The beginning of the war, even after almost 80 years, remains a mysterious period in the history of our country. It is difficult for a new generation to discern the truth amid the pile of numerous liberal myths and Western attempts to rewrite history. Therefore, we will repeat in a collective form the stories of military historians about the very first days of the Great Patriotic War.
In the first days of the war from June 22, 1941, the Nazis with tank wedges struck in the direction of the 8th and 11th armies ("Betrayal of 1941: the Troubles of the First Days"), as well as the 4th and 5th ("Betrayal of 1941: Was or No"). Let's try to trace what happened to other armies during these days of the Great Patriotic War. And to figure out why, along with the heroism of the above armies, historians write about treason and betrayal on the same days.
In addition to the 5th Army of the South-Western Front, historians also point to the heroic efforts that were made near Przemysl by individual units of the Red Army. For example, the right-flank 99 Red Banner Division of the 26th Army.
One of this division was opposed by two or three Germans, who pressed it in this very sector.
From the book of N. N. Inozemtsev's "Front Diary" (2005):
"The echoes of the artillery cannon are heard: it is the Red Banner 99th division that is holding Przemysl from three German divisions."
Moreover, she threw the fascists back, across the San River. And it was with this Russian / Soviet division that the Fritzes could not do absolutely nothing. Regardless of the massive onslaught that they tried to unleash on these Red Army men. And even without looking at the numerous air attacks. As historians testify, in the very initial period, the offensive of the fascists against other units (divisions) of this army was not carried out.
In the first part of this series ("The Betrayal of 1941: the Troubles of the First Days"), we formulated the question:
"Was the Red Army really weaker than the Wehrmacht in everything?"
And to this question, with their actions and real heroism, those of its units formulated the answer - our armies and divisions, which in the very first days of the Great Patriotic War fell on the main onslaught and all the might of the Hitlerite offensive.
And this answer is unequivocal
« No ».
No quality the Wehrmacht had no superiority over Soviet servicemen.
And it is this answer, like nothing else, that highlights the contrast of the situation at the very beginning of the war. We are talking about a significant polarization, which some historians even call a serious catastrophe.
If the domestic armed forces, on which the horde of Germans pounced with all their might, repelled the battles successfully and heroically, then how did hundreds of thousands of servicemen end up in captivity?
How did it happen that the USSR lost vast territories, lost tanks and planes in huge numbers?
Mysterious 12th Army
Historians ask the following questions.
And how, for example, did the 12th Army fight?
And did the units of this army fought so heroically against the Nazis, which either did not come under the massive blow of the first days of the war, or, if they did, then under the attacks of a much lesser force?
Let's take a look at this very 12th Army. It was led at that time by General Pavel Grigorievich Ponedelin.
This army was located on the front from the border with Poland (south of Lvov region), two divisions (13th rifle corps) covered the passes of the Carpathians (border with Hungary). Further corps of the 12th Army were deployed to Bukovina along the length of the border line with Romania.
Experts point out, by the way, that on June 22, Hungary did not intervene in the war.
From the memoirs of the officer of the border troops Mikhail Grigorievich Padzhev "Through the whole war" (Notes of the border guard) (1972):
“Only on the second day after the German attack on the USSR, the Hungarian government was 'invited' to take part in the war against the Soviet Union.
This explains the fact that in the sector of the 94th border detachment, most of whose outposts were located on the border with Horthy Hungary, the enemy did not take active actions in the first days of the war, although his troops were concentrated on the roads of Uzhoksky, Veretsky and Vyshkovsky passes.
Only after five dayswhen the Germans were already rushing to Lvov and Minsk, Hungarian troops crossed the bordery.
Historians note that on the first day of the war, divisions of the 12th Army raised the alarm and went to the defense of the lines with weapons and ammunition.
In the course of their movement to the forward positions, they were overtaken by enemy bombing.
However, the air formations, which were under the jurisdiction of the 12th Army, did not defend the air lines on June 22 and did not bomb the Germans, that is, did not take off at all. They were not ordered to defend their army units in the sky. No such order came that day from either the army commander or the army headquarters. Or did the commander (headquarters) of the 13th rifle corps, whose units were bombed by the enemy from the air, did not require air cover?
Thus, when the troops of the 12th Army entered the field positions, they practically did not undergo attacks on the ground: there were no attacks.
Triple evidence
Historians mention about the testimonies from the border guards of not one, but three border detachments at once (which guarded the Soviet borders south of Przemysl, and then along the Carpathian Mountains) that the first five days (that is, from June 22 to June 26), the Nazis did not take offensive actions.
Does this mean that on this entire extended section of the front (many hundreds of kilometers) on the 13th rifle corps, as well as on the division of its neighbor from the left flank - the units of the 26th army, there were simply no attacks and attacks from the German invaders?
Let's turn to documentary evidence.
Here is what N. N. Inozemtsev in his book "Front Diary" (2005).
“There is nothing special at the border yet. Occasionally a light skirmish at the border guards, and so the war is not felt to any extent …
Our division occupies a very large area - 60 km along the front.
In fact, we form small cover groups in critical areas; there is no solid line of defense.
But the Germans here, apparently, do not have great forces. Link
We are talking about the published diary entries (diaries and letters) of the artilleryman Nikolai Nikolaevich Inozemtsev. On the first day of the war, along with the artillery battery of the 192 rifle division, he was ordered to the position. And after a few days they received an incomprehensible order - to withdraw. As they explained to the Red Army men - the threat of a detour.
« Received the order to immediately withdraw and move through Streams to Drohobych.
Although the order was rather unexpected, we knew that things were bad near Lviv and there was a threat of encirclement."
They retreat after a little over three days (during which, according to testimonies, no one stepped on these units and did not attack them at all) - this (according to Inozemtsev's recollections) on June 25, or rather on the night of the 26th. From the headquarters of the South-Western Front, no order was received for the retreat of the 12th Army. But it was from the headquarters of the corps.
« Ordered to move mountains, by the shortest way to the Streams, and then to Borislav."
“There is no information about the Germans. A calm, normal life is going on …
The retreat is going along the entire front."
“June 28. At 5 o'clock in the afternoon we get further withdrawal order . Link
According to the recollections of the border guards from the outpost at Veretsky Pass, they were removed from the outpost by order of the rifle corps headquarters. That is, there was a written order.
"By the evening of June 26 by order of the commander 13th Infantry corps Major General N. K. Kirillova and our 94th frontier detachment, never coming into contact with the enemy, began to move away from the border". Link
It is curious that from the very first day of the war, Ukrainian nationalists very actively helped the Nazis, they harmed the border guards from the rear, cutting off telephone lines.
"The bandits from organizations of Ukrainian nationalists cut wires, damaged telephone nodes. This prevented timely transmission of the necessary orders, clarification of the situation in certain areas. " Link
After the war, documents were found showing how the border guards of neighboring detachments entered the battle and met the enemy.
Here is what Major Tselikov, Chief of Staff of the 93rd Border Detachment (neighbor on the right flank), wrote in a report:
“From 22 to 26 June 1941, the detachment continued to guard and defend the 177-kilometer section of the border.
The enemy did not show active hostilities in the guarded area.
On the night of June 27, by order, the detachment departed from the border. Link
Situation on the site of a neighbor from the left flank (95th border detachment):
"From 22 to 26 June, the detachment's sector is calm." Link
The third certificate is Colonel-General of the Technical Troops of the Soviet Army, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, Pavel Alekseevich Kabanov.
He served then as the commander of the 5th railway brigade of the Special Corps of Railway Troops.
Outlined by P. A. Kabanov his testimony in his book "Steel Ferries" (1973). Then, on duty, he interacted with the 13th rifle corps.
"On June 24, I was again in Zbarazh."
On the same day, June 24, 1941 (tells P. A. Kabanov) the chief engineer of the corps, Colonel F. N. Doronin entered the office and said:
“Just from Ternopil. I was there at the headquarters of the Southwestern Front.
Colonel Korshunov, head of the VOSO district, summoned me.
Your brigade operates in the zone of the 12th and 26th armies.
The brigade is assigned … border sections: State Border - Turka - Sambir and State Border - Lavochne - Stryi.
Your task is to protect these lines, and in case of withdrawal, destroy . Link
A day later (June 25), the head of the Stryi branch of the movement A. I. Bogdanov entered evacuation orderbut it looked like provocation … And Kabanov asks to double-check the sources of this order. It turned out that it was definitely a provocation. There was no longer any connection with the higher authorities. And confidence that the order was received from the chief of the road - too.
P. A. Kabanov:
“You can't leave. Think: Stryi is a knot, trains from the side of Przemysl, Khirov and Sambor go through it. Ahead of us is the Sambir branch. All his people are in place.
So, let's leave our comrades in trouble."
And then
“Bogdanov made the necessary inquiries, which confirmed my assumption:
order the head of the road for the evacuation of the department fabricated by enemy scouts . Link
The team of P. A. Kabanova in those days supervised the railway junctions in the south of the Lviv region: Sambor, Stryi, Turka, Drohobych, Borislav. According to the memoirs, on the morning of June 25, a detachment of railway explosives, arriving at the location of the headquarters of the 192 rifle division (part of the 13th rifle corps of the 12th army), wanted to receive and carry out orders to blow up. But they the headquarters were no longer found there … And they found only the Red Army men completing the withdrawal from previously defended positions.
“At dawn on June 25, P. A. Frolov with several soldiers went on a railcar to the State Border to the headquarters of the 192nd Mountain Division. It was necessary to get an assignment from her command.
Everywhere the troops were withdrawn from their positions and went towards the Turk station.
The division headquarters was not there either. . Link
Complete irresponsibility?
In the combat report of the 12th Army, which was posted online as an operational summary of the 12th Army Headquarters No. 04 / op by 7 o'clock on June 24, 1941 "On the state of the army's troops," Ponedelin reports:
« 13th Rifle Corps - no information available . Link
In addition, we present another declassified document on the situation with the transfer of information in Ponedelin's 12th Army, published on the Memory of the People website, dated July 23, 1941:
"Commanders of formations and units and their staffs show complete helplessness and irresponsibility to provide timely and comprehensive information on the condition of parts ". Link
The order to leave the outpost and remove, in fact, the defense of the state border, apparently, was erroneous. Since the border guards of the outpost, who previously guarded the Veretsky Pass, after the departure, again receive permission to return to the outpost. But now they meet the Nazis already on the descent from the pass.
The border guards drove the fascists out of the pass. But the Fritzes got there easily and simply, from the territory of Hungary, which had not yet entered the war, and also directly as a result of the "erroneous" order to retreat, which came from the corps.
Or was it not his order, but another sabotage of Ukrainian nationalists?
Well, and about the order from the then Kremlin - not to leave the Germans a single bottom or a tire.
Railway officer P. A. Kabanov recalls that the battalion commander reported:
“One hundred and ninety-sixth division … received an order to withdraw to the Drohobych region.
A detachment of miners is allowed to set up a complete fence on the entire section from the State Border to Sambor."
And further:
“Yesterday a detachment of miners received from the commander of the 192 rifle division strange written permission and plan for setting up a fence."
"Why strange?"
“Instead of destroying large objects, he suggests make out two military dead end and destroy the communication line, and then only from the State Border to Turk”. Link
In the very days when Soviet railway explosives were destroying the main facilities and life support depots, the Nazis bombarded the same border areas with their leaflets with threats of reprisals if something was destroyed before they arrived.
But the Germans, judging by the leaflets, seem to know that “their people” there (intentionally) leave important structures and communications intact for them …
In the book of P. A. Kabanov, there is another episode about non-destroyed strategically important objects.
“I am the head of the warehouse, The quartermaster said, worried. -
I cannot give aviation gasoline to the fascists. You see, I can't!
If they don’t shoot me for this, then I’ll shoot myself in the forehead!”
This time it was a question of a huge fuel storage, which was nevertheless blown up, but solely due to the demand of the head of this warehouse, which threatened to shoot himself if the facility refused to be liquidated.
On August 11, 2010, the Krasnaya Zvezda newspaper published an article by S. G. Pokrovsky "Treason 1941", which indicates that
« the order of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front for the withdrawal of the 12th and 26th armies was received … It was worked out at the front headquarters at 21 o'clock in the evening June 26.
AND was subsequently declared unfounded.
Due to the fact that the troops the left-flank divisions of the 26th army and the right-flank 13th division of the 12th army were not subjected to pressure.
The front headquarters hastened.
But at the same time, he indicated to the 13th Rifle Corps exactly those lines of withdrawal to which the corps departed on its own accord on June 24-25 . Link
And if such an order of June 26, 1941 on the abandonment of positions by the military for no reason and without pressure from any enemy in the areas of the guarded state border still existed (and was not an organized sabotage of Ukrainian nationalists), then why did not follow any reaction?
AND what separates this kind of allegedly erroneous wartime orders from the concept of "treason"?
We will consider the further fate of the surrendered 12th Army in the next part.
