“So they killed our Ferdinand,” his maid said to Schweik.
Schweik retired from military service a few years ago after the medical commission recognized him as an idiot.
- Which Ferdinand, Mrs. Mullerov? Schweik asked. “I know two Ferdinands. One serves the pharmacist Prusha. One day, by mistake, he drank a bottle of hair-growing fluid from him; and then there's Ferdinand Kokoschka, the one who collects dog shit. I don't feel sorry for both of them …
This is how Jaroslav Hasek reacted through the lips of his hero to the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Countess Chotek. The inhabitants are forgivable, at that moment after the invention of dreadnoughts, submarines, machine guns and other airships and airplanes, war seemed impossible to many, and political assassinations became commonplace back in the 19th century: from emperors to policemen.
But not this time, only a month will pass and the guns will start talking, and a fun walk for a maximum of three months will turn into a nightmare for four years with ten million corpses. Empires will collapse right on Engels.
“For Prussia - Germany, no other war is now possible except a world war. And it would be a world war of unprecedented scale, unprecedented strength. From 8 to 10 million soldiers will strangle each other and devour all of Europe to such an extent clean, as never before have been devoured by the clouds of locusts … Hunger, epidemics, the general savagery of both the troops and the masses … The hopeless confusion of our artificial mechanism in trade, industry and credit; all this ends in general bankruptcy. The collapse of the old states and their routine statesmanship; the collapse is such that dozens of crowns are lying on the pavement …"
And after the world war there will be the Spanish flu, the world depression and the Second world war.
Europe, which has not known major wars since 1870, will fight and die for the next 30 years, intermittently for pandemics and crises. It was planned, of course, something completely different. It's just that the world was already divided, and some of them considered the partition unjust and wanted to correct it, in their own favor, of course (Germany), and whoever grabbed a third of the planet wanted to keep it as it is (France and Britain). Some empires staggered greatly (Austria-Hungary and Ottoman), and some needed to increase grain sales by gaining access to the Mediterranean (Russia).
No one really had serious and vital reasons. There were plans and there were personal ambitions. And according to the plans, everything was fun, never bloody and fast.
Schlieffen plan
The German war plan was based on the axiom that they would have to fight against Russia and France, respectively, on one of the fronts they would have to attack, on the other - to defend. Taking into account the mobilization in Russia, lasting at least a month, and the weakness of the Russian army, it was quite logical to strike the first blow at France, and after its lightning defeat and the capture of Paris, to transfer German troops to the Eastern Front, using a railway network close to ideal.
60 days were allotted for the defeat of France, the main goal was to avoid a positional front. The main blow was through Belgium, bypassing the French fortifications. The plan is ideal and, undoubtedly, is a masterpiece of military thought, if in the end it did not degenerate into a run to the sea and a positional meat grinder. The German General Staff officers did not read the Russian classics:
We thought for a long time, wondered
Topographers wrote everything
On a large sheet. Smoothly written in the paper
Yes, they forgot about the ravines, And walk on them …
And as a result, they ran into the resistance of Belgium, Britain's entry into the war, the beginning of the Russian offensive before the end of the deployment and the miracle on the Marne alternately. Well, the inevitable problems with the management of unprecedented masses of troops and equipment. But, I repeat - the plan among the participants is the best and most realistic, taking into account the defeat of Russia ten years earlier, the catastrophe of France in 1870 and the neutral position of England, in theory it could have come out.
Plan XVII
In general, the first time after the Franco-Prussian War, the French were preparing for defense, powerful fortresses were built, reserves were created, fortress artillery was developed …
But over time, the thread of reality was lost and the young school triumphed. And in the navy, where the sailors believed that the line fleet could be destroyed by numerous light forces. And on land, where General Joffre was a supporter of an offensive along the entire front with a density of 3-5 km per division and a powerful second echelon - a reserve for the first echelon. The main attack was planned for the past Alsace and Lorraine, lost in the war. The humor is that the Germans foresaw this in their plans.
It turned out, again, according to the classics:
We made a noise with a bang, Yes, the reserves did not ripen, Someone has misinterpreted …
On Fedyukhin's heights
There were only three companies of us, And let's go to the shelves!
And only the mistakes of German diplomacy, incorporated in the Schlieffen plan, saved France.
Among all the plans, it was the French that was the most failed and stupid, and it was the French who had the worst in that war, in the military sense, exposing all the shortcomings of their strategy and tactics. But on paper there was a plan - an offensive based on moral superiority, and it seemed to many that it would come out, we would repulse Alsace with Lorraine, and there the Russian steam roller would arrive in time.
Russian plan of 1912
Russia also faced a war on two fronts - against Germany and Austria-Hungary, and with the first there was nothing to divide, but it had to, for the Entente. And the second could be broken, but if not distracted by the first.
To this should be added the fear of decisive action after the shame of the Russo-Japanese and we get a typical Buridan's donkey. The way out in 1912, however, was found "witty" - the main blow was to inflict the forces of four armies on Austria-Hungary, and in the meantime, two armies invaded East Prussia against Germany. Two more armies in the rear - one covering the Baltic coast and the capital, and the second - holding back Romania. Basically, a gamble - if Germany transfers reserves to East Prussia, our two armies are in danger of disaster. And taking into account the personality of the commander of the North-Western Front Zhilinsky and, in fact, two separate operations for the two armies of the front …
The prince said: "Go, Liprandi."
And Liprandi: “No, sir, No, they say, I will not go. You don't need a smart one there, You went there Reada, I'll see …"
Suddenly Read, just take it
And led us straight to the bridge:
"Come on, with a bang."
Then the results are somewhat predictable - the blow against Germany turned into a cauldron, and there was not enough strength to finish off Austria. But it looked more and more pink and optimistic. At least, no specific dates for victory were indicated, the Russo-Japanese War nevertheless gave the generals an inoculation against hats. It is a pity that she did not teach Nicholas and his government anything, just as the first revolution did not teach - as a result of the dragging out of the Russo-Japanese war.
Austria plans
It sounds funny, but the Austrians were also going to attack:
The Austro-Hungarian operational plan envisaged an offensive in the northern direction between the Vistula and Bug rivers, which in the end should have forced the Russians to clear Poland. The striking force was the advancing on Lublin 1st Army, which was supported by the 4th on the right, ledge back. The 3rd Army was required to cover the flank of the 4th from the northeastern direction (from the side of Lutsk), the Keves group covered the eastern direction. After the 1st and 4th achieved success between the Vistula and the Bug, one of them could provide assistance to the 3rd army near Lvov, and the other was to continue pursuit towards Brest.
Moreover, to attack with forces less than the Russians had, and having less mobility, less strength of troops and worse equipment.
In fact, the whole war plan was based on the fact that Russian mobilization would be extremely slow and chaotic, which would allow the Russian army to be beaten in parts as its corps arrived at the front. Do not forget - Austria also faced a war on two fronts, and although Serbia is a small country, but with a strong army and high fighting spirit.
The only real plan in such conditions was just a defense plan based on the Carpathians, but … Politics, patriotism would crack, which was critical for a patchwork monarchy. The two were already holding on to their word of honor, and the surrender of the kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria would be perceived as weakness.
The result is a disaster, fortunately for the Austrians, weakened by Russian planning flaws.
A certain result
Everyone was wrong.
What seemed to the parties to be a small conflict with a maximum duration of six months turned into a long-term nightmare, with a truce for a quarter of a century in the end.
I will say more - we could not help but be mistaken. Even Engels was mistaken, at least in numbers - only 15 million people were in the ranks of the Russian Imperial Army. It is clear that there were fewer people at the front, but …
There was neither the ability to manage such masses, nor the technology and tactics for breaking through the defenses (until the end of the war, the defense would not be broken on the Western Front, on the Eastern, the Brusilov breakthrough did not lead to strategic results), nor the means of developing success.
In the end, there was not even a recipe for a stable world.
A good example for our time, when Europe lives 76 years without war, going through a golden age, and politicians are drawn to rattle with weapons sharpened for the past war and not tested in a big war.
And after all, many people even now think: one has only to knock - and we will have lunch in one capital, and supper in the second. The case when history should teach at least something.
