The operation to seize the Taj Bek Palace, carried out in December 1979 in Kabul, has no analogues in modern history.
The forces for this action were gradually formed. In mid-September, immediately after the seizure of power by Hafizullah Amin, 17 officers from the special forces of the KGB of the USSR, headed by Major Yakov Semyonov, arrived in Kabul. They settled in one of the villas of the Soviet embassy and for the time being they worked in various departments.
On December 4, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a decision was made to send a trained GRU detachment of the General Staff to Afghanistan with a total strength of about 500 people. It was the so-called "Muslim" battalion under the command of Major Kh. T. Khalbaev, which consisted of representatives of the indigenous nationalities of the Central Asian republics. On December 9 and 12, from the airfields of Chirchik and Tashkent, he was transferred to the Bagram airbase. All officers and soldiers were dressed in Afghan military uniforms, made according to samples sent by military intelligence. At the beginning of December, two more subgroups of the special group of the KGB "Zenith" (30 people each) arrived in Bagram, and on December 23 - the special group "Thunder" (30 people). They had such codenames in Afghanistan, in the Center they were called differently: the group "Thunder" - subdivision "A", or, according to journalists, "Alpha", and "Zenith" - "Vympel". The number of Zenit men in Afghanistan, together with those who had previously arrived, reached more than 100 people. The general management of them was carried out by A. K. Polyakov.
From about mid-December, a forced transfer of small army units to Afghanistan began. With one of them, Babrak Karmal arrived illegally, who settled in Bagram under the protection of officers of the 9th KGB Directorate, headed by V. I. Shergin. There were also A. Vatanjar, S. Gulyabzoy and A. Sarvari, associates of the former PDPA General Secretary N. M. Taraki. In mid-December, it was planned to remove Amin, and the new leadership was obliged to be in Afghanistan by the time of the coup.
On December 11, the deputy commander of the Airborne Forces, Lieutenant General N. Guskov, set the task to seize the "Oak object" - Amin's residence in the center of Kabul. There was no plan of the palace, no system of its protection. It was only known that the palace was guarded by about two thousand guards. The assault was entrusted to only twenty-two Zenit men and a company of the "Muslim" battalion. On December 13, at 15.30, the personnel received an order for hostilities. The fighters were supposed to move from Bagram to Kabul in an hour and storm the residence of Amin. It is not known how this adventure would have ended, but, fortunately, at 16 o'clock the command "hang up!" Followed.
Employees of "Zenith" V. Tsvetkov and F. Erokhov shot sniper rifles at 450 meters - it was from this distance that they intended to shoot at the Afghan leader. Having chosen positions on the route of Amin's usual route in Kabul, they set up a watch, but increased security along the entire route prevented.
The attempt on Amin's life on December 16 also ended in failure. He was slightly wounded, and his nephew Asadullah Amin, chief of the Afghan counterintelligence, was seriously wounded and, after an operation performed by the Soviet surgeon A. Alekseev, was sent by plane for treatment to the Soviet Union. For the oppositionists who were in Bagram, headed by B. Karmal, an An-12 plane flew from Fergana, and they again flew to the USSR.
Only late in the evening on December 17, the "Zenith" and the "Muslim" battalion were assigned the task of moving from Bagram to Kabul to the Dar-ul-Aman region, where the new residence of the head of the DRA was moving. On December 18, Colonel V. V. Kolesnik, who had previously supervised the training of the "Muslim" battalion, received an order from the head of the GRU, General of the Army P. Ivashutin, to fly to Afghanistan to carry out a special government assignment. Lieutenant Colonel O. U. Shvets was sent with him. At 6.30 on December 19, they departed from the Chkalovsky airfield via Baku and Termez to Bagram. From Termez flew with two more fellow travelers - KGB officers Major General Yu. I. Drozdov and Captain 2nd Rank E. G. Kozlov.
Kolesnik and Shvets drove to the location of the battalion, which was stationed about a kilometer from the Taj Bek Palace, in an unfinished building with glassless windows. Instead of them, they pulled on a raincoat, put up stoves, "stoves". That year, the winter in Kabul was harsh, at night the air temperature dropped to 20 degrees below zero.
The day before, Amin moved to the Taj-Bek palace and found himself under the "wing" of the "Muslim" battalion.
The palace security system was carefully and thoughtfully organized. Inside, Amin's personal guard, consisting of his relatives and especially trusted people, was on duty. They also wore a special uniform, different from other Afghan servicemen: white bands on their caps, white belts and holsters, white cuffs on the sleeves. The second line consisted of seven posts, each of which housed four sentries armed with a machine gun, a grenade launcher and machine guns. They were changed after two hours. The outer ring of the guard was formed by the points of deployment of the battalions of the guard brigade (three motorized infantry and a tank). They were located around the Taj Bek at a short distance. At one of the dominant heights, two T-54 tanks were buried, which could shoot through the area adjacent to the palace with direct fire. In total, the security brigade numbered about 2, 5 thousand people. In addition, an anti-aircraft regiment was located nearby, armed with twelve 100-mm anti-aircraft guns and sixteen anti-aircraft machine gun mounts. There were other army units in Kabul: two infantry divisions and a tank brigade.
On December 21, Kolesnik and Khalbaev were summoned by the chief military adviser, Colonel-General S. K. Magometov, and ordered to reinforce the protection of the palace by units of the "Muslim" battalion. They were ordered to take up defenses between the guard posts and the line of the Afghan battalions.
On December 22 and 23, the Soviet ambassador informed Amin that Moscow had satisfied his request to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan and were ready to begin their deployment on December 25. The Afghan leader expressed gratitude to the Soviet leadership and ordered the General Staff of the DRA Armed Forces to provide assistance to the troops being deployed.
According to Magometov, when he was talking on a special connection with DF Ustinov, the Minister of Defense asked him: "How are preparations going for the implementation of the plan to remove Amin from power?" But Magometov knew absolutely nothing about this. After a while, the representative of the KGB of the USSR, Lieutenant-General B. Ivanov, apparently after talking with Yu. V. Andropov, invited Magometov to his place and showed him the plan developed by the KGB officers. The chief military adviser was indignant later, saying that it was not a plan, but a "filkin's letter." I had to develop an operation to seize the palace anew.
Directive No. 312/12/001, signed by Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff NV Ogarkov on December 24, defined specific tasks for the deployment and deployment of troops on Afghan territory. Participation in hostilities was not provided. Specific combat missions to formations and units to suppress the resistance of the rebels were set a little later, in the directive of the USSR Minister of Defense of December 27, No. 312/12/002.
Less than a day was allotted to carry out all the activities related to the introduction of troops into the DRA. This haste naturally entailed additional losses.
… Magometov and Kolesnik arrived at the field telephone office, which was deployed at the Club-e-Askari stadium near the American embassy, on the evening of December 24. On government communications, they called General of the Army S. F. Akhromeev (he was in Termez as part of the Operational Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense). The first deputy chief of the General Staff ordered them to report the decision in code with two signatures by the morning of December 25. There and then a report was written at the communications center, and by two o'clock in the morning the encryption was sent. Kolesnik was appointed by the USSR Ministry of Defense as the head of the operation, which was codenamed "Storm-333". Drozdov was entrusted with directing the actions of the KGB special forces. Setting him the task of HF, Yu. V. Andropov and V. A. Kryuchkov pointed out the need to think through everything to the smallest detail, and most importantly - to maximize the safety of the participants in the operation.
Amin, despite the fact that in September he deceived Brezhnev and Andropov (promised to save N. M. Taraki's life when the latter was already strangled. As a result, the Soviet leadership "bargained" with H. Amin for two or three days because of the by the time the leader of the April revolution), oddly enough, trusted the Soviet leaders. He surrounded himself with Soviet military advisers, consulted with high-ranking representatives of the KGB and the USSR Ministry of Defense under the relevant agencies of the DRA, fully trusted only doctors from the USSR and ultimately hoped for our troops. He did not trust the Parchamists, and expected an attack either from them or from the Mujahideen. However, he became a victim of political intrigue from a completely different side.
The operation plan provided for preventing the advance of Afghan battalions (three motorized infantry and a tank) to the Taj Bek palace. A company of special forces or paratroopers had to act against each battalion. The commander of the attached paratrooper company was Senior Lieutenant Valery Vostrotin. According to Drozdov, the paratroopers stood out for their bearing, smartness and organization. I would like to say a little about Vostrotin. In Afghanistan, he fought three times. First, the company commander. He was seriously wounded in one of the battles in July 1980. Then he commanded a battalion. Another wound. At the final stage of the war, he commanded the 345th separate parachute regiment and became a Hero of the Soviet Union.
One of the most important tasks was the capture of two buried tanks. For this, 15 people were allocated, led by the deputy commander of the "Muslim" battalion, Captain Satarov, as well as four snipers from the KGB. The success of the entire operation largely depended on the actions of this group. They started first. In order to teach the Afghans not to arouse suspicion ahead of time, they began to carry out demonstration actions: shooting, going out on alarm and occupying the established defense areas. Lighting flares were fired at night. Since there were severe frosts at night, the motors of armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles were warmed up according to the schedule so that they could be started immediately upon a signal. This was troubling at first. When the missiles were fired for the first time, the location of the battalion was instantly illuminated by the searchlights of the anti-aircraft regiment and the chief of the palace security, Major Jandad, arrived.
Gradually, the Afghans got used to and ceased to react cautiously to such "maneuvers" of the battalion. Only Kolesnik, Shvets and Khalbaev knew the new mission in the battalion.
Soviet military advisers and specialists working in the air defense forces of the DRA established control over all anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition storage areas, and also temporarily disabled some anti-aircraft installations (removed sights, locks). Thus, the smooth landing of aircraft with paratroopers was ensured.
On the night of December 24, the commander of the troops of the Turkestan district, Colonel-General Yu. P. Maksimov, reported by telephone to the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff about the readiness of the troops to carry out the assigned task, and then sent a cipher telegram to them with a report on readiness.
At 12.00 on December 25, 1979, the troops received an order, signed by the Minister of Defense of the USSR D. F. Ustinov, that the transition and flight of the state border of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan by the troops of the 40th Army and Air Force aviation began at 15.00 on December 25 (Moscow time) …
The scouts and the air assault battalion of Captain L. V. Khabarov, which was to occupy the Salang pass, were the first to cross, and then the rest of the 108th motorized rifle division under the leadership of General K. Kuzmin crossed the pontoon bridge.
At the same time, the airlift and landing of the main forces of the 103rd airborne division and the remnants of the 345th separate parachute regiment on the airfields of the capital and Bagram began by air transport aircraft. Unfortunately, there were some casualties - at 19.33 on December 25, when landing in Kabul, an IL-76 crashed into a mountain and exploded (commander - Captain V. V. Golovchin), on board which there were 37 paratroopers. All paratroopers and 7 crew members of the aircraft were killed.
On December 27, the airborne units of the 103rd division of Major General I. F. Ryabchenko and the allocated forces from the USSR KGB, according to the plan, went to important administrative and special facilities in the capital and "strengthened" their security.
Parts of the 108th motorized rifle division by the morning of December 28 were concentrated in the area northeast of Kabul.
For the general public, for a long time it remained a mystery what happened then in Kabul. Many different opinions were expressed about this operation, the most incredible rumors circulated. I had the opportunity to meet and talk with many participants in those events, they perceive them differently even now. Their stories are subjective and often contradict each other. Summarizing various versions and facts, I tried to restore at least a rough picture of that day.
On December 26, advisers under Amin's personal protection - employees of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR - were able to lead the scouts-saboteurs to the palace, where they carefully examined everything, after which General Drozdov drew up the floor plan of Taj-Bek. The officers of "Thunder" and "Zenith" M. Romanov, Y. Semenov, V. Fedoseev and Zh. Mazaev conducted a reconnaissance of the area and reconnaissance of firing points located at the nearest heights. Not far from the palace, on a dais, there was a restaurant where senior officers of the Afghan army used to gather. Under the pretext that the Soviet officers allegedly needed to book places for celebrating the New Year, the commandos visited the restaurant, from where the Taj Bek could be seen at a glance.
On the morning of the 27th, direct preparations for the assault began.
The Taj Bek Palace was located on the outskirts of Kabul in Dar-ul-Aman, on a high steep hill covered with trees and bushes, which was also equipped with terraces, and all approaches to it were mined. A single road led to it, heavily guarded around the clock. Its thick walls were able to hold back an artillery strike. If we add to this that the area around the palace was under fire, then it becomes clear what a difficult task the army special forces and special groups of the KGB of the USSR faced.
Our military advisers received different tasks: on December 27, some had to stay in the units for the night, organize a dinner with the Afghans wards (for this they were given alcohol and snacks) and under no circumstances allow Afghan units to move against the Soviet troops. Others, on the contrary, were ordered not to stay in the units for a long time, and they left home earlier than usual. Only specially appointed people remained, who were appropriately instructed.
On the morning of December 27, Drozdov and Kolesnik, according to the old Russian custom, washed in the bath before the battle.
In the middle of the day, they once again bypassed the positions of the battalion, informed the officers of the plan of the operation and announced the order of action. The commander of the "Muslim" battalion, Major Khalbaev, commanders of special groups M. Romanov and Y. Semenov assigned combat missions to the commanders of subunits and subgroups, and organized preparations for the assault.
At this time, Hafizullah Amin was in euphoria: he finally managed to achieve his cherished goal - Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. On the afternoon of December 27, he hosted a lavish dinner, receiving Politburo members, ministers with their families in his luxurious palace. The formal reason for the celebration was the return from Moscow of the PDPA Central Committee Secretary Panjshiri. He assured Amin: the Soviet leadership was satisfied with the version of Taraki's death and the change in the country's leader, which he described. The USSR will provide military assistance to Afghanistan.
Amin solemnly said: “The Soviet divisions are already on their way here. Everything is going great. I am constantly in contact by phone with Comrade Gromyko, and we are jointly discussing the question of how best to formulate information for the world about the provision of Soviet military assistance to us."
In the afternoon, the Secretary General was expected to speak on Afghan television. The highest military ranks and heads of political agencies were invited to the shooting at the Taj Bek Palace. However, during lunch, many of the guests felt unwell. Some have passed out. Amin also completely "passed out". His wife immediately called the commander of the presidential guard, Jandad, who called the Central Military Hospital (Charsad Bistar) and the clinic of the Soviet embassy. The food and pomegranate juice were immediately sent for examination, the suspected chefs were detained. Enhanced security mode.
When Soviet doctors - therapist Viktor Kuznechenkov and surgeon Anatoly Alekseev - drove up to the external security post and, as usual, began to surrender their weapons, they were additionally searched, which had never happened before. Something happened? Our doctors determined at once: mass poisoning. Amin lay naked to his underpants, with a drooping jaw and rolling eyes. He was unconscious, in a severe coma. Died? They felt a pulse - a barely perceptible beat.
Colonels Kuznechenkov and Alekseev, not thinking that they were violating someone's plans, proceeded to rescue the head of the "friendly USSR country." First, the jaw was inserted into place, then breathing was restored. They took him to the bathroom, washed him and began to do gastric lavage, forced diuresis … When the jaw stopped dropping and urine began to flow, the doctors realized that Amin had been saved.
At about six o'clock in the evening, Kolesnik called the Mohammedans on the line and said that the time of the assault had been postponed and that it was necessary to start as soon as possible. After 15-20 minutes, the capture group led by Captain Satarov drove out in a GAZ-66 car in the direction of the height where the tanks were buried. The tanks were guarded by sentries, and their crews were in the barracks, located at a distance of 150-200 meters from them. V. Tsvetkov from "Zenith" or D. Volkov from "Thunder" were supposed to shoot at the sentries.
Colonel Grigory Boyarinov, who was part of Zenit, who was at the command post, was noticeably worried, since he had arrived in Kabul only the day before and had not yet mastered the new situation. Seeing this, Captain 2nd Rank Evald Kozlov decided to help him, although he was not supposed to be in the assault groups. Neither Kozlov nor Boyarinov could have imagined that after the storming of the palace they would become Heroes of the Soviet Union, and the colonel was not destined to return from this battle.
When Satarov's car drove up to the location of the third battalion, fire from small arms was suddenly heard from there. Colonel Kolesnik immediately commanded: "Fire!" and "Forward!"
Self-propelled anti-aircraft guns ("Shilki") were the first to open fire on the palace with direct fire at the command of Captain Pautov, unleashing a sea of shells on him. Automatic grenade launchers hit the location of the tank battalion, preventing the crews from approaching the tanks. According to the plan, the first to move to the palace was the company of Senior Lieutenant Vladimir Sharipov, on ten infantry fighting vehicles of which there were subgroups of "Thunder" headed by O. Balashov, V. Emyshev, S. Godov and V. Karpukhin. Major Mikhail Romanov was in charge of them. Major Yakov Semyonov with his Zenit in four armored personnel carriers received the task of breaking through to the front of the palace, and then making a throw along the pedestrian staircase that led up to the Taj Bek. At the front, both groups were to be connected.
However, at the last moment the plan was changed, and the first to move to the palace building on three armored personnel carriers were Zenit subgroups, the elders of which were A. Karelin, B. Suvorov and V. Fateev. The fourth subgroup of "Zenith" headed by V. Shchigolev was in the column of "Thunder". The combat vehicles shot down the outer guard posts and rushed along the only road leading to the site in front of the palace. As soon as the first car passed the turn, heavy machine guns struck from the building. All the wheels of the first armored personnel carrier were damaged, and Boris Suvorov's car immediately caught fire. The subgroup commander himself was killed and his men were wounded.
The Zenit men were forced to lie down and shoot at the windows of the palace, some of them began to climb up the mountain using assault ladders.
At a quarter past seven in the evening, violent explosions thundered in Kabul. This is a subgroup of the KGB from Zenit (senior Boris Pleshkunov) blew up the "well" of communication, disconnecting the Afghan capital from the outside world.
The commandos quickly rushed out to the area in front of the Taj Bek. The commander of the first subgroup of "Thunder" O. Balashov was punctured by shrapnel with shrapnel; in a fever, at first he did not feel pain and rushed along with everyone to the palace, but then he was nevertheless sent to the medical battalion.
The first minutes of the battle were the most difficult. KGB special groups went to the assault on Taj Bek, and the main forces of V. Sharipov's company covered the outer approaches to the palace. Other units of the "Muslim" battalion provided the outer ring of cover. Hurricane fire from the palace pressed the commandos to the ground. They got up only when "Shilka" suppressed a machine gun in one of the windows. This did not last long - maybe five minutes, but it seemed to the soldiers that an eternity had passed.
The most difficult part was breaking into the building itself. When the soldiers moved to the main entrance, the fire intensified even more. Something unimaginable was happening. On the outskirts of the palace G. Zudin was killed, S. Kuvilin and N. Shvachko were wounded. In the first minutes of the battle, 13 people were wounded near Major M. Romanov. The group commander himself was concussed. Things were no better at Zenit. V. Ryazanov, having received a through wound in the thigh, himself bandaged his leg and went on the attack. A. Yakushev and V. Yemyshev were among the first to break into the building. Afghans from the second floor threw grenades. As soon as he began to climb the stairs leading to the Taj Bek, Yakushev fell, struck by fragments of a grenade, and Emyshev, who rushed towards him, was seriously wounded in his right arm. Later she had to be amputated.
E. Kozlov, M. Romanov, S. Golov, M. Sobolev, V. Karpukhin, A. Plyusnin, V. Grishin and V. Filimonov, as well as Y. Semenov with the fighters from Zenit V. Ryazantsev, V. Bykovsky, V. Makarov and V. Poddubny were the first to break into the palace building. A. Karelin, V. Shchigolev and N. Kurbanov stormed the palace from the end. The commandos acted desperately and decisively. If they did not leave the premises with their hands up, the doors were broken, grenades were thrown into the room, and then indiscriminately fired from machine guns.
The officers and soldiers of Amin's personal protection, his bodyguards (there were about 100-150 people) resisted desperately and did not surrender. A fire started on the second floor of the palace from the impacts of the Shiloks. This had a strong moral impact on the defenders. The soldiers from Amin's guard, having heard Russian speech and obscenities, began to surrender to a higher and just power. As it turned out later, many of them studied at the airborne school in Ryazan, where, apparently, they remembered Russian swearing for the rest of their lives. Ya. Semenov, E. Kozlov, V. Anisimov, S. Golov, V. Karpukhin and A. Plyusnin rushed to the second floor. M. Romanov, due to a strong concussion, had to stay downstairs.
The Soviet doctors who were in the palace hid wherever they could. At first, it was thought that the mujahideen attacked, then - the supporters of N. M. Taraki. Only later, when they heard Russian obscenities, they realized that they were attacking their own. Alekseev and Kuznechenkov, who were supposed to help Amin's daughter (she had a baby), found "refuge" at the bar. Soon they saw Amin walking down the corridor in white Adidas shorts, holding vials of saline in his hands, wrapped high in tubes, like grenades. One could only imagine what efforts it cost him and how the needles threaded into the cubital veins were pricked.
Alekseev, running out of hiding, first of all pulled out the needles, pressed his veins with his fingers so that blood would not ooze out, and then brought the secretary general to the bar. Amin leaned against the wall, but then a child's cry was heard - from somewhere from a side room, his five-year-old son was walking, smearing tears with his fists. Seeing his father, he rushed to him, grabbed him by the legs, Amin pulled him to him, and the two sat down against the wall.
Amin ordered his adjutant to call and warn the Soviet military advisers of the attack on the palace. At the same time, he said: "The Soviets will help." But the adjutant reported that it was the Soviets who were shooting. These words pissed off the secretary general, he grabbed the ashtray and threw it at the adjutant: "You're lying, it can't be!" Then he himself tried to call the chief of the General Staff, the commander of the 4th tank brigade, but there was no connection.
After that, Amin quietly said: "I guessed about it, that's right."
At the time when the assault groups broke into the Taj Bek, the fighters of the "Muslim" battalion created a rigid ring of fire around the palace, destroying everything that offered resistance and cutting off the influx of new forces.
When the riot police broke through the second floor, a woman screamed: "Amin, Amin …" It was probably his wife who was shouting. N. Kurbanov from "Zenith", the only one of the fighters who knew the local language, began to translate for Semyonov. Soon, the commandos saw Amin lying near the bar.
The battle in the palace did not last long (43 minutes). “Suddenly the shooting stopped,” Yakov Semyonov recalled, “I reported on the Walkie-Toki radio station to the leadership that the palace had been taken, many people were killed and wounded, and the main thing was over.” After the oppositionists A. Sarvari and S. M. Gulyabzoy identified the body, the remains of the Afghan leader were wrapped in a carpet … The main task was completed.
Kolesnik gave the order for a ceasefire and moved his command post directly to the palace. When he and Y. Drozdov ascended to Taj Bek, the commanders of the assault groups and subunits began to approach them with reports. V. Karpukhin approached them with a helmet in his hands and showed the bullet stuck in the triplex: "Look how lucky you are." The wounded and dead were evacuated by infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers.
In total, five people were killed in the KGB special groups directly during the storming of the palace, including Colonel Boyarinov. Almost all were wounded, but those who could hold weapons in their hands continued to fight. In the "Muslim" battalion, 5 people were killed, 35 were wounded. 23 wounded fighters remained in the ranks. For example, Senior Lieutenant V. Sharipov, wounded in the leg, continued to lead the company entrusted to him. Captain Ibragimov, a battalion medic, took the seriously wounded to the BMP to the medical battalion and the Kabul hospital. I do not know the fate of the officers of the 9th Directorate of the KGB of the USSR, who were directly guarding H. Amin. According to some reports, all of them were evacuated in advance.
It is likely that some of our compatriots suffered from their own people: in the dark, the personnel of the "Muslim" battalion and the KGB special group recognized each other by the white armbands on the sleeves, the password "Misha - Yasha" and … mat. But after all, they were all dressed in Afghan military uniforms, and they often had to fire and throw grenades from a decent distance. So try to keep track of here at night, in the dark, and even in such confusion, who had a bandage on his sleeve and who did not ?!
During the night, the special forces guarded the palace, as they feared that divisions and a tank brigade stationed in Kabul would attack it. But this did not happen. Soviet military advisers and airborne troops deployed to the Afghan capital did not allow them to do this. In addition, the control of the Afghan forces was paralyzed by the special services in advance.
The seizure of the remaining key targets in Kabul proceeded calmly and with minimal losses.
In the evening of December 27, Yu. V. Andropov got in touch with Babrak Karmal, who was at the airfield in Bagram. On behalf of himself and “personally” from Leonid Brezhnev, he congratulated Karmal on the victory of the “second stage of the revolution” and his appointment as Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA. Karmal immediately ordered to transport him to the capital.
On the night of December 28, another motorized rifle division, previously deployed in Kushka (commanded by General Yu. V. Shatalin), entered Afghanistan. She went to Herat and Shindand. One regiment of this division was stationed at the Kandahar airfield. It was later reorganized into the 70th Brigade.
The killed Afghans, including the two young sons of H. Amin, were buried in a mass grave near the Taj Bek palace (later, since July 1980, the headquarters of the 40th Army was located there). Amin's corpse, wrapped in a carpet, was buried there, but separately from the rest. No headstone was delivered to him. The surviving members of his family were imprisoned in the Puli-Charkhi prison, replacing the Taraki family there. Even Amin's daughter, whose legs were broken during the battle, ended up in a cell with a cold concrete floor. But mercy was alien to people whose loved ones were destroyed on the orders of H. Amin.
In the evening, an incident occurred that nearly cost the lives of all the immediate leaders of Operation Storm-333. They returned to the battalion in a government Mercedes, and although they had previously coordinated the signals with Lieutenant General N. N. Guskov, near the General Staff building of the DRA Armed Forces were fired upon by their own paratroopers. Years later, Major General Vasily Vasilyevich Kolesnik recalled: “There was a burst of automatic weapons. The car suddenly stopped abruptly and stalled. We began to shout that we were ours. And after the exchange of passwords, the shooting stopped."
When we got out of the car and raised the hood, we saw that there were five machine-gun holes. “A little higher and everyone would have died. It's so inept,”said General Drozdov (he went through the Great Patriotic War as a front-line officer, then was a resident in the USA, China and other countries).
Drozdov, Kolesnik and Shvets got into the armored personnel carrier with Khalbaev, took the Mercedes in tow, in which Kozlov and Semyonov remained, and drove to the battalion's location.
Upon arrival, they decided to "celebrate" the success. “The five of us drank six bottles of vodka,” Kolesnik told me, “but it seemed as if we hadn't drank at all. And the nervous tension was so great that, although we had not slept for probably more than two days, none of us could fall asleep. Some analysts assessed the actions of the special forces as treacherous. But what could be done in such an environment? The question was - either they are us, or we are theirs. " And no matter how many years have passed, every member of the special forces will remember the storming of the palace of H. Amin forever. It was the culmination of their entire lives, and they honorably fulfilled the mission of their government.
By a closed decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, a large group of KGB officers (about 400 people) were awarded orders and medals. Colonel GI Boyarinov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). The same title was awarded to V. V. Kolesnik, E. G. Kozlov and V. F. Karpukhin. YI Drozdov was awarded the Order of the October Revolution. The commander of the group "Thunder" MM Romanov was awarded the Order of Lenin. OU Shvets and Ya. F. Semenov were awarded the Order of the Battle Red Banner. Also received government awards about 300 officers and soldiers of the "Muslim" battalion, of which 7 people were awarded the Order of Lenin (including Khalbaev, Satarov and Sharipov) and about 30 - the Order of the Red Banner of Battle (including V. A. Vostrotin). Colonel VP Kuznechenkov, as a warrior-internationalist, was awarded the Order of the Battle Red Banner (posthumously) “For the storming of Amin's palace”. A. Alekseev was given a Certificate of Honor when he left Kabul for his homeland.
The participants in the storming of the palace, following the order, risked their lives (some were killed and wounded). Another thing - for what? After all, soldiers are always pawns in someone's big game and they themselves never start wars …
