THE SCHEME).
EIGHT MIRAGE III / V, MAYBE ANOTHER MIRAGE III / V AND ANOTHER MIRAGE MIRAGE III / V AND ANOTHER MIRAGE MIRAGE POSSIBLE BOEING 707 ARE AT TANDYL AERODROME. ONE "MIRAGE" III / V - ON THE STEERING TRACK, SEVEN "MIRAGES" III / V - ON TWO MAIN PARKING AND POSSIBLY ONE "MIRAGE" III / V IN THE SERVICE AREA. BOEING 707 - PARKING LOT, SIDE CARGO HATCH OPEN. IT'S USUALLY HERE UP TO EIGHT "MIRAGES" III / V. TANDIL AERODROME (ARGENTINA AERODROME V ESCADRILLES MIRAGE) LOCATED 6 NM NORTHWEST TANDILA (SCHEME 3 OF 4).
This data has been prepared for instructional purposes and should not be used for analytical work. The use of the data is limited to the purpose of preparing it for instruction, they are valid only during the reporting period determined by the data preparation time.
Attention!
Data prepared using intelligence sources and methods
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Confidential copy authorized for distribution 2010/06/11:
CIA - RDP82T00709R000101520001-8
