From the history of the red partisan movement in Transbaikalia. Part 2

From the history of the red partisan movement in Transbaikalia. Part 2
From the history of the red partisan movement in Transbaikalia. Part 2

Video: From the history of the red partisan movement in Transbaikalia. Part 2

Video: From the history of the red partisan movement in Transbaikalia. Part 2
Video: 🇬🇧🇺🇦 Fighting for strongholds near the Donetsk Ring Road 2024, April
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In the village of Ildikan, the partisans stayed for the night, but they did not have to sleep long. At dawn, the enemy launched an offensive against Ildikan from two sides: from the side of Zhidka - the 32nd rifle regiment with 1 battery and from the side of Bol. Kazakovo - the 7th and 11th cavalry regiments.

A fight ensued. After a protracted battle, during a counterattack, the enemy was thrown back in two directions: the rifle regiment - to Zhidka, and the cavalry - to the Undinskaya settlement. In this battle, there were significant losses on both sides.

From Ildikan, the red partisans moved to the Kazakovsk gold mines - where they stopped for the night.

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Their awakening was difficult. They had just managed to send reconnaissance to the Undinskaya Sloboda and Zhidka, when they immediately galloped back from the latter with a report about the White's offensive. Throwing away reconnaissance, the whites attacked the mines: with a rifle regiment - from the side of Zhidka, the 7th and 11th cavalry regiments - from the side of the Undinsky settlement, and a squad of 300 sabers - from the direction of Art. Byankino (scheme 2).

From the history of the red partisan movement in Transbaikalia. Part 2
From the history of the red partisan movement in Transbaikalia. Part 2

The Reds suddenly found themselves in the ring. With a tremendous effort, they managed to break through the ring and leave in the direction of the village of Zhidka (eastward). Withdrew to the village of Shivnya (Kopunskaya), having managed to take out the sick and wounded. In the Kazakov battle, the detachment lost 15 people killed, 25 wounded and 10 people were captured by the Whites.

The Whites disrupted the propaganda work of the partisans in the Kazakovsky fields - although they managed to recruit about fifty workers.

The enemy lost a whole company - which was crushed and destroyed at the moment of the breakthrough.

The Reds made a gross mistake, which was the result of "delight in success" and extreme fatigue - both of the command staff and the detachment.

First, M. M. Yakimov knew that the enemy, with whom the detachment had fought the day before at Ildikan, retreated in two directions: to Zhidka - a rifle regiment and to Undinskaya settlement - 7th and 11th cavalry regiments.

Both of these villages were only 8-10 km away from the Kazakovsky mine along the river. Unde, and the Kazakovsky mine is located in the center of these villages, falling from the river. Onds for 2 - 3 km to a mountain gorge. And into such and such a trap MM Yakimov led his squadron at night - knowing that there was a strong enough enemy in the neighborhood.

Secondly, the detachment did not provide itself with timely and proper reconnaissance.

The enemy did not fail to take advantage of such negligence and taught a good lesson.

Having made a halt in Shivna, the partisans marched on Mironov and Kopun, hoping to raise the population without much difficulty.

In Mironov, the lead detachment captured half of the infantry of the 31st Infantry Regiment with 4 officers.

The enemy's 31st regiment, which was moving here, did not know that its lead detachment had been taken prisoner - and suddenly collided with the Reds. A fight ensued.

The enemy was attacked in the village of Naalgachi. The situation in the battle was in favor of the partisans, especially since a defector from the white regiment reported that the regiment was successfully corrupting the underground Bolshevik organization - and the regiment was already half-disintegrated. A document from the Chita Bolshevik organization was sewn into the deserter's hat.

White weakened noticeably. MM Yakimov regrouped for the attack and had already given the order "to attack", when he received a report that the enemy (from the Kazakovsky mines), having occupied the village of Ishikan, was preparing a blow to the rear.

The detachment abandons the enemy regiment doomed to defeat, quickly withdraws from its position and retreats to Kopun.

The enemy cavalry, already at Kopunya, strikes the partisans' flank - but they did not accept the battle, broke away and retreated to Chonguli, where they spent the night.

The incessant fighting and rapid maneuvering tired the fighters and the horses - a respite was required at all costs. A detachment from Chonguli crossed the ridge by a forest path, went to Gazimur - and settled down to rest in the villages of Burakan and Bura.

The Whites did not go to Gazimur, since it was not possible to lead the artillery along this path.

Here the detachment rested for 2 days. Yakimov's detachment managed to contact Zhuravlev's detachment - which operated in the Bogdaty area.

After resting, it was decided to defeat the enemy located in front of Zhuravlev's detachment in the village of Kungurovo. The 3rd cavalry regiment from Zhuravlev's detachment was assigned to help (Scheme 3).

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The enemy forces are the 4th Cossack regiment and an infantry battalion with 4 machine guns and a two-gun battery.

The 3rd regiment (Zhuravlev's detachment) under the command of M. Shvetsov was ordered to occupy the eastern exits from Kungurovo - in order to prevent the enemy from leaving in an eastern direction.

Two hundred under the command of S. Tretyakov are advancing from the north to Kungurovo.

1 hundred with 2 machine guns blocks the southern exit from Kungurovo.

5 hundred inflict the main blow to the enemy from the west - to Kungurovo.

The "flying" detachment had to cover the 85-km distance from Bura and Burakan to Kungurovo. Therefore, on November 28 in the morning he sets out on the route of Bura, Plyusnino, Gandybei - and at dawn on November 29 attacks the enemy in Kungurovo.

After a 5-6-hour battle, the detachment's strike group from the western side rushes into the village of Kungurovo, captures an infantry battalion, captures a battery and 4 heavy machine guns. But the 4th Cossack regiment, which was defending Kungurovo, under the command of Colonel Fomin, manages, albeit with heavy losses, to break through in the eastern direction - through the 3rd regiment. The Reds captured 12 officers of the battalion, about fifty Cossacks, a large convoy with food, cartridges and shells, 2 guns and 3 machine guns.

The losses of the Reds were insignificant: 12 killed and 25 wounded.

The Kungurov battle was of great importance for the Reds. The defeat of the 4th Cossack regiment, the capture of an infantry battalion, the capture of cannons, machine guns and other trophies of war raised the spirits of the regiments of the Zhuravlevsky detachment, which were in a difficult situation in the area of the Nerchinsky plant.

The Whites were preparing an offensive against Zhuravlev's detachment - but the Kungurov battle preempted this offensive and saved the Zhuravlevites. The latter were, moreover, undressed - and in the 40-degree frost they would not have been able to fight. It was enough to knock the Zhuravlevites out of the village, and because of the severe frost, they would be out of order by 70-80%, becoming an easy prey for the Whites.

Also, with the Kungurov battle, the red partisans shot down the enemy's activity. White after that for a long time behaved in this area rather passively.

From March to September 1919, the insurgent-partisan units, which grew into 6 cavalry regiments, fought the enemy exclusively with a frontal method - and suffered defeat after defeat. The rebel cavalry did not give the proper scope - it was chained to the terrain and performed the functions of the infantry. The horse served not as a means of maneuvering, striking, or raiding, but as a means of movement. The horse attack was not practiced - not only with a massive fist, but also with small units, although this possibility was there, since the rebel regiments consisted mostly of Trans-Baikal Cossacks who had gone through the Russo-Japanese and the First World Wars.

But with the correct use of the horse, the "Flying" detachment began to gain victory after victory. A horse attack, a blow in a mounted formation, unexpected and lightning-fast, became the cornerstone of his actions. And due to quick maneuvering, even while suffering serious losses, the detachment again replenished its strength, replenishing with rebels. The "flying" detachment of red partisans within 1 month grew from 380 to 2500 sabers, perfectly armed and outfitted at the expense of the enemy, mounted a good horse, improved discipline and gained confidence in victory.

The partisan method of struggle and rapid maneuvering made it possible to carry out propaganda work among the population, which by April 1920 had given up to 30,000 bayonets and sabers to the ranks of the red rebels in Eastern Transbaikalia.

The Semyonovites and the Japanese by this rebel army were "planted" on the Amur and Manchurian railways, fearing to move away from the latter. They were afraid of the rebels who appeared unexpectedly and paralyzed and smashed their opponent. The partisans rendered tremendous assistance to the regular units, destroying the rear and disorganizing communications and command and control of the Japanese and Semyonovsk troops, destroying enemy military units.

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